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**DOCUMENTS
ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF YUGOSLAVIA**

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YUGOSLAVIA – INDONESIA
1945–1967
research and documentation



АРХИВ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ
УСТАНОВА КУЛТУРЕ ОД НАЦИОНАЛНОГ ЗНАЧАЈА

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Belgrade – Jakarta 2015

PREFACE

This book is the result of the cooperation between the Archives of Yugoslavia and the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Serbia and the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (ANRI).

The idea of publishing a book on the Yugoslav-Indonesian relations originated in April 2011 during the First Bilateral Interfaith Dialogue Serbia – Indonesia in the conversation between Serbian historians Prof. Dr Ljubodrag Dimić and Dr Aleksandar Raković and the Ambassador of Indonesia Samuel Samson. The idea was further discussed by the representatives of the Archives of Yugoslavia and the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia and they agreed that it should be the project of inter-archival cooperation.

Thus, the efforts of the three Serbian historians have unified and resulted in a unique monographic publication: *Yugoslavia – Indonesia 1945–1967: research and documentation* in Serbian (Belgrade, 2014) and English language (Belgrade – Jakarta, 2015). English edition of the book was supported by current Ambassador of Indonesia to the Republic of Serbia Harry James Kandou.

The book begins with an introductory study: *Yugoslavia and Indonesia – Tito and Sukarno 1945–1967: Contribution to the History of Non-Alignment*. This introductory study is based on the archival material of the Archives of Yugoslavia in the Fond of the Office of the President of the Republic (AJ, KPR – Arhiv Jugoslavije, Kabinet predsednika Republike) and the archival material of Diplomatic Archives (DA) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (MSP RS – Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije), other documentation, press, foreign and domestic academic literature.

The introductory study is followed by 227 archival documents on the relations of President Tito and President Sukarno, meetings of the statesmen and diplomats of Yugoslavia and Indonesia, Indonesia through the eyes and words of Yugoslav diplomats. Published material covers the period from 1947 to 1967: from the first Yugoslav diplomatic documents on Indonesia (1947) to the first contact between President Suharto and President Tito (1967).

The book is supplemented by a selection of texts about Indonesia published in the daily newspaper *Politika* from 1945 to 1947, short biographies of important persons of Yugoslavia and Indonesia and the index of personal names.

The authors and editors would like to thank the employees of the Diplomatic Archives of MSP RS and Nada Pantelić, archival advisor in the Archives of Yugoslavia, as well as the Association of Serbian-Indonesian Friendship NUSANTARA for their cooperation and assistance in the preparation of this book.

YUGOSLAVIA AND INDONESIA TITO AND SUKARNO 1945–1967

Contribution to the History of Non-Alignment

The landing of the Japanese army in March 1942 was seen as an opportunity to end the centuries of Dutch colonial rule over Indonesian islands (1602-1942) known as the colonial Dutch East Indies. The Japanese occupation administration stirred Indonesian nationalism and initiated the creation of local institutions on the scraps of the Dutch system. In the spring 1942, the Dutch colonial administration was replaced by the Japanese military command. The entire system of government was changed resulting in confusion and disorder. To re-establish the order in Indonesia, the Japanese resorted to strict discipline and punishments. The military measures also included a legitimate takeover of oil sources, means of transport and food supplies for Japanese needs. Consequently, the anger of Indonesians against the Japanese grew. After the capitulation of Japan (August 15, 1945), the nationalist leaders led by Sukarno declared independence on August 17, 1945.¹

According to the Constitution of Indonesia (1945), this country was founded on the philosophy of Pancasila – the five interconnecting principles: 1. Belief in the one and only God; 2. Just and civilised humanity; 3. The unity of Indonesia; 4. Democracy led by wisdom of deliberations among representatives; 5. Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.² Pancasila became the national ideology that was supposed to bring together numerous ethnic, tribal, religious, and geographical differences in the wide archipelago of Indonesia (1,027 ethnic groups, more than 13,000 islands).³ Despite the fact that Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world (more than 80% of the citizens belong to Mohammedan religion) it has never been a theocratic state. Pancasila included the recog-

¹ Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, Cambridge 2005, 85–87, 92–95

² <http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/about/pdf/IndonesianConstitution.pdf>.

³ I Made Titib, speech at the First Interfaith Dialogue Serbia – Indonesia, Belgrade, April 7, 2011. Published in: 1st Indonesia-Serbia Bilateral Interfaith Dialogue, Belgrade 2011, 37–42.

nized religions of Indonesia: Islam, Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism.⁴

After the capitulation of Japan, Great Britain and the United States started taking over the Indonesian islands. Japan was obliged to maintain peace and order in Indonesia in order to re-establish the Dutch government. After the British and Dutch military actions in Surabaya and Jakarta (1945) Sukarno's government withdrew to Yogyakarta from where he urged other Indonesian islands to join the fight for freedom. However, in July and August 1947, two Dutch offensives reduced the territory held by the Indonesian revolutionary government to Java and Sumatra enclaves. At the same time, the Indonesian army and Muslim militias fought against the left-wing coalition led by the Communists. In 1949, Islamists started a guerrilla war against the forces of the Republic of Indonesia in Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Aceh (Sumatra).⁵

In 1947, the Dutch military actions violated the Linggadjati Agreement signed in November 1946, by which it recognized the republican government of Indonesia in Java, Sumatra and Madura, which would then lead to the creation of the United States of Indonesia.⁶

The Conflict of Indonesian government with the Communists assured the United States of America that the Dutch accusations about the communist character of the Indonesian Revolution were unfounded. The Dutch further betrayed the Americans when in December 1948 they broke the achievements of several US peace initiatives. Despite the fact that the Dutch captured president Sukarno in Yogyakarta, Vice President Mohammad Hatta and Prime Minister Syahrir, the revolutionaries continued guerrilla war that ended in a truce on May 7, 1949, or peace on August 1, 1949. On December 27, 1949 The Dutch recognized the sovereignty of federal Indonesia and on August 17, 1950 the Indonesian government declared the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.⁷

From the very beginning, the great powers opposed their interests in Indonesia to introduce the newly established state into their ideological block. It should be borne in mind that the leaders of the Indonesian revolution, regardless of whether they were Communists or even anti-Communists, saw the Soviet revolution as a model for the liberation of oppressed people. At the first session of United Nations, the Soviets supported the Indonesians in efforts to achieve indepen-

⁴ Aleksandar Raković, „Interfaith dialog between Serbia and Indonesia (2011), positive experience in the state politics of the Republic of Serbia“, *Law, Religion, Culture: Interfaith Dialog between Serbia and Indonesia*, Belgrade 2012, 192–193.

⁵ A. Vickers, *ibid.*, 97–120.

⁶ M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200*, Basingstoke 2001, 275.

⁷ A. Vickers, *ibid.*, 110–115.

dence. On the other hand, the Soviet Union in 1948 approved the armed rebellion of the Indonesian Communist against the government in Jakarta. Furthermore, the Soviets supported the Jakarta against the rebels in 1958 and provided military and political support in annexation of Western Irian in early sixties and were on the side of Indonesian politics in dispute with Malaysia in 1963.⁸

During the fifties, the Americans did not believe private statements of Indonesian politicians to be Western-oriented while their acts inclined to neutrality. They asked Indonesia to tightly align with the United States and renounce the neutrality. When Jakarta refused to do so, the United States refused to provide military and economic aid. Therefore, Indonesia, due to the rigid attitude of the US, turned towards the state that did not raise such demands – the Soviet Union.⁹

Indonesia was deemed to be the leader in the Asian-African world and therefore convened the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955, which was a major diplomatic event. In fact, this conference was announced during the meeting of the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia in Colombo during April and May 1954. After the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Sukarno committed himself to make Indonesia the world leader.¹⁰ Sukarno's opinion that the fight against imperialism is the most important aim of Indonesian national policy corresponded to the opinion of the communist leader Aidit making the stands of nationalists and communists much closer.¹¹

Sukarno's attitudes and the criticisms of his authoritarian government (a concept known as "Guided Democracy") allied the United States, some right-wing officers of the Indonesian army, the leaders of the Socialist Party of Indonesia and the Muslim Masyumi party in an attempt to remove Sukarno from power. The unsuccessful assassination attempt against Sukarno in 1957 was organized by the officers and the leaders of Masyumi party who also organized a mutiny (1958). The mutiny was supported by the CIA. Sukarno's government suppressed the mutiny and banned the operation of the Socialist Party of Indonesia and Masyumi Party (1960).¹² Some rebels found shelter in Malaya, which was the basis for the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia in the early sixties.¹³

⁸ Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence from Sukarno to Soeharto*, Jakarta 2007, 83–85.

⁹ Andrew Roadnight, *United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years*, New York 2002, 183.

¹⁰ M. C. Ricklefs, *ibid.*, 301–302.

¹¹ Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959–1965*, Jakarta 2006, 175–176.

¹² A. Vickers, *ibid.* 140–145.

¹³ Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the*

In addition to the foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, the United States and the Asian-African countries, equally important was Indonesian policy towards China and the Chinese minority in Indonesia. The Indonesians felt animosity towards the local Chinese in the Dutch colonial period, as the Chinese, who had the economic power were much more favoured. Until 1953, the relations between Indonesia and China were cold because the official Jakarta feared the influence of Beijing on the Chinese minority in Indonesia. The attendance of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955 led to the warming of relations between the two countries. Later on, China supported the Indonesian aspirations towards Western Irian and its fight against rebels in the country (1958). However, the relations between the two countries worsened when, in 1959, the Chinese in Indonesia were forbidden to trade in rural areas.¹⁴ However, these measures to support domestic production in the rural parts of Indonesia were not directed only against the Chinese, but also against the Dutch and other European countries. These moves, as well as the nationalization of Dutch properties, led to the emigration of about 100,000 Chinese towards China and Singapore and the departure of the Dutch and Europeans to Australia.¹⁵

At the First Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade (1961) Sukarno announced that Indonesia could enter into a military confrontation with the Netherlands around West Irian. Unlike Tito and Nehru who believed that the Non-Aligned should avoid conflicts and insist on peaceful solutions, Sukarno underlined that the leftovers of imperialism should be eliminated by force. Since the Non-Aligned did not support a military action in the West Irian, the support arrived from the Soviet Union. Indonesia judged Yugoslavia for not supporting its military pretensions towards the West Irian. This established an anti-Yugoslav attitude of the Communist Party of Indonesia, which considered Tito a pro-Western statesman, and the communism in Yugoslavia treacherous.¹⁶ On the other hand, Yugoslavia, which advocated peaceful solutions, supported diplomatic demands of Indonesia concerning the West Irian and Malaysia in the United Nations.¹⁷

In August 1960, Indonesia suspended diplomatic relations with the Netherlands because of a dispute over West Irian. In 1961 newly elected US President John F. Kennedy noted the Indonesian turn towards the Soviets. He advocated

United States and the Creation of Malaysia, Cambridge 2001, 127.

¹⁴ F. B. Weinstein, *ibid.* 89–91.

¹⁵ A. Vickers, *ibid.* 145, 152.

¹⁶ R. Mortimer, *ibid.*, 178–179, 184–185, 191

¹⁷ Jovan Čavoški, „Sukarno between Mao and Tito: Indonesia, Yugoslavia and the People’s Republic of China 1955–1965“, the lecture was organized by the Association of Serbian-Indonesian Friendship "Nusantara" in the Belgrade City Library on December 28, 2012.

the creation of self-government in the West Irian and partly met Indonesia's demand in order to separate it from the communist bloc. The conflicts between Indonesian and Dutch forces made the United States propose a new peace settlement which was in favour of Indonesia. Under the settlement, the United Nations took over West Irian on October 1, 1962 and handed it over to Indonesia on May, 1963. Indonesia was obliged to organize a referendum on the status of West Irian no later than 1969. The military and political successes in the West Irian made Indonesia believe it became a real leader of the Asian-African world. Kennedy, however, hoped that the American mediation could bring Indonesia closer to the West and sent experts to Jakarta to explore the opportunities for providing economic help.¹⁸

In the early sixties (and earlier) Indonesians had low wages and rising inflation. At that moment, the public sector employed 807,000 people, and the army engaged about 200,000 men. The population of Indonesia was constantly increasing. There were 77.2 million Indonesians in 1950, compared to 85.4 million in 1955, and almost 97 million in 1961. In 1930 only 3.8% of the population lived in the cities, and in 1961 the urban population was 14.8%. In 1945 Jakarta had a little less than one million inhabitants, and this number doubled by 1955 and increased to nearly 3 million people in 1961. By 1961 only Surabaya and Bandung still had about one million inhabitants; Semarang, Medan and Palembang, about half a million. Cities have become the centre of social life and political activities and villages were more and more neglected. On the other hand, education was given most of the attention. While in 1930 only 7.4% of adult Indonesians were literate, in 1961 almost 76% of under aged males gained literacy schools and universities rose all over Indonesia.¹⁹

In the first half of the sixties, despite the economic problems, any kind of help from the West was considered as a possible loss of independence. Although the economy was in crisis, Sukarno tried to convince the Indonesians that full state independence was possible only through confrontation with the imperialist countries. The opponents objected that he led the country away from the rapid economic development. They felt that Sukarno's cooperation with the Communist Party of Indonesia was to be blamed for the isolation of the West.²⁰

This cooperation brought Indonesia closer to China.²¹ It was then that a radical anti-imperialist alliance of Indonesia and China was created.²² In the first

¹⁸ R. Mortimer, *ibid.*, 186–194, 205–206.

¹⁹ M. C. Ricklefs, *ibid.*, 290–292.

²⁰ F. B. Weinstein, *ibid.*, 31–33.

²¹ R. Mortimer, *ibid.*, 186.

²² J. Čavoški, *ibid.*

half of the sixties the Communist Party of Indonesia accepted financial help from the official Beijing. The China's support to communist revolutionaries in Southeast Asia aroused the suspicion of Indonesian opposition.²³

The new opportunity for confrontation between Indonesia and the West came in 1963 when Sukarno opposed the creation of a united Malaysia, which would include Malaya and former British colonial possessions in Singapore and north Borneo. Sukarno believed Malaya, Singapore and the northern parts of Borneo should be part of a united Indonesia. Therefore, there was an armed conflict between Indonesia on one hand and Malaysia and Britain on the other. British properties in Indonesia were nationalized. American oil companies were allowed to remain in Indonesia.²⁴ Nevertheless, Sukarno's attitude to Malaysia degraded the relations between Indonesian and America once more.²⁵

The greatest support was provided by China, which was against the formation of Malaysia, another pro-Western country in the region such as Thailand, South Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan. Despite the fact that Indonesia was also supported by the Soviets, the Chinese did not want to further increase Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. The Communist Party of Indonesia aligned with the interests of China. When it comes to the Indonesian-Malaysian dispute, three great powers crossed the spears: China and the Soviet Union, which supported Indonesia and the United States which supported Malaysia and Great Britain. During 1964, the Indonesians fought against Malaysian-British coalition in Malaya and in the area of northern Borneo. When, in 1965 Malaysia became a member of the Security Council, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations. Thus, it got closer to China but also drifted away from the Asian-African countries.²⁶ Indonesia and Malaysia, the two countries with population of identical or very similar origin, continued a separate existence in the post-colonial period.²⁷

Sukarno's dependence on China cost him too much, as much as the alliance of his National Party of Indonesia with Aidit's Communist Party of Indonesia. In 1965 there was a rumour that the members of the communist paramilitary formations were trained on hidden locations. The group of military officers of communist orientation "30th September" liquidated seven Indonesian generals on October 1, 1965. In response, General Suharto introduced order in the capital and accused the Communist Party of Indonesia for organizing the coup. Mass actions

²³ Franklin B. Weinstein, *ibid.*, 91–92.

²⁴ A. Vickers, *ibid.*, 149–150.

²⁵ F. B. Weinstein, *ibid.*, 74.

²⁶ M. C. Ricklefs, *ibid.*, 330–336.

²⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia–Malaysia Relations: One kin, two nations*, New York 2005, 2

against the Communists were organized all around Indonesia taking five hundred thousand to a million lives. A communist leader Aidit was killed. In 1965, General Suharto prevented Indonesia from becoming a communist country. Since then, he was considered to be the patron against the Indonesian Communists. Suharto took over the presidency in March 1967.²⁸

Although the Chinese weapons were smuggled to Indonesia, there was no evidence that China participated in the coup attempt in 1965 and that the Chinese Communist leaders knew about the coup.²⁹ The image of Communists' subversive activities and aggressive China was created on biased opinion, so in 1967 the Suharto's government suspended diplomatic relations with this country.³⁰ The foreign policy of Indonesia under Suharto made a turn towards the West.³¹ A great new chapter in the history of Indonesia was opened and lasted from 1967 to 1998 – three decades of Suharto government.

What was the Yugoslav opinion of Indonesia, its politics, economy, social life and leaders during the fifties and sixties of the 20th century?

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In April 1956, the Yugoslav Charge d'Affairs in Jakarta reported about Sukarno planning to visit the United States, some Asian and African countries and Italy. Josip Broz Tito wrote: "I think it would be a good idea to invite him as a guest to visit our country".³²

Diplomatic correspondence and protocol discussions showed that there was a high awareness of "the importance of the visit for both sides," and "its importance at the international level."³³ The moment when the visit was organized, and the first meeting of Josip Broz Tito and Sukarno coincided with the maturing of the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation. Sukarno's visit to Belgrade³⁴ was preceded by a meeting of Josip Broz Tito and Nikita Sergejevich

²⁸ Helen-Louise Hunter, *Sukarno and the Indonesian Coup: The Untold Story*, Westport 2007, 2–3; A. Vickers, *ibid.*, 152–160.

²⁹ R. Mortimer, *ibid.*, 423.

³⁰ F. B. Weinstein, *ibid.*, 28, 91–94.

³¹ Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order*, London 1998, 46.

³² The Archives of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije – hereinafter referred to as AJ), Cabinet of the President of the Republic (Kabinet Predsednika Republike – hereinafter referred to as KPR), I-3-a/39–5, Possible visit of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno to our country.

³³ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39–5.

³⁴ Yugoslav-Indonesian political talks were held in Belgrade from September 13 to 17, 1956.

Khrushchev in Moscow,³⁵ suppression of the workers' revolt in Poznan,³⁶ meeting of the heads of "non-aligned countries" Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Jawaharlal Nehru in Brioni,³⁷ the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal and the outbreak of the Suez crisis.³⁸ In such circumstances, Sukarno was a valuable co-speaker. The meeting marked a new, higher stage in existing relations. Belgrade had a positive attitude towards every step of Indonesia's foreign policy "that contributed to the independence of their country." Thanks to the active correspondence, diplomatic reports and analyses performed at the Foreign Ministry, the state leadership was familiar with the history of Indonesian struggle for independence and its economy, political system, religious politics (Constitution of August 18, 1950 guaranteed religious freedom for all citizens).³⁹

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The new form of Yugoslav foreign policy, the policy of "peaceful and active coexistence," was influenced by several factors: an authentic revolution performed in Yugoslavia during the years of the World War II in the strategic environment largely determined the independent foreign policy of the country; negative experience with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries; the political pressures of the West; also, the cooperation with the Asian-African countries, i.e. exploring the new world emerging from the anti-colonial revolutions, existing beyond Europe, having similar problems to those of Yugoslavia, and striving to level up on the scale of global political power.

³⁵ Yugoslav state and party delegation was visiting the Soviet Union from June 1 to 23, 1956. There were four meetings between Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev and Josip Broz Tito. Tito returned from Moscow with a signed "Declaration on inter-party relations of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." This document marked the inter-party reconciliation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Communist Party, confirming the existence of "different ways of building socialism" and stressed that cooperation between the socialist countries and workers' parties must be on a voluntary basis, equality and exchange of the opinion. On returning to the homeland, the Yugoslav state and party delegation stayed in Romania from June 23 to 26, 1956. The dialogue between Gheorghiu-Dej and Josip Broz Tito was devoted to the normalization of relations between the two countries and parties.

³⁶ The Polish Workers' Uprising was suppressed in Poznan on June 28, 1956 bringing Vladislav Gomulka back to power on October 21, 1956

³⁷ On July 18 and 19, 1956 Tito, Nehru and Nasser met in Brioni to discuss the implementation of the policy of peaceful and active coexistence, eliminating the causes of war in the world, disarmament, aid to developing countries. On that occasion Brioni Declaration (the "Joint Statement") was signed confirming the principles adopted at the Bandung Conference (April 1955) and emphasizing the non-bloc and non-alignment policy.

³⁸ Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956.

³⁹ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39-5, Indonesia, September 1, 1956.

The foundation of a new political orientation lay in the process of decolonization and the attempt to overcome underdevelopment whose proportions became apparent during the process of “decolonization”. Anti-colonial revolutions enabled the cooperation among the newly formed states and made the Non-Aligned Movement possible. They gave birth to independent foreign policy orientation which was outgrown by the need for a regional gathering with the aim of joint political and economic performance. It was further upgraded by universal problem of poverty and underdevelopment which had to be solved and the perspectives that were supposed to be “won” for millions of masses which, in the previous centuries, were put on the margins of the world history. The situation of underdevelopment placed the question of the model of development before the leaders of anti-colonial revolutions. In such circumstances, the new Yugoslav foreign policy was a response to the basic features of international relations: ideological blocs, bloc division of the world and “power politics”. Avoiding alignment with the blocs was the most striking feature of the policy of Yugoslavia, but also of many countries which were “born” in the anti-colonial revolutions.⁴⁰ The need for radical change of the existing international relations determined by the bloc division of the world, uneven economic development, war and nuclear threats, were the reasons that brought Yugoslavia and Indonesia closer together in 1956.

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“The opening of the perspectives” in cooperation between Yugoslavia and Indonesia can be traced through “several phases” and “several lines”. Yugoslav public was not unfamiliar with Indonesia and the circumstances in this distant land. Immediately after the liberation of Belgrade and Serbia from Nazi occupation, press started reporting on the activities of the colonial powers, including the Netherlands.⁴¹ The first news on Indonesia and the activities of anti-colonial movements appeared in the press in October 1945. Thus, the Yugoslav readers learned about: the conflicts in Batavia, the protest of the United States because the

⁴⁰ More on this: L. Mates, *Non-alignment. The contemporary theory and practice*, Belgrade 1970; L. Mates, *International Relations of Socialist Yugoslavia*, Belgrade 1976; O. Bogetic, D. Bogetic, *Origin and Development of the Non-Aligned Movement*, Belgrade 1981; D. Bogetic, *The Roots of Yugoslav Orientation towards Non-Alignment*, Belgrade 1990; D. Bogetic, *New Strategy of the Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia 1956-1961*, Belgrade 2006; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, Belgrade 2008; D. Bogetic, Lj. Dimic *Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (September 1 to 6, 1961): Contribution to the history of the Third World*, Belgrade, 2013

⁴¹ Belgrade was liberated on October 20, 1944; in early January 1945 the press delivered the first news about the Conference of the Pacific, which gathered the old colonial powers, including the Netherlands.

British were using weapons donated by the United States in Indonesia, decisions and the importance of the Conference of the Colonial Peoples in London, the actions of the Indonesian army, the declaration of the war against the Netherlands etc.⁴² The protests against every form of colonialism and the requirements for full freedom were in line with the foreign policy of the Yugoslav communists. The above information created an image of colonialism and its violent nature in the public. In this context, Indonesia represented an essential component and empirical sample for studying an important and universal phenomenon for the Yugoslav communists – colonialism.

What were the contents that influenced the Yugoslav reader's opinion?

The agency news dominated. They were loaded with terrors and crimes of colonial states. The resistance of anti-colonial movements was considered legitimate. Yugoslav public learned the names of Indonesian islands, provinces, and cities (Batavia, Surabaya, Bandung etc.) which were in the centre of conflicts. Figures such as Sukarno, Hatta and Syahrir became close to a Yugoslav reader. Each piece of information was filled with ideology. Agency news were coming from Soviet sources (mostly Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, press, radio service). Before 1947, most present were military information contents. After that, the press began to publish the information of military and political character from the spot, the news from the United Nations (UN) and the contents of the anti-war and anti-colonial protests in London, Washington and Amsterdam. The image was suggestive and ideologically coloured showing the immorality of wars fought by the colonial states. It brought to light the "humanity" and "progress" in the name of which the ruthless exploitation was done. Indirectly, it suggested that the wealth of individual European states was based on colonial exploitation. It became clear that the "legitimacy" of the metropolis was based on force and the rebellion (anticolonial revolution) and the armed struggle was the only alternative that could change the world. After 1948 and the conflict of Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Cominform, the source of information changed but the contents published by the press were the same. Basically, until the beginning of 1950, the Yugoslav politics functioned in the matrix of Soviet views on Southeast Asia. Starting from the mid-1951, part of the information on Indonesia arrived over Tanjug (Telegraphic Agency of New Yugoslavia) correspondent services in India.⁴³ Since that time, the Yugoslav press had begun to write analytically about the problems of Asian countries and Indonesia, which was a sign of greater political interest in this area.

⁴² The above information was provided by Belgrade press, primarily the daily newspaper *Politika* in October 1945.

⁴³ Tanjug's correspondent centre in Jakarta was established in June 1959.

Starting from 1947, the news received through the media was fulfilled by the news received through diplomatic channels in The Hague, London, Sydney, Washington, New York and Moscow. From that moment, Yugoslav diplomatic service tried to get to know and analytically examine the process of resolving “the Indonesian issue”.⁴⁴ The first reports coming from the capitals of Europe to Belgrade pointed out to a complex and difficult situation, filled with armed conflicts provoked by the Dutch armed troops. Yugoslav diplomats draw attention to the fact that Indonesia was “literally blocked” by the Dutch navy and unable to trade with foreign countries which was of vital importance for the country. There were divisions in the political life around the question of the continuation of struggle by armed or diplomatic means, nationalization of foreign capital and the fate of foreign interests, notions of nationalism and democracy, attitude towards imperialism and revolution, ties with the former metropolis, colonial powers, the socialist countries (primarily China), and neighbouring territories. The activities of Yugoslav diplomats, when it comes to reliable information on Indonesia, were partly conditioned by negotiations and signing of the Linggadjati Agreement (the agreement was initialled on November 15, 1946 and was finally signed on March 27, 1947) and, later on, Renville Agreement (January 17, 1948). On March 18, 1947, the mission of the Netherlands informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on the substance of the Linggadjati Agreement.⁴⁵ At the same time,

⁴⁴ The first reports on Indonesia arriving to Belgrade included information on Indonesian territories, the political composition of the provisional government, constitutional circumstances, internal political conflicts, personalities that were at the forefront of the country and individual parties.

⁴⁵ According to the agreement, the Dutch government recognized *de facto* government of the Republic of the Indonesian islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura, “if these areas were not occupied by allied or Dutch troops”. Both governments promised to cooperate in the establishment of “a sovereign democratic state on a federal basis, which would be called United States of Indonesia” and which would include all Indonesian territories. The member states of the United States would be the Republic of Indonesia, Borneo and the Grand Orient. The governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia “in order to improve the common interest” also agreed to cooperate in the establishment of the Dutch-Indonesian Union formed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the Netherlands, Surinam, Curaçao) and the United States of Indonesia. The agreement also defined the common interests among which we should emphasize the following: cooperation in terms of international relations, defence, finance and all issues of economic and cultural character; The King or the Queen would be the head of the Union and the Union authorities would publish and proclaim decrees and decisions on their behalf; The Constitution of the Dutch-Indonesian Union would include the following provisions – on both sides of the protection of the rights and guarantees in respect of the execution of obligations, provisions on assistance that the Netherlands should give Indonesia if it were not or not sufficiently equipped and organized, security in both regions of human rights and freedoms as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. The Union was supposed to be organized before January 1, 1949. In the event that there were different interpretations of the agreement, it provided for termination. The agreement provided for

Ambassador Vladimir Popović reported from Moscow that “The Dutch government was not fulfilling its obligations under the agreement but also brought new military units to suppress the national movement”.⁴⁶ At the request of Belgrade, Moscow provided the first diplomatic information about Sukarno. It said that the President of the Republic of Indonesian was an engineer by profession, that during the Japanese occupation he participated in “autonomous government” created by the Japanese, that he was “an opportunist and an opponent of the use of force in the process of winning independence.” The report of a Yugoslav diplomat showed that the diplomatic circles in Moscow did not have enough valid data on Indonesia at that time.⁴⁷

The information coming from London was much more comprehensive and more precise. Yugoslav diplomats marked the situation in Indonesia as “complicated” and the relations between Netherlands and Indonesia “unclear”. In London, they reported on continuous armed conflicts. The embassy reported that “The Netherlands was introducing new troops” and “Indonesia was arming and preparing a large number of its population for guerrilla fights.” Yugoslav diplomats from London noted that “the Dutch side” acted “provokingly” and “spread its expansionist aims,” that Indonesia was “literally blocked” by the Dutch navy and unable to export “food and tires,” that it was due to the economic blockade and military intervention that the government of Indonesia was “in a difficult position.”⁴⁸ But despite the “war circumstances” Ambassador Ljubo Leontić insisted in his reports that the Indonesian government was building its army, reinforcing political powers, introducing a “far-reaching measures to build the country.”

the United States of Indonesia to request the admission into the UN only after the Union had been established. The agreement insisted on democratic principles regarding the election of political representatives. Until the establishment of the United States of Indonesia and Dutch-Indonesian Union “Royal Dutch government was supposed to remain exclusively and solely responsible for all international relations.” The Netherlands expressed willingness to receive “a number of Indonesian officials” to “the foreign ministry” – Arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia – hereinafter referred to as A MSP RS) Political Archive (PA), 1947, F-124, doc. 12, sig. 47326, April 18, 1947, Note no. 1024.

⁴⁶ A MSP RS, Political Archive (PA), 1947, F-124, doc. 12, sig. 46768, April 14, 1947

⁴⁷ Vladimir Popović reported from Moscow: “We do not know about the composition of the other governments or about the party affiliation of the government members. The strongest parliamentary groups are the Peasant Party, the Labour Party and the KP. Other groups and parties are less significant. All groups support the government that also has a strong support from trade unions, youth and women’s organizations.” – A MSP RS, Political Archives, 1947, F-124, doc. 12, sig. 46768, April 14, 1947.

⁴⁸ The diplomatic reports emphasized that the Netherlands unilaterally declared the regulation by which Indonesia “was not able to export products that were grown on the property of foreigners”.

It was noted that President Sukarno and the government had “leadership in their hands” and that there was a conflict between the president and parliament primarily because “the President was making decisions without the approval of Parliament.” The analysis of the political life of Indonesia showed that there were several parties and fractions. Among them, special attention was paid to the National Party of Indonesia, which brought together most of the intelligentsia, merchants, civil servants, bureaucrats and those whose platform was “social democratic nationalism”. One of the parties rooted among Muslim believers was Masyumi parties. The number of the members of the Communist Party of Indonesia was not known to Yugoslav diplomats in London but it was the fact that there were 35 MPs in the Parliament. Youth wing of the Communist Party of Indonesia was of the opinion that “nationalist democratic revolution in Indonesia was the part of the Marxist proletarian revolution,” but that in the given circumstances Linggadjati Agreement should be applied (because further extension of the struggle would lead to “imperialist intervention”), and “economically build a country and unite other countries and islands with the republic.” London did not know much about the leading personalities of Indonesia. The government was said to be in the hands of socialists and a few nationalists, supported by the leftists and having “nationalist and Muslim parties” as the opposition.⁴⁹

In April 1947, Yugoslav diplomats from Australia also reported on Indonesia. They thought that the situation in that country was insufficiently known to the world public, and that Indonesia was a very important element in international relations, especially in the Pacific. The outcome of the conflict in Indonesia, according to them, was directly dependent on the fate of the Netherlands in Europe. The reports from Sydney contained information about the population, the national movement, political parties and national programs. Sukarno was presented as a “bourgeois nationalists”, a politician who often spoke about socialism and collectivism, democracy and independence, freedom and justice. Judging by the report, the Dutch did not intend to withdraw from Indonesia, but were actually increasing the troops (from 90,000 to 150,000 troops). This was considered as a major threat to Indonesia. The unwillingness of the authorities to resolutely oppose the penetration of old colonial structures to the economic life of Indonesia was marked equally dangerous. The Yugoslav diplomats also reported on seven “front-lines” where, from time to time, Indonesian military units were fighting the opponents of government supported from abroad.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ A MSP RS, Political Department, 1947, F-124, doc. 12, sig. 46768, April 14, 1947.

⁵⁰ To make the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia better understand the situation in Indonesia, the Consulate in Sydney sent a transcript of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, a transcript of the Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands, several publications (5) about Indonesia, the Constitution of the trade union movement and more.

A few months later, looking at the situation in the former European colonies in Asia, the Yugoslav diplomats perceived the similarity among the events in India, Burma, Indonesia (armed interventions, economic blockade, political pressures), which led them to the conclusion that it was a policy of the former colonial power which strived “to prevent or localize national liberation movements in the Far East”. They did not oversee the “interest” of Great Britain to be present “in every place” and to “balance” between “direct action and mediation policy.” This was followed by the assessment that “the British imperialism”, applied in Indonesia “on behalf of the Netherlands”, “lost its inner strength and was forced to enter into a compromise.” Yugoslav diplomats estimated that it was an attempt of London to stop the process of disintegration of its colonial empire and reduce it to merging “imperial properties to the dominions of the British community.” The haste with which this was done was explained by the fact that the movements for independence inclined not only towards the former metropolis (in case of Indonesia towards the Netherlands and Great Britain), but also towards those social forces in emerging countries that, regardless of their political course, continued to strive to maintain the presence of former colonial powers in the old territories. Another reason for the “haste”, according to the estimates of Yugoslav diplomats, was the fear of internationalization of colonial issues which seized the “privileged position” from the ancient metropolis in reaching “solutions” related to its former colonies. It was assessed that the British were interested to include Indonesia in “so-called The Dutch Union”, and through it in the economic and political system of “British community” which guaranteed the survival of the European colonial powers and the protection of their interests in the Far East.⁵¹ These reasons were used to explain the British military engagement in Indonesia in 1945 and 1946 as well as its continued diplomatic and political presence in the territory of this state. British mediation in the negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia most directly determined the nature of the Linggadjati Agreement in. But the British and the Dutch, after the end of World War II, were no longer the only interested parties there. The geostrategic position of Indonesia, which “cuts” the foundation “of the whole imperialist system in the Far East”, inevitably influenced the United States to join the already present colonial powers. China’s interest in this area was traditional, except that the new China had its ideological ambitions. India was also interested and willing to impose their lead. The Soviet Union also counted on Indonesia and its impact. In the opinion

The above literature, according to the consul, provided major ideological and political weakness of the national movement of Indonesia.

⁵¹ When it comes to Indonesia, Yugoslav diplomats thought that London wanted Indonesia to become a part of the Union with the Netherlands and thus “avoid” the influence of India on one hand and the United States on the other hand.

of the Yugoslav diplomats, Independent and rich Indonesia suited to neither of these non-Asian countries and Asian “giants”.⁵²

Yugoslav diplomacy carefully monitored all the activities of Great Britain and the Netherlands in Indonesia. They were particularly concerned about the tendency of the Dutch authorities to combine any possible “misunderstanding” or difficulty in negotiations with military actions, and to justify any war performance as “police measures” undertaken to ensure peace and order in Indonesia. It was observed very early that the colonial policy of Great Britain was implemented regardless of the official government policy and that the measures taken were later approved or rejected by the government in accordance with the achieved goals and international reactions. The reports arriving from London showed that the “conservative circles” in the Netherlands were unable to adapt to the changes that the war and post-war time imposed to the colonial powers in the Far East. Only formal acceptance of partnership and equality with Indonesia, an insistence on the control of exploitation of the former colonial possessions, ruling the market, and the use of force (the army of about 100,000 soldiers was engaged) – all these were planned activities that aimed to ensure the interpretation and application of the Linggadjati Agreement. The representatives of the Yugoslav embassy in London thought that without the strong US support there would be no engagement of The Hague in the war in Indonesia. Along with that they noticed that Great Britain was losing its influence in The Hague, causing the impotence and anger of London, that Washington was becoming a political entity that controlled events in the Far East.⁵³ Particularly important for Belgrade was the observation that “the spirit of the new Asia” was no longer willing to tolerate the “humiliation of the West”, that India was becoming “the centre” of liberation movements. The European intervention in the Asian territory was seen as “an insult to the entire Asia”.⁵⁴

By “comparing” diplomatic information and agency news, Yugoslav politicians not only got the “picture” of Indonesia and its importance, but also acqui-

⁵² A MSP RS, DA, PA, 1947, f-124, doc. 12, no. 418364. In addition to military interventions in 1945 and 1946, which “kept” the presence of the Dutch in Indonesia, the government of Great Britain was arming the Dutch occupation authorities (in the conflicts of the 1947 British Ministry of War Transport armed 62,000 Dutch soldiers) and training the Dutch soldiers. The centre of subversive activities towards Indonesia was Singapore. The efforts of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to limit the subversive activities of the Netherlands and Great Britain in Indonesia and to internationalize the issue were rejected in the UN Security Council.

⁵³ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1947, f-124, doc. 12, no. 418364. – By supporting The Hague, Washington was, at the same time, economically blackmailing Jakarta declaring that it would approve loans only when it had accepted “all the Dutch proposals”, which, among other things, were made “in the interest of peace and public order.”

⁵⁴ These were the statements of Nehru’s sister.

red important information that would, subsequently, most directly influence the shaping of the Yugoslav foreign policy orientation. Collected information showed that Indonesia was: a very important country in international relations in the Pacific and Asia, but also in Europe; country that most directly “determined” the fate of the Netherlands in Europe; the space where the power of the great powers was measured; a country where European colonialism was forced to compromise with local political forces which was a sure sign that it had lost its old strength and started wavering; a country where there was a tendency to stop “disintegration” of the colonial empires by “merging” the newly established countries in the framework of new forms of colonial exploitation; a country whose “independence” threatened Western interests in the Pacific and which “cut” across the entire foundation of the imperial system in the Far East; a state whose resistance to imperial and colonial powers clearly showed that it was not the “house of cards” but a political entity that was to be asked for a lot of things in the future. The acquired knowledge undoubtedly showed that in October 1947 the Yugoslav state and party leadership, despite the fact that it faithfully followed the pattern of Soviet foreign policy, reached its own notion about the essence “of Indonesian issues.” It was clear that it was an international problem with “crossed and conflicting interests” and that it could only be resolved as such. While studying Indonesia, Yugoslav diplomacy was able to perceive the face of Dutch colonialism and neo-colonialism, economic importance of Indonesia in the policy, the willingness of the metropolises to resort to force, to ignore the biased solutions offered by the UN Security Council, avoid commitments, threaten the world peace by war campaigns, deny the key principles on which international law rested. Taking Indonesia as an example, Yugoslav diplomats were able to clearly perceive selfish interests of great powers fighting for the territory to control, but also to become better acquainted with the “mechanisms” of institutions (UN) and the bodies (the Security Council) where world politics were led and strength and power measured, the influence of ideological and political fronts of Cold War.

Yugoslav “view” of Indonesia and “Indonesian issue” from 1945 to 1949 was completely incorporated in Moscow policy framework. Yugoslav diplomacy followed the Soviet policy, but also gathered information and conducted the first independent analysis. This characteristic of Yugoslav diplomacy was the result of an authentic revolution carried out in the strategic environment, leading to the perception of the shades that evaded to diplomats of other countries of “communist bloc” and deviated from the Soviet foreign policy “course.” The sharpening of the “view” most directly contributed to the experience in diplomatic affairs and assembled knowledge of international relations.⁵⁵ It can be concluded that in

⁵⁵ Ideologically blinded by the conflict with the West, with no experience in world politics and having insufficient information about the events in Indonesia, Belgrade interpreted the

the first years after the World War II Yugoslavia did not have an independent foreign policy views of Indonesia, but did have a 'view' of Indonesia. As such, its policy was functioning in the matrix of Soviet views on Southeast Asia and interests which Moscow tried to realize in that territory.

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First official contacts between Yugoslav and Indonesian diplomatic representatives, at the initiative of the Indonesian side, came at a very delicate moment for both countries. On the beginning of February 1948, Yugoslav Ambassador Darko Černež sent a telegraph to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade reporting that he was informed by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Indonesian Information Service in Prague Suripno that by the act of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno of January 13, 1948 he was appointed an envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union with headquarters in Prague. Ambassador Černež forwarded this information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade asking for "directives" how to act in the future in contact with the Indonesian side.⁵⁶ Moscow was asked for the confirmation of the news coming from Prague. When asked by the Yugoslav ambassador Vladimir Popović on February 22, 1948, "about the intentions of the Indonesian government to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR," Andrey Vyshinsky answered that Moscow received no news from its diplomatic representatives in Prague. Such a response was probably the result of a distrust the Soviet political leadership had towards Yugoslavia and its foreign policy. Meanwhile, as the time went on, and there were no instructions from Belgrade, on February 24, 1948 Ambassador Černež, in consultation with Soviet diplomatic representative in Prague Zorin, learned that the Soviet side officially received Suripno, so he did the same. Reporting on his first meeting with Suripno (March 11, 1948), Černež noted that the dialogue was of informative character emphasizing that he was able to get more information about the situation in Indonesia. Indonesian diplomat promised that he would forward materials delivered to the Soviet side to the Yugoslav embassy, too. In those days, Suripno was officially received by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister

requests of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Manuilski, stated in UN in February 1946, to send to Indonesia an international commission to investigate the situation resulting from the Dutch and British military intervention in the UN in February 1946 as an effort of the Soviet Union to "complicate the things as much as possible". A year later, with new experience and knowledge of international relations, Nehru's pointing to the same issue, was no longer seen as a political "intrigue", but rather an "appeal" to the international public to once more prevent the invasion of colonial policies to the people who once left the sphere of foreign tutorship and exploitation.

⁵⁶ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1948, f. 159, doc. 11, no. 43702.

Vladimir Clementis, which undoubtedly strengthened his position and gave weight to contacts he wished to make.⁵⁷

There were several elements that made the first meeting of the Yugoslav and Indonesian diplomats extremely delicate. According to the decisions of the Security Council, the Dutch and the Indonesian parties have, through the mediation of the “Commission on Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities” of the UN, started negotiations about reducing the Dutch aggression, stopping hostilities, establishment of demilitarized zones, confirming the Linggadjadi Agreement and its implementation. In such circumstances, just before the signing of the agreement on the American warship “Renville” (on January 17, 1948), the government of Indonesia sought to strengthen its diplomatic position by appointing official diplomatic representatives in Europe and the Soviet Union. The establishment of official contacts with the Soviet Union, the countries of “people’s democracy”, and among them Yugoslavia, was of great importance for Indonesia. Jakarta was in a hurry. At the same time, each establishment of formal diplomatic contacts with representatives of Indonesia caused the protests of the Netherlands and the lack of understanding of the West, which was completing negotiations on the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty. Therefore, during the Cold War, the attitude towards the representatives of Indonesia was interpreted as a form of alignment.

On the other hand, this moment was delicate for Yugoslavia because the first official diplomatic contact with Indonesia coincided with a dramatic escalation of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Stalin’s objections to Tito and Dimitrov regarding “Balkan Federation” (January 29, 1948), Soviet opposition to Yugoslav politics in Albania, where a special emphasis was given to sending two Yugoslav divisions to the country (January 19, 1948), a dispute over compulsory consultation on all foreign policy issues that would be ended by signing the obligation of “mutual consultation” (escalating in the period from January 31, 1948 to February 11, 1948), postponing and then freezing the Soviet-Yugoslav economic negotiations, resolving the issue of international navigation on the Danube wherein Yugoslavia opposed Moscow – these were some of the problems that dramatically worsened the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Moscow defined the current situation as “serious disagreement” in the understanding of mutual relations. Tito defined his views first time on February 19, 1948 at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CK SKJ), saying: “We have to be persistent in terms of our orientation, in terms of strengthening the role of Yugoslavia in the world, which is ulti-

⁵⁷ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1948, f. 159, doc. 11, no. 48105.

mately in the interest of the USSR “.⁵⁸ Ten days later the following attitude was expressed: “Our policy towards the Soviet Union remains unchanged, but we are obliged to strictly watch over the interests of our country.⁵⁹ In such circumstances, burdened with anxiety and efforts to promptly solve the accumulated contradictions in relations with Moscow, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Indonesia was in the second plan.

The first contact between Yugoslav and Indonesian diplomats, which occurred on March 11, 1948 in Prague, required caution but also encouraged the cooperation. “To become better acquainted with the situation in Indonesia and its relations with the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yugoslavia requested from the diplomatic service as much information, documents, materials, statements of politicians, and reactions of the public. Thus, the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations most directly affected more devoted and analytical approach to “the Indonesian issue”. Still, the question remains as to what extent this “analytical” approach of Yugoslav diplomacy, as an expression of the need not only to have the “attitude”, but to have “personal attitude” towards an important international issue, coincided with the cooling of the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (telegram about the withdrawal of military and civilian experts from Yugoslavia, the criticism brought by the first letter of CK SKJ (b) of 18 March 1948, and so on) and represented the first step probably unaware of opening the prospect of (alternative) cooperation with the Third World and a prerequisite for future political engagement in this direction. Anyway, cooling and then suspension of Yugoslav-Soviet relations most directly affected the establishment of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia.

In mid-June 1948, the Yugoslav embassy in Prague informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of FPRY on the establishment of consular relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Soviet Union which occurred on May 22, 1948. These classified information and materials were delivered to the Yugoslav embassy by Suripno. Therefore, it could be concluded that the Indonesians did not notice the existence of a conflict between Moscow and Belgrade. When Jakarta definitely became aware of the fact, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia was pushed to the background. In the circumstances set by the Cold War, the establishment of consular relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union (indicated as “the first step to further close cooperation”) caused a real panic in the Netherlands and West.

⁵⁸ AJ, Fond of CK SKJ, III/31a, Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, February 19, 1948.

⁵⁹ AJ, Fond of CK SKJ, III/32, Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, March 1, 1948.

During 1948 and 1949 the interest of the Yugoslav diplomacy in the events in Indonesia was continuously growing. After the Renville Agreement, neo-colonial policy of the Netherlands was analysed with particular care (military operations, “police actions”, diplomatic pressures, measures of the economic blockade, the infiltration of the Dutch capital in the economic life of Indonesia, the establishment of puppet creations and regimes in its territory, the political use of “local elites”, brutally imposing of its will to the Republic of Indonesia). Yugoslav diplomats monitored all the activities of the United Nations affecting Indonesia (commitment to war suspension, the implementation of the agreement provisions). They carefully monitored the change in policy of the United States and Great Britain towards Indonesia (motives, interests, changes that caused the victory of the revolution in China, the idea of forming the “anti-communist Pacific Union”, and moving the defence line to “the chain of islands along the coast of Asia”). The countries of Asia and Africa appeared together for the first time (the Conference of Asian, African and the South Pacific countries on January 20, 1949). The greatest attention was paid to the work and decisions of the Conference round table on the transfer of sovereignty (the agreement was reached on the transfer of power until December 30, 1949; recognition of new states as fully independent and sovereign countries, making the project of the statute of Dutch-Indonesian Union with an amendment which concerned the future cooperation and agreement ratification, the election of Sukarno for the president on December 16, 1949; the formation of the first government of the United States of Indonesia led by Hatta; unitary policy of the new government).⁶⁰ Belgrade headquarters received information from different sides. They carefully monitored the reaction of the former metropolis and the great powers, and performed the first studies on “the Indonesian issue” and the situation in Indonesia. Accurate, timely, detailed information about Indonesia most directly influenced the decision of Yugoslavia to be among the first countries which recognized the new Indonesian state on December 27, 1949. Was it the sign of an independent foreign policy, the desire to prove the foreign policy course to the members of “socialist camp”, the consequences of loneliness and the search for new friends in the world? – Probably a little of everything.

During the analytical analysis of the events in Indonesia, Yugoslav views on foreign policy and international relations matured significantly. In late December 1948, Indonesia was the reason why the Yugoslav diplomats pronounced one of the first critics of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union was criticized for not using contradictions of the policy of the United States and the West.⁶¹ At

⁶⁰ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1949, f-89, doc. 7, no. 423254.

⁶¹ It was an attitude that was uttered on December 24, 1948, by the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington – S. Kosanović. He expressed an opinion regarding the Resolution which was

the same time, they became aware of the fact that there was no place for “leftism” in matters related to foreign policy. In December 1949, diplomatic representatives of Yugoslavia abstained from voting in the Committee and General Assembly of the UN regarding “the Indonesian issue”. The reasons were: the “sharp Soviet attitude” against the Canadian resolution on the acceptance of The Hague Agreement, the lack of consensus on the same proposal from the Asian countries, the efforts of the Netherlands and individual countries of the West to interpret the Hague Agreement as a means of breaking the political unity of Indonesia and, crucially, the absence of its own position on this issue.⁶² Not wanting to “follow” anyone’s political views Yugoslav diplomacy came to an important realization that good and thorough knowledge of international issues was a prerequisite for conducting independent policy. When identifying the priorities of diplomatic service, the main motive was “to gather as much information about the real situation in Indonesia as possible” and enable Yugoslavia to be ready and have its own attitude once the Indonesian issue was “re-opened” in 1950.⁶³ The above decisions coincided with the decision of Yugoslavia to internationalize the conflict with the Soviet Union and the countries of “socialist camp” at a session of the UN General Assembly (September 26, 1949), the adoption of a new resolution of the Information Bureau (November 29, 1949)⁶⁴ and the conclusions of the Third Plenum of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (December 29 to 30, 1949), which represented a significant break in the current practice at internal and ideological level.⁶⁵

judging the Dutch intervention in Indonesia considering that the Soviet Union was not using the contradictions in American politics (anti-colonialism and support to the activities of the Netherlands). “It would be a real skill” considered Kosanović, “to face America with such contradictions and use it for peace”.

⁶² The terms “treacherous bourgeois government of Indonesia”, “counter-revolutionary republican army and police,” suppression of “the revolutionary guerrillas,” the role of Sukarno and Hatta in “total subjection of the Indonesian nation,” “puppet” and “bourgeois” government of Indonesia and its “treacherous steps” could not be heard so often.

⁶³ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1949, f-89, doc. 7, no. 422378 and 422379.

⁶⁴ J. Jovanović, *Yugoslavia in the United Nations, 1945-1953*, Belgrade 1984, 41-46 – Two days after the appearance of Edvard Kardelj before the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union canceled the Treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar cooperation. In November 1949, the Second Session of the Information Bureau was held in Budapest and a new resolution adopted, whose title spoke of the basic attitudes of – “Yugoslav Communist Party which was in the hands of murderers and spies”.

⁶⁵ More on this in: *Party building*, no. 2, 1950 – At the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the last days of December 1949 the pressures of the Information Bureau were regarded as “the politics of the Cold War,” exercised by the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia, and the “struggle for independence” of the Yugoslav state was listed as “the most important battle for socialism in the world.” Such attitudes

While carefully monitoring and noting everything in connection with Indonesia, Yugoslavia missed an opportunity in 1950 to establish diplomatic relations. Shutting down the prospects of establishing diplomatic cooperation led to decreasing the interest of Yugoslav politicians and the public for events in Indonesia. Immediately after declaration of independence, Yugoslavia recognized Indonesian state. In early February 1950, immediately after the receipt of the message on the Yugoslav recognition of Indonesia, Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta expressed the willingness “to start negotiations on the issue of the establishment of diplomatic relations.”⁶⁶ The Yugoslav side subsequently requested the establishment of diplomatic relations, but there was no answer from Jakarta.⁶⁷ In July 1950, Yugoslavia requested the credentials for the Ambassador Mihailo Javorski but there was no answer from Jakarta once more. A few months later accredited Yugoslav envoy in India and Burma Josip Đerđa signalled that Indonesia was open for presenting credentials. It turned out, however, that established cooperation with India and Burma did not “open” Indonesia. The “signals” were also coming from London (Ambassador Cicmil), New York (Bebler), and New Delhi (Đerđa) but there were no actual results.⁶⁸ In the second half of 1952, the Indonesian side suggested the establishment of diplomatic relations but again without results.⁶⁹ According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, the priority of Indonesian foreign policy at that time was establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, China and the countries of “socialist camp”. In Belgrade, there was a belief that the “silence” of Jakarta was the result of pressures from Moscow and other countries “socialist camp”⁷⁰

most directly affected the performance of the Yugoslav communists not only in the state policy but also in advanced and revolutionary movements in the Third World. Parallelism of the policies (state and party line) increased the already existing conflicts with the Soviet Union and the countries of “socialist camp” and the opening of new disputes with the “capitalist world”. There were the remnants of an old myth of the “world revolution”, which still existed in the minds of Yugoslav Communists and, even more, in the essence of authentic revolution performed during the years of the Second World War. Support to the revolutionary movements of the world at the same time was the most direct opposition to the political practice of Stalinism, but also the opposition to the ideology of the West. Transferring of experience was considered as an obligation.

⁶⁶ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1950, f-105, doc. 12, no. 42220.

⁶⁷ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1950, f-105, doc. 12, no. 41867.

⁶⁸ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1950, f-105, doc. 12, no. 48449, 42220, 413888, 419043.

⁶⁹ The initiative was implied by the diplomatic representatives of Indonesia in London, Bonn, and Cairo. A MSP RS, DA, PA 1952, f-36, doc. 10, no. 412232; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1952, f-36, doc. 8, no. 415461, 415461, 415117; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1952, f-36, doc. 9, no. 416929; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1953, f-38, doc. 3, no. 4579.

⁷⁰ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39-6, Relations Yugoslavia – Indonesia.

In December 1952, at the initiative of the Indonesian side the talks on sending Yugoslav military experts to Indonesia to conduct performance training and “organizational structure” of the Indonesian Army started.⁷¹ Indonesian socialists believed that the Yugoslav Communists can provide the necessary knowledge about the construction of the modern Labour Party.⁷² However, it was only after Stalin’s death that the talks on establishing diplomatic relations revived.

On November 5, 1954, the Indonesian government accepted the Yugoslav initiative on the exchange of diplomatic representatives. This act was associated most directly with Tito’s planned trip to India and Burma. Tito’s stay in Asia (December 1954 – February 1955) urged the establishment of the cooperation with Indonesia. Offices opened in 1955, were “raised” to the rank of embassies on June 10, 1956. Indonesian ambassador Sudarsono presented his credentials on August 21, 1956. Sometime later, it was also done by the Yugoslav ambassador Stane Pavlič.⁷³

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The conflict with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Cominform forced Yugoslavia to redefine its foreign policy and “pacify” its performance. It focused on “the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”⁷⁴ The statements of Yugoslav representatives in the UN defined the outlines of a new diplomatic course. The policy that insists on principled cooperation with all those advocating the peace in the world (regardless of their political order), the world of equal nations, which opposed any outside interference with the internal affairs of sovereign countries, which insisted on economic cooperation with respect to equality and independence – participated with the political views of newly liberated countries of the Third World. Yugoslav foreign policy performance, which was initially determined by a high degree of tension provoked by a conflict with the Soviet Union and the countries of “socialist camp”, was quickly improved with a number of upright positions of a more general character.

In this process, the Yugoslav diplomats realized that global conflict between the military blocs made other countries, especially those who had just gained

⁷¹ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1952, f-36, doc. 9, no. 416929; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1953, f-38, doc. 3, no. 4579.

⁷² A MSP RS, DA, PA 1953, f-38, doc. 7, no. 46109.

⁷³ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39–3, Information about the foreign policy of Indonesia, and our relations with Indonesia; AJ, KPR (837), I-5-B/40–1, Note on the proposal of the Government of Indonesia to raise the missions of the two countries to the rank of Embassies. – On August 21, 1956 J. B. Tito received credentials from the Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia Dr Sudarsono.

⁷⁴ J.Jovanović, *ibid.*, 41–53.

independence, choose the policy of neutrality. Associating with one of the parties to the conflict, as it was proven by everyday practice, most directly meant “endangering the country.” That is why the demands of Yugoslavia – defending the world, insisting on the use of peaceful means in resolving international disputes, resistance to the creation of artificial barriers to trade, criticism of the policy of spheres of interest, rejecting any political and military aggression, advocating economic aid to the underdeveloped, opposition to any form of hegemony and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries, supporting the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Africa and Asia to be free and independent – met with the understanding of the Third World countries. All this was not only an appealing foreign policy platform of Yugoslavia but the way to defend its own independence.

These principles were the starting point for the cooperation of Yugoslavia with many Third World countries, among others, with Indonesia. The same views were expressed in 1952 at the seventh session of the UN General Assembly, on the issue of underdeveloped countries and their development. At the eighth session of the UN General Assembly (1953), Yugoslavia and Indonesia had a similar opinion about the need for the establishment of the Development Fund. At the ninth session of the UN General Assembly their views regarding “colonial question” were identical. Then, in 1955, at the fifteenth session of the United Nations, Yugoslavia and Indonesia shared the same views on disarmament in the world. Establishing the contacts in the UN meant “the opening of political perspectives.” Initially, the cooperation was not the result of common views on international relations but of common views regarding the issues which were found on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations.⁷⁵

As the process of decolonization was born in Asia, the fundamental analysis of Yugoslav politics of India, Burma and Indonesia could not fail to observe the extent to which the elements of non-bloc policies were incorporated in the foreign policy doctrine of these countries. Independent foreign policy, non-alignment with military blocs, the policy of decolonization (freedom for “colonized people of the world”), opposition to racial discrimination, the struggle for world peace, cooperation with all peace-loving countries, active neutral policy – most directly “opened” cooperation perspective. In late 1952, based on these esti-

⁷⁵ More on this: J. Jovanović, *Yugoslavia in the United Nations 1945-1953*, Belgrade 1985; J. Jovanović, *Yugoslavia in the Security Council 1945-1985*, Belgrade 1990; *Non-alignment. The contemporary theory and practice*, Belgrade 1970; D. Bogetić, *New Strategy of foreign policy of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade 2006; D. Bogetić, Lj. Dimić, *Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (September 1-6, 1961)*, Belgrade 2013; Lj. Dimić, “Tito’s Trip to India and Burma 1954-1955. Contribution to the History of the Cold War,” *Flows of History (Tokovi istorije)*, Belgrade, 3–4/2004, 27–54.

mates, Yugoslav diplomats were given instruction to “intensify contacts” with representatives of Asia and Africa. This has paved the way for more intensive economic cooperation with Indonesia. In 1953, the two countries signed the Trade and Payments Agreement. Economic relations followed the political course expressed in the UN about economic cooperation and assistance to underdeveloped countries. The legal basis of cooperation was incorporated in the following agreements: Trade Agreement (1956), the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation (1959), the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation (1960), the Agreement on delivery of investment goods (1960), the Agreement in the use of nuclear energy (1960), the Agreement on Economic Cooperation (1962).⁷⁶ On two occasions: after Tito’s trip to India and Burma (1955) and after his visit to Indonesia (1959), Yugoslavia tried to define more precisely its economic priorities in this part of the world (economic, financial, military, technical, and cultural cooperation). One of the measures was to reduce buying Indonesian merchandise indirectly via the Netherlands and the Great Britain. After Tito’s instructions, Yugoslav banks offered Indonesia favourable development loans. Technical assistance provided by Yugoslavia increased annually, mainly represented in the training of personnel and sending experts. Belgrade was not satisfied with the scope of economic cooperation even though Indonesia was quickly becoming the most important economic partner of Yugoslavia in Asia. The plans for the future included: the study of the Indonesian market, growth of commodity exchange, sending experts, placement of capital, equipment and financial resources. They were contemplating about establishing joint ventures and opening representative offices. It was assessed that the economic exchange could have been expanded only by giving “long-term loans,” the participation of Yugoslav companies in the investment works and the development of technical cooperation. Similar considerations prevailed both in Jakarta. Military supplies had an important place in economic cooperation.⁷⁷ In the relations between Yugoslav and Indonesia, economy never surpassed politics.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International bilateral agreements.

⁷⁷ AJ, KPR (837) I-3-a / 39-16, Note on the Yugoslav-Indonesian dialogue during the visit of J. B. Tito to Indonesia from December 23, 1958 to January 1, 1959; AJ, KPR (837) I-3-a / 39-16, Reminder for the dialogue with the Indonesian delegation; Interviews with the Prime Minister Djuanda; AJ, KPR (837) I-3-a / 39-16, Information Note on Indonesia; Amendment to the information on Indonesia – Military supplies.

⁷⁸ Statistical data from the second half of the fifties of the 20th century show that Yugoslav trade with the world, regardless of political affiliation with the non-aligned countries amounted to 60% with the United States and Western countries, 27% with the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries and China, 13% with the countries of the Third World.

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When in 1953 Indonesia and Yugoslavia started establishing cooperation in political and economic field, Josip Broz Tito made first contacts with political representatives of Indonesia. In May 1953, Tito received the Secretary General of the Socialist Party of Indonesia Sitorus.⁷⁹ The guest was interested in the nature and characteristics of Yugoslav socialism and this was the main topic of the conversation. Tito spoke about relations with the Soviet Union, analysed the situation in that country after the death of Stalin and the first steps in approaching Moscow. Responding to the questions of his co-speaker, Tito pointed out that there was still a small possibility that some of the communist states could take the road once chosen by Yugoslavia. The new Soviet leadership would try to put under their control the progressive movements in Asia, but would, at the same time try to be much more flexible than Stalin – Tito said. He also expressed the opinion that the prospects for world peace were better than in previous years. Part of the discussion was driven by the economic and political situation in Yugoslavia. Tito carefully listened to the analysis of the situation in Asia presented by the Secretary of the Socialist Party of Indonesia. During the meeting, Tito did not ask any question concerning Indonesia.⁸⁰

In late October 1953, Tito received the Vice President of the National Party of Indonesia and the Minister of Education Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro and Indonesian Ambassador in Rome Sukardjo. They were also interested in Yugoslav socialism – its theoretical foundations, social system, system of government, economic and cultural policies, self-management, decentralization, industrialization, the policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), the problems of socialism and the ways to overcome them. The main result of this meeting was the readiness to transfer experience and the warning that there was “no template” in building the country. From the questions he asked guests it was obvious that, at that time, Tito knew little about Indonesia.⁸¹

At the same time, the representatives of the Yugoslav embassy in Jakarta started intensive diplomatic activity. The talks, that the Charge d’Affairs Radoslav Brzić had those days with representatives of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, prominent members of the parliamentary parties, diplomats, and

⁷⁹ The meeting occurred on May 23, 1953. At that time the Socialist Party of Indonesia was not in power. – AJ, KPR, I-3-a / 39-1, Note on the conversation between J. B. Tito and the Secretary General of the Socialist Party of Indonesia S. L. Mulia of May 23, 1953.

⁸⁰ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39–1, Note on the conversation between J. B. Tito and the Secretary General of the Socialist Party of Indonesia S. L. Mulia of May 23, 1953.

⁸¹ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39–2, Note on the visit of Mr Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro and Mr. Sukardjo Wilyopranoto, October 27, 1953.

foreign ambassadors most directly contributed to the sharpening of the Yugoslav views on Indonesia.⁸²

A key turning point in the relations between the two countries and “opening perspectives” of wider cooperation were the years 1955 and 1956. The visit of Josip Broz Tito to India and Burma, countries that had already had politically shaped and developed doctrine of coexistence, was seen as a significant contribution.⁸³ It was a chance for the Yugoslav state and party leadership to become more familiar with the problems of Asia. On that occasion Tito was invited by Nehru and U Nu to visit Indonesia on his next visit to Asia. Another valuable knowledge concerned the importance of the regional conference of Asian and African countries in Bandung and the care with which Nehru approached this event.⁸⁴ A direct consequence of discussions and information received in New Delhi and Rangoon was the creation of a special commission for monitoring the Asian-African Conference in Bandung and more careful consideration of foreign policy activities and opportunities in Indonesia. This was also supported by opening diplomatic missions in Jakarta and Belgrade, as well as the development of economic cooperation. The information gathered showed that Indonesia was one of the countries that, based on their own experience, which was the result of the achieved and proven principles, established a foreign policy similar to Yugoslav. Yugoslav reconciliation with the Soviet Union also encouraged the convergence of Indonesia and Yugoslavia. According to the estimates of Yugoslav diplomats, the right-wing and Muslim circles did not approve this process.

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The reports of Yugoslav diplomatic representatives focused on geographic and demographic data ranging from the characteristics of soil and climate to social, ethnic and religious structure of the population.⁸⁵ They showed a great interest in history, particularly the development and ideology of the resistance movements, declaration of independence, armed struggles, and the efforts of the new authorities to change the inherited structure of the colonial state and introduce a new system. They particularly analysed economy. They noticed that a small village property, the average size of 0.8 hectares, was insufficient to feed a family that lived on it, ensure the accumulation of revenues in excess of \$30 a year, po-

⁸² A MSP RS, DA, PA 1955, f-25, doc. 14, no. 46284.

⁸³ Lj. Dimić, “Tito’s Trip to India and Burma 1954-1955. Contribution to the History of the Cold War”, *Flows of History (Tokovi istorije)*, Belgrade, 3-4/2004, 27-54.

⁸⁴ During the meeting on January 1, 1955, Nehru thoroughly informed Tito about the preparation of the Bandung Conference and the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the five initiators, held in Bogor.

⁸⁵ When it comes to the religious structure of the population of Indonesia – 90% are Muslims.

sition itself on the market, change and modernize the old way of production. According to the estimates of Yugoslav diplomats, the poverty of the country was the result of decades-long colonial exploitation, economic dependence on the former metropolis, the presence of large plantations and capital, which testified that the foreign domination still existed in the field of economics and finance, the decrease of total production which occurred after the change of government (in some industries up to 50%), low productivity, low expertise, fragmentation of properties, lack of loans and finance, blockade of the world market and other. In contrast to the low standard of living, the economic wealth of Indonesia was indisputable. When it comes to industrial production and mining, they pointed out to the lack of electricity needed to start production (in 1954 Indonesia had 10 kWh per capita), the lack of qualified staff, poor equipment and technological obsolescence of industrial equipment, low productivity, poorly developed transportation system, weak foreign trade, and poor budgets. All this was opposed to pretentiously large plans of the government which were partly inherited from the colonial state. Yugoslav diplomats noted that in the given circumstances, burdened by given promises and high expectations of the people, the government had to move forward in “full force”.⁸⁶ Otherwise, the rising dissatisfaction resulting from betrayed hopes carried the risk that the former holders of resistance would lose everything for what they fought. The analysis showed that the difficulties resulting from the weak economy, a rigid social structure, low efficiency, lack of financial resources which could launch a production, a number of “developmental barriers” related to economic development, the change of the colonial type of economy and “conditions” under which foreign technical assistance was supplied, etc. – could not be solved overnight. All this led to increasing repression.⁸⁷

Yugoslav diplomats paid the equal attention to the government system of Indonesia. They were interested in constitutional arrangements and legislation, political system, statutes, the activities of political parties. They analysed the programs of the government, the benefits and consequences of dissolution of the Dutch Indonesian Union, followed the battle for the inclusion of West Irian into the Republic of Indonesia. They drew attention to the importance of political and ideological projects in the formation of a common national consciousness. In this context they studied the role of “national culture”, state and religious schools. They also monitored the foreign policy activities of Indonesia, its relations towards other countries, the response to international crises and events.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ AJ, KPR (837), I-2/11–2, Indonesia (study).

⁸⁷ More on this in: L. Mates, *Non alignment, Theory and Current Policy*, Belgrade 1970; O. A. Westad, *Global Cold War*, Belgrade 2008; AJ, KPR (837), I-2/11–2, Indonesia (study)

⁸⁸ AJ, KPR (837), I-2/11–2, Indonesia (study); AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39–5, Indonesia, September 1, 1956

Analysing the activities of the National Party of Indonesia, Yugoslav diplomats noticed that, as Muslims they wanted to create a healthy Muslim community and as Democrats they opposed the establishment of an Islamic republic in which religion would interfere in political life, and as nationalists they strived to create a unified Indonesian nation and state. According to Sukarno, the creation of a unified nation and state would not be possible if the country was based on Islam. That is why he adhered to the basic principles of Pancasila (nationalism, democracy, humanism, social justice, belief in God), considering them a core of Indonesian politics, tradition and philosophy which defends the country from militant Islam. In this way, according to Sukarno's interpretations, independence had not been won for an individual or for a group even if it was religious. He gave priority to the creation of a unified national state in which one of the main principle would be "all for all". He was of the opinion that the power of state lay in the communication and consultation of the representative Government with the Muslim majority and the Christian minority in the parliament. Sukarno's notion of "social justice" implied political and economic equality. Democracy in "full sense" was the only one which was capable to contribute to the "social progress" in a poor country like Indonesia. As to the principle of "belief in God" Sukarno stressed that in Indonesia should be a country in which "everyone would be free to profess their faith." Achieving full freedom in the future would be possible only if "people burned with determination".⁸⁹

In contrast to this view of Indonesian reality and future, there were also other religious tendencies expressed in a desire to build a state and society on Islamic principles. One of the parties on this way was Masyumi Party which, among other things, advocated the closer cooperation with the West. The third strongest political party in Indonesia Nahdlatul Ulama was more extreme and requested the strict application of Islamic principles. Its leadership was convinced that for the development of Islam the independence of the country was one of the most important requirements. Among the parties of the left orientation, the Communist Party of Indonesia was the strongest one and the fourth-strongest in the country. Its commitment to national independence was not questioned but its ideological affinity and influence of Moscow and Beijing was noticeable. Special attention was paid to the role and influence of the army in the political life of Indonesia.⁹⁰

Analysing the foreign policy of the Government of Indonesia, diplomats underlined that the government would not draw back "from an independent course of development" and that their concept was that of "non-bloc" policy. In the opinion of the Yugoslav diplomats, alignment with one of the blocs "would dis-

⁸⁹ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a, Indonesia, 25-30, Study of September 1, 1956

⁹⁰ AJ, KPR (837), I-2/11-2, Indonesia (political parties)

solve the national unity of the country” and no government should ever allow this. Yugoslav diplomacy predicted that there would be compromise both in inner and foreign policy, but that they would not settle for conditioning.⁹¹

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Yugoslavia did not take part in the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955, but the views presented in the final communiqué were close and mostly identical with those of Yugoslav politics.⁹² The importance of the Bandung Conference was primarily defined by the moment when it took place, the moment which was filled with great hopes and expectations (the withdrawal of France from Indochina; independence of several African countries; The Soviet “Peace Offensive” including the signing of the peace treaty with Austria and Khrushchev’s arrival in Belgrade; changes in China policy) as well as the awareness of the importance of the countries of Asia and Africa in the world politics.⁹³ The demands for the establishment of economic cooperation on the basis of “mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty” were very close to Yugoslav policy. Yugoslavia was consistent with the recommendations of the Asian-African Conference on the urgent establishment of the United Nations Fund for Economic Development. Representatives of the countries gathered at the Bandung Conference as well as the Yugoslav leadership believed that cultural cooperation is one of the most powerful means to enhance the understanding among nations and that is why this idea was wholeheartedly supported. Yugoslavia seriously condemned colonialism, racism, exploitation and advocated the freedom and independence of the colonized world.⁹⁴ Yugoslav foreign policy also advocated the

⁹¹ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1956, f-34, doc. 4, no. 45347; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1956, f-34, doc. 2, no. 48464

⁹² AJ, KPR (837), I-4-c/1, The final communiqué of the Bandung Conference. – The principles guiding the non-aligned countries were originally formulated in the framework of bilateral negotiations of India and China, and made public in a joint statement of Nehru and Chou En-Laj, given in Delhi on June 28, 1954. Those were the following five principles: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; mutual non-interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence. On this occasion, a special emphasis was on cooperation between the countries of different social systems which “should not stand in the way of maintaining peace and create conflicts.” This declaration greatly inspired the participants of the Bandung Conference and influenced the content of the Resolution that was passed in Bandung. – L. Mates, *Non-alignment. The contemporary theory and practice*, Belgrade 1970, 248-249, 388-390.

⁹³ Basic information on gathering of the leaders of Asian and African countries, J. B. Tito received from Nehru on January 1, 1955, and on this occasion he expressed the opinion that the idea of a “very positive”. A few weeks after his return to the country a special committee was formed to monitor all activities on the preparation of the Bandung Conference.

⁹⁴ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-c/1, The final communiqué of the Bandung Conference.

equality of all races and nations, big and small, as well as their right to self-protection. The same was true for the Bandung views regarding “justice and international obligations.” The meeting of representatives of 29 countries “with different concepts and different viewpoints,” was by itself considered a success. Yugoslav diplomats believed that the most important outcome of the conference was the principle “to respect the right of every nation to individual and collective defence, in accordance with the UN Charter, as well as the principle according to which all countries should refrain from the use of collective defence serving the special interests of any great powers “. ⁹⁵ Such attitudes of Belgrade was marked as the “victory of a non-bloc concepts” in international politics and a clear protest of all the conference participants against “tightening of block antagonism” and opposition to “serving the interests of the great powers.” Yugoslav diplomats specifically quoted the words of Nehru: “We should not belong to either side in the Cold War; we do not agree either with the communist or anti-communist forces. We believe that they are both wrong and that their policy is leading us towards the war.” ⁹⁶ The Nasser’s speech was emphasized in the part in which he condemned the policy of the great powers to “use small countries as its instrument” and underlined that small countries play a constructive role in international relations. In this context, particular emphasis was placed on common attitude of Asian and African countries on securing the peace in the world and uniformity of their views on how “to take destiny in their own hands and to resolve their own issues.” In his speech, Sukarno presented the idea of reaching a new “moral ideology of Indonesia” through harmonious blend of Islam, nationalism and Marxism. Being critical towards the policy of the great powers, he called for “subordination of everything to the well-being of mankind.” He thought that morality in international relations can only be restored through action of non-aligned countries. He was filled with the hope that the relations among the Third World countries were dominated by (the same attitude to colonialism, racism, the need for peace in the world, identical economic problems and ideals of national independence) over those which made them “superficially apart”. ⁹⁷

Yugoslav diplomats assessed that the Bandung Conference brought the crush to the tendencies which were on the “line of bloc politics of the great powers.” In their opinion, “non-bloc forces and tendencies increased” and they should seriously be counted on by “diplomacies of both East and West.” ⁹⁸ The Ban-

⁹⁵ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-e/1, The assessment of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ O. A. Westad, *Global Cold War*, Belgrade 2009, 134–136; AJ, KPR, 837, I-4-e/1, The final communiqué of the Bandung Conference.

⁹⁸ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-e/1, Assessment of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung; AJ, KPR (837), I-4-e/1, Final communiqué of the Bandung Conference, Statement of the Comrade

Bandung Conference was evaluated as a turning-point in “waking up and linking” people of Asia and Africa, highlighting the “aspiration for independence,” “faith in their own strength,” “increasingly important role in world politics.” The most important were the agreement on advancing economic development on the basis of “mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty,” and emphasizing that cultural cooperation “was one of the most powerful tools for promoting the understanding among the nations.” These were followed by specific demands for the promotion of cultural and educational cooperation, exchange of knowledge and information, the revival of national culture, as well as the rejection of all forms of cultural and racial discrimination. The unanimous condemnation of colonialism and discrimination of any kind, as well as the proclamation of the principle of self-determination and “free choice of political and economic system” was considered an important success. Labelling the colonialism as an “evil” which should be exterminated and as a phenomenon that lead most directly to the violation of basic human rights, also fitted the concept of Yugoslav politics. The condemnation of aggression, the requirements for general demilitarization and the ban on nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, were considered a huge success. The Yugoslav political leadership assessed that the principles adopted in Bandung would contribute to “easing of international tensions” and solving the existing problems on the basis of “equitable international cooperation.” Belgrade defined the Bandung Conference as a “historic turning point” which suggested “the creation of a new political situation,” victory of non-bloc policy and “improvement of overall situation in the world”.⁹⁹ Tito particularly honoured the determination of the people of Asia and Africa “to take their destiny in their own hands”, and the fact that “the dominating concept of the conference was completely in line with our concept both in terms of international cooperation and consolidation of peace and the right of Asian and African countries to solve their problems by themselves”.¹⁰⁰ The common ideology of non-aligned countries, which was deemed to be capable of annihilating a bloc division of the world and the Cold War, started outlining. Meeting with Tito, Burmese Prime Minister U Nu said that, despite the fact that the resolution “contained mostly platonic wishes,” Bandung Conference “had a strong influence on the way of thinking in almost half of the population of the world.”¹⁰¹

President at the Bandung Conference.

⁹⁹ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-e/1, Assessment of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung.

¹⁰⁰ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-e/1, Statement of the Comrade President at the Bandung Conference, to Radio Belgrade on April 27, 1955.

¹⁰¹ During the meeting with Tito in Belgrade and Brioni (June 10-12,1955) Prime Minister of Burma U Nu alleged in Bandung that countries like Pakistan, Ceylon, Iran, the Philippines, Thailand “represented, if not the Western bloc and the western one viewpoint and Western

In the months that followed, the gap between the countries that were willing to cooperate with military blocs and those who opposed it got even bigger. That process somewhat hindered the spirit of cooperation shown in Bandung, but it was obvious that a good part of the countries participating at this conference wished to maintain the political course based on the principles of Bandung. In order to succeed, it was necessary to go beyond regional boundaries of assembly and association, and obtain the broader support of the world for the ideas of Bandung. Since the attitude of Yugoslavia towards foreign relations was almost identical to that presented in Bandung and since that attitude was previously “tested” at the meetings that during his visit to India and Burma, in the winter of 1954/55, Tito had with Nehru and U Nu, further development was not accidental. Tito missed one more co-speaker, and it was Sukarno.

The principles adopted in Bandung were ratified in July 1956 during the meeting of Tito, Nehru and Nasser in Brioni. This meeting was the first step in exceeding regional cooperation framework. A joint declaration specifically insisted on the principle of “peaceful and active coexistence”: “Heads of State and Government felt that their countries pursued policies that led to “reducing international tension and development of equality between countries.” In their opinion, the existing conflicts and tensions in the world were causing “fear and anxiety” in millions of people which, again, most directly opposed the establishment of a solid peace. In contrast to the bloc politics which resulted in divisions, Tito, Nehru and Nasser believed that peace could only be achieved by establishing a “collective security worldwide,” expanding “the area of freedom” and ending the domination of ones over others. Among the established requirements, a significant place was given to the issues of disarmament and receipt of China in the United Nations. It was estimated that the disarmament process lead most directly to the reduction of the potential outbreak of conflict. World leaders were asked to stop atomic probes and to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. Increasing efforts were required to make underdeveloped countries experience rapid development. Accordingly, they hig-

ideology”, while countries like China and North Vietnam “represented, if not exactly the Eastern bloc, their ideology and their attitude.” Opposite to these tendencies, U Nu said, there were India, Indonesia, Burma, and Egypt, who “represented the neutral position, so that in the beginning there was the fear of dissolution of the conference, not making any beneficial resolutions.” A little later, on August 23, 1957, Sukarno’s government meeting devoted to foreign policy issues pointed out that the Bandung Conference “just wanted to consolidate the solidarity of Asian-African countries.” In his opinion it was wrong to show that the Bandung was against anyone. The reaction of the West to the decisions of the Bandung Conference was a consequence of the tendency of “breaking solidarity of AA countries”. Part of this US policy was the opening of a number of issues which “divide the countries AA”. Part of that US policy was the opening of a number of issues “dividing the countries AA”. – A MSP RS, DA, PA 1957, f-38, doc. 18, no. 419511; AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/15-5, Tito – U Nu talks, 10 and 12 June 1955.

highlighted the importance of international cooperation, condemned the policy of economic pressures and embargoes, and urgently requested the establishment and functioning of the United Nations Special Fund for Economic Development. It was pointed out that “conflicting interests of the great powers” complicate the solving of problems in the Middle East. As to Algeria they supported the efforts of the people of that country for independence. Generally, they sentenced colonialism. The same position was taken on the issue of Palestine.¹⁰² The meeting was full of misunderstandings, views that were difficult to reconcile, restraints, “reducing the importance of” meeting. However, the meeting in Brioni substantially contributed to the introduction and then the approaching of foreign policy views of Nehru, Nasser and Tito.¹⁰³ Immediately after the meeting at Brioni, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which came as surprise to Tito and Nehru – they became hostages of Nasser’s policy. At the same time, “opening” of the Suez crisis induced the establishment of “regular contacts” on the line New Delhi – Belgrade – Cairo in order to harmonize views and unique appearance in its solving. The core of the movement, who would later personify Nehru, Tito and Nasser, began to emerge.¹⁰⁴

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The visit of Sukarno to Yugoslavia was organized in accordance with his expressed desire to get information about industrial development and visit the “Islamic part” of the country. Yugoslav diplomats in Jakarta noted that Sukarno was an engineer and that he was interested in the factories as well as the issue of nuclear energy.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Brioni document, the joint statement by President Tito: in L. Mates, *Non-alignment. The contemporary theory and practice*, 388–390.

¹⁰³ L. Mates, *Non-alignment. The contemporary theory and practice*, 386–390; V. Petrović, *Tito’s personal diplomacy. Study and documentary contributions*, Belgrade 2010; 130-165; V. Petrović, *Yugoslavia enters the Middle East*, Belgrade 2007; A. Životić, *Yugoslavia and the Suez crisis of 1956-1957*, Belgrade 2008; J. Čavoški, *Yugoslavia and the Sino-Indian conflict of 1959-1962*, Belgrade 2009, 86-87. Notes on conversations at the meeting between Tito, Nehru and Nasser are kept in the Nehru Archives in New Delhi. – As part of the discussion about the absence of “unity of action” non-aligned countries, led by Tito on November 18, 1961 in Cairo, Nasser as follows commented on the joint meeting of 1956: “It is obvious that there is no unity of action-Aligned Countries, which is nothing new because such unity did not exist before. When we met at Brioni in 1956, we were unable to reach an agreement on a joint statement, and I had to put down the path to the statement signed. Nehru was not willing to publish such a statement.” – AJ, KPR (837) I-2/14, Record of conversation between President Tito and President Nasser, 18 November 1961, at 10 a.m. in the morning.

¹⁰⁴ Of particular importance was the visit of J. B. Tito to Ethiopia and Egypt (December 11, 1955 – January 6, 1956) and the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, Burma, India, Ethiopia, and Sudan (December 5, 1958 – March 5, 1959).

¹⁰⁵ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39–5, To the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, May 16, 1956, The

The meeting between Tito and Sukarno took place on September 13, 1956 and was, in a way, a continuation of the dialogue between Tito, Nehru and Nasser in Brioni in mid-July 1956. At the very beginning of the dialogue, Sukarno requested the joint statement to contain a reference to peaceful and active coexistence, the principles of Bandung, and to “include” the position that People’s Republic of China should be admitted to the United Nations. To those requirements, Tito added the assistance to developing countries, the importance of respecting the integrity of small countries and the need to address the “colonial question” as a threat to the world peace, the need for all questions and disputes to be resolved amicably. The only international problem that was addressed was the Suez crisis. Tito and Sukarno were of the opinion that Egypt should be supported in every way. Sukarno believed that the Suez was a “lifeline of imperialism” and that for the former colonial powers to keep Suez meant to keep imperialism alive. The attitude of France towards Suez issue Sukarno compared to the way in which that former colonial power wanted to “solve” the problem of Algeria, and the Netherlands the question of Western Irian. According to Tito, Suez issue was “perhaps the decisive battle in the process of decolonization.” The activities of colonial powers were seen as the efforts of these countries to stabilize their position in any way. Tito was of the opinion that in these circumstances Egypt should not be let alone. Hence, it was pointed out that the countries supporting Egypt must connect. Sukarno supported these views emphasizing his own proposal of August 17, 1956 on the convening of the second Asian-African conference and Suez being the only topic. Sukarno believed that, for that occasion, a conference should include the representatives of Yugoslavia and the communist countries. The opting for the policy of “regionalism” or “universalism” in solving global crises that would alienate Tito and Sukarno in the mid-sixties was visible in the initial talks between the two leaders.¹⁰⁶

The meeting of Tito and Sukarno contributed to the expansion of bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Sukarno insisted on increasing the intensity of scientific and cultural cooperation (exchange of scientists, students, exhibitions, cultural groups, books and publications). They showed increased interest for the cooperation in “atomic field”. Tito advocated more intensive economic cooperation between the two countries. He drew Sukarno’s attention to the advantages of Yugoslavia, its economic and technical potential, the need to increase trade exchange and joint geological exploration.¹⁰⁷

program of the official visit of President Sukarno to Yugoslavia 12-18 September 1956

¹⁰⁶ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39-5, Note on the Yugoslav-Indonesian talks at Beli Dvor, September 13, 1956; Joint statement on the occasion of the state visit of the President Sukarno, 17 September 1956, Speeches by J. B. Tito and Sukarno; Message of the President Sukarno to President Tito and the Yugoslav peoples at the end of his visit to Yugoslavia.

¹⁰⁷ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39-5, Note on the Yugoslav-Indonesian talks at Beli Dvor, September

During the dialogue, Sukarno spoke about the importance of revolutionary ideas in the recent history of Yugoslavia and Indonesia. He expressed the belief that “advanced socialist system, full of revolutionary dynamics ... is the best way to provide guidance and useful meaning to life and development” of the Yugoslav nation. He also took a position towards the Yugoslav socialism, which, he pointed out, was not the same as in the West. “Socialism”, Sukarno said, “became an obsolete system, because it lacked the revolutionary ideas”. He believed that it was the reason why socialism of the West “could not flourish” in Asia and Africa, or Indonesia. As to his policy, he pointed out that nationalism is still “a major source” of his ideas. “In Asia and Africa,” Sukarno said to Tito, “Nationalism is a young progressive and revolutionary faith. We do not to equate nationalism with chauvinism and we do not interpret nationalism as the superiority of our nation over others. For us, the rise of nationalism means our nation, it means an effort to gain equal respect for our people, it means the determination to take the future into their own hands, in a similar manner as progressive socialism gave positive achievements of Yugoslavia”.¹⁰⁸

The epilogue of the dialogue between Tito and Sukarno of September 13, 1956 was a “joint statement” which paved the way for future cooperation. The two leaders agreed to:

- Relations between the two countries should be based on a policy of peaceful and active coexistence and the principles of Bandung;
- All nations should participate equally in international life;
- Countries which hampered the development should provide economic and technical assistance without political conditions in order to eliminate economic underdevelopment;
- Colonial issues (such as West Irian), which are the source of tensions, should be addressed without delay;
- The problem of the Suez Canal should be resolved in a peaceful manner based on the sovereignty of Egypt and free shipping;
- The lawful right of the People’s Republic of China to have a representative at the United Nations should be fulfilled;
- Armament should be reduced and nuclear tests prohibited;
- Both sides underline the willingness to expand and strengthen cooperation in technical and economic fields, improve trade relations and develop cultu-

13, 1956.

¹⁰⁸ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39-5, Note on the Yugoslav-Indonesian talks at Beli Dvor, September 13, 1956.

ral cooperation through exchange of delegations, students and professionals in the field of culture.¹⁰⁹

Thus was paved the way for the policy which was confirmed and upgraded in the coming years through the meetings of Tito and Sukarno. The number of exchanged messages witnessed about the relations established between the leaders of Yugoslavia and Indonesia. Information contained therein created preconditions for a unique performance of non-aligned countries on issues of common interest. Correspondence was given a personal tone.¹¹⁰

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Over the years, the policy of independence strengthened the relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia. However, it soon became clear that Sukarno was for “regional” and Tito for “universal” principle of cooperation of non-aligned countries. As for Sukarno, the strengthening of cooperation between African and Asian countries was a prerequisite for “surviving the pressures to which they were exposed.” Starting from the fact that all the countries of the Third World faced the same problems, Tito thought that the cooperation had to involve the countries from all continents.¹¹¹ In addition to substantial differences in views on the form of cooperation of the non-aligned countries, during 1957 Sukarno spoke of Yugoslavia on almost every rally. He spoke of the “heroic struggle” of the Yugoslav people “against imperialists, colonialists,” the aid of Yugoslavia to Indonesia, President Tito, the unity of Yugoslav nations as a prerequisite for survival, Yugoslavia as a serious economic partner.¹¹²

The friendly attitude of the government gave Yugoslav diplomats the opportunity to report about the problems of Indonesia. Ambassador Pavlič talked to President Sukarno, Prime Minister Djuanda, Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Suwito, as well as to other ministers, officers and party leaders. State, political and social positions of collocutors were high.¹¹³ Some of the talks took place at private dinners to which Yugoslav ambassador was invited. This further testified about the acquired trust. Thus, the reports being sent to Belgrade included valuable information on: the in-

¹⁰⁹ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39–5, Joint statement on the occasion of the official visit of the President Sukarno to Yugoslavia, September 17, 1956.

¹¹⁰ AJ, KPR, I-1/420, The letter of Sukarno to Tito on May 6, 1957; AJ, KPR, I-1/421, Letter of A. Sukarno to J. B. Tito, June 1 to 8, 1957.

¹¹¹ More on the regional policy of Indonesia in: MSP RS, DA, PA 1957, f-38, doc. 17, no. 410877.

¹¹² MSP RS, DA, PA 1957, f-38, doc. 2, no. 424887.

¹¹³ MSP RS, DA, PA 1957, f-38, doc. 2, no. 45415.

ternal situation in Indonesia; communist rebellion; Indonesia's relations with the great powers; the level of established cooperation with Asian countries, China and Japan; the situation in the army; political and economic relations with the Netherlands. The exchange of military, economic, and cultural delegations in an atmosphere of cordiality, friendship and mutual understanding improved the relations between the countries.¹¹⁴

One of particularly important visits was the visit of Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo to Indonesia. Being delegated to visit Indonesia on the occasion of celebration of Independence Day, Tempo had a job to explore the possibilities of improving economic cooperation with which both sides were dissatisfied.¹¹⁵ Recalling his meeting with Sukarno, Tempo wrote that "Sukarno did not want or did not know to talk about reality." During the meetings with Prime Minister Djuanda and Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio, Tempo said that Yugoslavia was interested in buying rubber, leather and wood from Indonesia directly, not through intermediaries. In this type of cooperation Yugoslavia saw the mutual benefit, both political and economic (they would "bypass" the West as a mediator, and would strengthen political and economic relations).¹¹⁶ Tempo's visit left the impression that the economic exchange between the two countries would most directly support and strengthen political cooperation, but it would hardly be feasible. Sukarno did not look like a pragmatic person interested in the economic side of cooperation. Tempo also noted that Sukarno spent almost all state funds on the army maintenance. Hence, the sale of military assets and equipment in the following years was the most developed area of mutual exchange of goods. Of course, that showed the level of established political confidence. The Support of Yugoslavia to Indonesia in the United Nations was highly valued in Jakarta.¹¹⁷

Sukarno's Visit to Yugoslavia in mid-January 1958 most directly contributed to the further improvement of relations between the two countries. One reason for the visit was the international isolation of Indonesia and the pressure "from both sides" to which it was exposed, so the talks with Tito were marked as the talks "of the utmost importance for Indonesia." This opinion was shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Sukarno and the Indonesian government. Sukarno's visit to Yugoslavia was driven by two motives: the conviction

¹¹⁴ Particularly important was the visit of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Executive Council S. Vukmanović Tempo to Indonesia in August 1957 and the visit of Deputy Prime Minister of the Indonesian government Djuanda to Yugoslavia in 1958.

¹¹⁵ In 1957, this cooperation was slightly over \$ 1.2 million (0.59 exports and export 0.63).

¹¹⁶ S. Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolution that flows*, Belgrade 1971, 292–295.

¹¹⁷ AJ, KPR, I-5-6/40–1; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1957, f-38, doc. 2, no. 424877; AJ, KPR, I-5-6/40–2. – Delivery of weapons and equipment which was negotiated in January 1958 amounted to more than \$ 14 million.

that the country and its leader had the greatest experience “in implementing the policy of independence, the policy of active coexistence” and the reputation of Yugoslavia “as the only European country in AA world” which it had due to its foreign policy and the fight against colonialism. The visit took place at the moment when communist rebellion broke out in Indonesia, the blocs’ conflict strained as well as the crisis in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. In Jakarta, the opinion prevailed that they urgently needed to organize a meeting that would bring together the leaders of Yugoslavia, Indonesia, India and Egypt. According to the Indonesian side, developments in the world increased the “responsibility of countries that implemented the policy of independence, a policy of active coexistence”. For these reasons, Jakarta was of the opinion that in the shortest time possible, it was necessary to organize the dialogue of the “big four non-aligned”: Sukarno, Nehru, Nasser and Tito. In the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Sukarno’s government and “the eyes of the AA world, regardless of their present bloc membership and connections, (were) directed towards the activities of these four.” The circles around the president Sukarno dramatically emphasized that the collapse of cooperation of “these four” also meant the “collapse of the peaceful world.” In that case, “there would be only two blocs and only one alternative – war”.¹¹⁸

The main subject of the talks held in Belgrade from January 18 to 20, 1958 was the internal political problems which occupied Indonesia.¹¹⁹ The conflict with the Netherlands threatened the country’s international isolation and internal conflicts provoked further instability. In such circumstances, Tito’s drew Sukarno’s attention to the Yugoslav conflict with the Soviet Union in 1948 and the risks of “one-side orientation” in economic relations with foreign countries. Having good knowledge of international relations, Tito knew that Western countries did not often have the same interests in one area and that it should be used. In this context, he advised Sukarno to take advantage of all the possibilities in the East and the West. Tito expressed willingness to support the government of Indonesia in its efforts to resolve internal problems in accordance with the national laws of the Indonesian nation, fighting for freedom, independence and the world peace. The part of cooperation, around which the two presidents agreed, was greater engagement in the sphere of economy, trade exchange, military purchases, and loans. A few months later, Sukarno marked Tito’s attitude as pessimistic. In con-

¹¹⁸ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1958, f-40, doc. 2, no. 45415.

¹¹⁹ The communist mutiny broke out during Sukarno’s visit to Belgrade which further aggravated the position of Indonesia’s foreign affairs. Faced with the Netherlands, which “blocked” any effort for economic independence, Indonesia found itself under the pressures from China, which supported ideologically close rebels gathered around the Communist Party of Indonesia and its leader Aidit.

trast to Tito, who felt that most important for Indonesia was “the country’s unity, mobilizations and material preparation as a condition for the successful development of the campaign against the Netherlands,” Sukarno was convinced “that the Dutch were the main reason for the current defragmentation of the country, since they skilfully emphasize the differences between the parties and between the region and Jakarta.” Tito’s attitudes were probably understood as a critique of Sukarno’s policy.¹²⁰ In January 1958, both Tito and Sukarno were prepared to support a broad campaign aimed at organizing an international conference which would end the Cold War atmosphere and open up the possibility of solving international problems in a new way in the future. Both statesmen were of the opinion that countries that were not aligned to military blocs could play an important role in the process of securing world peace and strengthening international cooperation.¹²¹

In mid-July 1958, Sukarno once more suggested the meeting of the Heads of Government of India, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia in New Delhi. The suggestion was, by all accounts, motivated by internal difficulties and recent developments at the international level. Caught and isolated from both the East and the West, Indonesia tried to weaken the “pressures” by active engagement on the international scene.¹²² But, at this point, neither India nor Yugoslavia was ready to support the Sukarno’s suggestion. For Nehru and Tito, the initiative of the President of Indonesia was much like forming a “third bloc” of whose alleged creation they had been accused in the West and criticized in the East for years, and which they avoided by all means.¹²³ On the other hand, being aware of the sensitivity of Sukarno’s initiative and its possible consequences for Yugoslavia, stuck between two military blocs, Tito advocated a joint declaration of non-aligned state governments as a way to express the attitude on the international issues. At that moment he was not prepared to go further than that. Nehru was not even inclined to such an expression of political views regarding international relations.¹²⁴ According to Yugoslav ambassador Pavlič, Sukarno had a hard time accep-

¹²⁰ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39-8, Visit of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Sukarno to Yugoslavia. January 18-20, 1958

¹²¹ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39-8, Visit of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Sukarno to Yugoslavia, January 18-20, 1958; Note on the talks between President Tito and President Sukarno; Communiqué on the visit of President Sukarno to Yugoslavia.

¹²² These were military rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, which were supported by one of the largest political parties Masyumi. Formally neutral United States were providing political support and military aid to the rebels further destabilizing the situation in Indonesia. For these reasons, Sukarno decided to seek the support at the international scene.

¹²³ Lj. Dimić, “Tito’s trip to India and Burma in 1954. Contribution to the history of the Cold War,” *Flows of History (Tokovi istorije)*, Belgrade, 3-4/2004, 27-54.

¹²⁴ More on this in: AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39-8 Note on the talks between President Tito and President Sukarno, January 17, 1958; AJ, KPR (837) I-3-a/39-9, Note on the talks between

ting the rejection.¹²⁵ In Jakarta, they believed that Nehru's reserve was the main reason for rejecting the initiative of the president Sukarno. However, the idea of organizing the conference and stronger organization of non-aligned countries did not only meet the resistance of the West. The Soviet Union and China saw such an initiative as a threat to their own position among the African and Asian countries and an endeavour to create a "third bloc" opposed to "socialist camp".¹²⁶

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Indonesia and talks with Sukarno had a key place in the large Asian-African tour of Josip Broz Tito which was organized in the winter of 1958/1959.¹²⁷ On December 23, 1958, after twenty-two days on the road, Tito arrived at the first official visit to Indonesia, where he stayed until January 1, 1959. This was a delicate moment for Indonesia because tightening internal political situation and "pressures" from abroad could be felt in Sukarno's behaviour. Yugoslav diplomats noted that during the dialogue Sukarno was "mostly silent", that he gave priority to Prime Minister Djuanda and Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio, did not attend the meetings which focused on foreign policy issues, the political situation in the region, relations with the great powers, and international relations. It was only when they were alone that Sukarno was ready for an open discussion with Tito.¹²⁸

During Tito's visit, they had two major and several informal meetings. Tito, as an opponent of the "occupiers-colonizers", was awarded a "military medal" – a prestigious award which was awarded only to the army representatives of Indone-

President Tito and Indonesian ambassador Sudarson, in Brioni on July 22, 1958; D. Bogetić, Lj. Dimić, *Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (September 1–6, 1961)*. Contribution to the history of the Third World, Belgrade 2013.

¹²⁵ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1958, f-41, doc. 21, no. 423793.

¹²⁶ J. Čavoški, *Yugoslavia and the Sino-Indian conflict 1959–1961*, 115–155.

¹²⁷ During the tour, Tito visited four Asian (Indonesia, Burma, India, Ceylon) and three African countries (Ethiopia, Sudan, United Arab Republic). It was the first in a series of important visits of J. B. Tito to non-aligned countries in the years 1958–1961.

¹²⁸ Tito's visit to Indonesia was preceded by the visit of Prime Minister of Indonesia Djuanda Kartawidjaja to Yugoslavia in October 12 to 23, 1958. It was an opportunity for Tito and the Yugoslav leadership to become more familiar with the situation in Indonesia which had just been stifled great rebellions in Sumatra and north Sulawesi, which, among other things, greatly increased the influence of the army. Rebellion that began earlier that year was supported by the United States while the Soviet Union and the "socialist camp" showed solidarity with Sukarno's regime. The visit of Prime Minister of Indonesia was used for the preparation of Tito's first visit to Indonesia. – AJ, KPR, I-2/11 Summary of talks in the countries of Asia and Africa; A MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, f-42, doc. 8, no. 32270; B. Masalušić, *Tito's trip to Asia from 1958 to 1959*, manuscript of the MA paper, 34.

sia. Tito was also awarded an honorary doctorate of law by the Bandung University on December 25, 1958. Speaking on the occasion, Tito introduced the Indonesian public to the specific experience of Yugoslav revolution, the basic processes of internal development and foreign policy orientation of Yugoslavia. Being aware of the Indonesian interest in the internal political system of Yugoslavia, he devoted special attention to the internal model of development (self-management), but stressed that its successful application in Yugoslavia could not guarantee its success in other environments. Tito was critical to the existence of military blocs, the use of force in resolving international disputes, colonialism, and the arms race. On the other side, he advocated the peaceful and active cooperation between the states based on different social systems and solving of disputes by peaceful means. The anti-colonial struggle of the people of Asia and Africa and gaining freedom and independence were marked as the most progressive factors in a world divided by the Cold War. In this context, the importance of Bandung Conference (1955) was particularly emphasized and stressed that its success lies in the fact that representatives of the gathered states did not talk about what divides and confronts them, but about the common future. Tito thought of it as a universal approach that could have been and must have been applied in international relations, an approach which went beyond the framework of regional cooperation, which recognized that local problems were of the global character and should be resolved globally.¹²⁹

Beside the ceremonial part of the visit and the “extraordinary warm reception of the officials and people,” dialogues were not easy, and were even unpleasant.¹³⁰ During the meeting in Bogor on December 26, 1958, Sukarno expressed the hope that the talks would be honest and open and therefore requested the first topic to be bilateral relations between the two countries – “what Indonesia wants from Yugoslavia and vice versa.” Thus, the economic cooperation between the two countries, with which none of the parties were satisfied, became a key topic of discussion.¹³¹ Therefore, the foreign policy and international relations were temporarily “pushed” to the background.

¹²⁹ AJ, KPR, I-2/11–2, Speech of the President of the Republic J. B. Tito on the occasion of promoting an honorary Doctor of Legal Sciences at the University of Padjadjaran, Bandung, December 25, 1958.

¹³⁰ AJ, KPR, I-2/11–2, The report on the trip of the President of the Republic and the Yugoslav delegation to the friendly countries of Asia and Africa submitted at the meeting of the Federal Executive Council on March 17, 1959; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1958, f-42, doc. 8, no. 32270 Talks in Indonesia, Stenographic notes.

¹³¹ AJ, KPR, I-2/11–2, The report on the trip of the President of the Republic and the Yugoslav delegation to the friendly countries of Asia and Africa submitted at the meeting of the Federal Executive Council on March 17, 1959; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1958, f-42, doc. 8, no. 32270 Talks in Indonesia, Stenographic notes; D. Bogetić, *New Strategy of Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1956–1961*, Belgrade 2006, 315–316.

Dialogue showed that Jakarta was not satisfied with the Yugoslav economic performance in Indonesia.¹³² The cooperation was partly hindered by objective political and economic circumstances marked by the riots that rocked and paralyzed Indonesia. Indonesia wished to increase exports to Yugoslavia. It suggested that Rijeka should obtain the status of a transit port for Indonesian goods which would be placed on Yugoslav market but also on the markets all over Europe. It drew attention to the fact that the implementation of the agreed trade cooperation agreements came to a halt due to inadequate support of the Yugoslav banking institutions (interest rate in excess of 5% and short deadlines for loan repayment). Insufficient knowledge of economic capacities of both countries was considered another reason for such economic cooperation.¹³³ Indonesians expressed a desire to send as many of their experts to schooling in Yugoslavia. They were interested in hearing about the experience of Yugoslavia with “foreign experts” from the Soviet Union, as well as in the overall financial and economic cooperation with this country. Bonding of the people of Indonesia and Yugoslavia (study visits, training, travel, language learning, and cultural exchange) was considered a prerequisite for successful economic and political cooperation in the future.¹³⁴

Yugoslavia was not satisfied with the economic cooperation either. Tito expressed the opinion that economic cooperation, despite the improvements, did not use the potential provided by the level of political cooperation and economic capacities of both countries. Yugoslavia had the potential to export a much wider range of goods, equipment, and machines which could equip the factories; one of

¹³² The exchange of goods with Indonesia, expressed in millions of dinars, showed the following tendency:

Year	Import	Export	Balance
1953	29,3	1,44	-27,86
1954	101,9	19,62	-82,28
1955	242,5	121,6	-120,9
1956	168,9	65	-103,9
1957	8	126	+118
1958 (until August)	129	6	-123

AJ, KPR, I-2/11-2, Informative political material; B. Masalušić, *ibid.*, 38. – Since June 1953, economic cooperation with Indonesia was based on Trade and Payment Agreement which provided for the payment based on the clearing. The new trade agreement from mid-December 1956 stipulated the payment of goods in British Pounds.

¹³³ AJ, KPR, I-2/11-2, Note on the dialogue between Yugoslavia and Indonesia during the visit to President Tito to Indonesia from December 23, 1958 to January 1, 1959

¹³⁴ AJ, KPR, I-2/11-2, Note on the dialogue between Yugoslavia and Indonesia during the visit to President Tito to Indonesia from December 23, 1958 to January 1, 1959

the potentials to be used in the future, said Tito. He was of the opinion that economic cooperation between the two economies must be adequate to political relations between the two friendly countries. In order to improve it, Tito promised to reduce the interest rate of loans supporting economic cooperation with Indonesia (from 5% to 2%).¹³⁵ In other words, economic cooperation between the countries was not based on economic interests but on political decisions as undisputed priority. Indonesians accepted this statement as “generous”. Believing that close economic relations were the best support of the successful policy, Tito offered to build and equip the factory of ammunition and artillery weapons in Indonesia (105 mm guns). He expressed his willingness to finance the training of Indonesian experts by the Yugoslav loans. This kind of cooperation was considered particularly important for the future. He agreed with the idea that Rijeka as a port should be used for the reception and storage of Indonesian goods. At Sukarno’s initiative, Tito advocated the establishment of the list of products that Yugoslavia and Indonesia could offer to each other. He initiated the establishing of a mixed commission to deal with the exchange of goods.¹³⁶

Upon his return to the country, Tito indicated that the omissions from the Yugoslav side were the cause of stagnation in economic relations with Indonesia. For these reasons, he urged the fixing of all the defects as soon as possible. Otherwise, he predicted that Yugoslavia would be “squeezed out” from the market of Indonesia and other Third World countries which were the subject of confrontations between the East and the West. He demanded urgent changes in the Yugoslav economic policy towards the countries of Asia and Africa. Giving priority to the politics over economics, the core of his position, based on the knowledge gained in Indonesia, was the remark that the “percentages” that the Yugoslav bankers and businessmen sought to achieve in this market in the short term were the “least useful thing” in cooperation with politically important and in every respect “rich country” as Indonesia. Tito was very clear in his political demand: “If we miss it now, that is, if we lose this market now, we will not get it back easily. I think we should do everything to prevent it and to make necessary changes in our economic policy.” It was a clear criticism directed to everyone who believed that Yugoslavia had no political or economic alternatives beside the East and the West. Tito spoke with the knowledge based on his own experiences; he knew the price of political and economic dependence on the East and West.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ AJ, KPR, I-2/11-2, Note on the dialogue between Yugoslavia and Indonesia during the visit to President Tito to Indonesia from December 23, 1958 to January 1, 1959

¹³⁶ AJ, KPR, I-2/11-2, Note on the dialogue between Yugoslavia and Indonesia during the visit to President Tito to Indonesia from December 23, 1958 to January 1, 1959; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1958, f-42, doc. 8, no. 32270, Talks in Indonesia.

¹³⁷ AJ, KPR, I-2/11-2, Note on the dialogue between Yugoslavia and Indonesia during the vi-

During his visit to Indonesia, they exchanged many creative ideas and information on a number of issues related to the current international problems. Presentation of the Minister Subandrio confirmed Yugoslav estimates of the interest of the great powers in the Indonesian area.¹³⁸ Tito shared the opinion of Indonesian side that part of international problems, due to the “cynical” behaviour of the great powers, gained “an explosive form”. The change in the foreign policy of the United States and the increase of their economic assistance to the countries of the region was seen as its tendency to prevent “displacement” of these countries towards communism. The fact that the West was more afraid of social discontent that was provoked by poverty and underdevelopment than of Communist propaganda, was very useful. The evaluations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio were equally important – the “reopening” of the Berlin issue represented an attempt of Moscow to divert attention from the “main battlefield” which was located on the territory of Asia and Africa. Equally important were the impressions of the Minister Subandrio about the politics of Moscow towards the West and Asia, about the position of China in the region and developments in that country, the behaviour of the United States in the Far East, the continuing efforts of the West to destroy the solidarity and regional unity of African and Asian countries. It could be felt that Jakarta was worried about the breakup in the socialist camp and among the countries of Asia and Africa. Increased subversive policy of the West towards regional networking and cooperation among the countries of Africa and Asia was seen as the confirmation of the rightfulness of the policy that was established at the Bandung Conference. Representatives of Indonesia asked Tito to engage during his journey to improve relations and regional cooperation among African and Asian countries, “at least in cultural and other fields.” They were of the opinion that the interests of Western countries, primarily directed towards the destruction of the Asian-African regional unity, represented one of the biggest threats to Indonesia.¹³⁹ The speech of Prime Minister Djuanda showed that Indonesia did not give up the policy that would be symboli-

sit to President Tito to Indonesia from December 23, 1958 to January 1, 1959; B. Masalušić, *ibid.*, 41–42.

¹³⁸ Shortly before meeting with the Yugoslav delegation Minister Subandrio represented Indonesia at the meeting of “Colombo countries” where he met with high-ranking representatives of the United States of America (State Secretary J. F. Dulles), Soviet Union (N. S. Khrushchev and A. Mikoyan), Great Britain (Prime Minister H. McMillan and Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Lloyd), Federal Republic of Germany (Minister of Foreign Affairs H. von Brentano). – AJ, KPR, I-2/11–2, Note on the dialogue between Yugoslavia and Indonesia during the visit to President Tito to Indonesia from December 23, 1958 to January 1, 1959; B. Masalušić, *ibid.*, 45.

¹³⁹ AJ, KPR, I-2/11–2, Note on the dialogue between Yugoslavia and Indonesia during the visit to President Tito to Indonesia from December 23, 1958 to January 1, 1959.

zed by a new conference of Asian-African countries, but that the organization of a “new Bandung” should not be hasty since the current political circumstances were not favourable for the process of stabilization of regional unity and strengthening the solidarity of the countries of Asia and Africa. Indonesian colloquators were convinced that the “common independent policy” of non-aligned countries would finally “be acknowledged by the East and the West.” They did not hide that the foreign policy of Yugoslavia was a role model and inspiration for Indonesia.¹⁴⁰

In his speech about the international issues Tito paid special attention to the issue of Berlin, relations with the West and the East, cooperation with Egypt and non-bloc countries. His speech, attitudes, and the examples he quoted affirmed the principles which were in the base of the international relations policy of Yugoslavia.¹⁴¹ Tito’s presentation showed that the dialogue of the great powers about important issues of international relations should be supported, but they should not be allowed, in accordance with their exclusive interests, to decide the fate of the world. The rejection of the use of force in international relations, a permanent dialogue that encouraged the resolution of disputes, the search for alternatives that lead towards solving conflict and lasting peace, were some of the principles advocated by Tito. The examples that Tito gave showed that the active role in international relations, collection and analytical evaluation of diplomatic information, were the chance to express your own opinion at the places where the world politics were created and far-reaching decisions made and to directly contribute to increasing the impact and validating “the necessity of existence” in world politics. The part of presentation which spoke about the relations of Yugoslavia with the West and the East pointed out that being a prominent subject in world politics and playing a role in world politics was a prerequisite for survival and an objective to strive to. As for the countries which were not protected by military pacts and guarantees of the great powers, a high degree of international connectivity was a prerequisite for survival. In this context, Tito thought that collaboration with non-bloc states and unique performance in the UN was very important.¹⁴²

After the trip to Asia and Africa on 9 April 1959, Tito sent Sukarno a detailed report on the discussions he had and the impressions he gathered during the visit to Burma, India, Ceylon, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia and Sudan.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ AJ, KPR, I-2/11–2, Note on the talks between Yugoslavia and Indonesia during the visit to President Tito to Indonesia from December 23, 1958 to January 1, 1959.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ AJ, KPR, I-1/424.

Sukarno was pleased with the content of the message, but not with the official tone. On that occasion, he expressed a desire to be addressed as “a friend”. He said to the ambassador that in the next message to Tito with the impressions from a visit to some countries in Europe and South America, “Tito would see his form.”¹⁴⁴ Indeed, the next note of Sukarno to Tito started with the words “My dear friend Tito” and ended with “most cordial greeting” and Sukarno’s signature.¹⁴⁵ The next message of J. B. Tito to the President of Indonesia reflected friendly relations. “Dear friend Karno” – conveyed a high level of friendship and human intimacy.¹⁴⁶

Reporting on the dialogue in Indonesia, Ambassador Pavlič sent a telegram to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia which reflected the atmosphere of the visit: “1. Visit successful. President satisfied. Again, he said he was surprised by the reception, he sees greater opportunities to expand cooperation in all areas. Reception and the visit to Java and Bali exceeded all previous visits. Sukarno was constantly with President, on the Galeb. 2. Numerous talks, fruitful ... Sukarno first spoke with the President in the car, about the problems of the building Indonesia ... He clearly expressed the desire of Indonesians to avoid weakening of the Eastern Bloc. In the given circumstances the Western bloc represented the main threat. Driven by the desire to ameliorate our relations with the People’s Republic of China they offered their ‘good services’. 3. The communiqué well received, subject of much attention ... 4. Press gave full attention to the visit... 5. The arrival, receptions and departure were attended by all the ambassadors, including the Eastern bloc ... 6. Safety organization perfect. Our comrades have provided excellent cooperation. No actions known, although there were enough opportunities. President did not use our car. Often drove together with Sukarno in an open car, through the crowd. Again, he got out from the car and walked through the crowd. In Bali he even used a helicopter ... an unforgettable New Year’s celebration. Both presidents, all night...”¹⁴⁷

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Yugoslavia and Indonesia were basically linked by the policy of non-alignment which was not abstract. It was most directly shaped by the development of international relations. The sources of non-alignment policy were found in the

¹⁴⁴ AJ, KPR, I-5-6/40-3, Note on the conversation between Ambassador Pavlič and President Sukarno on April 19, 1959.

¹⁴⁵ AJ, KPR, I-1/425. Sukarno’s message to J. B. Tito of October 6, 1959.

¹⁴⁶ AJ, KPR, I-1/424. Tito’s message to Sukarno of October 19, 1959.

¹⁴⁷ MSP RS, DA, PA 1959, f-41, doc. 13, no. 4318, Telegram from the Ambassador Pavlič to the State Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Koča Popović, January 5, 1959

process of decolonization and the attempt to overcome underdevelopment. This policy was also the answer to the fundamental feature of international relations marked by bloc division of the world and resulting power politics. The opposition to the bipolar division of the world was “the most striking feature” of a policy of non-alignment, which was based on an estimate that the world peace would be threatened until “power politics” prevailed in international relations, until there was a split in the military blocs and spheres of influence and until the stronger imposed their will to the weaker without sanctions. For just liberated countries of Asia and Africa, including Indonesia, an alignment with blocs meant the renunciation of acquired sovereign rights, independent internal politics, active participation in international politics, and cooperation with all peace-loving countries of the world and keeping the policy in accordance with its own interests.¹⁴⁸ All this inspired the cooperation of non-aligned countries.

In early April 1960, President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio visited Yugoslavia once more. It was a chance for the two countries to once again exchange views on the world situation from all aspects of bilateral cooperation. In interviews Tito and Sukarno exchanged information on the situation in Iraq and the position of Prime Minister Qasim. They shared a common negative attitude towards the suggestion of Cuba on convening the conference of economically underdeveloped countries. Both presidents were for convening a conference of this type, but they shared the opinion that the relations of Cuba with most Latin American countries suggested that such a meeting in Havana would be unsuccessful and counterproductive. The impending topics of discussion were the great powers and their politics, particularly the relations of Sukarno and Khrushchev. The uniformity of the attitudes was also expressed in terms of the danger posed by the renewal of atomic probes. There was also an absolute agreement in estimates about the conflict in Algeria and help to the National Liberation Front. Tito and Sukarno shared the opinion about the need for greater involvement of non-aligned countries in the issue of disarmament, helping economically less developed countries, accelerating the process of liberation of the nations who were still living in the colonial slavery. It was a program that could unite non-bloc countries. After returning to Jakarta, at a meeting with the Yugoslav ambassador Pavlič, the Indonesian side had once more highlighted the interest in convening a meeting of representatives of independent and non-aligned countries. After the talks they had with Tito, the representatives of Indonesia were further convinced that “peace could not be the subject only of the great ones”. They believed that “the

¹⁴⁸ More on that in: O. Bogetić, D. Bogetić, *The emergence and development of the Non-Aligned Movement*, Belgrade 1981; D. Bogetić, *The roots of Yugoslav orientation towards Non-Alignment*, Belgrade 1990; L. Mates, *Non-alignment. The contemporary theory and practice*, 34–59, 78–162.

great powers should take care of other countries” and that they would do it especially if independent countries started to meet and give their suggestions.¹⁴⁹

During the meeting in Belgrade they also discussed the important issues of internal politics. Indonesian politicians, including Sukarno, showed very “intense and detailed” interest in the principles of the functioning of the internal Yugoslav system – decentralization, workers’ self-management, institutions, organization of political life, the question of ownership and more. Their interest in Yugoslavia stemmed from the fact that, after many difficulties and national revolution, it basic social and political reconstruction of the country. Since Stalinist and Maoist model of development did not suit Indonesia, Jakarta thought that the Yugoslav experience might be of particular importance. Both sides were aware of the fact that a model of development could not be simply copied. They agreed that the Agreement on long-term economic cooperation achieved good results, and that the exchange of experiences in the field of scientific and technical cooperation would further improve political relations and friendship.¹⁵⁰

The talks in Belgrade opened the prospects of further cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural and military field. The next step in that direction was made in the late July 1960 during the visit of Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia Djuanda Kartawidjaja to Yugoslavia.¹⁵¹

The unity in an effort to radically change international relations determined by the bloc division of the world, uneven economic development and nuclear threats was achieved in the first contacts of the leaders of non-aligned countries. The awareness of the fact that active participation in international events reinforced the “independence” of each country and made them all together a significant factor in international political and economic relations however did not mean that a “joint action”. This was hindered by the specific interests of individual countries, which, as it turned out, were difficult to reconcile. The universality of the objectives and principles were not enough to overcome divisions and calm the conflict. However, the right to equal participation in solving international problems –

¹⁴⁹ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39–15, Minutes of the dialogues between Tito and Sukarno Belgrade, April 5 to 8, 1960; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1960, doc. 1, f-41, no. 418289, Note on the dialogue between Ambassador Pavlič and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio of April 13, 1960.

¹⁵⁰ More on this in: A MSP RS, DA, PA 1960, doc. 3, no. 410142, Note on the dialogue between State Secretary Koča Popović and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio of April 6 and 7, 1960 in Belgrade; MSP RS, DA, PA 1960, dc. 1, f-41, no. 418289, Note on the talks between Ambassador Pavlič and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio of April 13, 1960.

¹⁵¹ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39–16, Joint statement on the visit by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia Djuanda Kartawidjaja to Yugoslavia, Belgrade – Brioni, July 29 – August 3, 1960.

seen as responsibility and active struggle for peace in the world – was not requested, but won. This was demonstrated by the initiative of the Five (Nehru, Nkrumah, Nasser, Sukarno, Tito) which was submitted to the UN General Assembly in September 1960, and which requested the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union to “renew their contacts” and “find solutions to open issues through negotiations.” The contacts of diplomatic and political representatives of Yugoslavia and Indonesia before the Fifteenth Session of the UN General Assembly were intensive and incentive.¹⁵²

The contacts of Tito, Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukarno and Nehru at the Fifteenth Regular Session of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 1960, were initiated by the estimation that the great powers were not able to agree on the key issues regarding the world peace. In such circumstances, Tito was of the opinion that the conflict of the great powers about the election of a new Secretary General of the United Nations suppressed more important issues such as disarmament and the colonial question. The basic idea of the numerous meetings and discussions between Tito and the representatives of non-aligned countries, including Sukarno, was to mediate the meeting of Khrushchev and Eisenhower. On the other side, Nehru had long resisted any joint action; he was of the opinion that priority should be given to “individual actions on a common path”. The idea of the Five, as presented in a separate resolution, was for the non-bloc countries to take over the mediation between the opposing forces and their confronted leaders. The leaders of non-aligned countries thought that the high level of “international tensions,” particularly affected the countries fighting for independence. Although the Resolution did not get sufficient support, it clearly indicated the future rearrangements in the UN, paved the way for an organized presentation of non-aligned countries and contributed to the linking of the countries with similar political views. “The stream of pacification in the world” won a moral victory over the politics of force (41 states voted in favour of the resolution, whereas 37 states close to the United States were against it, and 17 states close to the Soviet Union remained neutral), and developing countries started to perceive themselves as “positive and pacifying factor” in the world politics.¹⁵³ The presentations of the above mentioned officials at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the UN were focused on the questions of disarmament and colonization.

¹⁵² More on this in: A MSP RS, DA, PA 1960, doc. 1, f-41, no. 428573. The talks of the Ambassador with the Foreign Minister Subandrio on September 1, 1960; Prime Minister Djuranda on September 6, 1960; President Sukarno on September 9, 1960.

¹⁵³ AJ, KPR (837), I-2/12. Notes on J. B. Tito’s talks with Eisenhower, Nasser, Nehru, Khrushchev, Sihanouk in September 1960, during the XV Session of the UN General Assembly; AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a/k-202, The speech of J. B. Tito at the Belgrade meeting on his return from the session of UN General Assembly in New York, October 12, 1960.

The Yugoslav leadership estimated that the “close cooperation” with representatives of other non-aligned countries, achieved at the XV Regular Session of the UN General Assembly in New York, “constructively contributed” to preserving peace and resolving disputes through peaceful means. The views on disarmament, resolving colonial issues, and assistance to underdeveloped countries were considered consistent efforts of Yugoslavia to contribute to the “relief of tensions,” adopting the methods of “negotiation and agreement between nations and states,” encouraging “active international cooperation” between all countries, regardless of differences in their internal systems, based on “respect for the principles of independence, equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of others.” Tito came back from New York with the awareness of the “depth of the gap” separating “Western and Eastern countries.” The reason for this, he saw in the efforts of military blocs to solve the existing problems by the “power politics” that constantly kept the world on “the brink of a new war catastrophe.” Tito observed that the new members of the United Nations had not yet had the opportunity to be “sufficiently and properly oriented in the Cold War atmosphere,” of the XV Session of the UN General Assembly and to fully respond to the “aspirations and interests of their people.” However, he thought that the appearance of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries was effective and prevented the outbreak of “more severe conflicts” between the opposed blocs, brought a clear position towards disputed issues, and pointed to the need of finding a way to their peaceful solution. In this way, according to Josip Broz Tito, the United Nations formed “a new force that was not willing to be a silent observer and a voting machine, but wanted to be an active factor in the implementation of the politics which could ensure peace and constructive cooperation to humanity”. To him, the stands of non-aligned countries represented “the conscience of mankind in today’s nuclear and chaotic international atmosphere.” Tito was aware of the fact that the main objective was not fully realized, but a “solid foundation was set for developing and strengthening the awareness that the destiny of humanity could not be in hands of just a few of the great powers, but that the responsibility for further developments in the world should be shared by all countries, big and small.” The exchange of ideas in New York enabled the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries to come to a unified opinion “on the most important issues of general interest that required an urgent solution since they constantly threatened the peace.” Tito perceived the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly in New York as a “moral victory” of non-aligned countries. Unanimously adopted resolution of 28 countries at the end of the general debate, which requested all United Nations member states to refrain “from actions harmful to international atmosphere and to make efforts to achieve full cooperation among all countries”, showed that in the given circumstances no one was ready to be “an open opponent of international cooperation and negotiations.” After Tito’s opinion, the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly showed “that the negative forces could not oppose the positive international actions.”

It was at the same time a stimulus, encouragement and kind of “guidance” for further work.¹⁵⁴ This team work most directly contributed to further reunion of Yugoslavia and Indonesia.

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The joint presentation in New York was followed by frequent contacts, consultations, new journeys, meetings, discussions, and exchange of messages. In the United Nations, Yugoslavia and Indonesia were signatories and often the initiators of a number of resolutions concerning disarmament, suspending nuclear experiments and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, abolition of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, intensifying the world development and the establishment of funds that could contribute therein. They established the policy of peace and international agreements and demanded that the great powers could no longer be the only ones to have a decisive influence on making decisions about important international issues. They argued the full independence and freedom of the people of Congo and Algeria. One of the topics openly discussed was the organization of the conference of non-aligned countries and institutionalization of their cooperation in the future. The idea of a conference of the non-aligned countries began to take shape. Indonesia was one of the key partners of Yugoslavia in that process.¹⁵⁵

The engagement at the international level was accompanied by a cordial, but not good economic relations between the two countries. The volume of trade exchange increased, but it was clear that military supplies account for almost 90% of the total turnover. There were problems regarding the delivery of rubber from state plantations. The Yugoslav businessmen still saw Indonesia as a market where they could achieve “free currency” and made no effort to balance imports and exports with the country. The procedures of Yugoslav companies when delivering various types of equipment to Indonesia were defined as “worrying”. There was a certain level of indolence about bidding for tenders published by Indonesia, which resulted in the loss of large business investment construction. Loans given to Indonesia were not fully used. The performance of Yugoslav businessmen was evaluated as “too rigid”. Nothing much was done in the field of scientific and technical cooperation was. When it comes to sending experts to Indone-

¹⁵⁴ AJ, KPR, I-2/12, Notes on J. B. Tito’s dialogue with Eisenhower, Nasser, Nehru, and Khrushchev in New York in September 1960; AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a, f-202, The speech of J. B. Tito at the XV Session of the UN General Assembly, held in New York on September 22, 1961; From the speech of J. B. Tito at the Belgrade meeting on his return from the session of UN General Assembly in New York, October 12, 1960; From the speeches of the Comrade President held in the Federal National Assembly on December 26, 1960.

¹⁵⁵ L. Mates, Non-alignment. The contemporary theory and practice, 391–393.

sia, Yugoslav negligence was considered “unacceptable”. All this represented an indisputable problem in the relations between the two countries.¹⁵⁶ However, the worsening of relations was much more influenced by politics than economics. At the time of intensive international cooperation, Indonesian diplomacy asked for Yugoslav military support in resolving the issue of the West Irian, which was contrary to one of the basic principles of Yugoslav foreign policy that all disputes should be resolved peacefully. This question, as it turned out, most directly affected the relations between the two countries in the future.¹⁵⁷

Tito and Sukarno shared the opinion that the great powers and the countries belonging to military blocs were not able to maintain world peace and ensure the smooth operation of the UN and that the Third World countries should also be included. After the XV Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Tito realized that in a year to come, they needed to organize a meeting of non-aligned countries. Sukarno and Nasser were of the same opinion, but not the Nehru who, as reported by the Yugoslav diplomats from Delhi, saw no reasons for such a meeting.¹⁵⁸ Sukarno was the first who thought that the meeting should take place in Belgrade.¹⁵⁹ But, he was also an ardent supporter of the concept of regional cooperation and holding of the new Asian-African Conference. In his reflections, the Belgrade conference was supposed to be only a step towards a “new Bandung”.¹⁶⁰ So, the question of the organization of the non-aligned countries (regionalism or universalism) brought Yugoslavia and Indonesia both closer and

¹⁵⁶ Trade with Indonesia in the period 1958-1960 in millions of dinars

Year	Export	Import	Balance
1958	6	129	-123
1959	4.304	234	+4.070
1960	3.553	200	+3.353

AJ, KPR, I-5.6/40-4, Information about economic relations with Indonesia; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-39, doc. 19, no. 428046; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-38, doc. 31, no. 413842.

¹⁵⁷ During his visit to Yugoslavia Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio expressed concern that Indonesia’s West Irian can become a “base of international colonialism” for executing and subversive actions and riots in Indonesia. Being surrounded by the members of SEATO pact and the countries of the Commonwealth, Indonesia was concerned for their own development. Military assistance and support for the intervention of Indonesia was obtained in Moscow. – A MSP RS, DA, PA, 1961, f-38, doc. 29, no. 46959.

¹⁵⁸ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 1, no. 45196, Telegram of the Ambassador D. Kveder from Delhi, February 17, 1961.

¹⁵⁹ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 2, no. 49237, Telegram from J. Đerđa to the Ambassador of the Yugoslavia in Indonesia Pavlič, March 25, 1961.

¹⁶⁰ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 8, no. 410166, Telegram of the Ambassador Pavlič from Jakarta, April 1, 1961.

apart. The months that followed were filled with initiatives and dilemmas. They did not lack contradictions.

In March 1961, Yugoslavia and Indonesia, together with the United Arab Republic, started informative discussions concerning the potential holding of the conference of the non-aligned countries "in the near future." The future conference was supposed to deal with matters of Congo and Algeria, "colonial subjects" but also with "wider world problems".¹⁶¹ A few days later, the news arriving from Cairo and Jakarta to Belgrade told about "the idea of the conference spreading" due to, among other things, diplomatic actions of Egypt and Indonesia.¹⁶² At the moment, a good part of the leading political figures of Indonesia were not familiar with the idea of holding the conference of non-aligned countries. Those more familiar thought the conference would only deal with current international issues related to colonialism (Algeria, Congo, etc.). They also expected the West Irian to be one of the priority issues which would undoubtedly strengthen Indonesia's foreign-policy position towards the Netherlands.¹⁶³ But, at the same time with the development of the idea of the conference of non-aligned countries, Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Jakarta reported on the efforts of Indonesia to immediately come up with new "Bandung Conference and the Conference of Independent States." For this purpose, as reported by the Yugoslav diplomats, Sukarno's delegates stayed in Cambodia, Burma, Ceylon, the United Arab Republic, and Sudan. Sukarno urged the organization of a new Asian-African Conference in Bandung, believing that it should be held prior to the Sixteenth Session of the UN General Assembly to consider "all the current issues." In the opinion of the President of Indonesia, Yugoslavia was the most suitable place for a conference of non-aligned countries. Sukarno also felt that the conference of non-aligned countries should discuss only one issue – the issue of Algeria.¹⁶⁴

In Delhi, it was interpreted as a consequence of Sukarno "losing popularity" in his country and "having serious internal problems." Indian diplomats thought that the views of Sukarno should not be taken seriously. At the other end of

¹⁶¹ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 3, no. 49596; MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 3, no. 49695.

¹⁶² A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 7, no. 49515, Telegram from J. Đerđa to V. Mićunović, March 29, 1961.

¹⁶³ A MSP RS, DA, PA f-118, doc. 11, no. 428472, Belgrade Conference and Indonesia, September 19, 1961.

¹⁶⁴ The idea of a meeting of non-aligned countries, which would deal only with the issue of Algeria, was first launched by Sukarno in January 1961, but Koča Popović rejected the idea believing that such a meeting would not be of particular benefit because it would not be attended by Nehru or U Nu. However, Koča Popović advised not to give a negative response to Jakarta, but to stay reserved while checking the mood of other countries. A MSP RS, DA, Office of K. Popović, f-2, Top sec., K-15, February 2, 1961.

the world, in Accra, President Nkrumah believed that Sukarno “had no luck” with new Asian-African Conference, “because it was difficult to gather together non-aligned and aligned AA countries, and even more difficult to achieve constructive and firm decisions.” That is why, in his opinion, it was more sensible to organize a conference of non-aligned countries “exercising a policy of positive neutrality”. Yugoslav diplomats concluded that Sukarno “focused” on the organization of the Asian-African conference, but also spotted the loss of “orientation” when it comes to Indonesian foreign policy and the attempt to be on “two trails”.¹⁶⁵ It was clear that Indonesia would stay a reliable partner in the policy of non-alignment with military blocs, but preference was given to the concept of regionalism. Yugoslav diplomats in Jakarta sent a message that Indonesia was an important political partner, that “it was worth efforts” winning it over, that we should invest “more patience” and efforts to “get to know their mentality,” that it should be supported in the efforts to find its own way (“between Beijing and Moscow, for or against Sukarno”).¹⁶⁶ Later analysis showed that Sukarno’s obsession with the idea of a “new Bandung” stemmed from the success of the Bandung Conference (1955), the affirmation of Indonesia and its leaders had established and the fruitful period of cooperation between the countries of Asia and Africa, which subsequently followed. All this, according to the Yugoslav diplomats, fed the illusion about the benefits the “new Bandung.” This idea was also supported by the People’s Republic of China.¹⁶⁷

Tito’s visit to Egypt and his talks with Nasser on April 20, 1961, were of particular importance for a final decision on organizing the conference of heads of state and government of non-aligned countries.¹⁶⁸ Sukarno joined the diplomatic initiative for a conference of non-aligned during the dialogue between Nasser and Tito in Cairo. Indonesia actively participated in the very demanding preparatory meeting held in Cairo from 5 to 12 June 1961.¹⁶⁹ Shortly before the beginning of the preparatory meeting, in order to anticipate possible difficulties, Yugo-

¹⁶⁵ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 2, no. 49 263, Telegram from the office of J. Đerda of March 25 1961; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 5, no. 410 350, Telegram of the Ambassador Pavlič from Jakarta, dated April 1, 1961; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 8, no. 410170.

¹⁶⁶ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-38, doc. 31, no. 413 842. Dispatch of Ambassador Pavlič from Jakarta of May 1, 1961.

¹⁶⁷ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-118, doc. 11, no. 428 472. Belgrade Conference and Indonesia, September 19, 1961.

¹⁶⁸ Note on the talks between the delegations of FPRY and UAR, Cairo, April 20, 1961.

¹⁶⁹ The preparatory meeting in Cairo was attended by the following countries: Afghanistan, Cuba, Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Morocco, Cambodia, Yemen, India, Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Brazil (as an observer).

slav diplomacy harmonized the views on important issues with Egypt.¹⁷⁰ The active diplomatic contacts established with Indonesia reaffirmed that this country had identical views.¹⁷¹ Indonesia was among the first countries to use political arguments to support the idea that Belgrade should be the host of the Conference of the Heads of States and Government of the non-aligned countries.¹⁷² Joint presentation of Yugoslavia, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic definitely broke the “myth of the leading role of India in the Asian-African and non-aligned world.” In Delhi, there was an opinion that India was meant to be a mediator and “take a middle line”, but “there was nothing left of this idea in Cairo.” This role among the non-aligned countries was played by Yugoslavia, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic.¹⁷³ As to Indonesia, influential politicians like Abdulgani and Sastroamidjojo permanently obstructed the policy of minister Subandrio forming the public opinion that the conference of non-aligned countries “would not account for Indonesia’s interests”.

The meeting in Cairo, as it turned out, was not only a set of organizational preparation for the future conferences, because it launched a number of fundamental issues. Let alone the regional meetings, it was the first meeting of the “countries with a common global concept” but a different level of development. It presented various interests and attitudes, but the sharp exchange of opinions “brought about a common view on specific issues and confirmation of common attitudes.” The results of Cairo meeting were evaluated as “successful and a very important step in preparing the conference, and harmonizing views and actions in general”.¹⁷⁴

Notwithstanding the position advocated in Cairo, Indonesia did not easily give up the concept of “regional organization” of the countries of Asia and Africa. Such a position produced contradictions and fluctuations in the Indonesian foreign policy and made Belgrade and Jakarta drift apart. Yugoslav diplomats re-

¹⁷⁰ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, F-116, doc. 32, no. 417 198, Telegram of the Ambassador R. Dugonjić from Cairo, May 3, 1961.

¹⁷¹ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 35, 417 569, Telegram of the Ambassador R. Dugonjić from Cairo, June 2, 1961; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, doc. 36, no. 417 694, Telegram Ambassador R. Dugonjić from Cairo, June 5, 1961.

¹⁷² A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 36, no. 417 967, Telegram from the Minister K. Popović from Cairo, June 7, 1961; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-117, Doc. 2, no. 418 276, Telegram of the Minister K. Popović from Cairo, June 9, 1961.

¹⁷³ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-117, doc. 8, no. 420 359, Analysis of Indian positions at the preparatory meeting in Cairo, Delhi, June 24, 1961.

¹⁷⁴ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-117, Doc. 30, no. 420 140, Telegram of the Minister K. Popović to all FPRY missions abroad, June 29, 1961; A MSP RS, DA, PA, 1961, f-117, doc. 3, 418 705, Telegram of K. Popović to Yugoslav Embassy in Havana.

ported on the first “tangible changes” in the politics of Jakarta in early April 1961. Therefore, the main instruction given to our ambassador in Indonesia was to try and “make Sukarno act in accordance with to the current arrangement.” The overall engagement of Indonesia in Cairo was evaluated positively (as one of the most mature). However, under the pressure of political parties, particularly those close to Beijing, as well as through consultations with the Chinese leadership, Jakarta officials started to think more intensely about the old idea – the organization of a new Asian-African conference (the “new Bandung”). Yugoslav diplomats recognized the efforts of Sukarno and other prominent and influential people to convince all relevant officials in the country that the best affirmation of Indonesia and its greatest contribution to the mankind “lies in its tight relation and active collaboration with other non-aligned countries.” In the end, they found a compromise. They declared that “Belgrade Conference” would not weaken or harm the Asian-African unity, but contribute to the national struggle of the people of Africa and Asia.¹⁷⁵ China also supported this position of Indonesia. Having decided to temporarily support the upcoming conference of the leaders of non-aligned countries, China openly suggested Sukarno to go to Belgrade and resolutely defend the politics advocated by Indonesia and China, and to leave the idea of a “new Bandung” for the period immediately after the Belgrade Conference.¹⁷⁶

After the preliminary meeting in Cairo, and before the conference in Belgrade, Josip Broz Tito and the Yugoslav diplomats undertook important diplomatic activities.¹⁷⁷ Present circumstances imposed a meeting with Sukarno, which was held in mid-June 1961.¹⁷⁸ It was one more opportunity to “clarify” the common views on key issues of international relations and the importance of bringing together representatives of non-aligned countries. On that occasion, Tito infor-

¹⁷⁵ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 7, no. 410 229, Telegram from Josip Đerda to J. B. Tito, April 5, 1961; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-117, doc. 17, no. 422 286, Telegram from Jakarta, July 15 1961; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-117, doc. 26, no. 423 611, telegram from Jakarta, July 31, 1961.

¹⁷⁶ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-116, doc. 5, no. 410350; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f- 116, doc. 5, no. 410315; J. Čavoški, *Between Great Powers and Third World Neutrals: Yugoslavia and the Belgrade Conference of the Nonaligned Movement 1961*, manuscript.

¹⁷⁷ As the host of a future conferences, he was bound, among other things, by the conclusions of the Committee of diplomatic representatives, from the session held in Cairo from 21 June to July 5, 1961, AJ, KPR (837) I-4, a preparatory meeting ... Report of diplomatic representatives in Cairo, July 5, 1961.

¹⁷⁸ The Yugoslav side wanted a meeting in early January 1961. In March, it was noted that Sukarno’s interest in visiting Yugoslavia was “weak”. Tito thought it would be a good idea for Sukarno to celebrate his sixtieth birthday in Yugoslavia together with him. On this occasion, touched by the Tito’s attention, Sukarno did not promise the arrival in Belgrade, but expressed hope that he would come to the conference of the heads of state and government of non-aligned countries.

med Sukarno in detail about the growing idea of organizing a conference, expressed his views on the events in Cairo, and thanked Sukarno for his constructive initiative and support. He believed that, in the future, they should “act together to prevent attempts to weaken the conference.” He stressed the need to “define” and “direct” guidelines and aims of discussion concerning the joint presentation. On this occasion Tito expressed the hope that the Prime Minister of India Nehru would participate at the conference but also the determination to hold the meeting even if that state cancelled its participation. Emphasizing that he expected “concentrated efforts against the conference,” Tito expressed his conviction that Yugoslavia and Indonesia “must be cautious and should not allow the failure.” The President of Indonesia shared the same opinion. In an interview with Sukarno, Josip Broz expressed the view that future conferences “should not represent a frontal attack on the blocs” or a meeting that would increase “tensions at international level.” He suggested that they needed the utmost patience and prudence if they did not want to be “accused of riding on the tailcoat of any great powers or blocs.” On the other hand, Tito stressed the importance of the struggle for the principles “common to all non-aligned countries”. Tito and Sukarno also talked about bilateral relations. Sukarno remarked that “Yugoslavia buys little goods in Indonesia” and that the exchange of goods should be increased in the future.¹⁷⁹

The meeting of President Josip Broz Tito, Sukarno and Modibo Keita at Batajnica Airport on June 17, 1961, took place at the time of the meetings of the Committee of diplomatic representatives in Cairo, and the central topic of the meeting was the question of expanding the list of participants at the conference of the non-aligned countries. In the tripartite declaration signed by the presidents of Yugoslavia, Indonesia and Mali it was pointed out that the conference came at the right time and was a necessity of the present time.¹⁸⁰ In the correspondence that followed, Tito asked Sukarno to use his authority to encourage individual heads of state and government to come to Belgrade.¹⁸¹

Tito and Sukarno met once more on August 3, 1961, shortly before the start of the Belgrade Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned countries. They agreed on the view that Belgrade Conference should take “determined action against imperialism and colonialism.” Sukarno marked it as the “basic importance” of the conference. The Belgrade conference was seen as “the first step towards further action.” He believed that the Conference should

¹⁷⁹ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/39–19, Notes on the conversations between President Tito and Sukarno, June 16, 1961

¹⁸⁰ AJ, KPR (837), I-3-a/74–1, Note on the conversation between President Tito and the President Modibo Keita during his visit to Yugoslavia, from 17 to 23 June 1961; Report on the conversation; A toast of J. B. Tito.

¹⁸¹ AJ, KPR, I-1/428. Tito’s letter to Sukarno, July 19, 1961.

be concluded by adopting “declaration, appeal or charter” that would subsequently be implemented. On this occasion Sukarno once more made his point that “his country belonged to the Asian-African community” and that the Belgrade Conference “could not be a substitute for the Asian-African conference, but only the supplement of that conference.”¹⁸² On the same day, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Koča Popović had a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio. Those were the last consultations before the Conference, at which it was agreed to organize closed meetings and consensus was reached on the political and personal presentation of the Congo (Adula or Gizenga), political differences in Guinea and the absence of Sékou Touré, renewal of Soviet nuclear testing. On this occasion, it was decided that the President of Indonesia, Sukarno should be the first speaker.¹⁸³

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In the time immediately preceding the Belgrade Conference the Cold War was in full swing. Confrontation between the East and the West around Berlin resulted in the raising of the Berlin Wall. Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world at the brink of a nuclear war. International peace was threatened by the military intervention of the colonial and the great powers in Congo, Angola, Vietnam, and Laos. The nuclear moratorium was not respected. All this was the test of the policy maturity of the states gathered in Belgrade.

“Never in the entire post-war period, has it been so urgently necessary as it is today that those states which are not aligned with any blocs set forth with the greatest degree of unanimity, clearly and unequivocally, through their highest representatives, their views on problems which are leading the whole world to the brink of the biggest catastrophe in the history. The idea that non-aligned countries should participate, in one way or another, more effectively in international developments, particularly in those which are of direct and vital interest to them, stems from the realization of the fact that, in our time, the responsibility for the future of mankind cannot be borne by only a few states, irrespective of how large and powerful they may be.” These were the words of Josip Broz Tito in his welcome speech on September 1, 1961, by which he addressed twenty-four states as full-fledged participants, three observer countries and nearly forty liberation and advanced movements. For those gathered in Belgrade there was no doubt that a conference of non-aligned countries was a “huge moral success” in a time when the Cold War had won such proportions that it could at any moment lead to a glo-

¹⁸² AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a/κ-204, Note on the visit of President Sukarno to President Tito, August 31 at 21:00.

¹⁸³ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-118, doc. 1, no. 426380.

bal tragedy. The aim of the conference, Tito pointed out, was to make the great powers realize that the fate of the world can be not only in their hands. The agenda of the conference included the “exchange of views” on the situation in the world, the consolidating and strengthening of the international peace and security, problems of uneven economic development and underdevelopment.¹⁸⁴

During the Belgrade Conference, there were fifteen plenary and two closed sessions, in which the heads of delegations submitted presentations and exchanged views.¹⁸⁵ President Sukarno of Indonesia, not coincidentally, was the first speaker. Josip Broz Tito spoke on the third day. In his speech, Sukarno “opened” the issues which gave the opportunity to other leaders of the Third World countries to present their views. Tito’s speech represented the sublimation of the Yugoslav positions on key international issues, which were the reason for gathering of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries. At the same time, considering the views of other statesmen present in Belgrade, including Sukarno, Tito was trying to “balance” his presentation and “gather” all the views presented. Both presidents delivered program speeches. Sukarno and Tito defined the views on the key issues of the modern world in an almost identical way. They spoke about the essence of non-alignment, the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and racism. They drew attention to the issue of underdevelopment and the need to help developing countries. Both presidents criticized the bloc division of the world and resulting power politics, interference in the internal affairs of other states. Both Tito and Sukarno thought it was wrong to expect that the “great powers alone would find time” for a peaceful settlement of existing international problems. Equally erroneous was the thought and long-lasting belief that “small countries, and underdeveloped in particular, were not competent to solve international problems and firmly express their views on them.” For Tito, as much as for Sukarno, non-alignment did not equal neutrality. They saw the non-aligned as the “new force” capable of changing the world filled with conflicts, and the politics demonstrated by non-bloc states as the conscience of mankind. More than Tito, Sukarno advocated “urgent solution” of the key issues, clear definition of the problems and recognizing the essence of existing disputes and their sources.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a/k-202, President Tito’s Welcome Speech, September 1, 1961; Meetings of Non-Aligned Countries 1961-1974, Belgrade 1974, 40.

¹⁸⁵ Stenographic notes from the Belgrade Conference were published in the book: Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (Belgrade, 1964). The publication does not bring stenographic notes of the two secret sessions, held on September 4 and 5, 1961 in the afternoon and evening. This material still remains a mystery to historians.

¹⁸⁶ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a, Review of the presentations of the heads of delegations on the first day of Conference, September 1 1961; *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September, 1–6, 1961*, Belgrade 1964, 23–36; *International Politics*, no. 274–275, Belgrade 1961, 9–10.

Tito and Sukarno shared identical views on the issue of disarmament, the arms race, the rights of all peoples to freedom, and the existence of two German states. For both of them, the gathering of non-aligned countries could never be equated with the formation of a “third bloc”, but should be understood only as a gathering around a few key principles regulating international relations. They advocated the principle of equality in international relations. Both presidents thought that the conflict between old and new was inevitable. In the areas where the conflict of “foreign interests and new forces” climaxed, “became very sharp and explosive” Sukarno proposed acceptance of the *status quo* as the first step. As a second step, he advocated “the principle of peaceful and active coexistence” and definite action to mitigate hostile mood and enable the start of negotiations. The ultimate goal would be to negotiate “an acceptable solution in order to save the world from destruction.” He proposed determining of the “time limit” for the complete removal of colonial subjugation of one nation by another. In his opinion, this time limit must not exceed two years. The issues discussed by Tito were also followed by the actual proposals for their resolution.¹⁸⁷

There were only a few issues in which Tito and Sukarno remained unwavering.

Sukarno defined the Belgrade Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned countries as the “brother in arm” of the previously successfully organized conferences – Conference on the relations in Asia, held in New Delhi in 1948, which condemned the military attacks of the Netherlands to the Republic of Indonesia and expressed the “protest against colonialism in its purest form” and the conference held in Bandung in April 1955, which “fastened and consolidated the cooperation among independent nations of Asia and Africa in their struggle for a just and prosperous society”. In this context, he noted that the main purpose of the meeting in Belgrade was to link non-aligned countries “in a coordinated accumulated moral force to preserve world peace and establish a new balance based on the world order featuring social justice and prosperity.” Not giving up the regional concept in resolving key international issues, Sukarno announced a new Asian-African Conference from the stand of the Belgrade conference. It was deemed necessary for achieving the set goal – “dynamic progress in the struggle for liberation, emancipation and stability in the world.” Thereby, he expressed the hope that those gathered in Belgrade would “bear in mind the

¹⁸⁷ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a, Review of the presentations of the heads of delegations on the first day of Conference, September 1 1961; *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September, 1–6, 1961*, Belgrade 1964, 23–36; *International politics*, no. 274–275, Belgrade 1961, 9–10; Speech of President Tito in the general debate, September 3, 1961, AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a/κ-202, Belgrade Conference.

need of organizing other Asian-African Conference in the near future.”¹⁸⁸ The positions of Sukarno were partly extorted by political circumstances in Indonesia where, in the weeks preceding the conference, there was a widespread belief that the conference in Belgrade “would not account for Indonesia’s interests” and that the state policy of the country should be more directed towards solving issues in the territory of Asia and Africa.

On the other side, Tito saw the conference in Belgrade as the evidence of commitment of the non-aligned countries to take their “share of the responsibility for the world peace and the fate of the world” in accordance with their own experiences. He was aware of their small economic power and limited opportunities, of their enormous moral strength and of the hard way they have chosen. The essence of Tito’s almost missionary idea of not regional but universal importance of the meeting in Belgrade, was summarized in the closing words of his speech: “... we have assembled here today to coordinate our forces, to unite our efforts and to help the world – which is constantly being pushed to the brink of disaster, to become conscious of all dangers that threaten it, to mobilize all its vast moral forces and energy towards the strengthening of world peace and the extension of general international cooperation on an equal basis.”¹⁸⁹

For Sukarno, the main objective of the non-aligned countries should be “building a new world.” In the name of that, his speech was designed to reveal the essence of neo-colonialism – the endeavour of colonial powers, forced to abandon their colonial possessions, to preserve as much as possible of their economic, political and military interests. In this context, Sukarno spoke about the conflicts encouraged by the colonial powers in newly liberated countries, causing secession that is done under the pretext of self-determination, creating chaos through military provocation and rebellion. Criticizing colonialism in all its forms, Sukarno marked the developments in the West Irian as “celiac wound” of the humanity and “cancer that erodes” the world. He reminded that one-fifth of the territory of Indonesia was occupied and dominated by “the Dutch colonialists,” and noted that the West Irian was “an indivisible part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Indonesia”. From the stand of the Belgrade Conference Sukarno ultimately asked “the establishment of government of the Republic of Indonesia” in the West Irian. For these reasons, the acceptance of the principle of “peaceful coexistence”, according to him, did not mean to “preserve the present

¹⁸⁸ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a, Review of the presentations of the heads of delegations on the first day of Conference, September 1, 1961; *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September, 1–6, 1961*, Belgrade 1964, 23–36; *International Politics*, no. 274–275, Belgrade 1961, 9–10.

¹⁸⁹ Speech of President Tito in a general debate, September 3, 1961, AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a/κ-202, Belgrade Conference

situation for ever”, but rather an opportunity that allowed each nation “to develop as it sees fit, unhampered by external pressures or interference.” Understanding the “peaceful coexistence” as the *status quo* would lead, in the opinion of Sukarno, to an ongoing “division of the nation”, preventing them to evolve their own “national concept of life,” to choose a form of political and social system that best suits it.¹⁹⁰ These positions also stemmed from expectations of the political public in Jakarta that the Belgrade Conference would provide a concrete support to Indonesia.

Tito also thought that colonial question was one of “the most important unsolved issues” of the modern world, which, by its complexity, generated other sensitive issues. Tito was particularly worried about the fact that the colonial powers, protecting their specific interests, were not ready to accept the inevitability of anti-colonial process and the spirit of the time in which they took place. In this context, he criticized the policy of France in Bizerte (Tunisia) and Algeria, the behaviour of the Belgian authorities in Congo, the activities of Portugal in Angola, racial discrimination in South Africa, interfering into the events in Laos, opposition to the former colonial powers to annex West Irian Indonesia military intervention by the United States to Cuba. All these questions, based on colonialism and its legacy, constituted a threat to the world peace – thought Tito.

There was no doubt that Sukarno and Tito shared almost identical views regarding colonialism. When it comes to West Irian Tito said: “As far as the West Irian is concerned, it is really high time for the colonists in distant Europe who are in possession of that colony, to realize how senseless it is to oppose the liberation of West Irian to be released from colonial bondage and its union with Indonesia – its mother country. The people of Indonesia will, of course, never renounce their right to that part of their country, and it would be better if this question was settled in a peaceful manner as soon as possible”.¹⁹¹ Tito supported the legitimate demands of Indonesia, but limited them by the need to find a peaceful solution, which at that time did not suit Sukarno. It could be assumed that Indonesia was expecting more of a definite position and significant support from Yugoslavia regarding the transfer of sovereignty than expressed in the President’s speech. Since the entire Tito’s presentation was aimed at promoting the policy of peaceful and active coexistence between states with different internal social order, one could not have expected more than he said. Hence, the high ex-

¹⁹⁰ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a, Review of the presentations of the heads of delegations on the first day of Conference, September 1, 1961; *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September, 1–6, 1961*, Belgrade 1964, 23–36; *International politics*, no. 274–275, Belgrade 1961, 9–10.

¹⁹¹ Speech of President Tito in a general debate, September 3, 1961, AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a/κ-202, Belgrade Conference.

pectations produced just as much disappointment. As for Tito, the policy of peaceful coexistence was not political “manoeuvre”, but the possibility that the changes that have seized the world take place without conflicts and wars. Starting from the fact that the world peace was indivisible Tito considered all the conflicts and wars equally dangerous. Accordingly, he advocated the implementation of reorganizational measures within the UN, with the aim to strengthen their role in the world and efficiency in solving international problems.¹⁹²

During the Belgrade Conference, there were 15 plenary and two closed sessions. During the closed sessions, held in the afternoon and evening on September 4th and 5th, 1961 as recorded by the Yugoslav diplomats, “they insisted more on issues of specific interest to participants, which” in the opinion of Yugoslav politicians and diplomats “was inevitable but also, to some extent, demanding.” It can be assumed that at these sessions they discussed the West Irian issue, as well as the types of support that the non-aligned countries could provide to Indonesia.¹⁹³ Did the support of Yugoslavia and its leaders fulfil Sukarno’s expectations or, perhaps, cause disappointment which was reflected in the bilateral relations between the two countries? Was there a hidden “trigger” that initiated a discontent of Indonesia and slowly began to alienate Belgrade and Jakarta?

In his speech, delivered at the Belgrade Conference Sukarno put himself in the centre and promoted himself as the protagonist of the idea of non-alignment, the initiator of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, the one who decided to invite other participants to the conference.¹⁹⁴ The lack of modesty probably stemmed from Sukarno’s mentality and character, but also from the overt dissatisfaction with the position he had in the process of organizing the conference of non-aligned countries. By all accounts, Sukarno was expecting more attention than he was granted in Belgrade.

The participants of the Belgrade Conference adopted two documents: the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries and the Statement on Danger of War and Appeal for Peace. Both documents were signed by Tito and Sukarno. In relation to the Declaration, which had a strategic character, the other document concerned the current political circumstances. The Declaration did not explicitly mention the right of Indonesia to West Irian. The

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-118, doc. 14, no. 427 253, The initial evaluation of the Conference (V. Mićunović’s Office), September 11, 1961 – Stenographic notes from the closed sessions are not available to the academic community.

¹⁹⁴ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a, Review of the presentations of the heads of delegations on the first day of Conference, September 1, 1961; *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September, 1–6, 1961*, Belgrade 1964, 23–36; *International politics*, no. 274–275, Belgrade 1961, 9–10.

Statement on the Danger of War and Appeal for Peace expressed concern and protest against a possible world war and nuclear disaster. Hence the Soviet Union and the United States were requested to “immediately cease the preparations for war” and to restart negotiations “for a peaceful resolution of the existing disagreements” respecting the principles of the United Nations. The right to the appeal, the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries found in the permanent interest of all peoples of the world that “humanity was progressing on the path towards peace and prosperity and not to a fatal destruction.”¹⁹⁵ In this context, the conference participants wrote letters of identical content to the President of the United States John Kennedy and President of the Ministerial Council of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev – letters expressing the bitterness due to the worsening international situation and the possibility of the war “that threatens the mankind.” Kennedy and Khrushchev, as the representatives of the states “holding the key to peace and war”, were required to make efforts and restore direct talks on disputed issues of international relations. The Conference delegated the President of Indonesia Sukarno and the President of the Republic of Mali to deliver the letter to the President of the United States, and the President of Ghana Nkrumah and Prime Minister of India Nehru to deliver the letter to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁶

The non-aligned countries evaluated positively the results of the Belgrade Conference. In an interview of Koča Popović with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio on September 7, 1961, it was concluded that the adopted Declaration represents “a kind of program – a platform” incorporating the essence of the concept of non-alignment. Indonesia was of the opinion that Belgrade Conference was a useful step beyond regional boundaries.¹⁹⁷ A few weeks later, information coming from Jakarta was conflicting. Part of the press glorified the role of Sukarno as a politician who “gave the line” to conference and “put things in the right light.” On the other hand, there was a visible disappointment due to the fact that those gathered in Belgrade did not provide bigger support to Indonesia in terms of the West Irian. The fact that the final document did not expressly grant Indonesia the right to the West Irian caused disappointment of the public and was an instrument of the political attacks on the government. The opposition press created the impression that the Belgrade Conference did not “meet the expectations of Indonesia”. The authorities, especially the part that without reservations accepted and supported the Belgrade Conference, in such circum-

¹⁹⁵ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a/ Belgrade Conference, the Statement on Danger of War and Appeal for Peace.

¹⁹⁶ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a/ Belgrade Conference, Letters to Kennedy and Khrushchev.

¹⁹⁷ AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a/κ-204, Note on the conversation between state secretary Koča Popović with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio on September 7, 1961

stances were not allowed to talk about the achievements of the Belgrade Conference. Guided by the logic of daily politics they made sure that this topic was discussed as little as possible. The advocates of regional cooperation among the countries of Asia and Africa found the confirmation of their views in these facts. Yugoslav diplomats in Jakarta concluded that the citizens were aware of the importance of the Belgrade Conference and its “outstanding contribution” to the struggle for peace, the abolition of colonialism, affirming the policy of coexistence, and the development of socialism. The fact was that all accomplishments of Belgrade Conference were dominantly watched through the “prism of West Irian,” which indirectly showed how colonial legacy burdened and paralyzed political life in Indonesia.¹⁹⁸

By all accounts, on his returned from Belgrade, Sukarno was quite disappointed. There were more reasons for this. His political situation after the Belgrade Conference was much more difficult than before, because his policy was under the attack of communists and nationalists. The fact that the Belgrade Conference did not pay the expected attention to West Irian issue and that this issue was not mentioned in the final document Sukarno certainly perceived as a personal defeat. The defeat was all the more remarkable because it took place in the presence of many party leaders who formed the delegation of Indonesia. Since no one cared about the character of Sukarno, his “sensitivity”, “the way of thinking and reactions of people from the Far East,” there was no praise or recognition by the host of a conference for all he has done for its success, which would strengthen his political position and help him regain his self-dignity. The fact that more attention was paid to Nasser and Nehru was also not negligible. The combination of these political and personal reasons, perhaps was not decisive, but certainly influenced the change in Yugoslav-Indonesian relations.¹⁹⁹

After the Belgrade Conference, Tito and Sukarno exchanged several messages. On September 13, 1961 Sukarno informed Tito on personal impressions about the conversation he had with Kennedy. A few days later, on September 18, 1961 Tito sent reflections and assessments of the situation in the world. Both messages were written in a friendly ton.²⁰⁰ Nevertheless, Belgrade Conference brought a change in the relations between the two countries. This was witnessed

¹⁹⁸ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1961, f-118, doc. 11, no. 428 472, Belgrade Conference and Indonesia, Jakarta, September 19, 1961.

¹⁹⁹ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1962, f-41, doc. 42, no. 439444, Note of Stane Pavlič about the conversation with the Ambassador of Indonesia in Paris Tamsil, November 25, 1962

²⁰⁰ AJ, KPR, I-1/429, Message from the President Sukarno to J. B. Tito sent on September 13, 1961; AJ, KPR, I-1/430, Message from the President J. B. Tito to Sukarno sent on September 18, 1961.

by the fact that the newly appointed Yugoslav ambassador in Jakarta Aleš Bebler was not allowed to talk to Sukarno on political issues the next 14 months.²⁰¹

In early December 1961, the Ambassador of Indonesia, Dr Asmaun informed the Secretary of State Koča Popović that Indonesia would undertake military operations in West Irian. Since such a move produced numerous uncertainties (US intervention, military experience, and the use of battle ships) the Indonesian side sought for an “opinion”. Pointing to many unpredictable consequences of such a move, the need to ensure the “success” through diplomatic channels before taking action, the necessity of good assessment of the opportunities and circumstances of the Yugoslav side was not able to provide the expected advice. The answer to the Ambassador’s question whether “friendly countries” could influence the government of the Netherlands to accept the “bilateral negotiations on the West Irian” was positive. As to the third question: how Yugoslavia would behave in the event of Indonesian armed action, Popović said he “did not understand the question well.”²⁰² Information that Ambassador Asmaun forwarded to Jakarta certainly did not suit Indonesian political leadership. The anxiety and discomfort was also felt in Belgrade. The friendship was at stake, but also were the basic principles of Yugoslav foreign policy.

When the dispute over the West Irian escalated, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia issued a statement saying that “Yugoslavia has always held the opinion that the question of West Irian should be solved as soon as possible in a peaceful manner within the justified requests of the people and government of Indonesia, that is, by the recognition of the sovereignty of Indonesia.” In Jakarta, the part of the statement which insisted on a “peaceful solution” was interpreted as a reproach to Indonesia’s politics. Also disputable was the part of the statement about the “recognition of the sovereignty of Indonesia,” because it was thought that the sovereignty of the West Irian was not debatable. On the other hand, Belgrade was of the opinion that the statement very clearly confirmed the justified requests of Indonesia and its right to use the force. The message of the Secretary of State Koča Popović to the Yugoslav Ambassador Aleš Bebler on January 18, 1962 was very important for understanding the attitude towards Indonesia and Yugoslav politics of that time. The note said that “the previous practice showed that it was not good to identify oneself with or commit to certain attitudes in advance even if these were the friendliest countries. First of all, Indonesia did not consult us before making such a decision; therefore, it had no reason to expect us to adopt in advance all the details of its tactics relating to the situation

²⁰¹ AJ, KPR, I-5.6/40–4, Note on the conversation with Sukarno, Jakarta, October 12, 1962.

²⁰² AJ, KPR, I-5-b/40–4, Note on the conversation between Koča Popović and the Ambassador of Indonesia Asmaun, December 5, 1961.

which arouse therein. Furthermore, we do not know whether Indonesia would alter anything in this tactic, which would mean that we acted hastily. Furthermore, we must act in a way that, based on our reasonable position, we can still influence other countries. Moreover, the support we get from Indonesia when we have difficulties, for example with China, is not even close to that of ours. Furthermore, it is not good to have the feeling of total support, because they will ask for bigger maximum and lose interest in fighting for our support, and will attach less importance to it. Also, it is not certain whether it has been appropriate to unconditionally reject Dutch proposal on negotiations. And so on. These are the considerations which are normally kept in mind when deciding on our position. However, we have been providing and will keep providing maximum support.”²⁰³

Indeed, the Yugoslav diplomacy quickly spotted the realignment of Sukarno and Subandrio towards the United States, displacement of the figures prone to closer correlation with the Eastern bloc and China from the government, strengthening the role of the army.²⁰⁴ All this was interpreted as an attempt to resolve the question of the West Irian under the patronage of the United States. When this happened, Tito sent a message to Sukarno to congratulate him and stressed that it was “with great sympathy” that Yugoslavia watched the struggle of Indonesian people for “the realization of its legitimate national aspirations for full territorial unity of the country and removing the last remnants of colonialism”.²⁰⁵

It somehow happened that the end of colonialism in the history of Indonesia coincided with the end of the period in which Indonesia and Yugoslavia exercised the most intensive political cooperation. There came a time in which political contacts between the two countries and the two statesmen were no longer so intense.

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In December 1962, the Yugoslav state delegation led by the Vice President Edvard Kardelj visited Indonesia.²⁰⁶ The discussions were dominated by three

²⁰³ A MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, f-41, doc. 20, no. 41658, Telegram of K. Popović to the Ambassador Bebler, January 18, 1962

²⁰⁴ A MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, f-41, doc. 5, no. 48926, Telegram of the Ambassador Z. Štambuk from The Hague, March 16, 1962; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1962, f-41, doc. 5, no. 49417, Telegram of the Ambassador A. Bebler from Jakarta on March 18, 1962; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1962, f-41, doc. 5, no. 49416, Telegram of the Ambassador A. Bebler from Jakarta on March 18, 1962; A MSP RS, DA, PA 1962, f-41, doc. 2, no. 410184, Telegram of the Ambassador A. Bebler from Jakarta, March 26, 1962.

²⁰⁵ AJ, KPR, I-1/431, Message from J. B. Tito to the President Sukarno, August 16, 1962.

²⁰⁶ At the insistence of Sukarno, the Indonesian side organized a visit in December 1962, which was Kardelj’s desire. AJ, KPR, I-5-b / 40-4. Note on the conversation between Ambassador Bebler and President Sukarno, October 12, 1962.

themes – the internal reform, international situation, and bilateral relations. At the time, Indonesia was trying to build an economic and legal system “that corresponded to its terms” one of the main topics in discussions with Kardelj was “building socialism in Yugoslavia.” Yugoslavia saw the meeting as an opportunity to become better acquainted with the political and economic situation and examine the possibilities of Indonesia. Open discussions of Kardelj and Prime Minister Djuanda pointed to the similarities and differences in the problems the both countries were facing in an effort to reform the economy, stop the decline and achieve the production growth, build institutions, reorganize state-owned enterprises, relationship between state administration and workers, increase exports, modernize agriculture, and examine the possibilities of cooperation. Indonesia was interested in the Yugoslav experience and counted on the help of the Yugoslav experts. The mutual conclusion was that one should know and use the experience of another, but that actual results would be achieved only in case it was critically reviewed and adapted to the circumstances in which it was to be applied.²⁰⁷

Part of the conversation which dealt with the international themes included the exchange of information on the situation in the world. Kardelj informed his hosts about the relations of Yugoslavia with neighbouring Balkan countries, European countries and the great powers. He particularly emphasized the best possible relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. He outlined the relations with China (and Albania) expressing regret that Beijing “did not realize that the Yugoslavia policy was actually in favour of China.” With reference to Indo-Chinese conflict, Kardelj primarily spoke about the possible consequences it could have on the policy of non-alignment. He defined the relations with the United States and the West as “more or less normal” with “the elements of deterioration” resulting from the improvement in the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the course it took regarding the events in Cuba. Kardelj defined the policy of non-alignment which Yugoslavia had chosen as “a policy that consistently opposed colonialism, imperialism, aggression and generally politics from the position of powers.” Accordingly, he proposed the consultations among the small countries in the preparation of “world economic conference”.²⁰⁸

On the other hand, Indonesian side paid special attention to the development of relations between the Soviet Union and China, adding that Indonesia “kept out of this conflict.” With equal prudence and a desire to end conflicts and give way to negotiations Indonesian side defined the situation arising out of the Indo-Chinese conflict, stressing that it was very important “to keep India among

²⁰⁷ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1962, f-42, doc. 6, no. 443998. Notes about the talks of E. Kardelj in Jakarta on December 11 and 15, 1962.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

the non-aligned countries.” Prime Minister Djuanda also expressed the same attitude concerning the need “to find more universal solutions to some of the existing problems.” Similar views were shared regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, and liberation in the world. Djuanda paid special attention to the events in North Borneo, noting that Indonesia gave “moral support” to the liberation movement on the island with the aim to enable the people living there to “freely choose their government and build their country “. ²⁰⁹

Djuanda and Kardelj talked very little about the bilateral relations. A little something was said about the work of the group for the development of economic cooperation. The attention was drawn to the “generalized provisions” of economic protocols noting that the lack of precision could harm future cooperation. The Yugoslav representatives were informed that Indonesia had to review its economic policy as soon as possible as well as “the possibilities of the country” and its ability “to repay debts” and was, at the moment, unable to “take concrete commitments” in terms of placing Yugoslav loans, purchasing textile and equipment, investments, and building new facilities. They acknowledged that economic cooperation must be established in a way to “benefit” both sides.” The separation of economic cooperation and mutual assistance”, according to Kardelj, led to “the development of political relations.” In other words, “healthy” economic cooperation was the base of good political relations. ²¹⁰

On this occasion, Kardelj was honoured and given the due attention as any head of the state. Almost entire government of Indonesia participated in the talks. Kardelj had five meeting with Sukarno but did not get the chance for the thorough exchange of views because Sukarno avoided it. Yugoslav diplomats also spotted an important difference between the two “toasts” Sukarno made as a president, one at the banquet prepared in the honour of Kardelj, and another one made at the reception in the Yugoslav embassy. The first one was “conventional” and contained “inappropriate jokes”, while the other one was “warm just like in old times.” Economic talks were half as successful, but Indonesians got the impression “that we were an interesting partner”. As for the foreign policy, they reached a high degree of consensus. The views represented by Yugoslavia were in the spirit of the Belgrade Conference and were received “without resistance” The

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid. – In early 1963, the volume of exports to Indonesia amounted to 10.9 billion dinars. The structure of exported goods was dominated by military procurement. Imports, which amounted to 1.6 billion dinars, included a modest range of products which could be reduced to three items – raw rubber, bucket and tin. The main problems that have hindered the exchange of goods were weak trade networks, occasional appearance of Yugoslav companies in the Indonesian market, the absence of a long-term plan in cooperation. – A MSP RS, DA, PA 1963, f-29, no. 47098.

public was informed about the visit and “recalled Yugoslavia and Tito.” For the first time in a long time they refreshed memories of the Belgrade Conference. Yugoslav diplomats’ visit was evaluated as “absolutely positive”. The reports alleged that Sukarno in particular was “impressed by the fact that” in his performances Kardelj did not criticize the politics of China and promised a new visit.²¹¹ The entire visit was giving off the impression that relations between the two countries were at the new beginning.

In January 1963, after more than a year, Tito and Sukarno renewed correspondence. In his message of January 14, 1963 Tito informed the President of Indonesia on his views on the situation in the world, visiting the Soviet Union, talks with Khrushchev, the Berlin crisis, Indo-Chinese conflict, and of the impressions the Kardelj’s visit to Indonesia incited in Yugoslavia. Although it was of a formal nature, short and without specific details, the message was sent to Sukarno with the idea to renew a dialogue.²¹² The message directly “opened” the possibility to perceive the causes of a “gap” which was opened between Jakarta and Belgrade after the Belgrade Conference.

The time spent in “silence” had taken its toll, so that the Yugoslav diplomats in January 1963 estimated that the reason for Sukarno’s dissatisfaction lay in the fact that Yugoslavia “had become a serious impediment among the non-aligned countries regarding his pro-Chinese actions”. This conclusion was made due to the Sukarno’s criticism of Yugoslavia in his talks with Soviet Ambassador Mihailov. According to information from the Soviet side “forwarded” to the Yugoslav Embassy in Jakarta, Sukarno complained that he was not understood and supported by Yugoslavia in terms of organizing the “new Bandung”; Yugoslav “gestures” towards Malaysia (Ambassador Bebler visited Kuala Lumpur) were not considered as friendly acts at a time when Indonesia was helping liberation movement in the North Borneo; he was also critical of the Yugoslav support to India and attitudes of Belgrade towards the Indo-Chinese conflict; he had completely opposite views on the need for convening an international trade union conference.²¹³

²¹¹ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1962, f-42, doc. 27, no. 442295.

²¹² Sukarno was interested in the functioning of workers’ self-management in Yugoslavia, making production plans of enterprises, the way the economic system functioned. He was interested in the position of J. B. Tito on the Indo-Chinese conflict, as well as its assessment of who was to be blamed in this dispute. The explanation of the Ambassador Bebler that in the final stages of the dispute, in the opinion of the Yugoslav side, it was the China’s fault was not welcomed by Sukarno. AJ, KPR, I-1/432, Message of J. B. Tito to the President of Indonesia Sukarno of January 14, 1963; A MSP, PC, DA, PA 1963, f-38, doc. 24, no. 42842.

²¹³ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1963, f-38, doc. 24, no. 42726, Telegram of A. Bebler to Koča Popović, January 23, 1963.

The answer to Tito's message did not arrive before March 23, 1963. The delay of seventy days was not an accident and had symbolism. The intent of its drafter was to indirectly point to some of the questions whose different interpretations caused "discrepancies" in the relations between the two countries and offer explanations to confirm the correctness of the policy advocated in Indonesia. In Sukarno's message addressed to Tito, Indonesia's policy was defined as consistent and peaceful. The resolution of the conflict between India and China was attributed, among other things, to the initiative of six African-Asian non-aligned countries (Colombo group), which stressed the importance of regional cooperation and efficiency of the regionalist approach in which he believed and advocated the convening of a "new Bandung." In his message to Tito, Sukarno tried to define an unwanted position in which Indonesia found itself in terms of Malaysia and devoted most of the space and attention to this problem in his message. His unconcealed intention was to demonstrate Tito the validity of the attitudes of Indonesia on this issue. He declared the policy of Malaysia and its president Tunku Abdul Rahman hostile, anti-Indonesian, and "foreign subversive activity". Emphasizing the tolerance Indonesia had expressed in previous years, Sukarno stated that the attempt of the realization of the neo-colonialist ideas of the Malaysian Federation was an event that had "gone too far". Refraining from the conflict imposed on it, but also a strong position which demonstrated by the policy of "active confrontation", Sukarno explained as the need to once more promote the importance of "good neighbourhood and Asian solidarity."²¹⁴ A key part of Sukarno's address, in which he also emphasized the legitimacy of a regionalist model supported by Indonesia, presented the view "that the countries and peoples of Southeast Asia should work on active preservation of their security rather than let others plan and impose it from outside."²¹⁵ Everything expressed in the message, Sukarno perceived as overcoming the existing dispute, explanation of the reasons that contributed to the deterioration of the Indonesian-Yugoslav relations and the

²¹⁴ Disputes with Malaysia "broke out" about Sumatra to which Kuala Lumpur had pretensions, inciting rebellions against the Indonesian government, the establishment of military bases for training rebels, organizing Association of Southeast Asian Nations in, which did not include Indonesia, the Malaysian pro-Dutch attitude about the West Irian. Striving to form Malaysian federation, which would include the territory of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah, was seen as endangering Indonesian vital interests. Therefore, Indonesia was not ready to allow the realization of this neo-colonial project which would make its borders vulnerable. In contrast to the concept that encouraged Great Britain, Indonesia proposed that the population of the above mentioned areas should be allowed to decide about their own future. Along with that it supported the anti-colonial struggle of the population of those areas that were opposed to the idea of the Malaysian federation and offered as an alternative to the creation of an independent Federation of North Kalimantan. – AJ, KPR, I-1/432. Message of Sukarno to J. B. Tito of March 23, 1963.

²¹⁵ AJ, KPR, I-1/432. Message of Sukarno to J. B. Tito, March 23, 1963.

explanation of his one-year “silence”. The final paragraph of his message – “I intend to maintain regular contact with you, and keep you informed about events and developments in our part of the world”,²¹⁶ forecasted the better days in the Yugoslav-Indonesian relations.

The above “discrepancies” were not mentioned in a brief and informal visit of Sukarno in June 1963, but the visit clarified certain attitudes that determined the policies of both countries. On June 12, 1963 Sukarno and Tito met on board of the river ship “Krajina”. The talks were dominated by several topics. One of complex issues was “the creation of Malaysia” and the formation of a confederation that would include Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Sukarno informed Tito of the talks he had, at the insistence of the Malaysian side, with President Rahman in Tokyo. He marked “the creation of Malaysia” as a project “forced” by the English and Rahman and the fact that mid-1963 was the deadline by which the Great Britain had to give freedom to Singapore. Since 70% of the population in the city were of Chinese origin and under the strong influence of traditional China, the British tried in every way to prevent a situation in which Singapore would become a stronghold of the People’s Republic of China. In this context, they proposed the formation of a confederation which would include Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Sukarno informed Tito that he generally approved the creation of such a “group” provided that a number of provinces under British protectorate (Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo) get freedom and express their right to self-determination before the formation of the future confederation. Tito acknowledged the above without further comments.²¹⁷

Another topic discussed by the two presidents was the future of the policy of non-alignment. Sukarno fully agreed with the proposal of Tito to hold the conference in the “near future” which would be wider than the Belgrade Conference regarding the “number of participants and subject matter”. Tito was on the way to visit the countries of Latin America. Sukarno “authorized” Tito to “invite the governments of the countries to participate in the conference, and to count on Indonesia as one of the conveners of such a conference.”²¹⁸ It was possible that the unreserved support that Sukarno gave to universalistic principle in the organization of non-aligned countries was a surprise for those who knew the attitudes he represented, but it undoubtedly represented the success of the policy which Tito advocated.

In the months that followed, the relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia significantly improved, but they somehow lacked the desire which was pre-

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39–21, Note on the conversation between Tito and Sukarno of June 12, 1963.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

sent in the years preceding the Belgrade Conference. There is no doubt that each country was more mature due to the acquired experience both in bilateral relations and advocating different approaches to cooperation of non-aligned countries. During the visit of the Deputy Foreign Minister Ms. Supeni to Yugoslavia, the subject of the talks were the problems of Southeast Asia and the politics of great power, but she did not initiate any question concerning Yugoslavia's foreign policy, nor expressed interest in the position of Yugoslavia in international relations.²¹⁹ In November 1963, the two presidents exchanged messages about the upcoming GANEFO games that were to be organized in Jakarta.²²⁰ In December 1963, Tito informed Sukarno that he shared his views on the world developments. The message contained a lot of information about the talks he had with Khrushchev, impressions from the United States, the content of the talks in Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Mexico, the support they needed to provide to the countries of Latin America and the interest of small countries for a policy of non-alignment. The message sent to Sukarno was at the same time an invitation to the President of Indonesia to support the initiative on holding a wider conference of non-aligned countries.²²¹

This invitation came at the same moment when Yugoslav diplomats acquired the information about certain elements in Indonesian foreign policy which were not in compliance with its policy of non-alignment and which, objectively,

²¹⁹ A MSP RS, DA, PA 1963, f-38, doc. 26, no. 435308, Note on the talks between Undersecretary of State M. Nikezić with Ms. Supeni, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, October 22, 1963

²²⁰ Sukarno expressed satisfaction that athletes from Yugoslavia will take part in GANEFO, but, at the same time, he wondered why their number was reduced to only five contestants. In response J. B. Tito explained that the Yugoslav side felt it was important for its athletes to participate in GANEFO and that Yugoslavia would also send cultural and artistic society „Branko Krsmanović“. – AJ, KPR, I-1/434 Messages of Tito and Sukarno of November 2 and 12, 1963.

²²¹ The message, among other things, stated: “In my opinion, the current stage of the world development is characterized by intense process of polarization to peace forces and cold war forces, with positions of peace forces getting stronger. It is significant that this polarization takes place on a large scale encompassing many countries and almost all areas of the world. There is no one who is immune to this process: military-political group, ideology, even religious communities, and social systems ... In such an atmosphere, an initiative to hold a new conference of non-aligned countries, which was launched from several directions, is significant in my opinion, a further important contribution on the path of understanding and solving international problems. It could be particularly useful in efforts for disarmament and easing tensions, solving the most important issues of economic development, for the final eradication of colonialism and the like. In short, this conference could help the further progress on the road to the general application of the principles of peaceful and active coexistence.” AJ, KPR, I-1/434, Message from J. B. Tito to the President of Indonesia Sukarno, December 1, 1963.

performed “constant pressure” on foreign policy relations with Yugoslavia. Primarily, this meant “directing basic foreign policy efforts of Indonesia towards the implementation of a regional Asian-African action, together with – and sometimes under the decisive influence of – China”; Indonesia’s aspiration to promote the concept of “new emerging forces” that sometimes were at odds with the policy of non-alignment; reduction of Indonesian interest for the activities of non-aligned countries (especially for organizing a conference and maintaining relationships with non-aligned countries); constructing attitudes about “ideological disagreements” with Yugoslavia and growing tolerance towards the attacks of the Communist Party of Indonesia to the policy of non-alignment and Yugoslavia as its protagonist; constant pressures to obtain absolute support “for all its attitudes and actions,” which was a standard for determining the closeness of the relationship.²²²

In the first months of 1964 a decrease in the intensity of political relations became apparent. In the opinion of Yugoslavia, this was largely due to the efforts of Indonesia to bring about the holding of the second Asian-African conference (“second Bandung”) which distanced it from most of the activities of states engaged in organizing second conference of non-aligned countries. As Indonesia announced it would send its representatives to the preparatory meeting of the conference of non-aligned countries, and continued with the preparation of the conference of Asian-African countries, there was a doubt that it would use the upcoming preparatory meeting “to impose” the second Asian-African Conference as priority. Despite the fact that both sides declared that future conferences would not conflict, that they had the same goals, that the Asian-African was “more of nationalistic”, whereas the other, which gathered the non-aligned country was “more of internationalist character”, the existing doubt was destroying the foundations of the Yugoslav-Indonesian relations. It was further expressed by the support to the politics of Indonesia towards Malaysia, just like in times of crisis with the West Irian without willingness to unreservedly support every move of Indonesia. When it comes to economy, the crisis in relations between the two countries was expressed in total decline in commodity exchange which decreased by almost 25% when compared to 1962, and exports by 39%.²²³

Current situation could not have been “fixed” by the messages that Sukarno and Tito continued to exchange, messages which witnessed about the coopera-

²²² A MSP RS, DA, PA 1963, f-38, doc. 24, no. 441478, Note on some aspects of foreign policy of Indonesia, December 26, 1963.

²²³ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39–23. Note on some questions of bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia, March 20, 1964 Note on the reception of the Indonesian Ambassador R. A. Asmaun at State Vice President A. Ranković, March 23, 1964.

tion “that develops in all fields and becomes better and wider every day”.²²⁴ The meeting in Belgrade planned for the days immediately preceding the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo did not take place. Therefore, the idea that the two presidents should go together to this event, which was supposed to symbolize the uniqueness of attitudes, was not realized either.²²⁵

The meetings of Sukarno and Tito that occurred on October 5 and 10, 1964, at the Second Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo, were the last meetings of the two statesmen. The first meeting was somewhat different from all the previous ones. The exchange of information, expression of the same or different views on certain issues was followed by an overt nervousness, quite undiplomatic need for “skipping” and emphasizing leadership role among the Third World countries. Sukarno expressed evident dissatisfaction and underestimates of the gathering in Cairo, especially when it comes to the topics that were to be discussed and attitudes that were to be adopted, a readiness to value everything through the “prism” of the Asian-African countries, lack of patience and tolerance. Tito, in turn, expressed his views in a form that could not bring into question his firm convictions and authority, but yet tried not to let conversation slide into confrontation with each other, in a “quarrel”. It could easily happen, especially in interpretations of the phenomena about which the two presidents had identical opinion (imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, domination). While Sukarno insisted that the “focus” of the conference should be on the fight against imperialism and colonialism, Tito stressed that “it is not about the sequence” of the topics that would be discussed, “but how to set up the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.” In contrast, Sukarno resolutely emphasized that “he, Sukarno (is), for peace,” but also for “the struggle against colonialism and domination”; Tito insisted that these problems can be solved “only in a peaceful way and not in war,” which sounded like he criticized the policy of Indonesia towards Malaysia. Sukarno’s exclusivity and belittling the importance of the meeting in Cairo, which was also reflected in his statement that the conference would be “interesting for the Asian-African countries only if the topic number one was sentence and the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and its new form – neo-colonialism,” was followed by Tito’s sarcastic attitude that “all problems should be put in the first place” and that success would not fail if the daily struggle was lead “in all fields”. Tito’s observation about the importance of victory “in the fight for providing assistance to developing countries” as a contribution to the “liquidation of economic underdevelopment,” Sukarno reciprocated by the words “that help was not so important for the Asian-Afri-

²²⁴ AJ, KPR, I-1/437, Message from Sukarno to Tito, May 7, 1964.

²²⁵ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39–23, Invitation letters to Sukarno and postponing visits, August 13 – September 23, 1964.

can countries” and that help “was not the main thing that Asian-African countries were interested in.” On Sukarno’s remark that he did not like the way the word “help” was used regarding just liberated and underdeveloped countries, Tito replied that that term was not “about any kind of charity”, but about the cooperation in a number of fields. Sukarno’s insistence on protecting the interests of Asian and African countries, was opposed by equally legitimate needs and interests of the peoples of Latin America “to emancipate, to unite somehow and rely on someone”, as well as the obligation of the “non-aligned countries” to help them. On Sukarno’s remark that equal help in the fight against imperialism and colonialism can be provided by the conference of the Asian-African countries because these countries adopted “his ideas,” Tito favoured a broader model of assembly in which equal attention should be paid to the universal processes, and local peculiarities. Sukarno either “overheard ... or did not hear at all” Tito’s malicious remark that his views of “the current events in the world” are “too simplistic”. In the end, both presidents expressed the opinion that “the joined fight of non-aligned countries” was the priority of their policy and the ideal to which both they strive to.²²⁶ However, such conversation could have only been led by friends.

Tito and Sukarno last met on October 10, 1964. On that occasion, the two presidents agreed that the final document of the conference must be brief, “clear and concise, and that all details should be included in an annex.” Not paying attention to Tito’s sensitivity when it comes to the Belgrade Conference, Sukarno openly expressed the view that “the Cairo Conference achieved even greater results than the Belgrade Conference”. Tito equally openly pointed to the fact that the Cairo Conference “revealed great differences in the views between Yugoslavia and Indonesia.” Sukarno did not deny it, but tried to relativize the current dispute with a remark, with which Tito agreed, “that differences and even quarrels often occur between brothers, but (that) it does not mean that there is a real cleft among them.” In order to contribute to reducing the differences, Tito tried to calm a dispute that broke out at the conference about the meaning and the Yugoslav use of the concept of “coexistence” by a remark that “Indonesians did not understand well.” However, his explanation of the content and the context within which the term was used (Tito said that the word “coexistence” did not mean “maintaining the existing situation,” but a way to “resolve all issues in a peaceful manner, not through war,” he did not mean cooperation with colonialism, nor cease the struggle for the final liquidation of the more “alternative to general war”), only further affirmed that it was not that the Indonesians did not understand him, but that they did not want to understand him at the time. Despite

²²⁶ AJ, KPR, I-4-a/5, Note on the talks between Tito and Sukarno, October 5, 1964.

the fact that they parted with the promise that they would discuss all outstanding issues “in detail” during subsequent visit of Sukarno to Belgrade, life did not give them the opportunity.

In the years that followed the intensity of relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia faded. Yugoslav diplomacy did not manage to persuade Sukarno to revoke the decision to withdraw from the UN. Mediations in this issue brought no results.²²⁷ Foreign policy activities and internal political situation in Indonesia were followed with greatest interest, but diplomatic contacts between the two countries were no longer so intense and meaningful. The image of dramatic events that took place in Indonesia starting from October 1965 was based on agency news, press reports and information sent by Tanjug. The situation in Central Java, the activities of the movement “Thirtieth September”, the liquidation of several Indonesian generals, protests of Muslim youth, the campaign against the Communist Party of Indonesia and its suppression to the underground, the extremists’ actions, the involvement of the West in the process of Sukarno’s turnover, the reactions of China, rebellion, duality of governance, contradictions of socio-political development, attempts to take over the power, the search for compromise, strengthening the army, restraint of foreign diplomatic representatives in estimates of what would happen – all these were the “pieces” of a puzzle, but not a clear and accurate image of unstable situation and dramatic changes in Indonesia. By knowing the processes which were “speeded up” it was possible to anticipate some things, but daily surprises were common.²²⁸ Based on the gathered information, in addition to dualism on internal political level, the Yugoslav diplomats also spotted the dualism in foreign policy. There were contradictions in everything. Marking “Bandung spirit” as the guiding principle of foreign policy was accompanied by cancelling the “second Bandung”. The elimination of the Communist Party of Indonesia from the political life was explained by the need to “avoid turning right.” The tendency of fixing relations with the United States was followed by the attacks of Sukarno on the US Ambassador. In the chaos that shook Indonesia, there were some voices that emphasized the importance of the relations with Yugoslavia.

²²⁷ Indonesia brought that decision after the election of Malaysia to the Security Council. In a separate letter to Tito Sukarno informed him about the decision, and Yugoslavia was officially notified through diplomatic channels. – AJ, KPR, I-5.b/40–6 Note on the interview of Deputy Secretary of State M. Nikezić with the Ambassador of Indonesia R. Subyakto of January 13, 1965; AJ, KPR, I-1/438. Message of A. Sukarno to J. B. Tito of January 19, 1965; AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39–28, Note on the conversation between J. B. Tito and Ambassador R. Subiakto of February 25, 1965; AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39–29, Note on the conversation between J. B. Tito and Ambassador R. Subiakto of May 31, 1965.

²²⁸ More on this: A MSP RS, DA, PA 1965, f-55, no. 427707, 435588, 435589, 435623, 435624, 435666, 435967, 411164, 437610, 441581, 443273, 439192.

At the time of the coup Tito and Sukarno exchanged messages once more. Based on information he had and assessments he received, Josip Broz expressed the hope that “attempts to cause disorder and disruption of normal development of Indonesia” would be quickly hindered and that the Indonesian people, under the leadership of Sukarno, would continue along the way of “progress”, “preserving independence” and “achievements of the Indonesian revolution”. Sukarno replied with gratitude, deep respect and best wishes.²²⁹ And that was all. Half a year later, in May 1966, a group of Yugoslav parliamentarians who unofficially visited Indonesia and was able to meet and talk with Sukarno reported that he refused to talk about political issues. Sukarno was to give a statement before the Congress and face charges of autocracy, megalomania, and “orchestrated democracy.” Replying to the greetings, he invited “President Tito to Indonesia, where he would organize tiger hunting by a helicopter”.²³⁰

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Much of the interstate relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia, established in the fifties of the 20th century, have been sent to oblivion. That is the history, the experience worth re-examining. We believe that this is a way to reach out to a secure foundation and instructive signposts that “open” perspective cooperation between our countries in the future.

Ljubodrag Dimić
Aleksandar Raković
Miladin Milošević

²²⁹ AJ, KPR, I-1/439, Message of J. B. Tito to ASukarno and his answer of November 7, 1965.

²³⁰ AJ, KPR, I-5-6/ 40–7, Report of Yugoslav Inter-Parliamentary Union on Indonesia (P. Dapčević, J. Vilfan), June 2, 1966.



Josip Broz Tito



Sukarno

**DOCUMENTATION OF
THE ARCHIVES OF YUGOSLAVIA
AND
THE ARCHIVES OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA**

1

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on the situation in Indonesia**

London
TS. 190
April 21, 1947

In response to your telegram no. 45966 dated April 4th this year to the Embassy in London, it is my honour to submit the following incomplete report: The situation in Indonesia is quite complicated because of the complicated relations between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands on one side and difficult internal situation in the country on the other side. Although the two countries have declared the truce and there are no more negotiations, there are still armed conflicts between the two armies. The Netherlands is introducing the new troops and Indonesia is arming and preparing a large number of its population for guerrilla warfare. The territorial boundaries between the jurisdictions of both states were hurt many times especially by the Dutch with provocative intent to disrupt the truce and have an excuse for their colonizing goals. In addition, Indonesia is literally blocked by the Dutch navy and unable to export food and rubber, which Indonesia has in sufficient quantity. The Dutch themselves have declared a provision according to which Indonesia cannot export products that are grown on foreign land and simply considers that all goods produced in Indonesia are the property of Dutch citizens. In such a situation of the economic blockade and direct armed intervention, the government of the Republic of Indonesia has found itself in a rather difficult position because it cannot import the necessary machinery and products that are necessary for restoration and reconstruction. Despite the war circumstances the government is building its army, reinforcing political powers, introducing far-reaching measures to build the country.” The Republic of Indonesia was established more than a year and a half ago comprising the islands of Java, Madura, Sumatra and hoping to annex Borneo, Negara, Indonesia, and Timur if population wants it. Indonesia intends to include Celebes, which is not under the administration of the Netherlands; so far it is just a desire. The political structure is temporary; the new constitution has yet to be adopted by a constituent assembly, which would not come to life soon. Presently, the Republic of Indonesia includes individual islands that have their own administrative autonomy. The head of state is the President of the Republic Dr Sukarno with Mohammad Hatta being a Vice President. The Provisional National Assembly, co-called the Central Indonesian National Committee consists of the president-appointed deputies. The deputies are the representatives of individual parties and movements. At the last meeting in February and March in Malang – East Java – the number of parliament members amounted from 230 to 450 by the president’s

decree because the old Knip did not represent the nation properly, especially workers, farmers and communists. Parliament Presidency, so called Executive Committee was increased from 25 to 47 members and divided in proportion to the individual parties. Executive power belongs to the government and relevant ministries made up of politicians which are not party representatives. The Government and the President of the Republic have a leadership in their hands, while there is a conflict between the President and the Parliament, particularly because the President makes decisions without the approval of the Parliament as well as between the Government and political parties. There is a serious conflict within the Executive Committee regarding the elections and broadening the Executive Committee. All the advanced powers marked the Executive Committee as reactionary, not helping the government in revolutionary problems but dealing with internal party conflicts instead. The Committee is charged with sabotaging the government's decisions and not being able to care for the good of the nation. When the Executive Committee rejected the President's decision to expand the committee for legal and constitutional reasons, the President urged the Parliament to accept his decision threatening with his resignation and the resignation of the Vice President. Under such pressure the political decision was accepted unanimously. The Parliament consists of representatives of numerous parties and movements. At the last year session of the Parliament a united front – Persatuan Perjuangan – disintegrated in terms of the provided struggle and the fate of foreign interests. The government's attitude supported by the Socialists and some Christian parties gives priority to the suspension of fighting, diplomatic negotiations and neo-confiscation of foreign interests. The triumph of the Government caused a split in the front itself. Today there are a lot of small parties and fractions in the Parliament. The Socialist party – Partai Sosialis – with a ministerial president Sutan Syahrir is one of the most influential parties. The Socialist Party is a fusion of the former Partai Sosialis Indonesia Parsi under the leadership of Amir Sjarifoeddin, current Minister of Defence and OEI HWAT and party Partai Rajat Sosialis Paras under the leadership of Syahrir. Parsi has many members of the former Democratic Party from 1937 Gerindo – Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia, while Paras has many members from the party Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia – PNI to which Vice President Mohammad Hatta belonged. The latter were against cooperation with the Socialist Party considering it as the hideout of the liberal bourgeoisie and reaction, but it denies it and claims that country socialization is the part of the program. The party having a great reputation and a lot of supporters and which is assumed to be equally strong if not stronger than the Socialist party, is nationalist Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia PNI established after the proclamation of the republic. The party brings together the members of the former Gerinda party, as Dr Sarton, bourgeois nationalist and Dr A. K. Ghana, as well as some members of the pre-war PNI. This party includes mainly intelligence, traders, government officials, bureaucrats, but is not against nationalization – its motto being the social democratic nationalism. It gave... some m..... amendments of natio-

nalistic character against Indonesian-Dutch agreement, and in fact it has accepted agreement quite opportunistically. PNI together with Masyumi Muslim Party was the great strength of the executive committee and actually voted no-confidence to the President of the Republic. Masyumi represent strength among their followers and essentially represent the reactionary tendencies. In addition to these major parties, there are many smaller fractions particularly extreme nationalist and some ultra-left. Some of the most important parties were the Communist Party of Indonesia whose actual strength is unknown and whose leader is Sarjono. He was in exile in Australia before the war and during the war. The influence of the party and the number of members are growing, as evidenced by the fact that Sukarno appointed 33 new communist members of the Parliament and two have already been in the Parliament. There is also Hasan Raid in the executive committee. A few months ago the party held its conference. Concerning the Agreement with the Netherlands, the Party focused on Article 14 of the Agreement which provides for the return of property rights to all non-Indonesians. It seems that there is a tension between the party and the Communist Youth League Angkatan Komoeinis Moeda – which, by resolution, is against Linggadjati Agreement. According to the writings, the parties should be of the view that the nationalist democratic revolution in Indonesia was the part of the Marxist proletarian revolution, that the extension of the struggle would cause..... imperialist intervention, that it is needed now to build state economically, unite other countries and islands of the Republic and accept Linggadjati Agreement as a cover. This call in a socialist paper is so suspicious and of opportunistic nature that it is impossible to judge whether this is really the attitude of the party itself. The division within the Parliament and the party was clearly seen in the conduct of the Executive Committee concerning the President's decision. The Socialist Party, the Communist Pesindo [Pesindo] – Socialist Youth – Laskar Rakyat – fighting nationalist group, the Labour Party and the Youth Congress supported the President and the government, while the Muslim parties – Masyumi – nationalist parties and Barisan Banteng – a Republican fraction were against the President. In addition to these parties, there were also the representatives of Celebes, China Association Chung Hwa Hui – CHCH – representative of Borneo, the Catholic party, the Women's League – PPI [Pemuda Puteri Indonesia] – individuals not belonging to any party. Without going into the details of the leading figures of the Republic and the Government of which are known only names without detailed data, we see that the government is largely in the hands of the Socialists and several nationalists, supported by leftist parties and that there is opposition including the reactionary elements and Muslim nationalist parties. The revolution carried out by the people in Indonesia against the imperialist slavery had the character of a national revolution and was stopped by the socialists and nationalists influence as well as by direct intervention of the imperialist powers of the Netherlands and the UK from taking wider shape and starting to pose a threat to the reactionary elements in Indonesia. The agreement between the Republic and the Netherlands is only a continuation

of the same political lines and reflects the actual relation between the reactionary socialist leadership of Indonesia and imperialist satellite of the Netherlands. The so-called Linggadjati Agreement was drafted more than 13 months before the final signing in March 25th this year in Batavia. The Netherlands delayed the signing of the agreement; in the meantime, economic sanctions and military occupation and oppression exerted pressure on Indonesia. The journey of Indonesian general committee to the Netherlands meant capitulation. Democratic masses were not pleased, but the government needed an agreement. The Linggadjati Agreement did not provide a complete liberation of Indonesia from the imperialist yoke but only some type of condominium of both governments with greater rights of the Netherlands, which retained economic resources. The agreement has long been ready for signing and was only waiting for so-called Jonkman interpretation. Jan Jonkman Anne, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Trade said that the Indonesian republic can only be de facto recognised until the union between the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia provided by the Agreement receives a legal form. The Linggadjati Agreement represents a new form of voluntary cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Under this agreement the Dutch government recognizes de facto the Indonesian republic which has the authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra. Both governments will work on establishing a sovereign democratic government on the federal basis of the largest United States of Indonesia which will include the entire territory of Dutch India, Borneo, Negli / Negam / Indonesia and Timoer – Eastern Indonesian state – provided that the population decides on its origin on democratic basis, the Constitution of the United States of Indonesia should be adopted by the constitutional assembly. Willing to improve the relations, the two countries will jointly establish a Dutch-Indonesian Union, which will include Netherlands, Surinam and Curaçao and United States of Indonesia. The Union will have its organs for the development of common interests including the collaboration in the field of foreign political relations, defence if needed, finance, economy and cultural relations. The Union is headed by the Dutch King and Queen. He issues decisions presenting common interests. For the purpose of cooperation, both governments have high commissioners with another government. The Statute of the Union will: protect the rights of both parties, guarantee the fulfilment of their obligations, guarantee civil rights to all citizens, regulate the Dutch aid to the bureaucracy and administration until Indonesia organizes its own bodies, and protect human rights and freedoms in both countries. This Statute will be drawn by representatives of both countries and will be adopted by both parliaments. Both governments will ensure that both the United States of Indonesia and the Indonesian Dutch Union are created before January 1, 1949. The Dutch government is obliged to ensure the membership of the United States of Indonesia in the organization of United Nations immediately after the creation of the Dutch-Indonesian Union. The government of the Republic of Indonesia acknowledges the request of all non-Indonesians to rebuild their rights and restitute their properties. For the purpose of restoration and restitution,

they will establish mixed commissions. The Dutch government will make the necessary changes in its constitution with regard to the new situation in Indonesia. After signing the agreement both parties are required to reduce the army through mutual consultations. For the purpose of cooperation and execution of this agreement, both governments will create a separate organization including members of both countries with its secretariat. All likely disputes would be settled by arbitration under the chairmanship of a consensual plan of another nation, and if that fails then the president of international court would decide. Before signing the agreement the Indonesian delegation has said that it does not accept Jonkman's interpretation as valid. After signing the agreement the rest is a procedure, the Netherlands explain, i.e. only after the creation of the United States and Dutch-Indonesian Union Indonesia will be received to the UNO and only then the cooperation in foreign political relations will be of common interest. This means that before the creation of the Union, the Dutch government was the only one responsible for external political relations. But, to make a transition for taking over these jobs in the Union, the Dutch government tried to prevent establishing direct relations of other countries with Indonesia, before it agrees to it. The signing of the Linggadjati Agreement has not changed the factual situation. The Republic of Indonesia implements its legislation and its measures to build and strengthen its power, while the Netherlands continues the blockade and military actions wishing to destroy a young republic. Please note that there is little material available in London, therefore the report is incomplete.

Kos

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1947, F124, dos. 12, no. 47607

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on British policy towards Indonesia**

London, August 1, 1947

Conf. No. 1155

Subject: War in Indonesia

The events in Burma and the war in Indonesia can be an expression of the same policy that strives to prevent or localize national liberation movements all over the Far East. The English foreign policy balances between direct action and mediation policy. Direct actions on behalf of the Dutch, first in India and later in Indonesia and quite recently, in Burma, showed that British imperialism lost its inner strength and was forced to enter into a compromise with the organized parties on the spot. The recent developments provide reasons to believe that the official policy of the Labour government has definitely clarified what is possible today and what is not and therefore has tried to stop the process of disintegration of its colonial empire by merging imperial properties into British crown dominions. London is working very hard on this for two main reasons: 1. the movements for complete independence and separation are spreading and strengthening on daily basis not only against the British administration, but also against domestic elements, out of fear of revolution and everything that goes with it, still want some kind of British presence and 2. There is a risk that the "quarrels within the family" will leave the home and thus become the subject of international debate in which England would lose its privileged position.

In this situation, the issue of Indonesia is as much important to England as the issue of India or Burma, although Indonesia is not its land. This is because these three vast areas of the Far East, with homogenous population of over 400 million and natural resources, has all the preconditions to develop into a strong federation or a tight alliance against which the British forces would smash once it is actually founded. The focus of the entire British policy is therefore to incorporate these three elements in one and the same economic-political system: India and Burma in the British Commonwealth and Indonesia in so-called Dutch Union. This issue is vital for the survival of England in the Far East, which is the reason why England was fighting through Indonesia during 1945 and 1946, without which the Netherlands would never be able to return to their former possessions.

From 1945 until today, England has been helping the Netherlands in Indonesia both militarily and politically. The end of the war found the Netherlands with no army and no weapons in a country which has harboured a sharp traditional hatred towards the Dutch as a people and towards their colonial policy widely

famous for its ruthless exploitation and cruelty. The occupation of Java and Sumatra by Japan increased the hatred, since Japan, guided by its special interests, began to support the nationalist movement aiming at autonomy, if not independence of the island. When Japan left, the nationalist movement remained in an organized form and was so powerful that England had to make an armed intervention on behalf of its policies in India and for the account of the Netherlands, which had to continue the exploitation of resources on which it has lived for 300 years. To ensure the presence of the Netherlands in Indonesia, the British government, after a successful intervention, continued the arming of the Dutch occupation authorities and training the Dutch soldiers. Singapore was and still is the main basis for this.

The actions of London and further plans of English-Dutch capitalist imperialist bloc did not remain unnoticed in the general international politics. In February 1946, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Manuisky initiated the whole issue before the Security Council of the United Nations and asked for an international commission to be sent to Indonesia to investigate the circumstances and make suggestions. That request was rejected owing to Bevin's particular action which, from the very beginning, intended to remove any third influence in these parts of the Far East. Basically, Bevin also worked for the account of the United States which, at that time, were engaged in Japan and around. For this action Bevin has received great compliments in the Parliament and the English public, because it was believed that the relations will be fixed and will enable Indonesia the further exploitation of its riches. The abundance of natural resources is best illustrated by the fact that, until the Japanese occupation, there were about 2,500,000 hectares of rice in Indonesia. Indonesia also produces soybeans, sugar, coffee, tea and many other types for fat production. Also, there are substantial amounts of coal, petroleum, and tin. Therefore, it was no wonder three capitalist elements: American, English and Dutch met in its territory. However, given the geographic location of the island, the politics play a crucial role. Located between Malaya, India, Philippines and Australia, independent and progressive Indonesia would cut across the base of the whole imperialist system in the Far East.

For the English policy of incorporating the existing units of Empire into the British community, the creation of the Union between the Netherlands and Indonesia represents the best solution, because in this way, Indonesia would become a kind of a free state of the Dutch Union and simultaneously eliminate the impact of unsafe India on one side and the US imperialist policy on the other side. That was the reason why England, upon completing the first phase of the war in 1946, immediately suggested the Netherlands to make an agreement with the existing parties in Indonesia in order to create the Dutch Union. Thus, they moved from military to diplomatic actions.

In early 1946, the Lord Inverchapel (then Sir Archibald Clark Kerr), who is now the British ambassador in Washington DC, was sent to Batavia with a

mission to mediate the conclusion of an agreement on the creation of the Union between the Dutch administration and the government of the Republic of Indonesia. The Chairman of Indonesian Government Dr Syahrir accepted an agreement which The Hague, on the other side, refused to ratify because it was supposed to give a wider autonomy than the Netherlands wanted. Therefore, in August 1946, the English government sent Lord Killearn, special commissioner for the South-East Asia, to Batavia to re-mediate the agreement. The result of this mediation was Linggadjati Agreement concluded on March 25, 1947 which provided for the establishment of a federal government under the name of "the Government of the United States of Indonesia" on January 1, 1949. On the same day the Dutch-Indonesian Union would be proclaimed in which the Kingdom of Netherlands on one hand and the United States of Indonesia on the other hand would cooperate on the bases of "joint partnership."

From then until July 21, England continued mediating the negotiations on practical measures for the implementation of the agreement. According to an official statement from the Foreign Office on July 21, the main point of disagreement was the question of Dutch-Indonesian gendarmerie. It seems certain that the Netherlands wanted to take the entire gendarmerie under its exclusive administration, which was unacceptable for the Republican government although it was willing to make substantial concessions in this direction. England has proposed to put gendarmerie under the administration of a neutral party which was rejected by The Hague without further notice. Thus the negotiations have ended and the second phase of the war in Indonesia started, but this time the war was led by the Dutch soldiers trained in the British bases and supplied with British weapons.

The Dutch government has presented the war as "a police measure" for preserving peace and order in the country because the Republican government has not been able to do so or not willing to conform to the provisions of Linggadjati Agreement which, after all, it has sabotaged systematically. In that regard, the Dutch Governor Dr Van Mook arrested all members of the Republican government, occupied state buildings and offices and began the occupation of the country that was to become an "equal partner" of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

London was not surprised by the news about the war. More than a few months ago, it was clear that the Dutch might terminate the negotiations. According to the reports that have been publicized in London periodically, it seemed that the Dutch conservative circles were not able to accept the changes that the war and post-war time brought to all parts of the world, particularly to the Far East. The allied forces that eliminated the Japanese from the region were not seen as "liberating" because the masses saw it as the return to the old status, which nobody wanted. The Dutch administration continued "as usual". It accepted formal political equality with the new, aroused Indonesia, but at the same time requested a full restitution of properties and goods that were previously held and exploited by the Dutch owners. Furthermore, it insisted on controlling the police apparatus

of the new Republic. If, initially, it was "silent", it was because the Dutch forces were still weak, and the British armed assistance was still needed. Thus, through the entire post-war period, the Netherlands have been gathering the army that now engages about 100,000 people, which the British could not fail to notice. Great Britain approved and even actively assisted, but did not want the Netherlands to use the army at war, and therefore corrupt the political plans of the British Government, but to use it to ensure the implementation of an agreement, which was mediated by the England and concluded with regard to the general situation in the Far East, not only to the situation in Indonesia. Thus, the British government took upon itself the amount of responsibility it cannot evade today.

Although England may not be taken aback by the turn of events in Indonesia, It has certainly been unpleasantly surprized by this "independent" attitude of the Netherlands which it has been actively supporting and would not even today leave to itself regarding a sensitive issue such as the future status of Indonesia. Even the conservative English press was forced to distance itself from the "unwise procedure" of the Dutch government and "divide" the blame for the recent developments on both sides with observation that giving full freedom to the peoples of Indonesia was beyond any "practical and wise policy." In the Parliament, British government itself kept "explaining" what was done so far but did not involve the Parliament into any detailed discussion about this development. But it has, in a way, expressed its displeasure with The Hague which it says has exhausted all possibilities of compromise and mutual tolerance. Out of fear that the responsibility for what has been done so far would be transferred mainly to it, the Foreign Office, in its statement of July 21, found it necessary to emphasize that the action of the English government was, in all the times, undertaken in "full consultation" with the government of the United States.

If not military, the political action of Washington in Indonesia was stronger than the London's. It was stronger because it was accompanied by an offer of a loan which was meant to cause the Republican leaders of Indonesia to make many concessions. According to the Daily Worker (July 23) it seems that the US government has openly informed the Indonesian government that it does not expect any loans before it accepts all the Dutch proposals that are "in the interest of peace and public order." This certainly influenced the attitude of the today's president of government Sjarifoeddin who agreed to certain concessions on the issue of the gendarmerie on which the Foreign Office reports. However, it seems to influence the Dutch government which understood the US intervention as *carte blanche* for military action or which was said to understand it that way. Daily Worker believes that the Dutch would not have decided to take this step without a clear American support in any case. Starting a colonial war against people who feel ready to be independent and who can count on millions of compatriots, was a risk that the Netherlands could not take by itself. Judging by the general political line of the Foreign Office in relation to the Far East, it could not be concluded that the En-

glish official policy was ready to support the Dutch armed action in Indonesia. It could be rather concluded that the Netherlands simply “pulled itself out” of the English hands once it felt strong enough and saw that Washington provided.

Former Prime Minister of the Republican government Dr Syahrir fled from the country and acted from India for a new liberation of Indonesia, and today’s Prime Minister, Sjarrifoeddin remained in the country. The fact that Dr Syahrir went to India is understandable when one bears in mind that today’s India is the central point of all liberation movements in the Far East. According to Pandit Nehru, “the bombing of defenceless people is a scandal” and the spirit of the new Asia will not tolerate such things. The fact, Nehru continues, “that the foreigners are fighting at the Asian territory is itself an insult to the whole of Asia.” Nehru’s attitude is very seriously monitored in London, and his statement that he would refer the issue of Indonesia to the United Nations, is interpreted as a very independent move of a new India.

In London, Mohammad Ali, the spokesman for the government of Indonesia, openly accused the British authorities for allowing Singapore to become a major naval base for supplying the Dutch “unprovoked war.” According to him, the British Ministry of War admitted that England had armed 62,000 Dutch soldiers and was trying to arm another 19,000. At the intervention of the Foreign Office, the State Department, according to Mohammad Ali, agreed to send 53 tanks to Batavia. The Government of Indonesia is ready for “fair mediation” in order to stop the war, but it will never agree to “unconditional capitulation” to the Dutch colonial tyranny, says Mohamed Ali. The charges of Mohamed Ali passed quite silently in the English press, the Daily Worker being the only exception.

How big the direct responsibility of the official England was for the opening of hostilities in Indonesia is hard to say. It is more likely that they were not advised by the British government. This, however, did not mean that other UK organizations were aside. England’s colonial policy was, as a rule, led independently from the responsible government, which subsequently sanctioned the facts or denied them depending on how the thing worked. It is important to note that, according to a Reuter’s report from The Hague, a new British aircraft carrier “Venerable”, constructed in 1945, was given to the Netherlands. British Admiralty, when asked about the price of the ship, did not want to reveal the price but did not deny the fact either.

In January 1946, Bevin managed to stop the issue of Indonesia being referred to the Security Council and boasted of it. This time the thing was set quite differently. When the proposal was submitted by Manuilsky, it was interpreted as “an attempt of the Soviet Union” to “stir things up” in the Far East. When it was submitted by Nehru, was no longer seen as a political “intrigue”, but rather an “appeal” to the international public to once more prevent the invasion of colonial policies to the people who once left the sphere of foreign tutorship and exploitation. It is expected that England and USA would try to “include” the issue in the

procedure of the Council to get time for the conclusion of a new agreement with the imprisoned Republican government or another, if this persists in its attitude. This will be particularly underlined by the British government which never cared to prolong riots there where its empire is slipping away and where it wants to replace one colonial policy with another. Will it succeed in getting the Netherlands to compromise, depends on the support of the Washington to one or the other side. Once again, London has taken the position of a mediator. However, judging by the present and former attitude of the Netherlands, London does not exclude the possibility that the Netherlands would keep on with its own policy until "being taught a lesson." The fact that the Far East is burning with a very flaming fire of a new and powerful enthusiasm of broad masses leads to the conclusion that this time London may just be right.

Ambassador
Dr Ljubo Leontić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1947, F-124, dos. 12, no. 418364

3

Special Envoy of the Republic of Indonesia for Central and Eastern Europe to the Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Praha

Praha XIII, January 28, 1948
Tř. Krále Jiřího 1072, tel. 92179

To Mr Darko Černež
Ambassador of the Federative People's Republic of Yougoslavia

Dear Mr Černež,

Allow me to acknowledge you, that, after having been in charge of the Indonesian Information Service in Prague for some months, on January 13, 1948 I received a telegraphical appointment from my Government as her Special Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary for Central and Eastern Europe. Enclosed please find a duplicate of the letter of authorization which I have received by post to day.

According to my instructions my Government anxiously desires to enter into diplomatic and other relations with yours, a very natural course due on one hand to the aim of the Indonesian Republic to have friendly relations with all democratic countries and on the other hand to the popularity that especially the countries of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. are enjoying in Indonesia. In view of this I should like to request you to grant me an audience in order first to introduce

myself to you and to have informal discussions and exchange of information on the questions concerned.

Since my instructions are covering the whole of Eastern Europe, I have sent similar letters to the Ambassadors or other representatives of all the Eastern-European countries, represented here in Prague, About the same problems I have already had a fruitful, although informal conversation with Dr V. Clementis, State Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Thanking you in anticipation, I remain,

Yours truly,
Soeripno m.p.
Special Envoy and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the Republic
of Indonesia.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1948, F-159, dos. 11, no. 43702

4

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in Praha to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on the first official contact between Indonesian
and Yugoslav diplomatic missions**

Praha, February 2, 1948
No. Cab. no. 109/1948

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Minister of the Republic of Indonesia.

Attached is the copy of a letter, received from the former Chargé d'Affaires of the Indonesian Information Service in Prague Mr Soeripno who on January 13 this year received the act of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Mr Sukarno by which he was appointed the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister for Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union with headquarters in Prague. Please, send us directives.

Death to fascism – freedom to the people!

Ambassador
Dr Darko Černej

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1948, F-159, dos. 11, no. 43702

5

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in Praha to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on the first official Yugoslav-Indonesian meeting
in Czechoslovakia's capital**

Praha, March 22, 1948
No. Cab. no. 254/1948

Regarding your confidential dispatch no. 43702 I was waiting for your directives on the issue of relations with the representative of Indonesia, Soeripno. Since I received no instructions, based on the interviews with Zorin from 24-II-48, who told me that Bodrov as the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires received Soeripno and talked to him, I also decided to receive Soeripno.

On March 11, 1948 Soeripno paid me a visit. At the very beginning of the talks, he said that the meeting was for informational purposes only. Soeripno extensively explained the situation in Indonesia and said that he was preparing memorandum and various materials on this situation for the Soviet Embassy. I asked Soeripno to send the material to me. On 19th this month I received a letter with the transcript of the material, which is hereby enclosed.

It should be noted that the Soeripno was also received by Dr Clementis.
May the Ministry be so kind as to send us directions on this matter.
Death to Fascism – Freedom to the people!

Ambassador,
Dr Darko Černej

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1948, F-159, dos. 11, no. 48105

6

**Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the UN
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade**

New York
Number: Conf. 375
December 8, 1949

We abstained from voting in the Committee and did not give any statement by substance and procedure to the Plenum regarding the Indonesian issue. The resolution supporting the Hague Agreement was adopted. It is interesting that the

resolution was submitted by 14 countries – participants of the Conference in New Delhi. The Hague Agreement was portrayed as a victory of Asian countries against colonialism. The Dutch, American and Belgian were the only ones from the Western bloc who spoke – all with the allusion to the Yugoslav issue. The attitude of the Soviet bloc was completely isolated. We think that our participation should be well prepared for the discussion in the Security Council. The latest documentation on Indonesia was sent to you by a courier.

Vilfan

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1949, F-89, dos. 7, no. 422379

7

**Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia at UN
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade**

New York
Conf. no. 360
December 14, 1949

The discussion on Indonesia in the Security Council took two sessions. Canadian resolution on the acceptance of the Hague Agreement and on the extension of the committee was treated by the Soviets. Ukrainian resolution that is identical to the draft resolution for Gen. Assembly was rejected by 9 votes to 2. For now, despite the veto, there is no intention to return to the discussion on the Hague Agreement. However, it is not excluded for January. Besides, we must keep in mind that the question of SC membership will soon be considered. Also, there is a possibility that later this year, Indonesian question of New Guinea will be raised before SC. At least, that is the intention of Indonesia. Given the harsh Soviet stance on one hand and inconsistent support of the Hague Agreement by all Asian countries on the other hand it is very important to gather as much information about situation in Indonesia. The Soviets claim that the fights are still going on, that entire units of Indonesian army have joined the resistance, that some territories have been liberated etc. This is only supported by the data presented to the General Assembly by Manuilsky. The American press has been silent about Indonesia for months. The speakers at SC were also suspiciously silent on this issue. We may be able to find out something more from The Hague and our Consulates in India. The Hague Agreement which was only superficially addressed by Ninčić and given a lot of positive reviews should be assessed in detail in Belgrade. The USSR was inconclusive about it; however, its criticism of the regulations on the Dutch armed forces seems solid. The Dutch presentation in SC clearly

showed the Dutch tendency to interpret the agreement as a means of breaking political unity of Indonesia. Delegation member who is in charge with studying the documentation and monitoring the issue is Comrade Popović.

Vilfan

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1949, F-89, dos. 7, no. 422378

8

Embassy of Yugoslavia in The Hague to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade

Conf. no. 711
December 23, 1949

Subject: on the work and the agreements
reached at the Round Table Conference.

The Round Table Conference ended the work reaching the agreements regarding the problem of “the transfer of sovereignty” and the draft of the statute of Dutch – Indonesian Union with particular amendments to the future co-operation.

The Agreement on the transfer of sovereignty provides for a formal declaration of absolute sovereignty of the United Republic of Indonesia no later than December 30, 1949 except for New Guinea, which temporarily retains its status quo and whose future political status will be determined within the next year.

The statute project of Dutch-Indonesian Union contains a decision by which the United States of Indonesia become “a democratic constitutional state on a federal basis” where the sovereign authority was in the hands of the government elected by the National Assembly and the Senate.

Republican territory – it says – consists of seven “negaras” or autonomous states, and nine other constitutionally independent units.

The Statute also governs future mutual relations of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia in external, defence, economic and cultural field.

Standing at the head of this Union would be Dutch Queen Juliana, and successors of the Dutch crown by the right of inheritance.

Indonesia is given the right to “own” foreign policy and to organize and hold its own diplomatic service. Indonesia will also, with certain limitations, manage its foreign policy.

All issues, if they are not solved during occasional ministerial meetings will be submitted to arbitration, in the case of equal number of votes, to the Chairman of the International Court in The Hague.

The agreement also provides that “shortly” the Netherlands will have to evacuate its military units from Indonesia and that the Indonesian military personnel will include only natives. The Netherlands will, however, supply this army with instructors and materials.

As to Indonesian Navy, which has not existed until today, the Dutch support will be essential and important. First of all, the Netherlands will supply ships and cooperate in the formation of Indonesian professional and qualified workforce. Surabaya port will be at the disposal of the Dutch navy and managed by a Dutch officer who will be directly responsible to the Indonesian military authorities.

The initial efforts of the Dutch to keep the leading position in Indonesian economy, did not give the desired results. Indonesian delegation, however, objected to any direct interference and influence of the Netherlands in this field, since it would impair and prejudice the sovereignty of Indonesia. The Dutch made concession about the problem of national debt by taking upon themselves two billion out of the six and a half billion guildens of debt.

Early at dawn on December 9, with 79 votes against 21, the Dutch parliament adopted the agreements reached by the Dutch and Indonesian delegates during the Round Table Conference and signed on November 2. The First Chamber i.e. the Senate shall hold a session this week to make a statement and no doubt it will follow the example of the Second Chamber.

Given the fact that these agreements needed two-thirds majority in government circles to become legally effective, there was a considerable concern during the parliamentary discussion preceding the vote. The government, however, could certainly count on the votes of its regular parliamentary majority, i.e. the socialists and Catholics, but the total number of these does not constitute the required two-thirds majority.

Under these circumstances and due to the fact that the government could not expect (and even less compel) the consent of deputies of the Communist and Anti-Revolutionary Party, the fate of the agreements with Indonesia depended on the position and orientation of two small parties, namely: the Christian Historical Party and Liberal Party. Thus, these two small parties with a total of 17 votes have become arbiters of the situation.

These two parties once supported a policy of “firm hand” during the last military actions of the government in December 1948. This fact was a serious reason for the government’s concern regarding the possible withdrawal of the parties and their position in the final vote.

The attitude of the parliamentary majority and minority in the Parliament discussion

During the Parliamentary discussion on the agreements, the Socialist Party gave its unanimous support to the government. After all, the party advocated a peaceful settlement of Indonesian problem from the very beginning.

As to the Catholic party, especially its left wing headed by prof. Romme, the situation was more complex. Since December 1948, i.e., since the second Dutch military expedition to Indonesia, professor Romme represented – as we have mentioned in our previous reports – and advocated with his counterparts, the policy of “strong-arm”. However, when the Dutch government, under the grip of the US, had to withdraw and begin negotiations with the Indonesians in 1949, prof. Romme did not agree with this basic change of the Dutch attitude towards the Indonesian problem. He has quite long kept his opposition stance, but had to give in to the request of the Catholic trade unions, who did not want to complicate and possibly terminate the agreement with the Socialists. Prof. Romme yielded to the request of his own Catholic party, which is, as it is well known, a Dutch party of big capital.

During the discussion in Parliament prof. Romme complied with the party discipline and spoke in favour of ratification, “although the solution of Indonesian problem was not ideal, there was nothing better.”

The ad hoc opposition of Communist Party of the Netherlands and Anti-Revolutionary Party was sharp and open. The speakers of the latter one openly stated and emphasized that the work of the Round Table was the result of a shameful capitulation under the pressure of the USA; that the agreement was incompatible with the Dutch Constitution; that the future Dutch Indonesian Union was nonsense; and that the Dutch Queen, as the head of the Union, had no authority.

On the other hand, the Communist Party of the Netherlands, through its leader de Groot, has once again pointed out that Indonesia has not achieved its independence and that the Dutch control over Indonesia will now be replaced by control of the US big capital.

Rebus sic stantibus government was forced to make clear that the Parliament would resign if the conclusions and agreements made at the Conference of the Round Table are not adopted and approved. This warning particularly relates to the criticism of some MPs belonging to the majority. The same declaration points out that the refusal of the agreement would have unmeasurable consequences for Indonesia because the government would not be able to handle the situation that would arise and take over the responsibility.

In the same statement, the government admits that they have compromised more than they initially intended. It is also aware of the anxious impression of the Dutch people at this time when the end of the traditional relations is near. The strongest argument, however, by which the government defends its role and a

share in the conclusion of the agreement, is the fact that, in its opinion, there was no other solution and that rejecting the ratification would mean a national disaster for the Netherlands. On this occasion the government's declaration does not make any references to US pressures, but on the other hand it clearly and openly warns and declares that, in the event that the agreement is not approved, the Netherlands would be under such a strong foreign pressure that it would have to recognize the independence of Indonesia under even more difficult conditions than they are today.

The Dutch Public and the Agreement

The Dutch public was not very much enthusiastic about the signing of the agreement. From the beginning of the Round Table Conference, the Dutch followed its work with great scepticism and gradually got used to accepting the results without much excitement. On the other side, the political circles, especially those of the ruling parties – if not through public appearances and special resolutions, then at party meetings, strongly denounced concessions that the Dutch delegation made in favour of the Indonesians when drafting the agreement. Thus, the day after ratification, prof. Romme was repudiated by his party at the meeting in Utrecht area immediately after the ratification of the agreement. During the discussion, one of thirteen speakers reproached Romme that he and his “strong-hand” policy are guilty because he lost a son in Indonesia. On this occasion, prof. Romme defended his position by the argument that he did not want to overthrow the government with anti-revolutionaries and communists.

It is said that the military circles also criticized the ratification of the agreement. These circles, among other things, highlighted the paradoxical position of the Dutch naval units in Surabaya – the port that was at the disposal of the Netherlands – whose commander, although the officer of “Royal Navy” was subordinated directly to the Minister of Defence of the United States of Indonesia.

Press

The agreement did not get better reception in the local press, either conservative or advanced.

The vast majority of local dailies, each having its own views and motives, criticized the decisions and results of the Round Table Conference.

Thus, the main journal of the Communist Party “De Waarheid” asked and answered the following questions: “Would you say that the Netherlands is an independent country if Helder became the naval base of a foreign power? For the same reasons, Indonesia will not be independent if its central naval base remains under foreign control. Can we say that Indonesia is independent, when the colonial law guiding the Dutch policy for 300 years and turning Indonesia into the country for the Dutch exploitation, is today supported by Hatta? Can you talk ab-

out voluntary mutual cooperation, when Hatta agreed to recognize the right to the Netherlands to exercise control over Indonesian finance and economics until old debts and present commitments are settled? Can you talk about independent Indonesia if Hatta obliged himself to ask The Hague each time he wanted to sign an agreement with another country?"

Commenting on US efforts to control the UN over the execution of the agreement, the same journal says: "Now the position of Cochran is stronger than ever. Dutch imperialists bowed their heads before the Wall Street. They had to give up all the authority and Indonesian raw materials that would be sent to America. By signing the agreement they committed and agreed to convert Indonesia to the province or territory occupied by the Americans."

Liberal "Algemeen Handelsblad," recapitulates the history of "three centuries, through which the energy of the Dutch and the Dutch love to this equatorial country brought benefits to the Netherlands as well as to Indonesia. Now, however, the circumstances which are the result of international pressure, not always wise and disinteresting, led to the liberation of Indonesia and the transfer of sovereignty and history itself will show whether this was really in the interest of the people who settled on the islands."

Ultraconservative weekly "Elsevier", in one of its deliberations on the agreement ratification, writes: "It's miserable and sad, but we must try to endure in spite of everything, to work hard and to fulfil our duty. We will appreciate this lousy deal and perform the obligations of the contract that offends us with honour and dignity."

Finally, the counter-revolutionary "Trouw" ends its comment, as follows: "In conclusion we can say that the Dutch government acted anti-constitutionally in contrast to the dignity and authority of the Netherlands."

Appointment of Dutch High Commissioner for Indonesia

The Dutch government has appointed Dr Hirschfeld the High Commissioner in Indonesia.

Dr Hirschfeld was born on May 25, 1899 in Bremen (Germany) and acquired his PhD degree in 1922 in Rotterdam.

From 1925 to 1930 he was head of the department of statistics and economics of "Javasche Bank" in Batavia, and in 1931 was appointed Director General of Trade and Industry Ministry of Economy. From 1940 to 1947 he was Secretary General of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. From 1947 he was entrusted with the general administration of the Marshall Plan in the Netherlands.

The fact that the government has not appointed the prominent political figure as a High Commissioner, but one of finance and economic experts, leads to the conclusion that it is time we tried to provide those economic concessions that

managed to obtain from Hatta through USA. On the other hand, the appointment of Cochran political and diplomatic representative of the USA in the Republican government indicates the probability that the expert on Indonesian matters entrusted to the major political control in Indonesia.

The appointment of Hirschfeld was recorded as a part of protocol including the above information from his clerical career. However, judging by the interviews with some Dutchmen it can be concluded that Hirschfeld was seen as a collaborator of the occupier. These charges were based on the fact that Hirschfeld could not stay in such a delicate position during the occupation without doing favours to Germans. This assumption is reinforced by the fact that Hirschfeld was of Jewish origin.

Agreement before the Indonesian Parliament

Indonesian Parliament approved the agreement with 226 against 62 votes; 31 delegates abstained from voting. Those who voted against were: the Communist Party of Indonesia; Tan Malaka's communists (Trotskyists) and ten independent MPs. Socialists did not vote.

On the same day the representatives of the sixteen states of the United States of Indonesia signed the statute in the same building, the building in which Dr Sukarno proclaimed the Republic.

The press has not published any special news on a military situation. Also, it could not be reliably told whether the territory that was the scene of recent armed conflicts, was free or not. However, at different locations in Sumatra and Java, as recorded by the Western press, the situation was not clear. Paris "Le Monde", for example, reports that farmers with plantations in Delhi, feeling "unsafe", sought the intervention of the conference in The Hague. One of the latest issues of the same journal brings a report of its permanent correspondent in The Hague who announces the riots that will occur in the time of the transfer of sovereignty, even a "revolution in which the troops of Dar-ul-Islam (communist-oriented) would oppose Republican army with the support of the Indonesian Communists and the Chinese illegal associations."

The above quote was given not so much as a particularly safe guideline on further developments in Indonesia, but rather to indicate the continuous efforts of the friends of colonial Netherlands to emphasize the necessity of further stay of the Dutch armed forces in order to entrust the suppression of the progressive movement in Indonesia to Dutch and not to Hatta's troops.

It seems, however, that the above-mentioned efforts were not in vain. According to the press releases of the National Committee for the transfer of sovereignty, of Batavia, published in Warheid in the issue of December 16, the Dutch land forces and navy units may at any time be used for military action at request of Indonesian government, with the aim to maintain peace and order.

If this is true, nothing can better than this explain a two-faced role of Hatta and his delegation at the conference in The Hague as well as the deception by decision and the solutions brought at the Round Table Conference, which we suggested in our report Conf. no. 558 of September 13th.

The Dutch Senate (First Chamber) approved an Agreement with one majority vote. Due to the lack of time we cannot take this opportunity to look in more detail the course of the debate in the Chamber. It will be done later by the first courier mail.

We hereby enclose the French translation of the excerpts containing the comments of the Dutch press, speaking deputy de Groot (CP) and the Minister Marsaveen regarding the above.

Ambassador,

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1949, F-89, dos. 7, no. 423254

9

Embassy of Yugoslavia in London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade

London
Number 71
January 30, 1950

On January 26, I received the following note from the newly-appointed Chargé d’Affaires of the Indonesian Republican government doctor Subandrio: “I have the honour to inform your excellency that I was appointed Chargé d’Affaires of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia in the UK and that until the appointment of the ambassador I am authorised to act on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Indonesian republic.” The Government of the Indonesian Republic seriously wants and hopes that relations with the government of Yugoslavia will be cordial and friendly and that good understanding will prevail between them. Please, receive my According to the protocol I should answer by February 5. Please send instructions: shall I say something regarding the expressed desire of the Indonesian Government, or shall I just keep to the protocol.

Cicmil

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1950, F-105, dos. 12, no. 41867

10**Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia Edvard Kardelj to the Prime Minister of Indonesia Mohammed Hatta**

Belgrade,
February 1, 1950

To the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United States of Indonesia,

Dr Mohammed Hatta

Jakarta

I have the honour to announce that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia decided to recognize the United States of Indonesia as an independent sovereign state.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia suggests the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Please, Mr President, accept the assurance of my respect.

Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal
People's Republic of Yugoslavia

Edvard Kardelj

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1950, F-105, dos. 12

11

**Prime Minister of Indonesia Mohammed Hatta to the Deputy Prime
Minister of Yugoslavia Edvard Kardelj**

Jakarta,
February 6, 1950

His Excellency Edvard Kardelj
Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your message stating that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia decided to recognize the United States of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign state and proposing the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries.

Acknowledging the above statement, it is my honour to express the appreciation on behalf of the Government of the United States of Indonesia. My Government is willing to start negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Mohammed Hatta
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1950, F-105, dos. 12, no. 42220

12

**Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia at the UN to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade**

New York
Conf. 78
February 21, 1950

I was paid a visit by Indonesian representative Mr Palar. He told me that his government was happy about the proposal of Yugoslav Government to exchange diplomatic representatives. They decided that Yugoslavia should be among the first European countries with which Indonesia will exchange representatives. But for now, Indonesia has no missions in Europe and is working on it. In further

conversation Palar explained the difficulties in establishing his diplomatic service. On several occasions he mentioned the strong pressure exerted on them and their need for foreign loans. He said they have just got a loan of 100 million dollars here. As to the reception in the UN he said that Soviet veto was the only threat, and that Malik would let them know that Indonesia would not exchange representatives with the USSR until the USSR was preventing the entry of Indonesia in the United Nations. The point of all this in terms of exchanging representatives with us is the fact that the next step would be considered later depending on the political circumstances and consent of the Western great powers.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1950, F-105, dos. 12, no. 48449

13

Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia at the UN to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade

New York
Conf. 273
June 8, 1950

The Ambassador of Indonesia Palar paid a visit and announced that his government was now ready for the exchange of diplomatic representatives. During the conversation he said that he was promised by Vyshinsky that the USSR would not veto the admission of Indonesia to the United Nations. He got the impression that the Soviet Union was very interested in the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Indonesia and would perform the exchange in the rank of ambassador in a short time. They will not exchange diplomatic representatives with other Eastern European countries. Asked whether he got any directives from his government in terms of our representatives, he said he did not, and that he thought that his government would accept any suggestion coming from us. His personal opinion is that the first representative of FPRY could have the rank of a minister and later be promoted. Due to the lack of staff they will temporarily appoint one of their representatives from Western Europe as a representative in Belgrade. I told him that FPRY would send its representative to Indonesia. He replied that our representative would be welcome. I ask for guidance.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1950, F-105, dos. 12, no. 413888

14

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in New Delhi to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia in Belgrade**

New Delhi
Number 152
August 17, 1950

In the conversation with Indonesian Ambassador about the accreditation for Javorski he categorically stated that his government would respond positively and that he believed that the delay had certainly been due to the Government's preoccupation with large internal reforms and other difficulties in the country. As it can be seen from the latest news, the Indonesian Government has been working hard to declare a United State of Indonesia on the day of the Indian national holiday – August 15th as opposed to a federal republic with sixteen units which was imposed by the Dutch and represented the source of the weaknesses and danger to the unity and survival of the Republic. In earlier conversation with the Ambassador I have got the impression that Indonesia wants more than just an exchange of diplomatic representatives. During the conversation he told me that they will participate at the January session of the international commission for irrigation and that maybe on this occasion our exhibition could be transferred from Delhi to Indonesia. I'm leaving this to the organizers of the exhibition.

Derda

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1950, F-105, dos. 13, no. 419043

15

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia in Belgrade**

London
No. 760
September 14, 1952

Yesterday Šokorac was visited by Sudjomo Hudyonoto, publicity officer of the Indonesian Embassy in London. He said he came by the order of Ambassador and asked Šokorac to inform his superiors about the subject of their conversation. He particularly emphasized that none of the officers of their embassy sh-

ould know. He was authorized to say that their government had definitely decided to open a mission in Belgrade headed most likely by a deputy minister. For financial reasons, they cannot open an embassy, and therefore the number of people in the mission would be limited. At the same time, they will open an embassy in Moscow. The opening of representative offices in Belgrade and Moscow should take place no later than early next year. There is only one difficulty: finding a representative because of a strong competition among political parties wanting to have their people in such positions. As an example he mentioned the fact that their ambassador in London, Dr Subandro, who was supposed to go to Moscow six months ago, is still here, just for that reason. For the purpose of opening the missions he was asked to report on: First – General working conditions of foreign missions in Yugoslavia, especially the Information Department at the mission. Are there any restrictions regarding the moving, contacts, publications and other forms of activity? Second – What about accommodation, for the mission and personnel? Third – Information about prices and life conditions, in order to determine the salaries of staff in Yugoslavia. Hudyonoto also asked for a copy of our Constitution, the law on the press and information. He said they needed a law on the press because right now they intend to create their own and would like to pre-study ours. Šokorac replied that foreign missions have full freedom of moving activities, including propaganda, within the frame of existing laws and on the basis of reciprocity. Ministry of Internal Affairs would provide facilities and help them find accommodation. He promised to provide data concerning the wages. Please inform us on further actions regarding this contact, and provide us with the required information for wage calculation.

Vidić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1952, F-36, dos. 10, no. 412232

16

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Bonn to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade

Bonn
Conf. 1356
November 26, 1952

The local Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of Indonesia Dr Zain has shown great interest in Yugoslavia and establishing close relations. He says that during the war Indonesian revolutionaries were learning on the example of Yug-

oslovakia and now they want to use the Yugoslav socialist experiences. He further says that his government is socialist-oriented and would like to pursue the policy of independence and autonomy like Yugoslavia. He condemns the American policy in Asia, especially the pressure of the United States to force Indonesia into the Pacific pact. Indonesia wants to stay out of all pacts, which is another matching point with Yugoslavia. He further says that he has been instructed by his government to take an interest in industrial development and to examine whether Yugoslavia can export to Indonesia and what kind of machines. His government has a plan to open an embassy or a mission in Belgrade. Please contact us if you are informed about this, but also if, maybe, we intend to open our representative office in Indonesia.

Iveković

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1952, F36, dos. 8, no. 415461

17

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade to the Embassy of Yugoslavia in Bonn

Belgrade
Conf. 415461
December 3, 1952

Our shipbuilding and machine building industry are interested in Indonesian market – your reference: Conf. 1346. We can build vessels of all tonnage. Machine building industry can build and export a number of machines, centrifugal pumps, diesel engines, metal processing machines, agricultural machines, hydro turbines and turbo generators, transformers above 500 kW, three-phase electromotor, crankshaft machines, woodworking machines, etc. Interested parties should write directly to the Federal Chamber of Commerce, Belgrade, Studentski trg 15, PO Box 47.

Regarding the exchange of diplomatic missions between our country and Indonesia, only for your information we are reporting on developments. In 1950 we requested accreditation for Comrade Javorski. Since Indonesians were reluctant granting accreditation, in January 1951 we announced that we are ready to seek accreditation for another person, due to the fact that the Comrade Javorski got another schedule owing to his health condition. However, Indonesians were no longer interested in it, so that owing to such a position we did not open our mission in Indonesia. This year, the Indonesian Charge d’Affairs in The Hague

asked Jakšić if we had something against their proposal for the establishment of diplomatic relations. In addition to that, the Indonesians have repeatedly raised the issue of informal exchange of missions in discussions with our diplomatic representatives in several countries. Finally, in July of this year, on their own initiative they officially informed Brilej in London that they would soon be ready to establish the Indonesian mission in our country. In reply to this, they were informed that Yugoslavia would gladly accept any initiative and that it was the desire of our government. This issue was also addressed through our missions in Cairo and Rome, where they announced that our positive attitude did not change.

You should not start this issue in Bonn but, if Indonesians mention it, you can give them an answer that was given by our Embassy in London.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1952, F36, dos. 8, no. 415461

18

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Cairo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade

Cairo

No. 5509

December 5, 1952

Indonesian envoy asked me to keep sending him our political materials which are being studied with great attention in Jakarta and which have contributed to better understanding of our position. Therefore, his government favoured the presence of socialist delegates at the congress in Zagreb. He further says that he has written twice to his government that it is in Indonesian interest to establish diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia as soon as possible and that this issue should not be conditioned with the previous establishment of relations with the USSR. The envoy expects a change in the government's attitude regarding this issue and gave a personal suggestion that it might be a good moment to accredit in Jakarta our representative in Burma mentioning the close and friendly relations between Indonesia and Burma. I told him that our attitude towards Indonesia had not changed but that further suggestions and initiatives should come from their government. I was careful not to give the impression that we cared a lot about this, but to make it more of their interest.

Ristić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1952, F-36, dos. 8, no. 415117

19

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yugoslavia on exchange of diplomatic missions with Indonesia

TS

December 29, 1952

Exchange of diplomatic missions between our country and Indonesia

In early July 1950 we requested accreditation for Mihajlo Javorski as envoy in Jakarta through Comrade Bebler in New York. As we did not get the answer from Indonesians, on August 5, 1950 we gave instructions to the Embassy in New Delhi to investigate, through the contacts with Indonesian representatives, the reasons for delay and to urge the thing. On August 17, 1950 our Embassy in New Delhi received the answer of Indonesian ambassador saying that regarding the accreditation to Javorski his government responded positively, and that in his opinion the delay was due to the occupation of Indonesian government with large internal reforms and other difficulties in the country. On November 2, 1950 another dispatch was sent to Bebler in New York with the following contents: "We do not know the reason why Indonesians did not give the answer regarding Javorski, ask Indonesians in a handy form whether the reason is the person appointed or something else."

Since we did not get a reply, on January 30, 1951, we sent a dispatch to the Embassy [in] New Delhi of the following content: "Report to the Indonesian Embassy that Javorski got another schedule owing to his health condition. We are ready to ask accreditation for another person. However, we would like to clarify the question of whether the Indonesians really want the establishment of regular diplomatic relations."

Due to the lack of Indonesian interest we did not open our mission in Indonesia. It was only in March 1952 when the Indonesian Charge d'Affairs in The Hague before his departure to a new position in the Vatican asked the delegate Jakšić whether we would have something against if he was accredited for Yugoslavia as well. After that, Indonesians have repeatedly raised the issue of opening their mission in Yugoslavia. Thus, for example, in June 1952, a press attaché at the Indonesian Embassy in London asked Šokorac whether we were interested in establishing diplomatic relations with Indonesia. Šokorac answered that our government offered the exchange of missions more than a year ago, but then came the difficulties from the Indonesian side. The Attaché replied that at that time the government in Indonesia was purely Muslim, and that now there is a coalition government in which there are socialists.

A month later, i.e. in July 1952, the Indonesian Ambassador in London informed Comrade Brilej on their own initiative and that the Indonesian gover-

nment had for a long time considered the question of exchanging diplomatic missions with Eastern European countries and is now able to announce that it soon will be ready to establish the Indonesian mission in Yugoslavia. Acting in accordance with our instructions from August 25, Comrade Brilej thanked, and responded in writing that Yugoslavia would be happy to accept such an initiative and that it had been the desire of our government.

Two months after that, in September 1952, Publicity Officer of the Indonesian Embassy in London visited Šokorac and stated that the Indonesian government has definitely decided to open a mission in Belgrade chaired by a Minister Plenipotentiary is likely to be, whereas the number of staff would be limited. Concerning this, we gave instructions to Šokorac to continue receiving communications from the Indonesian side regarding the exchange of diplomatic missions, but not to initiate the question himself, and to be moderate about the same.

Together with Indonesian initiative in London there were also initiatives in some other countries for exchange of diplomatic missions. At the end of September 1952, in a conversation with comrade Iveković in Bonn, the Indonesian diplomatic representative said he was instructed by his government to take interest in the Yugoslav industrial development and to explore whether Yugoslavia can export to Indonesia and what kind of machines. In addition, he said that his government planned to open its embassy or mission to Belgrade. Bonn was instructed to give an answer to Indonesians in terms of the above response of the Embassy in London from August 25, 1952. In the second conversation with the Indonesian Charge d'Affairs in Bonn on December 9, 1952 Indonesian representative told Iveković that Indonesian government still hesitated whether to immediately establish relations with the USSR, that in some trade negotiations in London Indonesia had rather bad experience with the Russians, and that there was no exchange of goods between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, although the Russians were very interested in Indonesian rubber. On this occasion, Indonesian further stated that in the minds of Indonesian masses there was an innate hatred towards Western imperialism, which is why there were strong illusions about the Soviet Union, and that it would be necessary to introduce the masses to Yugoslav experience, to be able to see that Soviet imperialism is no less dangerous. This time the Indonesian said to Iveković that the Indonesian government intends to establish diplomatic relations with the FPRY.

Moreover, Indonesians launched this issue in Cairo. In conversation with comrade Ristić in June this year, the local Indonesian delegate, said that the Indonesian government would like to see the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. Furthermore, on December 5, 1952 Ristić reported on the second talk with Indonesian ambassador who told him that he wrote twice to his government that it was in Indonesia's best interest to immediately establish diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and that that issue should not be influenced by the establishment of relations with the USSR. On this occasion, the Indon-

esian presented Ristić a personal suggestion that it might be a good moment to accredit in Jakarta our representative in Burma, noting close and friendly relations between Indonesia and Burma. Ristić answered that our attitude towards Indonesia did not changed, but that further suggestions and initiatives should come from their government.

On December 8, 1952 comrade Velebit talked to the Indonesian ambassador in Rome. On this occasion, Indonesian said that the Indonesian government is not satisfied with the work of Dutch military instructors in Indonesia. With this respect, the Indonesian asked Velebit to check the attitude of the Yugoslav government as to whether Yugoslavia was and under what circumstances prepared to send larger group of military experts to Indonesia to help them with organization of their army, as well as to organize its training. Comrade Velebit replied that without the directives from the government he cannot respond to his proposal and that this kind of help from our side would demand the regulation of diplomatic relations. The Indonesian replied that he talked about this with his Foreign Minister, and that he had received an explanation that the government of Indonesia entered into an agreement with the USSR two years ago, by which the Soviet Union was committed to help Indonesia become a member of the UN, and Indonesia to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as soon as possible. However, since the Muslim party opposed the establishment of relations with the USSR they have not been established until today. Therefore – said Indonesian – Indonesian government has already made a decision to regulate diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia together with regulating relations with the USSR in order to maintain balance.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1952, F36, dos. 9, no. 416929

20

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Bonn to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade

Bonn

TS 4

January 15, 1953

Charge d'Affairs of Indonesia Dr Zaim told me in confidence last night that his government intends to request one group of Yugoslav military experts and instructors who would help the organization and training of the Indonesian army. Now, there are about 600 Dutch military experts in Indonesia, but Indonesian government intends to ship them home soon and replace them with ours.

Zaim said that our military capabilities are highly appreciated in Indonesia and believed that our experts could be particularly useful in conveying the experience of guerrilla warfare. He further said that Indonesian military attaché in the Netherlands told him about the plans of his government and that allegedly / he was not sure / our General Staff agreed. He assumed that there were some interviews with the representatives of our Embassy in The Hague. Regarding diplomatic relations, he said that the biggest obstacle was that Indonesia lacked the personnel, and they needed a strong political figure in Belgrade. Please inform me if there were some discussions concerning the above.

Iveković

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1953, F-38, dos. 3, no. 4579

21

Embassy of Yugoslavia in New Delhi to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade

New Delhi
Number 228
May 4, 1953

Indonesian Parliament voted on a resolution on the establishment of the embassy in Moscow by the end of this year. On this occasion, Indonesian ambassador told me that he was of the opinion that immediately after the opening of the Embassy in Moscow they should open an embassy in Belgrade. It was believed that it would not be politically realistic and opportune to open the embassy in Belgrade before Moscow. On my remark that Yugoslavia led an independent policy toward the eastern and western bloc, just as Indonesia, and that the independent policy dates back to the times of the war, he replied that no one thinks of Yugoslavia without ties to Russia as nobody thinks about Pakistan without ties with India. I believe that this is the position of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that these are the main reasons for “forgetting” the accreditation of Javorski three years ago. He is a socialist. Maybe it would not be superfluous to talk about this topic with the Secretary of the Socialist Party Sitoras who is on his way to Yugoslavia. Sitoras told us to go to Yugoslavia with the aim to learn how to build a modern Labour Party from Ranković and Đilas. On 6th [May] Indonesian is traveling to Burma and then to Indonesia. He will remain for a while on duty in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The diplomatic corps assume that he will be the first Indonesian ambassador in Moscow. We believe this is true.

Komarica

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1953, F-38, dos. 7, no. 46109

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in Cairo to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia in Belgrade**

Cairo
Conf. 5103
May 6, 1953

Indonesian Ambassador Hadji Abdulkadir said that they had no mission in Yugoslavia because in that case they would have to establish relations with the Russians, not to offend them / he asked me, I did not start the issue /. He personally regrets the fact that we have not established relations and sends all the material he gets on Yugoslavia to his Government.

The Government believes that it is still dangerous to have the Russian Embassy in Jakarta, because it is a young country and it feels weak, although they are for establishing relations with them later.

The Chinese have a mission in Indonesia and the Russians are working on it, through CP Indonesia [Communist Party] and through agencies, which include many Europeans. Recently, there has been a conspiracy against the government in the Army. At the head of the conspiracy was the Minister of Defence, swayed by the Communist Party. He says that the conspirators were executed. There are about two million Chinese, and according to them, the regime is very strict: "We told them to rest, or we will exterminate them." They have always been on the side of the stronger sometimes Dutch sometimes Indonesians.

Indonesian representative in China has almost no freedom to move around.

He says that Americans do not understand the position of his country. Indonesia has refused to receive free weapons; they prefer to buy it. It will now receive technical assistance from the USA but not the military. This does not mean that Indonesians have illusions that they can remain neutral in a war. They would surely find themselves in the anti-Russian camp. The Americans have to understand that and not to insist that everyone in a potential conflict with them would state it openly.

Nikezić

Meeting of the President Tito and the Secretary General of the Socialist Party of Indonesia Sitorus

Belgrade, May 23, 1953

Today at 16 o'clock, the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito received Secretary General of the Socialist Party of Indonesia Mr Lintong Mulia Sitorus at his home where they spent about an hour in a conversation.

Also present was Vladimir Dedijer, Secretary of the Committee for International Affairs of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia.

In the beginning of the interview Mr Sitorus informed Comrade Tito that he had been in Yugoslavia for four days and that he had already visited Bosnia, Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia. He then said that he was particularly interested in international issues, including the situation after Stalin's death and relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and China, and asked for Tito's opinion regarding these issues.

Comrade Tito replied: – I have already made a statement about how I see the situation and relations after Stalin's death. The recent events have shown that the Soviet leaders are trying to find a way out of the situation which was the result of the Stalin's rigid policy. However, the Soviet leaders do not change their goals, but rather change their tactic. In my opinion, they will naturally try to find an easier way to achieve their goals, if they can. But their actions today can lead us to the conclusion that they are ready to compromise regarding some things. The compromises they have made are known and small, but still sufficiently significant with regard to the current policy of the Soviet Union.

As to the relations between Soviet Union and Yugoslavia they have not changed a bit, since fights there are still, the same propaganda and campaign of their press and radio against Yugoslavia. There are still very serious incidents at the border so we could not speak of changes. In fact, there are no changes which could lead us to the conclusion that they will change their policy in the near future. But, they are using the cheap tricks, for example the establishment of contacts and relationships whatsoever because we have only dormant diplomatic relations: neither their envoy is here nor ours is there. Of course, it would be wrong to say right now that it is all part of their tactic, that it is a manoeuvre, and that they really do not care to have any kind of normal relations with us. But it is not clear enough, nor can we claim that what they do has not been done to create a mistrust of Western countries towards us by a peace offensive of the Soviet Union and efforts to establish relations with Yugoslavia.

As for China, we think that you are familiar with circumstances there. It is clear that they would ensure not to repeat mistakes they made in relation to other

countries and particularly in relation to Yugoslavia, so a conflict does not seem to be an option. The Soviet Union has found itself in a rather complex international position, but their leaders are smart enough to know that they could not afford to lose their allies so easily, especially China. Therefore, they will make even more concessions. That is all I can say knowing their senses.

Mr Sitorus – I'd like you to answer these three questions: First, is there any chance that some of the Eastern countries would go through that what Yugoslavia has gone through after Stalin's death? Second: what are the prospects for world peace? And third: in your opinion, will the Soviet leaders recreate the Popular Front of workers' and other parties, which is particularly important for us in Asia.

Comrade President – As to your first question, I would say there is very little chance for that, because it depends not only on foreign policy reasons, but also on internal economic and other reasons. However, if difficulties endure, it will certainly happen. In a sense it depends on Yugoslavia, on understanding the justification of our attitude during and after the conflict with the Soviet Union, when it would be proved as useful, as an example.

Regarding the prospects for world peace, I think they are better today than they have been before. It turned out that neither side believed that the war would pay off and that either party could draw any benefit from this because the vast majority of humanity was generally against the war. If we take a look at what the Soviets are undertaking and on the other side what western circles, English and others, are trying I think we can say that this is still a tendency to prevent conflict. Neither side would like to step into this adventure. Fortunately, such a tendency, such realistic vision is typical of responsible people – for example, of Mr Churchill in England, and the US State Department – for the most reactionary forces have not managed to handle the psychological preparation for war. They have not yet prevailed, but are only trying here and there. France, which is in a very antagonistic mood against the war, should also be taken into consideration, not to speak of the Asian countries, India and others. All this shows that the war threats were somewhat reduced, though the main unresolved issues still hang in the air.

As to your third question, I would say that, in my opinion, the Soviets would try to control the progressive movements in other countries, which have been neglected after the war. I think that they will be more flexible, because they have done it before, but were only trying to fully absorb these movements. Therefore, in the future, they will certainly lead smarter politics. I say this not because I want to be a prophet, but because I think that is what I would do if I were in such a situation.

Further on, Mr Sitorus noted that Tito's biography is read a lot in India and Indonesia, and in connection with this Tito informed Dedijer that his book is no longer banned in Italy.

The President of the Republic then asked Mr Sitorus about the latest developments in Indonesia and other Asian countries and particularly about the penetration of Ho Chi Minh's troops in Laos.

– Do you feel – Tito asked – that China is behind it? Are there tensions and do you expect the greater penetration and engagement of China in Indonesia, Burma, etc.

Mr Sitorus – Our leader, Sutan Syahrir has already given a directive to the members of the party to be ready for every eventuality and to strengthen the rows of the party to be ready for this danger.

Comrade President – I still do not know on what basis Ho Chi Minh has so much success in Laos. Is this due to internal economic reasons or to colonial reasons?

Mr Sitorus – It is about colonial reasons – the desire of the people to be independent. In the eyes of Indian Socialists Ho Chi Minh is positive, while Indonesians and Burmese have a changing attitude towards him.

Comrade Dedijer added that Indonesians suffer great pressure from the Chinese, and on the other side it is about the entry of the Dutch, American, and Indian capital from Bombay.

Answering to the Comrade President's question, Mr Sitorus said that he himself had not been to Yugoslavia, but that Sutan Syahrir advised him to come to our country. The Comrade President observed that Yugoslavia is interesting, because it had enemies everywhere and had recently fixed its relations in one place only. But, now, Yugoslavia is in a conflict with Italy.

Mr Sitorus – After Batajnica they have slightly changed the tone of writing. One prominent American newspaper / / has been writing positively, as well as others. This is especially true for the French press. The French daily newspaper "L'Aurore" wrote well yesterday.

Comrade Dedijer (jokingly) – De Gasperi was afraid that you delivered such a speech because he banned us a book...

Comrade President – We'll see what he will say tomorrow, and then we shall speak again, if needed ... In Italy, the situation is very complicated, because they want to solve their internal problems on account of certain pretensions beyond its borders. And it all revolves around Trieste. In general, none of the parties dares to tackle and solve a variety of internal difficulties in the country. On one hand, the ruling circles which are under the influence of the Vatican and the capitalists and large landowners do not want to tackle it because it's a tricky question, and they do not want to make any promises. On the other hand, the Communists are also afraid to tackle it, because if they come into the government they will not be able to do a thing. So now everyone is trying to mobilize people and get votes on the irredentist claims against Yugoslavia.

Comrade President then asked Mr Sitorus whether he talked to some of our executives and Comrade Dedijer informed him that Mr Sitorus spoke to Comrade Đilas, Comrade Salaj, Comrade Momo Marković and Krsto Popivoda, and then introduced the Comrade President to a further program of travel and meetings of Mr Sitorus, pointing out that he would have another general meeting, before the travel of Comrade Đilas to England, during which they will talk about the things the guest is interested in.

Comrade President – We have now brought two new laws, one on the relationship between church and state and the second on the agrarian maximum.

Mr Sitorus – I have just talked about it with Momo Marković.

Comrade Dedijer – The law on nationalization of the land in the cities is another socialist measure...

The Comrade President – I'd like to say that this agrarian reform law is very important for us. We have established cooperatives and tried to create large socialist farms without taking sufficient account of the historic, economic and psychological element – the degree of farmers' awareness. We failed to observe it just like the Russians. It turned out to be wrong.

Of course, the West uses these measures as a reason to criticize us. They say that instead of establishing large farms that are more profitable than small, we have opted for fragmentation. I agree that smaller farms are less profitable than the larger ones, even if they are individual, private properties, but it should be borne in mind what the country is in question. In a socialist country, a big possession in the countryside strengthens the capitalist sector. We were actually guided by the idea that the landless and impoverished small farmers should have more land than the rich, but that the surplus land should not be given to individuals but to the Land Fund, and cultivated in a socialist manner, in the form of cooperatives – and that will be strengthening the socialist sector. On the other hand, it will bring differentiation in the countryside, so that these elements are not unique as far under the influence of certain elements which were against joining into cooperatives. This is going to change now and we believe that by this change we will win over the poor.

We will now create socialist economy slowly and gradually through mechanization and support the existing cooperatives as well as the creation of the new ones. In a word, the farmers will gradually realize what is best for them.

Namely, it was wrong to believe that in a few years one can skip what has been developed over four hundred years, as it is the case with us, because, the situation with the land here was completely different. Generations and generations were private landowners. So we need to go slowly and gradually. I believe that this will work and will not last too long, especially as soon as our overall national income increases and industry becomes a leading economic force in the country.

Comrade President paused for a moment and added: It is easy to make a revolution and take power, it is far more difficult to create a socialist economy and change people's consciousness.

Mr Sitorus was further interested in what Tito thought about the Malenkov's authority at the Soviet Party.

Comrade Tito replied: His authority is certainly much smaller than Stalin's, but that does not mean that he would be like Stalin, and that he is not better than him. I think he is better than Stalin, but not in the sense that he knows more, but rather in a sense that he would take care of various things better than Stalin, who was a cruel autocrat. Stalin, however, was the strongest of them all and imposed his will to everyone.

At the end of the reception Mr Sitorus congratulated the Comrade President his 61st birthday, expressing his joy for being given the chance to be the first to congratulate him.

Saying goodbye to his guest, Tito thanked him and asked him to convey his best wishes to the people of Indonesia.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-1

Arrival of the Deputy Minister of Education of Indonesia Mangunsarkoro and Indonesian Envoy in Rome Wiryopranoto in Belgrade and their request to meet President Tito

Conf. No. 2182/V
October 27, 1953

The Vice President of NPI (the ruling party of Indonesia) and Deputy Minister of Education Mr Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, together with Indonesian representative in Rome Mr Sukarja Wiryopranoto, arrived to Belgrade from Rome on October 25, 1953. They planned to stay in Belgrade 3 or 4 days until Saturday morning. Then they would go to Zagreb, where they would visit some Indonesians who are on specialization, and then continue to Rome. After that, Mr Sarkoro goes back to Indonesia.

On Monday, October 26th at 11a.m. they were received by Comrade Marija Vilfan at the premises of the SSRNJ (Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia), wherein they expressed the aim of their visit.

Their party (the Nationalist Party of Indonesia), which is now in power, – according to their statement – is of socialist orientation. The term “nationalist”, as they say, should be understood as “patriotic”. They want to find a socialist solution that best suits the circumstances in Indonesia. Unlike the Socialist Party of Indonesia, they do not take Marxism as a basis. The party is now working on collecting the experiences of other socialist parties and movements in the world (especially those in power) in order to use these experiences to further develop their policies on internal and external levels. They both say that Yugoslavia is very interesting for them and that the aim of their visit is to learn about our experience and achievements.

They want to become familiar with the following:

- 1) The philosophical basis of our social system.
- 2) Social and state system, system of government, the constitution. (They, for example, want to get to know our new system after the adoption of the Constitutional Law and to compare it with American “presidential” system).
- 3) The political, economic and cultural democracy (they say that Western European type of parliamentary democracy does not suit them, because it would hinder their development, which must be energetic and quick; they take France as an example of powerlessness). They are especially interested in decentralization and workers’ control, and then the electoral system.
- 4) Concerning the above, they want to see how we address the question of democracy and the actual role of the Communist Party and mass organizations, their relationship, and similar.

5) The economic system, the economic problems of Yugoslavia and how we solve them. They are particularly interested in two questions: a) how to obtain foreign capital “without foreign capitalists”, i.e. without the direct investment of foreign capital; they are interested in our arrangement with Swiss banks for the purpose of building aluminium industry. b) How we trade and solve foreign-trade, financial and currency problems since we are not a member of the European Payments Union (they say that Indonesia is an indirect member of the Union, via the Netherlands; since, according to their statement, they have decided to completely terminate with the Netherlands, their membership in the EPU will end and they will find themselves in a difficult position which in some sense may be similar to that in which we were in 1948. They are interested in how we come out of these difficulties in the field of foreign trade and finance, and how we are solving problems today).

6) Educational policy. Mr Sakoro and Mr Wiryopranoto would like to get a solid overall picture, and then would possibly send experts on individual issues for a more detailed study.

Mr Wiryopranoto also underlined their interest in further developing and deepening the comprehensive relations with Yugoslavia.

Mr Sakoro and Mr Wiryopranoto expressed a desire to make a courtesy visit to the Comrade President.

A. Šokorac

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-2

25

Meeting of the President Tito with the Minister of Education of Indonesia Mangunsarkoro and Indonesian Representative in Rome Wiryopranoto

Belgrade, October 29, 1953

Today, at 11a.m. in the White Palace, the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito received Indonesian Deputy Minister of Education Mr Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro and Indonesian representative in Rome Mr Sukarja Wiryopranoto and spent an hour talking to them.

Since Comrade President expressed his satisfaction for being able to talk to the representatives of Indonesia, towards which our people have sympathy, Mr Sukarja Wiryopranoto said:

“We arrived to Yugoslavia last week. These few days we have had many meetings and contacts and we have been able to gather a lot of material that will be useful for building our own country.”

- Have you seen factories? – Comrade President asked his guests.

Mr S. Wiryopranoto – We are mainly interested in theoretical things – the question of the state and the community.

Comrade President – Who did you talk to?

Mr S. Wiryopranoto – My friend was talking to Krsto Popivoda and Comrade Vilfan. We want to build a new life in our country – a socialist life in accordance with our own circumstances and conditions. We are located between two blocs, capitalist and Soviet, but we are following our own way.

Comrade President – It’s a hard way, but if you are consistent, it can be managed. These blocs are often too close, and being constantly in the middle is difficult. Sometimes you need to push a little.

Mr S. Wiryopranoto – May I ask you a question? – In what way is it possible to provide the strongest possible unity of the nation of 80 million people, such as ours?

Comrade President – Is it a nation that is nationally compact, or there are different nationalities?

Mr S. Wiryopranoto – It is one nation – one race including various isolated groups.

Comrade President – Then it will not be difficult to achieve the unity. The point is that you should select the most important issues affecting the country, the entire nation. Most important issues can unite a nation, and these are usually social issues. Of course, it cannot be the question of the maximum program in internal politics, but economic and social issues should be set up in a way to make people see the progress. Since you have social classes: the rich, the poor and the middle class, you should set up such a program that would be accepted by the vast majority of the population. In your country, you cannot set up a program that would bring a great revolutionary turnover, you have to go gradually – not by leaps and bounds. This is especially true for your country, because you have external difficulties. With such minimal internal program you can unite the nation towards the external danger. The smaller the external threat, the easier it would be to develop the internal social system. And to make such a program, people should be studied and the voice of masses listened, what is very important to them, because people are not always willing to accept whatever is given from above, people do not like do-gooders so much – those who talk much and then act from the top and not from the bottom.

Mr S. Wiryopranoto – Fortunately, our nation is quite poor, starting from the president and ministers to the bottom. Only the Dutch and Chinese are rich.

Russians and Moscow have a strong impact on Cominform Party in Indonesia.

Comrade President – Is it strong?

Mr S. Wiryo Pranoto – It is pretty strong and very well organized. In our country the strongest is Muslim party expressing capitalist tendencies; the second strongest is a Nationalist Party with a socialist program and the third is the Communist Party. All other parties are small. We expect to have the first general elections in early 1955.

Mr M. S. Sarkoro – I was given a directive from my party's leadership to make acquaintance with your Communist Party and I had the opportunity to visit the Executive Committee of your party.

Comrade President – Have you been in the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia?

Mr M. S. Sarkoro – We have talked to one of the trade union leaders, and yesterday we met representatives of the Central Committee of the National Youth. For us, it is very important to know your circumstances because we know that your socialism is based on your, Yugoslav situation, just as we want to build socialism based on our Indonesian circumstances.

Comrade President – We have gradually come to the present point. We first implemented Soviet practice. After the termination in 1948 we rejected this practice and started building socialism in accordance with our internal circumstances. It was much more successful. It is better to develop the internal system by its own needs and perceptions, and not by the pattern of any other state. This is the biggest mistake. Therefore, we have managed pretty much since 1948. You should be given all the material presenting this development, particularly decentralization and democratization. At the moment, in your case, decentralization and democratization are out of the question. In the beginning, the centralization is necessary to raise people's consciousness to the level that social needs are perceived as a common thing. Of course, it is not necessarily to develop a state capitalist system, because it inhibits further development. Then the decentralization followed bringing tremendous opportunities for initiative and creativity. The initiative and creativity brought a powerful leap forward.

We are convinced that this process is going more slowly in more backward countries. In a backward country you cannot speak of democracy in the true sense of the word, especially not of a socialist democracy. It is born gradually – with the increase of people's consciousness democracy can grow wider.

Unconsciousness and backwardness are contrary to democracy preventing social development. Thus, the centralization gradually creates collective consciousness.

Mr M. S. Sarkoro – We have a problem in our own guerrilla. As you had your partisans, so we have our guerrilla of 500,000 people. The problem is that some guerrillas do not want to return to a normal life, to hand over the guns, but

want to live in the old way. On the other hand, we are not able to receive all of them in the army. How can I resolve this issue?

Comrade President – Well, create some semi-military organization such as the Alliance of Fighters, or pre-military training that will be controlled and have periodical drills. We also have pre-military organizations here, but they are established from other reasons. People will give up this way of life if they have employment and resources. If it does not work, you will have to find another solution.

For us this was not a difficult problem. As soon as the war ended, a large part of the fighters remained in the army, and the other part that was out of the Army immediately began building the country. With volunteer work we built railways, roads and other general social facilities. Hundreds of thousands of people were on voluntary work, we gave them food and sometimes clothing. Thus, people became gradually engaged and one of the ways for you would be to undertake public works.

Mr M. S. Sarkoro – Our struggle for political freedom ended and struggle for economic freedom began.

Comrade President – Yes, you need to build the country. How big is Indonesia?

Mr S. Wiryopranoto – Approximately 850,000 km². Only one island – Java is half as big as Italia, Sumatra is tree times bigger and Borneo five times bigger than Italy. We have quite a big territory, but 50 out of 80 million inhabitants live in Java, where the average population per square mile is 400. 50% of the population are illiterate.

Comrade President – And that's a problem that you need to resolve quickly.

Mr S. Wiryopranoto – We have made a lot of effort in this direction. During the Dutch reign 90% of the population were illiterate, and now the percentage of illiteracy is reduced to 50%. However, although illiterate, they know what is in their best interest.

Comrade President – What about your industry? You certainly have useful things to export: cotton, coffee?

Mr S. Wiryopranoto – We have coffee, rubber, tea, technical fat, tin, and we also export kerosene.

Comrade President – Tin is also great, but scarce and is one of the valuable export articles.

Mr S Wiryopranoto – Tin is in state hands and petroleum in Anglo-American hands / “Standard vacuum”, Royal Dutch and Shell /.

Comrade President – Your country is very rich.

Mr S Wirlopranoto – Rich for others but poor for its own population.

Comrade President – It is usually the case with countries where there are still remnants of colonialism.

Mr S Wiryopranoto – We spent 350 years under the Dutch and three and a half years under Japanese, so that we real experts are in terms of colonialism. We have suffered very much and now we are starting a new life. We do not want neither Soviet nor the capitalist way of life, we want manahism /? /.

Comrade President – You do not have industry and you have to go another way, you will gradually come to that because socialism requires a strong industry.

Mr S. Wiryopranoto – 80% of the population are farmers.

Comrade President – This is why you cannot take any template.

Mr S Wiryopranoto – We do not have big estates – for example, the average possession on Java is half an acre.

Comrade President – You should consider the gradual lifting of agrarian culture to a higher level by using modern means, machinery and so on. It is sometimes dangerous, if a man is surrounded by highly developed industrial countries, as the imports of machinery hides the danger of influence and later the pressure – they often look for certain conditions. I think that Yugoslavia and Indonesia could cooperate in terms of economics.

Mr S. Wiryopranoto – I agree.

Comrade President – Because Indonesia is not threatened by Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia has no colonial pretensions. It is a socialist country and one of the slogans that is printed on its flag – the struggle against colonialism and for self-determination of people.

Mr S Wiriopranoto – Yugoslavia is known in Indonesia. That's why we invited the Yugoslav football team, and lost with a great pleasure.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-2

26

The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs Yugoslavia on Trade and Payment Agreement with Indonesia

Legal advice
Conf. no. 98816/53
April 29, 1954

Presentation regarding the signing of the decision on ratification

On June 11, 1953, our country and the Republic of Indonesia signed the Trade and Payments Agreement in Jakarta.

The exchange of goods between the two countries will be carried out in the framework of lists and payments based on the Payment Agreement. We shall export food and beverages, textiles, paper products, matches, non-metals, metal and glass goods, non-ferrous metals, chemical and pharmaceutical products, machinery, industrial equipment, electro technical materials, railway equipment, trucks, boats and other products. We shall import rubber, coffee, tobacco, Sinkon / crust containing quinine /, coconuts, palm oil, pepper and other spices, leather, shells, tin, petroleum, nickel ore and more.

This is the first trade agreement between our country and Indonesia and the way to expand our foreign trade market. We find the agreement particularly useful because it gives us the opportunity to directly acquire many articles which are of great importance for our economy, and some of them being of strategic importance – highly demanded and appreciated on the world market.

Death to fascism, freedom to the people!

State Advisor
for Foreign Affairs,
Dr Milan Bartoš

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-1

**Letter of the Embassy of Yugoslavia in Rangoon to the Embassy
of Indonesia in Rangoon suggesting the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Yugoslavia and Indonesia**

Conf. 360
Rangoon, August 24, 1954

The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Rangoon

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia and has the honour to beg it to convey to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia having in mind the existing friendly relations between our two countries and hoping that there are further possibilities to strengthen this relationship as well as economic ties is desirous to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of Indonesia and to exchange diplomatic representatives on a Legation level.

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia earnestly hopes that the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia will be magnanimous enough to interpret the desire that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and that the diplomatic relations between our two countries will be established within a very short period.

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia avails itself of this opportunity of renewing to the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia the assurance of its highest consideration.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1954, F-74, dos. 1, no. 414743

28

**Letter of the Embassy of Indonesia to the Embassy of Yugoslavia
in Rangoon with the note on accepting the establishment of diplomatic
relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia**

No: 3384

File: A.e.507

Rangoon, October 20, 1954

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Rangoon

The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and with reference to Yugoslav Embassy's Note No: POV 360, dated August 24, 1954, saying that the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and having in mind the existing friendly relations between our two countries and hoping that there are further possibilities to strengthen this relationship as well as economic ties is desirous to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of Indonesia and to exchange diplomatic representatives on a Legation level, has the honour to inform that this Embassy received a cable from Djakarta saying that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia at its Cabinet meeting on October 14, 1954 decided to open diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia avails itself of this opportunity of renewing to the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia the assurance of its highest consideration.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1954, F-74, dos. 1, no. 414743

29

**Reply of the Embassy of Yugoslavia to Indonesian Embassy in Rangoon
proposing a joint communiqué on the occasion of the establishment
of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia**

No. Conf. 360/1

Rangoon, October 23, 1954.

The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Rangoon

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Indonesian Embassy's Note 3384, dated August

20, 1954, saying that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia at its Cabinet meeting on October 14, 1954 decided to establish diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

In connection with the establishment of the diplomatic relations, the Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to propose the draft of the communique which is to be published at stated times in both capitals.

The Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia avails itself of this opportunity of renewing to the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia the assurance of its highest consideration.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1954, F-74, dos. 1, no. 414743

30

The Yugoslav draft of the communiqués regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia

Communique

Being desirous of promoting the existing friendly relations between Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Indonesia, the two Governments have decided to establish normal diplomatic relations and to exchange diplomatic representatives with the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1954, F-74, dos. 1, no. 414743

31

Talks of Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić with Foreign Minister of Indonesia Soenario, March 5, 1955

A courtesy visit was agreed through the Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. I handed him a letter of our Minister of Foreign Affairs. He told me he was very pleased that we had established regular diplomatic relations. I told him that our government intends, within 5 to 6 months, to send a representative to Indonesia and that my task is to prepare everything for his arrival, as well as to find premises for the Mission, and a private residence for the

envoy etc. He replied that it would be difficult to find due to the housing crisis in Djakarta. He further said that the Indonesian government had not decided anything in terms of sending a representative to Belgrade. He thinks that the main reason is the shortage of staff and funds they will not send an envoy to FPRY but only a Charge d’Affaires. But they will also accredit one of the envoys from the neighbouring countries in Belgrade. In fact this issue – he said – will definitely be resolved immediately after Afro-Asian Conference.

Mr Soenario then referred to the Indonesian foreign policy, stating nothing more than officially proclaimed and well-known general principles. “Our relations with the Netherlands – he said – are quite bad and tense, primarily due to the occupation of the West Irian by the Netherlands and their attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Indonesia in order to restore the old.” In its foreign policy, Indonesia adheres strictly to active neutrality being against the alignment with any of the blocs. To this end it has been trying to establish diplomatic relations with eastern countries.

In the end, Mr Soenario wished me success in my work, and expressed the desire for our two countries to establish closer and tighter relations.

Provisional Charge d’Affaires
R. Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1955, F-25, dos. 14, no. 46284

32

Talks of the Provisional Charge d’Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić with members of the Politburo of the Socialist Party of Indonesia Sudarsono, March 11, 1955

Soedarsono is a member of the Politburo of the Socialist Party of Indonesia. He is up to 45 years old. He is married and has three children, two of whom are now studying in England. Before the war, Soedarsono was a doctor by profession. After the war he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the Socialists were in power, he was on duty as the Indonesian ambassador to New Delhi, where he met Comrade Đerđa and Comrade Vilfan.

I handed him the letter of Comrade Vilfan and so I met him.

First, I inquired about the Indonesian press in English and Dutch. He told me that in Indonesia there were two to three dailies in English and three to four in Dutch. The most interesting paper in English is “Indonesian Observer”, which reflects the government’s view, although it is not its official organ. Each edition

brings a short editorial. In addition to this, there is a daily newsletter of the Indonesian unofficial Agency “Aneta” – “Antara”, and twice a week the newsletter providing a review of local press. The Socialists publish their paper only in Indonesian. They periodically publish promotional brochures in English. The press in the Dutch language is unrealistic, and due to the tense Dutch – Indonesian relations quite reserved.

I have asked him about upcoming parliamentary elections. He says that the Socialists are ready to go to the polls. However, he thinks that the government will probably postpone the elections for 1955. The reason is that they would like to better consolidate their positions. In his opinion, the current government depends on the support of KPI. If the KPI withdrew its support the government would inevitably fall. This is confirmed by the confidence voting in Parliament.

Soedarsono explains the possibility of cooperation between the government’s Nationalist Party and KPI by the development of the former. In his opinion the Indonesian nationalists represent a unique phenomenon in Southeast Asia. Unlike Indian nationalists who, under the British domination, acquired strong financial positions, Indonesians under the Dutch colonial administration failed to gain economic position in the country. Moreover, the Indonesian nationalist bourgeoisie has always been progressively oriented, and in the beginning KPI represented a radical left wing of the nationalist movement.

When asked what he thought about Afro-Asian conference he said that he agreed with Nehru that this conference could be the experiment. In his opinion, the conference can come up with valuable discussion and present practical solutions. The discussion can give results in anti-colonial issues. As to other issues, he did not expect the reaching of important decisions. If the prohibition of atomic weapons was discussed, he was afraid that it might just repeat what has already been set out in the UN. The success of the conference will depend on Nehru’s proposals. The conference will represented different ideologies. If there was a sharp contrast among the participating countries, the results could be diminished.

Provisional Chargé d’Affaires
R. Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1955, F-25, dos. 14, no. 46284

33

**Talks of the Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić
with Canadian Ambassador to Indonesia Heasman, March 18, 1955**

Courteous Visit,

He criticized the economic and financial situation in the country. The official exchange rate of the rupee against the dollar (11.32 rupees for one dollar) is extremely unrealistic and puts many foreign missions in the extremely difficult position. However, missions somehow manage in many different ways. Heasman says it is a usual thing that certain members of mission in Djakarta import several more cars from abroad for their needs only to sell them later. Due to high import taxes the price of cars is very big. Since diplomats are exempt from taxes, they acquire significant financial resources from selling the cars.

In terms of finding a building the situation is quite difficult. Heasman stayed a year and a half at the Des Indes Hotel. In a few weeks he will be leaving on a six months leave in Canada.

Provisional Charge d'Affaires
R. Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1955, F-25, dos. 14, no. 46284

34

Talks of the Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić with the Deputy Chief of the Political Department for Europe at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Darmanto, March 19, 1955

The talks were also attended by Mr Imrom Rasyidi, Head of Eastern Europe at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to whom I was introduced by Darmanto.

In the opinion of Darmanto, at the end of the AA Conference, Indonesians will appoint a Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade. They will try to send someone from Jakarta. They were not able to say when they will appoint deputies. However, he thinks that they will appoint someone from the neighbouring countries. I presented Darmanto the issue of our sailors who were in Indonesia as instructors and asked him to intervene. The fact is that the Indonesian maritime company Pelni landed our sailors in Jakarta with the explanation that it was necessary for them to travel to Singapore for the extension of the Indonesian entry visa. Since our sailors have been without job for a month now, they asked the Mission to take their case into consideration. Darmanto promised to make sure that our sailors get a visa extension in Jakarta.

At the same time I asked Darmanto to accommodate Comrade Perić in Des Indes Hotel. He said it would not be possible due to the fact that a large number of rooms is reserved in the hotel for the purpose of AA Conference. After the conference MFA will ensure the accommodation for Mr Perić in Des Indes Hotel.

At the same time I asked Darmanto to put me in touch with the Department of Information at the MFA, so I could get all the material from the AA Conference on time.

Provisional Charge d'Affaires
R. Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA 1955, F-25, dos. 14, no. 46284

35

Talks of the Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić with the Soviet Ambassador to Indonesia Zhukov, March 21, 1955

Protocol visit.

I was received rather cordially, but he kept aloof during the talks. Zhukov arrived to Jakarta six months ago, and is still located at Des Indes Hotel. The

embassy office is also at the hotel. Before coming to Indonesia he was an envoy in Chile.

Russians purchased two buildings in the diplomatic area of the city and now they are restructuring and redecorating. They have also ordered the air conditioners from the US. He says it is very difficult to obtain the building in Djakarta and the matter is best resolved on the basis of reciprocity. They have difficulties in this regard since, according to Russian law, foreigners cannot become owners of the land in the USSR, which applies to the Indonesian diplomatic mission as well.

He complained about the climate in Jakarta stating that it is quite heavy for the Europeans. However, the country pays little attention to the formalities so one can move freely (except for official reception) without a coat. Judging by what he has heard from his colleagues in diplomatic corps, and by his own experience that in Indonesia one does not even need a jacket or tuxedo.

The Russian embassy has four officers who speak Indonesian perfectly. They keep up to date with the writing of the Indonesian domestic press. In the end, Zhukov expressed his desire to keep good relations and promised to return the visit.

Provisional Charge d'Affaires
R. Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1955, F-25, dos. 14, no. 46284

36

Talks of the Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić with the Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia Chen, March 21, in 1955.

Protocol visit.

I was received extremely friendly. I can say that it was a most cordial reception that I have ever had in the local diplomatic corps. The conversation was quite reserved and a few questions which I have tried to launch as, for example, the question of AA conference were limited to very general considerations. Asked whether he thought that China would try to establish broader economic relations with other Asian and African countries at the AA conference, he said that other countries would have more benefit than China. In his opinion the embargo imposed on China in the Korean War did not harm it at all, but rather helped it establish the closer economic relation with the USSR.

Then Huang Chen expressed the desire to maintain friendly relations. He stressed that relations between the FPRY and China should be developed on a new basis. In the end, he raised a toast to the friendship between China and our country.

Provisional Charge d'Affaires
R. Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1955, F25, dos. 14, no. 46284

37

Talks of the Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić with US Ambassador to Indonesia Cumming, March 21, 1955

Courteous visit.

Cumming was the Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow at the same time when Comrade Bulajić was there. He said he was happy to remember and sent him greetings.

Speaking about the political situation in the country Cumming criticized the former Dutch colonial rule, stating that he believed it was to be blamed for the current situation in the country. During the years of administration in Indonesia Dutch did very little, almost nothing in the field of education and promotion of native personnel. It resulted in the current rate of literacy and weak post-war organization of the Indonesian Army. Cumming says that the Indonesians hate the Dutch and wish to be free of them as soon as possible.

In Jakarta there is an American reading room, which is well attended. Embassy also publishes a newsletter in English, while USIS shows American films once a week and.

In terms of getting the building US Embassy also had difficulties. Americans bought several buildings. When buying – says Cumming – one should be very careful, because the purchase does not entitle a new owner to evict the tenants from the building. The US Embassy has been waiting for over a year to move several tenants from the building they have bought. Cumming thinks it will be difficult for Indonesian MFA to rent us a building and that it will probably suggest the purchase of the building, as is suggested to many other missions. In his opinion, it is best to solve this issue on the basis of reciprocity.

I ask him how he gets informed about the writing of the Indonesian press, namely whether the Embassy has an interpreter for the Indonesian language. He says that in addition to the press in English and Dutch, the Embassy monitors the

writing of major government and opposition papers in Indonesian. The interpreter translates the Embassy editorials contained in these papers and these are issued every day in the form of a newsletter. I ask him to send me a copy of this newsletter if he can. He tells me that he is very sorry and that it cannot be done, since the aforementioned bulletin is intended for internal use only.

In addition to this, Cumming says he reads daily Annette and Antara bulletins in English. These are two unofficial Indonesian news agencies. In his opinion, the former is under Dutch influence, while Antara is of clear Indonesian character. He follows the writing of both bulletins and the true state of things can often be learned on the basis of the differences between them. Out of the book about Indonesia that are written in the English language and that he finds worth reading, he recommends the book "Indonesia, Land of Challenge", 1954.

Provisional Charge d'Affaires
R. Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1955, F-25, dos. 14, no. 46284

38

Talks of the Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić with the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Hanifah about the Asian-African Conference on April 4, 1955

Protocol visit.

He was curious about my arrival and accommodation and my first impressions of Indonesia. He expressed satisfaction about the establishment of regular diplomatic relations between the two countries as well as the desire to deepen and expand the established relations.

Speaking of Asian-African Conference, he said that it was difficult to predict its significance. In his opinion it was not about whether this conference was significant or not – because its convening represents the first substantial attempt to realize the spirit of cooperation and friendship between the countries of Asia and Africa – it is about to what extent this conference will be able to harmonize different presentations of the participating countries. Its success will depend on the degree of harmonization. In the end, Hanifah inquired whether some of our journalists would attend the conference.

Provisional Charge d'Affaires
R. Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1955, F-25, dos. 14, no. 46284

**Talks of the Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić
with the Ceylon ambassador to Indonesia Saravanamuttu about
the Asian-African Conference on April 5, 1955**

Protocol visit.

After we had exchanged formal questions we went on to talk about Asian-African Conference. Saravanamuttu is a member of the Committee for organizing the conference.

He told me that the success of the conference will depend on the unanimity of the participating countries, which will be difficult to achieve due to their heterogeneous composition. The Committee will invite all the countries participating in the general debate to avoid controversial issues that can be solved by the usual diplomatic channels, such as the issue of Kashmir, or the question of the attitude of the Arab countries to Turkish-Iraqi Pact.

In the opinion of Saravanamuttu these questions could easily be launched. However, in this case the chairman of the conference will invite the interested parties to resolve them outside the general debate in private conversations, which will be reserved for the evening. In this way – says Saravanamuttu – it would be able to avoid the risk of dichotomy harming the conference.

Furthermore, Saravanamuttu thinks that this way they can enable a unique and constructive approach to solving many of the problems of global significance. Participating countries have submitted about 12 questions to the committee today asking to be put on the agenda. Among these are economic, cultural and social issues, which are of particular interest for AA countries, and general issues such as the issue of condemnation of colonialism in all its forms, prohibiting nuclear tests etc.

Saravanamuttu believes that the Bandung Conference will bring certain solutions. Finally, in mutual contacts they may find solutions to the burning questions of the Southeast Asia, as it is for example the question of Formosa and so on. The conference is not expected to bring any significant and quick solutions. However, the resolution that it will probably bring as well as the exchange of opinion between individual countries will undoubtedly make a significant contribution to the current international situation. If need arises, committees will be formed and will continue working after the departure of the heads of states. He believes that the heads of states in Bandung will not stay longer than the planned duration of the conference, i.e. a week.

Provisional Charge d'Affaires
R. Brzić

**Talks of the Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić
with the Egyptian Ambassador to Indonesia Al-Amrousi about Asian-
African Conference, April 6, 1955**

Courteous visit.

He has been in Jakarta for a year and a half. He has no residence of his own and intends to buy a building soon. He knows the Egyptian representative in Belgrade very well and says that he is an Oxford student. As far as the building for the mission is concerned, he recommends us to urge constantly in Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his opinion, it is the easiest and most efficient way.

Regarding the Asian-African Conference, he says that the idea of convening the conference came from the Egyptian foreign minister who in September 1952 proposed the convening of such a conference to the Indonesians. However, at that time the Indonesians were not ready to accept the proposal. Nehru himself saw no need for convening the conference on such a large scale.

The AA Conference in Bandung will be attended by the representatives of independent movements of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. Egypt has always been supportive to these movements, and so it will be in Bandung.

In Al-Amrousi's opinion, the major aspect of the conference will be economic. Asia and Africa make a very rich area of great political, demographical and geographical importance. In fact, the success of the conference will depend a lot on whether it would be able to remain outside the bloc politics. There is no doubt that a crucial role will be played by Nehru, who will advise China to take a reserved approach. As for Egypt, it will not launch the question of Turkish-Iraqi Pact. However, he will launch the question of Israel in the form of a criticism of racial discrimination.

The United States took a very realistic attitude towards the conference and advised the Asian countries under their influence to take part in the conference. This attitude is explained by the American opinion or fear that the Chinese influence could prevail and that conferences could assume anti-American character.

It is likely that after the conference, a permanent conference body would be established with the headquarters in one of Central Asian countries.

In the opinion of Al-Amrousi the Conference could bring certain political solutions. Although Egypt still recognizes Chiang Kai-shek's regime, it is possible that after the contacts between Egypt and China, the Egyptian will open the consulate in Beijing. Egypt has always supported trade with China and is interested in its development.

Provisional Chargé d'Affaires
R. Brzić

41

**Talks of the Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić
with US Ambassador to Indonesia Cumming on Asian-African Conference
April 7, 1955**

Returning a protocol visit.

Presenting the US attitude toward AA Conference, he says that the United States have a positive stance. In his opinion, the main danger threatening the conference is China, because it may focus the debate on anti-Western, primarily anti-American positions. Cumming does not believe that the conference could increase the difference between the participating countries. He thinks that the debate will be dominated by issues of greater importance, such as peace, coexistence and so on. He expects that the final resolution may, between the lines, include formulated attacks on the US.

Finally, Cumming offered to send, if it could be of any use to us, the Embassy's internal bulletin which includes extracts from the Indonesian daily newspapers (see the note of March 21) translated into English.

Provisional Chargé d'Affaires
R. Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1955, F-25, dos. 14, no. 46284

42

**Talks of the Provisional Charge d'Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić
with officials of the Socialist Party of Indonesia, a member of the Politburo
Soedarsono and Secretary General Sitorus about the arrival of Socialist
Youth to Yugoslavia, Asian-African Conference and the political situation
in Indonesia, April 10, 1955**

I was told that the Executive Board of SPI wants to send a group of young people to Yugoslavia to become familiar with: a) the history of our liberation struggle, organizational forms, roles and functions of the youth movements in the struggle and so on, B) the measures taken by the State, the Party and mass organizations in order to raise the youth as a force building socialism, and c) the internal state system (trade unions, SSRNJ, women's and youth organizations etc.) and cultural life.

The National Executive Board of SPI approved the following youth leaders to travel to Yugoslavia: Murdianto, Hakim, Bedjo, Soepardi, Jimmy, Ibrahim Hussein, Achmad, Marullo Silitonga, Soewarni, Janiga, Anwar, Dajono.

These young people would spend 2-3 months in our country. They would travel by our boat.

Given the large costs that SPI will have in connection with the SPI Congress, to be held in June this year and the coming Parliamentary elections, Sitorus asked for maximum understanding regarding transportation costs.

I asked Sitorus for his opinion on Asian-African Conference. He said that even now he could not tell what the real goal of this conference was. Socialist give the positive evaluation to the Conference, but their attitude towards it is restrained. The Indonesian government has not invited the Socialists to cooperate in preparations regarding the Conference.

Speaking about the internal political situation Sitorus pointed out that Indonesia was in the midst of the election campaign. All political parties were making efforts to secure their influence among the masses. In his opinion the government's leading political party PNI (Nationalist Party of Indonesia) would not remain in power after the coming parliamentary elections. It will be totally defeated at the elections. The elections will produce three parties as the main political forces of Indonesia: Masyumi, SPI and KPI. These three parties would summarize the greatest number of the Nationalist Party's members. In case of such outcome of the parliamentary elections, Masyumi and SPI could form the government, and exclude KPI, with which both of the aforementioned parties refuse any cooperation.

At the time of the pre-election struggle PNI is trying to use the Bandung Conference to strengthen its position. It puts much importance to the convening of a general Indonesian People's Congress, which would gather all the political parties. In the current situation, the government emphasizes the need of the unity of people and believes that the mentioned Congress could contribute. However, the opposition refused to participate in such a broad front. It intensified its attacks to the government. Recently, the opposition in Parliament proposed voting the confidence to the government. The voting should be done by the end of this month. In Sitorus' opinion there are little chances that the opposition could bring down the government in the Parliament, because the government still has a majority of votes, including KPI of Indonesia. Far more important for the opposition is the current situation in the government's party PSI (Federation of Islamic parties). In this party there are two blocs – wings and it could come to the splitting, which would significantly weaken the government's bloc in the Parliament.

According to the Sitorus, PNI is neither organizationally nor quantitatively as strong as it presents itself. According to the official data PNI has over 7 million members, but in fact it has no more than 70 thousand members, i.e. as many as SPI.

Provisional Chargé d'Affaires
R. Brzić

43

Letter of the Provisional Charge d’Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade regarding the request of the Socialist Party of Indonesia to visit Yugoslavia

Jakarta
Number 8
April 13, 1955

Commission for international relations

The Executive Board of SP wants to send 10 young people – representatives of the youth movement to our country in order to study:

1. The History of National liberation Struggle, the role of the youth movement in this struggle, the organizational form of struggle and recruitment of youth staff;

2. The measures undertaken by the state today, parties and mass organizations in order to rise youth as a to raise the youth as a force building socialism.

3. The internal state social order and political and social organizations, trade unions and women’s organizations, youth organizations, etc. Popular Front. and cultural life.

These are the youth leaders who would be staying in our country for two or three months, and travel by our boat. Given the large financial expenditures that SP should submit in connection with a forthcoming party congress in June and parliamentary elections, Sitorus asked for maximum understanding in terms of transport costs. Please send the answer by a telegraph.

Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1955, F-25, dos. 17, no. 45351

44

Talks of the Provisional Charge d’Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić with the members of the Politburo of the Socialist Party of Indonesia Soedarsono about the political situation in Indonesia, April 20, 1955

We met at my request in relation to sending Indonesian youth leaders to our country. I asked for a meeting with Sitorus, but he was not in Djakarta at that moment, and would be back only after the AA Conference. I informed Soedars-

ono about the contents of the letter received from Comrade Vlahović. He expressed his gratitude for the kindness of our SSRNJ. He promised to submit information about the young people who would leave to FPRY.

Concerning the internal political situation in Indonesia Soedarsono believes that the coming Parliamentary elections are one of the most important events. The press has already published a statement of the President of the Organizational Committee by which the elections for the Parliament will be held on September 29 and for the Constituent Assembly on December 25 this year. Soedarsono says that these dates are yet to be confirmed by the government. He still doubts that the elections will be held this year and believes that they will be delayed for the year 1956.

In Soedarsono's opinion the political situation in Indonesia may seem very complicated to an observer. First of all, the question is how comes that a leading government party PNI (nationalists), which is actually a progressive party, could cooperate with KPI and not cooperate with the Socialist Party. The differences between PNI and SPI (Socialists) date back to the Second World War. Nationalists were for the cooperation with the Japanese occupiers, while the Socialists participated in the armed resistance. The divisions that have occurred on the basis of such developments are still present.

However, the Socialists believe that that the difference between PNI and SPI can be eliminated in the near future. The major activity of SPI today is the breaking of collaboration between KPI and nationalists. Indonesian Cominformists are acting against Masyumi and the Socialists as the main advocates of capitalism in Indonesia and are trying to establish cooperation with PNI. But at the same time they are attacking PNI and are trying to discredit it. To isolate KPI, the socialists are trying to include Masyumi representatives in the government even before holding the general election. If they achieve this, KPI will be forced to change the current attitude towards the government.

Soedarsono believes that Masyumi is currently the strongest political party in Indonesia. It has about half a million members and has substantial financial resources, which is very important in the current election campaign. In fact, in Indonesia today there are only three political parties which have substantial monetary funds; these are: PNI, Masyumi and KPI.

The Socialists wish to establish cooperation with PNI. Soedarsono believes that this cooperation will be realized after the victory of the opposition in parliamentary elections, when the majority of PNI members would join the Socialists and Masyumi. If this happens, KPI will be completely isolated.

Provisional Charge d'Affaires
R. Brzic

**Provisional Chargé d’Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić
to the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs Yugoslavia in Belgrade about the talks
with the former ambassador of Indonesia in Cairo on Asian-African
Conference**

Jakarta

Number Conf. 219

December 28, 1955

Abdul Kadir, a former Indonesian ambassador in Cairo and the current head of the political department for the Middle East in MFA presented the following opinion.

Indonesia is very interested in organizing the new conference of AA Countries, because it believes that after the failure of the Geneva, international development headed back in the direction of tensions and contradictions and such a conference could contribute to the strengthening of the word peace policy. At the moment, the main danger threatening the world peace is not the Southeast Asia, but directly Middle East; after England and the United States, the USSR appeared at the political scene. The question of Israeli-Arab differences reached the critical point. After the unsuccessful conference in Geneva the Russians undertook a large-scale offensive. Russian leaders visited Asian countries with the aim to incite anti-colonial feeling of Asian countries against Western powers; however, the Asian countries have tactically accepted this Russian move, on one hand due to strengthening of its position against the West, and on the other hand, because it was expecting certain concrete Russian economic assistance.

In light of the current explosive situation in the Middle East, the Asian-African Conference would be very significant. Kotelawala has already sent a proposal to Nasser and other conveners of Bandung Conference. However, India and Burma have not yet submitted their response. It seems that these countries do not want a conference to be convened at this level. They are more prone to organizing a meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers, because they believe that some problems have to be examined in more detail. Also, there is a concern that holding conferences at the highest level could harm the reputation of the Asian-African group.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1956, F-34, dos. 20, no. 4255

46

Provisional Charge d’Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade about the political situation in Indonesia

Jakarta
Conf. 114
March 29, 1956

The new government is formed on the basis of a coalition, which represents the only possible formula with respect to the balance of existing powers in the assembly. Compared to the previous nationalist government headed by Ali Sastroamidjojo, the current government represents a definite step to the right. However, shifting the balance towards the religious parties has not affected the turn towards the right regarding the government program. The whole program is very progressive and as such is acceptable to all parties including the communists. Its main points are: economic reconstruction and security, anti-colonialism and active and independent foreign policy.

The implementation of a government program will not be easy considering the opposing views, which have until now been manifested in practice between the nationalist and Islamic conceptions in the field of both internal and foreign policy. Undoubtedly, the nationalists will not allow any meaningful deviations from previous independent course of development. The concept of their policy is of non-bloc nature and they will fight for its consistent implementation. On the other hand, having a first vice-president, Masyumi will always be able to prevent any Sastroamidjojo’s action trying to weaken the Islamic position in the country. Having in mind that the Masyumi Party is known for its pro-Western beliefs and negative attitude towards Asian-African policy formulated in Bandung, we can conclude that the functioning of the government as a whole will involve difficulties. The success of government policy will depend on constant speculation and compromises of coalition parties. In fact the current government represents the experiment, which should show whether the cooperation between Nationalists and Islamists is possible.

The present composition of the cabinet is influenced by objective and subjective factors. After the Parliamentary elections in the country, the tendency of regrouping the political forces was strong. This crystallization process is at an early stage and will certainly result in new political constellations in the coming years. At present, very significant are the changes in the orientation of Nahdatul Ulama, which by the number of votes and mandates in the Assembly was the third strongest party in the country. The leadership of this conservative Muslim party on which the PNI counted in their after-election combinations, turned towards cooperation and rapprochement with the Masyumi party.

In this situation, PNI, which was entrusted with the mandate to form the government, was forced to take a more permissive attitude. The moment was critical to the extent that any stronger and firmer presentation of mandates would include the risk of failure in forming the government. In this case the mandates would be elected from the ranks of the Masyumi Party. This is one of the main reasons for the Sastroamidjojo's indecisiveness. There was also the pressure of the right wing of PNI, which appealed to broader national interests. Sastroamidjojo found himself in front of the political dilemma: either to establish a coalition government with Masyumi and other religious parties or to form a left-oriented government on the basis of the coalition PNI – NU, like the former nationalist government. However, at the moment of reorientation in the ranks of Nahdatul Ulama, the first combination stood out as the only constructive solution.

When the draft of government structure has been submitted for Sukarno's approval, he tried to intervene and include the representatives of the People's Front in the government, which is under the control of the KPI. The intervention did not succeed, because it was too late. Masyumi was unwilling to agree to any further changes in Sastroamidjojo's settlement proposal and Sukarno was forced to accept it.

As for the support in the Parliament, the present government was unable to ensure the absolute majority. It is not incredible that the communists would provide support, although they are of the opinion that it does not reflect the real national unity. Their attitude will depend on the extent of consistency with which the government would implement the program. The similar view is supported by the Socialists, who accept the government program but who are unhappy because they were not invited to participate in it. Their entry into the government is not out of the question, as nationalists believed that the SPI as a right-wing party would shift the balance even more to the right.

Western powers and the United States welcomed the constitution of Sastroamidjojo's government, including the dominant position of religious parties, thereby increasing the chances of political influence. Given that the Western powers are interested in sustaining of the current government, which does not include Communists, it can be expected that the US will revise its current rigid stance in terms of providing economic assistance to Indonesia, because conditioning the aid by any obligations of political, economic or military character was unacceptable for nationalists.

Brzić

47

The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs to the Office of the President of Yugoslavia Tito about the possible visit of President of Indonesia Sukarno to Yugoslavia

Belgrade, April 9, 1956

Possible visit of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Sukarno to our country

Our Chargé d'Affaires in Indonesia informed the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs that during the months of June and July President Sukarno would be visiting the United States, Thailand, Pakistan, Sudan and Italy. At the same time, Chargé d'Affaires suggested that they could consider inviting President Sukarno to visit our country.

With regard to the development of our relations with the countries of South and Southeast Asia and considering the fact that the Indonesian government sent an official invitation to the Comrade President, during his stay in Burma, to visit Indonesia, Comrade Koča Popović thought that our Charge d'Affaires could quite casually inquire whether President Sukarno would be able to visit our country during his next visit to Italy and the USA.

Please note that the visit of President Sukarno could be organized in time when Comrade Tito is absent, should he propose such an appointment. If however he accepted the possibility of the visit and the proposed dates, when the Comrade Tito is in our country, the Comrade President would organize a lunch and reception, and possibly attend the lunch and reception that would be organized by Sukarno.

We ask for a principled decision of the Comrade President.

NOTE: Comrade Kardelj is also of the opinion that our Charge d'Affaires should inquire about the possible visit of President Sukarno to Yugoslavia during his next trip abroad.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-5

**Provisional Chargé d’Affaires of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Brzić to the State
Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on the
international position of Indonesia**

Jakarta
Number Conf. 195
May 23, 1956

Assessing the current political developments in Indonesia, we consider it necessary to underline some important moments. In our opinion, which we presented in the previous coded letters, at the present stage of social and political development of the country’s politics, the middle way has proven to be the most appropriate formula for achieving certain political stability. This moderate course would be manifested in a compromise between nationalism and Islam, i.e. the two leading political ideologies and parties that make up the current government. The extreme political solutions at this moment, when the bloc powers are struggling for the influence in Indonesia and when there is a subversive terrorist movement, would only increase the existing imbalance in the country. It should be borne in mind that the key positions in the economy are in the hands of the Dutch and it is difficult to imagine any long-term plan of economic reconstruction without liquidating the exceptional position of the Dutch capital. Therefore, the struggle to achieve full political and economic independence is still in the foreground. Under such circumstances, the nationalism stands out as a real driving force.

It is understandable that in the current situation, the national unity is a necessary basis for taking effective actions. On the other hand, the fact that the alignment with any of the blocs would break the national unity of the country set an independent character of Indonesian foreign policy. Therefore, we can say that the present government of Sastroamidjojo is an actual reflection of the current political reality, and as such represents the maximum that the progressive forces could achieve at the moment. We believe that we would make a mistake if we let scepticism prevail in judging the new government because of its composition. We must not neglect the fact that in terms of the new world situation and cooperation with the nationalists, the representatives of Masyumi party in the current government were forced to retreat from the previous dogmatic understanding and to take more resilient and moderate stance. Certainly, there is a danger that the ideological and political differences, which are subordinated to a higher purpose, would suddenly emerge and disable further cooperation. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the present experiment of Islamic-Nationalist coalition point to the ways of long-lasting cooperation with respect to the dimension and character of political and economic difficulties in which the country found

itself. At the present moment, it seems that speculations regarding these issues are less important than unquestionably far more significant process of creating national unity, which began with the establishment of a new government. The Islamic-Nationalist coalition represents a real positive factor, which could mobilize the masses towards economic construction and launch them in the struggle to achieve full national independence. A progressive program adopted by Sastroamidjojo's government was acceptable to all parties. Criticism of the opposition relates solely to the government's attitude. In fact, in the ranks of the opposition, there is nobody who would step out against this program, which clearly indicates an active and independent foreign policy course. There is no doubt that the independent foreign policy which is now supported by the main political parties, would enable the Sastroamidjojo's government successful appearance on the international scene. Therefore, we expect to strengthen the international position of the country, which will specifically contribute to strengthening the position of Indonesia against Dutch colonialism. In the light of this development, the policy of heterogeneous and disunited opposition forces, which in the present phase of building the country and the struggle for national independence, openly express their doubts about the government's ability to achieve the set program is in contradiction with the general aspirations for strengthening strictly necessary unity.

Brzić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1956, F-34, dos. 2, no. 48464

49

The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs in the Office of the President of Yugoslavia on the proposal of the Government of Indonesia to raise the missions of the two countries to the rank of embassies

Conf. No. 48709

June 7, 1956

The Government of Indonesia has officially suggested to our government to raise the missions in Djakarta and Belgrade to the rank of embassies. It pointed out that it is taking this initiative, because our country is considered politically important.

According to the notice of our mission in Djakarta, the Indonesian government has already ordered its ambassador in Belgrade. It will request the accreditation at the reception of our answer.

We think that we should accept this initiative of the Government of Indonesia.

Recall that the Indonesian government has recently sought accreditation for Dr Zainal Zain for a representative in our country. We gave accreditations, but he was subsequently appointed Charge d 'Affairs in Bonn. The official proposal to raise the rank of our Missions to the rank of Embassies came from the Indonesian side after inviting Sukarno to visit Yugoslavia.

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-1

50

First Ambassador of Indonesia in Belgrade Sudarsono presented his letter of credence to the President of Yugoslavia Tito

Brioni, August 21, 1956

Today at 8:30 pm, at Brioni, the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito received the first Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr Sudarsono, who presented his letter of credence.

Receiving the letter of credence, Comrade President said:

Mr Ambassador,

I willingly accept this letter by which your government and President Sukarno appoint you as the representative of your country in Yugoslavia.

I am happy to able to say that the relations between our countries have been very good so far. Your presence, as the representative of Indonesia, will contribute to further strengthening of the relations and establishing better relations and comprehensive cooperation between our countries.

I wish you a lot of success.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-3

**Talks of the State Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Vidić
with Indonesian Ambassador Sudarsono on Suez crisis,
September 11, 1956**

Confidential number 414732

He has come following the instructions of his government to take the interest in our opinion on the situation and solutions of the Suez Crisis. He also thinks that given the closeness of our attitudes we need to maintain links and occasional conversations.

His Government thinks the situation is very serious. They foresee the possibility that the Soviet Union and the United States will remain in the position of the observer and that England and France (particularly England) will take military action. It does not even have to be a war, but a minor military action. This is because the English are very well and better than anyone else familiar with the situation in the Middle East and people. We do not know what internal forces now operate in Egypt and the Arab countries.

Hence, it would be particularly dangerous for Nasser if the Arab religious fanaticism would be used by an individual or a group for a provocation under the slogan: "We defend the sacred land and the like."

That is why Nasser needs to be patient and act like a statesman, and also avoid the chain reaction regarding the nationalization of petroleum in the Arab countries because it would immediately and inevitably lead to the war.

The Government of Indonesia has no definite opinion about how to solve the problem of managing the Canal but it thinks it would be useful and proposes an AA Conference on Suez in order to strengthen the position of President Nasser.

But Nasser said that he found it useful and wise to convene a conference that would include all Canal users.

Before his speech, answering his questions, I presented our views on the issues of nationalization and the existing plans for the solution. I have told him that from the first moment it was clear that for England it was not about the free navigation as much as it was about the fear that this successful nationalization would bring about the similar actions of other governments in the Middle East. I have also told him that we did, as much as we could, in an appropriate manner, point to the Egyptians the need for constructiveness, keeping the spirit of negotiations and seeking solutions; that we acted similarly with Western governments; that we believe that so far Nasser created moral prerogatives by such behaviour. In terms of further searching for solutions I presented him our general position

that the patience in bringing the views closer is as one of the main conditions for the successful outcome of any future conference on Suez.

When we get the full text of Nasser's note at the end of the conversation with Menzis we will be able to accurately determine our attitude towards possible future actions.

Judging by the Indonesian exposure, we can conclude that they doubt the stability of the Nasser's regime in case of turmoil, and are afraid that he might, by a reckless reaction, using the slogan of Arab nationalism and using religion, trigger the war with the West.

Dobrivoje Vidić

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-1

52

The first meeting of the President of Yugoslavia Tito and the President of Indonesia Sukarno in Belgrade, the Beli Dvor, September 13, 1956

Top Secret

Internal Use Only

Text is not approved.

The meeting began at 10 am and lasted until 11:30 am.

The Yugoslav side was represented by: The President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito, Vice Presidents of Federal Executive Council Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Ranković and Svetozar Vukmanović, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Srđa Prica, Secretary General of the President of the Republic Joža Vilfan and translator Aleksandar Šokorac. The Indonesian side was represented by: The President of the Republic Sukarno, Minister of Foreign Affairs H. Roeslan Abdulgani, Ambassador in FPRY Soedarsono, Director of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic A. K. Priuggodigdo and head of the department for education and press in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Suwito Kusumowidagdo.

The conversation started with the question of President Sukarno whether there is an intention to publish a joint statement at the end of the visit. Comrade Prica confirms that we have already prepared a draft on our part. President Sukarno expressed the view that the best procedure was to form a small committee that would formulate a statement and submit a report, while the main problems should now be discussed and conclusion made. He assumes that we will discuss common problems and our mutual relations.

Comrade President agreed with this proposal and immediately indicated Vilfan and Prica as the Yugoslav members of the committee. President Sukarno delegated Minister Abdulgani and Ambassador Soedarsono. He further stated that the joint statement should underline active and peaceful coexistence and the principles of Bandung Conference. The Yugoslav side agreed.

For its part Comrade President asked for the underlining of the importance of assistance to developing countries. President Sukarno agreed with this and started a discussion regarding the term “underdeveloped countries”, which did not seem correct to Indonesians. It was decided that the Editorial Committee should find an appropriate formulation.

Comrade President further stated that, in his opinion, importance of small countries and their need for respect should be underlined. It is considered that attention should be particularly drawn to the problem of colonialism as a threat to world peace. In the end, the Comrade President says he believes that we should point out the necessity of solving all problems peacefully. The Indonesian side accepts all these proposals.

President Sukarno asks whether we will mention the Suez problem. Comrade President believes that it is quite reasonable, since the Suez problem is a typical illustration of the problems they have just talked about.

President Sukarno suggests that the statement should also include the China’s right to become represented in the United Nations; Comrade President has immediately agreed with this wanting simultaneously to point to the general problem of universality of the United Nations and to mention China as the basic requirement in this regard.

Both sides agreed that the statement should be officially signed by the Ministers of foreign affairs in the presence of the heads of state, the press and photographers.

The only international problem discussed was the Suez issue. President Sukarno expressed the view that regarding Suez Egypt should be supported by all means. This stems from their (Indonesian) general attitude on the issue of colonialism, but Indonesia also has an important interest therein. Indonesia is one of important Canal users because its wealth passes through the Suez Canal. The attempt of the West to control the Suez Canal, the lifeline of imperialism, was an attempt to maintain imperialism. By their stance towards the Suez issue France was trying to solve the question of Algeria, and Dutch the question of West Irian.

Comrade President expressed the opinion that the Suez question might be the decisive battle in the process of decolonization. Colonial powers try by all means to stabilize their position. This could be a decisive point. In this conflict, Egypt must not be left alone. Comrade President indicates a new moment: Idn’s suggestion to create the Association of Canal users. He sees it as a camouflage of the attempt of aggression and expression of the mentality of people who only

think of ships, and not about the countries using the ships. He mentions the improvement in Labourists' attitude. He agrees with the opinion that we should actively assist Egypt. In this regard, he mentions a note that he sent to Egypt two days ago. Nasser's proposals are believed to be good and would dull blade in the Western attitude. Nasser's suggestions will be supported in many countries. However, the West brings together "their" Canal users for a particular action, while Egypt has only moral support and the countries providing support act individually. Comrade President thinks that the countries supporting Egypt should be united.

In this regard Sukarno mentions his proposal to convene Second Asian-African Conference on August 17 saying that the objective of his proposal was to unite the countries supporting Egypt. It would be good, said Sukarno, if such Asian-African Conference would be convened specifically regarding Suez issue, and include Yugoslavia and communist countries.

Comrade President is of the opinion that this could be done even in a broader scope, because ultimately, the whole world is a Canal user. President Sukarno understood that Comrade President thought of a conference that would include all countries supporting Egypt (perhaps countries he did not mention, but only those countries supporting Egypt), so Comrade President explained that he thought of inviting countries from the group 18. Some of them are indecisive and they should all be given the opportunity to make a statement. This conference should not only express support in a platonic way: immediate action is needed.

Both sides agreed that the Committee should find the appropriate formulation regarding this issue.

President Sukarno then opened the issue of cultural cooperation. Comrade President said he believed it was necessary to develop such cooperation, throughout the area. He expressly mentioned the exchange of students, exhibitions and cultural groups, scientific cooperation especially in the atomic field, exchange of publications and so on.

On the other hand, the Comrade President has especially emphasized economic cooperation. He believes there are great opportunities in this field, which President Sukarno will be able to see during his visit, and these opportunities are still growing. Comrade President primarily refers to the possibility of exporting industrial goods. We on our part are interested in importing raw materials from Indonesia. It is true that there is already a clearing agreement between us, but according to the Comrade President that is not enough and we should work on expanding the exchange.

Comrade President has also mentioned the technical cooperation and the opportunities that we have in the area of geological research.

President Sukarno agreed with this, stating that he has already heard from Ambassador Sudarsono about the high level of our electrical engineering.

In the end, both parties agreed that the ceremony of signing the joint statement could be combined with a short press conference.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-5

53

Toast of President Tito in honour of President Sukarno, in the premises of the Federal Executive Council

Belgrade, September 13, 1956

Mr President,
Dear friends,
Comrades,

I am very pleased because I can, in the name of the people and the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as in my own name, wish a warm welcome to Your Excellency and your associates and convey the warm greetings and expressions of friendly feelings to the noble people of the friendly Republic of Indonesia.

In your personality, Mr President, we salute the man and statesman whose work and activity have so much contributed to the realization of the aspirations of the Indonesian people for freedom and independence. The people of Yugoslavia, who in distant and recent history passed through ordeals on their way to independence and equality, followed the efforts and struggle of the Indonesian nation to acquire its independence with a lot of understanding and sympathy. With the same sympathy our nation follows the efforts and successes of the Indonesian people achieved in transformation and reconstruction of the country under your leadership, Mr President, and under the leadership of your government.

The commitment to the ideal of national independence, for which the people of our two countries have made great sacrifices, and the fact that both are faced with the task of general and particularly rapid economic development have contributed to our mutual sympathies which have evolved into friendly feelings. It is my pleasure to observe that the relations between our countries, although recent, are filled with the spirit of understanding and mutual desire to expand and strengthen mutual ties and cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and other fields. So far, our experience and our similar views on many international issues and methods for solving these problems – particularly evident in the joint work of the United Nations – are the best confirmation of the mutual desire of our people to strengthen friendship as much as possible and contribute to the con-

solidation of peace in the world and development of a constructive and positive international cooperation.

We are convinced, and the developments in recent years have shown that the peace and general social progress can only be ensured by the adoption and implementation of a policy of active and peaceful coexistence among people and states, based on the principles of equality and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the non-interference in internal affairs and the recognition of the rights of every nation and country to independent development, regardless of the existing ideological, socio-economic and other differences.

We are therefore anxious about the possible comeback of the old sabre-rattling methods in resolving certain issues. In the current stage of development of the international situation, when the risk of a general war is being reduced, the main threat to the peace and further easing of tensions in the world are the local conflicts, with all the uncertainties that may arise from them.

Sabre-rattling, no matter how motivated, brings into question some of the basic international principles which entered the Charter of the United Nations as a big achievement of a modern mankind, primarily the principles of independence, equality and sovereignty of the country. These principles cannot be just an empty phrase and not exhaust the formal recognition of the right of individual states to international communication and the like. They are an expression of the aspirations and rights of every nation to be master in its own house. It goes without saying that, if the relations between states are highly developed linking them into a single unit, no country would have obligations with an international character, which must be taken into account. However, the ability of an independent and sovereign country to fulfil its obligations and to do so in the form of voluntary and freely received commitments and guarantees cannot be doubted.

Only by adopting these principles and accepting the negotiations as the only permissible method in solving international problems, we can eliminate the risk of worsening the relations and conflicts between states and preserve the world peace. The realization of these goals asks for the joint efforts of all countries and peoples, and only in this way a peaceful international cooperation can be achieved as the only alternative to war.

In Yugoslavia, we pay special attention to developments in Asia and Africa, where your country plays such an important role. The recent developments in this spacious area showed that in this part of the world it is possible to consolidate peace and ensure progress, if they secure independence and equality of their countries. The useful and positive role of your country, which became particularly apparent in the Bandung Conference and after it, we see a strong process of affirmation of the countries of the region as equal members of the international community. We believe that it is the duty of all countries to assist this process. Concerning this, the provision of organized international assistance through the United Nations Development Programme to still underdeveloped countries and

areas would make special contribution. Such assistance would be beneficial not only to the economic development of these countries and the world in general, but it would also eliminate one of the constant dangers that unevenness in economic development represents for world peace.

Mr President,

I am confident that your visit to our country will provide an opportunity for you and your associates to feel the warmth of friendly feelings that the peoples of Yugoslavia have for the Indonesian people and to you personally, and that it will allow you to become familiar, to some extent, with some of our achievements, particularly in the field of economic development of our country. You'll also be able to see with how much interest our nations follow the development of your country, deeply appreciating the efforts you put into consolidating the world peace and promoting international cooperation.

We are confident that your visit and our future talks would be a powerful stimulus for further consolidation of our bond of true friendship and would confirm that there are all grounds for the successful development of the relations and cooperation between our two countries, in favour of both nations.

Wishing you a pleasant stay in our country, I'm raising a toast to your health, Mr President, to the further progress of the Republic of Indonesia, and the extensive friendship among the people of our two countries!

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-5

54

Joint statement on the occasion of the visit of President Sukarno to Yugoslavia

Belgrade, September 17, 1956

At the invitation of the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno made a state visit to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in the period from September 12 to 18, 1956.

During the visit, President Sukarno was accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs H. Roeslan Abdulgani, first vice president of the Parliament Zainul Arifin, second vice president of the Parliament Arudji Kartawinata, members of Parliament Sukiman Wiryosandjojo, J. Leimena and Sutarto Hadisudibyo, as well as senior officials of different branches of the administration and the officers of

air, sea and land forces. They were also accompanied by the group of Indonesian journalists.

During their stay in Yugoslavia, President Sukarno and delegation members visited various industrial facilities, scientific and cultural institutions in Belgrade and in People's Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. President Sukarno and his delegation members expressed their gratitude for the warm welcome and reception by the President, Government and people of Yugoslavia. The visit has strengthened the feeling of friendship and increased the understanding between the two countries.

During the talks the Indonesian side was represented by the following figures: President Sukarno, Minister of Foreign Affairs H. Roeslan Abdulgani, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia in Yugoslavia Soedarsono, Director of the Cabinet of President of the Republic AK Pringgogidgo and Head of the Department of Studies and Press, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Suwito Kusumowidagdo. The Yugoslav side was represented by the following figures: President Josip Broz Tito, Vice Presidents of the Federal Executive Council Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Ranković and Svetozar Vukmanović, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Koča Popović, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Srđa Prica and Secretary General of the President of the Republic Joža Vilfan.

The talks were conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality, understanding and mutual respect, and were related to international issues as well as the issue of Yugoslav-Indonesian cooperation.

As the result of the talks, both sides agreed to the following statements:

1. Both sides expressed their conviction that the relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia as well as among all other countries should be based on a policy of active and peaceful coexistence, the principles of equality and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and the recognition of the right of every nation and state to independent development, regardless of the existing ideological, socio-economic and other differences – following the principles of the Bandung Conference.

Underlining the current expectations and demands of the people in the world, they especially emphasized their beliefs that all open international problems should be solved exclusively by peaceful means and by means of negotiation and communication.

2. In the exchange of views on the current international situation, both sides were guided by the Bandung spirit and principles.

- a – Both sides believe that the achieved development of international relations requires the full and equal participation of all nations, large and small, in international life making their position in solving the world problems equally important.

b – Both sides believe that the uneven level of economic development of countries in the world is one of the main sources of international instability. In this respect they think that the countries, whose economic development, due to colonialism or other special historic conditions, has been impeded or hindered, should be provided with technical and economic assistance aimed at reducing and eliminating disparity. This assistance, free from any political conditions, should be aimed at harmonious economic development in the world.

At the same time, it is necessary to fully respect the right of these countries, contained in their sovereignty, to freely exploit their national wealth and resources.

c – Both sides emphasize that the colonial problems that still exist in many parts of the world, such as the West Irian problem, are the sources of international tension and it is necessary to make every effort to resolve these problems as soon as possible. Therefore, they support the process of emancipation of still dependent nations.

d – Concerning the problem of the Suez Canal, both sides expressed their deep concern and opinion that this problem should be solved in a peaceful way, without any threat of force, based on the principles of respect for sovereignty and dignity of Egypt, and taking into account the principle of free navigation.

Both sides believe that this problem cannot be solved by unilateral action of a group of users of the Suez Canal, and therefore call upon all States to adopt the above principles, to help negotiated solution in active and organized manner.

e – In order to make full realization of the principle of universality of membership in the United Nations, both sides fully agree that countries that are not yet members, and meet the requirements of the Charter of the United Nations, should be received promptly in this organization.

In this regard, as a constructive contribution to the world peace, the People's Republic of China should be recognized the right to the membership in the United Nations.

f – Both sides believe that the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and experiments represent important contribution to the world peace. Therefore, they agree that it is necessary to continuously make efforts – primarily through the United Nations to achieve international agreement in this regard.

3. Both sides express the willingness to expand and strengthen cooperation in the technical and economic field and, among other things, to increase the exchange of goods, for which there are great opportunities.

4. By improving mutual understanding between the people of Indonesia and Yugoslavia, both sides agreed to develop cultural cooperation through the exchange of missions, students and professionals in the fields of culture, art and science.

5. The President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito has gratefully accepted the invitation of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Sukarno to make a state visit to Indonesia.

State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of
the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Indonesia

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-5

55

Letter of President Tito to President Sukarno informing him that he will not be able to visit Indonesia in 1957

Belgrade, February 21, 1957

To his Excellency
Dr Sukarno,
President of the Republic of Indonesia,
Jakarta

Dear Mr President,

I am very glad that I can use the journey of Ambassador Pavlič to Jakarta as an opportunity to send the expression of friendly feelings and best wishes.

I would like to take this opportunity to assure you that your visit to our country has been a special pleasure for I had the opportunity to meet you personally and a very useful exchange of opinion. For Yugoslav people, the visit represents an extraordinary opportunity to manifest their feelings of sincere friendship which they have for the people of Indonesia and you personally.

I believe that I express your opinion when I say that our common views and assessment of key international problems were confirmed by the developments over the past months, and that your visit represents a powerful incentive for strengthening the relations between our two countries. So, I eagerly looked forward our new meeting in your country and the opportunity to directly meet with your people.

However, I have just reviewed all my obligations in 1957 and found with great regret that this year I will not be able to realize this desire. In the summer this year, we will be holding the First Congress of the Workers' Councils, and in November 1957, we have scheduled VII Congress of the League of Communists

of Yugoslavia and in March 1958 we shall have Parliamentary elections. All these are major events in our internal political life, which require several months of preparation and my personal involvement, due to which I shall not be able to leave the country. That is why I am compelled to suggest the postponement of my visit to your country for a later date in 1958, which fits you. I would appreciate very much if I could get a general answer regarding this proposal in the near future.

Dear Mr President, please receive cordial greetings and best wishes from me and my wife.

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**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on the Sukarno's wish
to receive Tito's framed photo with a dedication**

Djakarta
Conf. 87
March 23, 1957

To Vilfan. Sukarno asked, in front of a large auditorium, to be sent as soon as possible a photo of Comrade President with a dedication, the bigger the better and in a Yugoslav frame, if possible. He needs it for his collection in the palace. He has already received the photos of Nehru and Nasser.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1957, F-38, dos. 3, no. 46791

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia about his talks with the leader of the Communist Party
of Indonesia Aidit**

Djakarta
Conf. 138
April 23, 1957

To Vlahović. On April 19th, I had a meeting with Dipa Nusantara Aidit, Lotman (First Deputy of Secretary General) in the presence of the editors in chief of party bulletins. Aidit's basic remarks:

1. Today we all know that in 1948 Yugoslavia was right. The Russians admitted the mistake and tried to correct it. Yugoslavs are wrong to constantly mention 1948. No Party was so much offended by Moscow as it was the Chinese Party. But the Chinese got over that in the interest of the unity of the Socialist Camp. Yugoslavs should look up to the Chinese.

2. The danger of imperialist bloc. The class character of the struggle. Socialist camp must be united. It is a pity that such a reputable Party remains outside and criticizes other parties, starting from the position outside the bloc.

3. Criticism of Yugoslav circles is often justified, but the way of criticism is not always acceptable. Instead of comradely criticism, taking into account the experience of other parties, the Yugoslav comrades share lessons. Speech of Comrade Tito is published. They are not familiar with speeches – articles of Kardelj, Koča, and Vlačko. In response to Aidit's remarks, I interpreted only the most important parts of these articles. During a two-hour discussion, Aidit and others were very apologetic and approachable. The question of the unity of Socialist Camp is reasonable. They are very influenced by the Moscow's presentation of the imperialist threat. Their internal political situation as well as the strategic position of Indonesia and the interference of foreign powers just confirm this threat. However, they agree that the existence of an imperialist bloc and the danger should not be the reason for suppressing any criticism of what is happening within the socialist countries or Socialist Camp. They agree that it is only through constructive criticism it is possible to accelerate the construction of a socialist society and thus gradually reduce and eventually eliminate the possible aggression of imperialist bloc. They largely agree with our assessment of the Hungarian events. They still cannot understand how it could come to that, 11 years after establishing a new government and with the full support of Moscow. The analysis of the causes is needed and not putting all the blame on the imperialist conspiracy.

Aidit and others have shown a lot of common understanding. Basically, they are confused about the way of achieving the unity of the socialist world without obstructing the social progress, taking into account the specific conditions of each country and secondly, presenting our criticism in a way that was useful to the imperialist bloc. They asked for more information about our talks with the Italians and French.

They want closer cooperation with us. In particular, they want to get acquainted with the workers' councils. Representatives of their unions are ready to come to the Congress. Aidit is ready to come in person with another member of the Bureau to the Congress of the Council. This is his wish; the decision will be brought by the Bureau. He asked about the travel expenses (having poor funds and used to having the expenses paid by the parties which invite them). Aidit would like to stay in the country for about a month to be able to get acquainted with our experience. He feels sorry because Tito will not be able to come this year. He says that he would be received as a great Communist by KPI.

For Djuanda, he says he will succeed. He does not exclude the possibility of small rebellions, but if SIMBOLON case reopens then all mass parties, without exception, would prevent this by all means.

He will help the cooperation in economic and cultural fields. They appreciate very much our support on international plan. They recommend closer cooperation with PNI (nationalists). I delivered the mentioned articles. They promised to read them and possibly discuss.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1957, F39, no. 49796

58

Letter of President Sukarno to President Tito saying that he is welcome to Indonesia in 1958, May 6, 1957

Djakarta, May 6th, 1957

To His Excellency
Marshal Tito
Belgrado.

My dear Marshal Tito,

Today your Ambassador paid me a visit, and I am very happy to learn from him that you will be able to pay a visit to my country end of this year. I have

agreed that your Vice-President and his staff come to Djakarta in advance, and attend the celebration of the Indonesian National Day on 17th of August.

The information Ambassador Pavlič brought swept out the disappointment that rose in me by what you wrote in your letter of February 21: that it would be only possible for you to come at a later date in 1958. Thank you for the expression of friendly feelings and best wishes in that letter and be sure that they are returned in full measure.

As I have already assured to you, my visit to Yugoslavia last year was a most moving and enlightening experience, and the conversations we conducted certainly were of continuing importance. I sincerely believe that they were of benefit to both our countries and that they gave a much stronger foundation of understanding to the relations between our respective peoples. That those relations are of real friendship was made very clear by the remarkable reception the Yugoslav people gave to me and my party during my visit.

I have looked forward with pleasure to resuming our conversations in the light of present world conditions, and, in particular, have looked forward to introducing you to my country and my people.

I, with all the Indonesian people, will be very glad to be your host, not only personally, but also because we have the best of feelings towards Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav people.

I am certain that you will meet a very warm reception, not less warm than that rendered to me by the wonderful hospitality of your people.

I failed to answer your letter of February 21 at once, for want of a quiet hour. As you know, we are now passing through some difficulties in my country, but the picture in the foreign press is highly exaggerated. I think the difficulties are calming down, and I am quite optimistic about the future. I am concentrating all my love and hope on the people, and I think they are going in the good direction. After all, the fate of any state is in the hands of the people, not in the hands of party-leaders. You see, the difficulty in my country is that we have too many parties.

The Indonesian people were being spoiled by those party-leaders, who always quarrel with each-other, but I am trying to leap over those party-leaders, and contact directly the people – with reasonable success.

I am of good hope, and I think by December this year you will be received enthusiastically by a government and a people, stronger than ever before.

Please, my dear friend, give my kindest regards to Madame Tito. How is she?

With my best greetings and
best wishes for you and your country,
Sincerely yours
Soekarno

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about his meeting with Minister of Foreign
Affairs Subandrio on Indonesian foreign policy issues**

Jakarta
Number Conf. 155
May 9, 1957

On the 8th [May], I visited Subandrio, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sukarno has already informed him about the proposed visit of Tempo. He delegated him to inform the government at the first session. He accepts program, time and duration of the visit. Definite answer will be given after the session of the Government.

Foreign policy issues – The government of Djuanda Kartawidjaja will continue with its non-bloc policy of independence. Basically, they are for stronger cooperation between AA countries. AA countries need this to “survive the pressure to which they are exposed”. They have tried to prevent the bloc divisions in their inner life. They have failed. Their Parties and army are bloc-oriented, torn. This is even harder in the relations between AA countries. They will work to strengthen the unity of AA countries, but not to create the third bloc. Yugoslav policy gives great contribution. He, himself is insufficiently informed about the latest developments in Yugoslav politics. Earlier, he was the ambassador in Moscow and London. He followed and knows about the pressures on us from both sides. I interpreted the substance of our relationship with the Soviet Union. Djuanda’s Government considers that there are no conditions for the convening of the second AA Conference this year. They differ from Ali who is for the convening. They are in contact with the conveners of the first conference. All except Nasser are against. However, it is necessary to point to the need of holding the second AA Conference in order to accelerate the ripening conditions for its convening, and efficient implementation of the conclusions of the first Conference. It is necessary to strengthen cooperation among AA countries in all areas. Not much done. I say there are specific reasons that guided Sukarno in recent speeches in which he attacks the interference from the West, and the emergence of the new forms of colonialism.

They will start negotiations with the United States on economic aid. He brings figures showing that Indonesia is among the countries that have received the least.

He is optimistic regarding the solutions of Japanese reparations. Informal negotiations are in progress. I have informed him about our experience with the ZN. He says that time is working against them. It should be finalized. He agrees.

A day before that, Egyptian Ambassador asked for my help in the talks with Subandrio regarding the active support of Indonesia to the memorandums of Suez, submitted to the UN. S. avoided the answer. He studied our position, statement of Comrade Koča. S. says he was not aware that they provided full support to Egypt during the aggression but now he expects more from reality Nasser in the final resolution of the Suez issue. They did not need written arrangements with Israel but need to be firmer in the practice. The countries of the Far East are suffering because of the Suez crisis. Prices increased; shortages of goods. Nasser is being informed. He thinks that we and Indians could help. We are already doing it; it is unacceptable to reward the aggressor; reasonableness necessary on both sides. He promised to study the issue and Koča's statement.

He talked about different approaches of the Russians and Chinese to their issues. Chinese people care about the Indonesian circumstances (SEATO, a strategic and economic position, minorities, inner disorder, pendant of the West), the Russians don't. They approach their issues using the same criteria which they use the Czechs, for example.

Internal Affairs – Djuanda's Cabinet remains in opposition. He knows there is no other solution. This is the last chance to keep the existing form of government. Otherwise the Parliament and parties will be dissolved. Tomorrow, National Council enacted as "Emergency Bill". Before the Parliament only for discussion not for voting. Ali Sastroamidjojo – candidate for the head of the UN mission. We recommend realizing his visit to Yugoslavia ref. 46197. He objects our former connection to the socialists. He recommends others, especially PNI. He confirms that PSI is changing attitude. He says Sukarno will soon meet with Syahrir. He asks for the regular delivery of our materials. We ask the same, but only in English, French is useless.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1957, F-38, dos. 17, no. 410877

60

Letter from President Sukarno to President Tito on West Irian

June 1957

Your Excellency President Tito,

Thank you very much for your staunch support towards the Indonesian struggle against colonial bondage. The measures we are taking now are directed against the privileged position of the Netherlands in Indonesia. I consider it ne-

cessary that Indonesia's friends understand the motives behind Indonesia's actions. As is well known to Your Excellency, since 1950 the Indonesian government has done its utmost to convince the Netherlands of the necessity to find a solution for the West-Irian problem by direct negotiations.

When efforts failed, Indonesia decided to bring the matter before the United Nations. The West Irian problem appeared four times on the agenda of the General Assembly. Each time: the United Nations failed to adopt the moderate resolution of inviting both parties to discuss the matter. The proceedings in the General Assembly's last session again prove the Dutch unwillingness to discuss the West Irian problem with Indonesia.

Though the Indonesians are a patient people it cannot be expected to acquiesce indefinitely in the situation when about one fifth of the Indonesian territory with more than one million of their brothers remain under Dutch colonial rule.

As Your Excellency knows the Indonesian Government did its best to convince the world of the explosive situation which may arise as the Indonesian people's patience is exhausted and people's temper is running high if the United Nations fail to pass a resolution urging Indonesia and the Netherlands to enter into negotiation about West Irian. Unfortunately the Indonesian governments warning went unheeded and the resolution failed to reach the necessary two third majority in the General Essembly. Consequently the Indonesian people went into action and confronted the government with its consequences. The Dutch enterprises were taken over by the workers but immediately reported and handed over to responsible authorities.

In order to protect the security of these enterprises and to prevent any disruption in its productivity the government decided to take over the control of almost all big Dutch enterprises. This however should not be interpreted as expropriation, nationalization or confiscation. A few days hereafter the government has the outburst of emotion amongst the whole population of Indonesia under control and up till now none of the Dutch people or any other foreigner has been molested.

I want to emphasize that the Indonesian government is still seeking peaceful negotiations with the Netherlands to solve this West Irian problem and subsequently is doing all efforts to normalize its relations with the Netherlands. If however this is not possible because of the obstinate attitude of the Netherlands government, it will then be almost impossible for us to continue its normal economic relation with the Netherlands, to sustain the privileged economical position of the Netherlands in Indonesia.

The West Irian problem is of an utmost national importance for the whole Indonesian people and nobody can expect that an unsolved conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia on this matter would not result in the discontinuation of its normal relation between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

I may assure Your Excellency that we will only embark upon this second alternative after profound consideration and it is only after realizing that the other alternative is much worse for the future of Indonesia that we adopt this new course in our policy towards the Netherlands.

In the execution of our policy we will take care that respect for humanitarian considerations will be sustained and simultaneously the peaceful intentions of the Indonesian government and people.

Soekarno
President of the Republic of Indonesia.

AJ, KPR I-1/421

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**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on Sukarno's wish to have
a Meštrović's work of art**

Jakarta
Conf. no. 229
July 1, 1957

To the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs

To Vilfan. During the visit to the gallery, Sukarno has asked for "anything by Meštrović." He misses it in his collection. Please bear this in mind during the visit of the Comrade President. He would know to appreciate it because he is an art expert and he knows what Meštrović stands for.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1957, F-30, dos. 3, 415191

62

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on Indonesian foreign policy
views**

Jakarta
Number, TS 358
August 31, 1957

At the meeting on August 15, which was chaired by Sukarno, Djuanda presented internal policy and economic issues, Ruslan Abdulgani presented Sukarno's concept and the role of the National Council, and Subandrio the framework of foreign policy. On August 23, the political talks with Subandrio were continued. Herein I present the overview of their attitudes regarding foreign policy:

– Although social systems are different: Yugoslavia is a socialist country and Indonesia is founded on the principles of Pancha Sila, we share the same views on major foreign policy issues. They want to continue to actively cooperate with us.

– Indonesian policy is wrongly defined as the neutral policy. It is not true that they want to make use of the conflict between the blocs. They just want the independence of their country and that is contrary to the bloc-alignment. They want to reduce the contrast between the two blocs. They are acting towards the "real coexistence" but not only between countries of different systems, but also between the countries of the same system.

– They are afraid that Indonesia is becoming the scene of an ideological war. Guided by the independence of their country they want to prevent the cold war being transferred to internal party life. They are aware of the dangers of party differentiation based on the bloc concept. Their parties should act in the best interest of the country and not in the interest of foreign factors.

– They recognize the contribution of FPRY at the international level. They also underline their own contribution. They believe that the tension among the great powers is weakening.

– They stress the importance and contribution of the Bandung Conference. The Bandung Conferences aimed to consolidate the solidarity of AA countries. It is wrong to think that it was directed against anyone. The Bandung Conference achieved its goal but also provoked the reaction of the West concerning the solidarity of AA countries. SEATO is not only an instrument of defence against communism, but also the instrument through which the West-USA exercises the policy of interference and pressure towards AA countries trying to make them opt for a bloc policy. The situation in Asia is not stable. It can be changed at any moment, for example, in Thailand and Pakistan, where 45% of the budget de-

pend on the United States. Bandung launched a number of issues dividing the AA countries: Israel, Suez, Kashmir, Pakhtunistan, Vietnam, Korea, the Kuomintang in Burma, Taiwan, Darul Islam in Indonesia, etc.

The attitude of the Indonesian government towards some countries:

– Japan – They are concerned about the rapid economic growth in Japan which could, with the support of the United States, once again become the decisive military force. They are taking into account the psychological moment – the mood of Indonesians towards a former occupier. There is a natural instinct of Japan for expansion /almost one hundred million people in overpopulated island/. They are trying to involve Japan in solidarity of other Asian people. Without success. Japan aims at the special position in the Far East, being aware of its economic strength and counting on the support of the great powers. They are using the existing conflict. They are afraid that China and Japan could join their forces together in the expansion to the South. They hope that China will remain loyal to socialist principles in its foreign policy. Caution needed. They will be the first under attack. 12 years after the war, the issue of reparations still unresolved. Japan is difficult to negotiate with. They are trying to evade negotiations believing that later it would cost them less. Solving the issue of reparation is a condition for establishing general cooperation. They are trying to be real in their requests but must take account of the public opinion. They are asking for \$ 400 million for reparation, i.e. between the amounts approved for the Philippines \$ 650 and Burma \$ 250 million.

– China. – Relations are very good, close. The only problem is the Chinese minority of two million. Beijing is starting to understand the essence and approach the issues using socialist principles. They are preparing the agreement on dual citizenship. The problem is that the Chinese do not have a sense of loyalty to the country in which they live. The only thing they are interested in is money. Most of their economy is in the hands of people who have nothing to do with the destiny of Indonesia. Their efforts for moral integrity are undermined by the amoral group of people. We are aware that the Chinese are more capable and diligent than Indonesians. Under the same conditions Indonesians would continue to deteriorate. Indonesian people are increasingly dissatisfied due to the disloyalty of Chinese minority. There is not one corruption affair in which they are not involved, even more, the Chinese are organizers. The Chinese use links both with Beijing and Taiwan. Political regimes are not a problem. Indonesia has the most liberal attitude towards the issue of Chinese minority. Chinese people are abusing it. They will be forced to apply some restrictions similar to that towards the Philippines and Thailand. US are using Chinese minority abroad against Beijing. The Beijing government is trying to neutralize it by increasing propaganda and securing greater protection. However, Zhou Enlai has realized the problem and realistically assessed the role of Chinese people abroad. The Beijing government is ready to accept that the Chinese people born in Indonesia will become In-

donesian citizens. The current privileged status of foreigners enjoyed by the Chinese must be liquidated.

– Middle East. Their attitude is well-known. They support Egypt and the national movements of the Arab countries. Convinced that, on the long run, nationalism/independence. They are taking care about feudal relations in this part of the world. They have provided full support to Nasser in the nationalization of the Suez. They have advised him to be careful, moderate and first to consolidate the country. The issue of Oman is clear as far as the British intervention is concerned. The ambivalence of Arab countries prevents their action. Arab feudal lords strive to expand.

– Kashmir. The leftovers of the colonial policy. They are very careful in formulating their attitudes. They want to actively contribute to finding solutions. It is a serious obstacle for the convening of second AA Conference.

– Vietnam. They have general consulates in both parts of Vietnam, but trade agreements only with North Vietnam. They will establish diplomatic relations with Laos and Cambodia.

– USSR. They agree with our assessment of events and policy of the USSR. The developments in the USSR can have a strong influence on the world politics. They are afraid of shifting the balance between the great powers; if one bloc splits, another bloc could get use of it. They are interested in whether the change in the Soviet attitude, i.e. their strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries in the future, will result in the same attitude in inter-party relations. It is the question of vital importance as it allows the full freedom of action to the Communist Party, which has become very influential. There are serious objections to the influence of Moscow through the Communist Party.

- West Irian. They have raised the issue at this year's session of the General Council. They are asking for support. They emphasize moderation and only ask for negotiations with the Dutch established by the 1949 Agreement. They do not request the transfer of sovereignty from UN.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1957, F-38, dos. 18, 419511

63

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on Indonesian internal policy
views**

Jakarta
Pov.452
November 18, 1957

At the invitation of Sukarno, I visited the islands of Eastern Indonesia: Timor, Kay, Ceram, Flores, Sumbawa, Sumba, Lombo, and Bali. 12 days. In each city a mass rally and political conference were held, more than 20 in total. They were all focused on the West Irian issue, and mobilization of the masses against colonialism. Sukarno and Abdulgani devoted a considerable part of their speeches to the criticism of the bloc policy and explaining the reasons for leading the independent non-bloc policy. They stressed the need for the unity of the country in contrast to the existing party system. They once more underlined the concept of democracy as a way out of the situation. They interpreted the significance and importance of the national conference and the future conference for reconstruction and development. Beside Sukarno, also present were Abdulgani, the Vice President of the National Council, Sudibjo, Minister of Information, and the President of the Committee for the West Irian, regional commanders, and local leaders.

The visit was successful and made significant contribution to the unity of the country. The unity of the people and the army is the requirement for resolution of the West Irian issue. S. intensified a campaign to restore West Irian. He started threatening by non-payment of existing investment debts in case that the Dutch do not show understanding. He spoke about the "other means and measures", about tightening general and especially economic relations with the Dutch, about the threat to the peace in the Far East and so on. He promised that the West Irian would be returned by the end of this year, provided that they were united and unique. S. consciously supported the campaign to strengthen the unity of the country. The West was of the opinion that Sukarno deliberately intensified the West Irian issue to regain the prestige lost by the conclusions of the national conference, by Hatta's return etc.

S. emphasized the need for a unitary state, condemning all attempts of the federalist system. That is a correct attitude under the given circumstances, taking into account, first of all, the threats from the outside. But the question of decentralization, economic and educational life becomes serious. It is impossible to govern such a spacious country with a rigid centralism.

S. acted sometimes skilfully and sometimes opportunistically. He adapted his speeches to the circumstances in the islands, i.e. their political and religious

orientation. On Sumbawa (conservative Muslim – Masyumi) he devoted a lot more attention to Hatta, cooperation with Hatta; on Flores (one hundred percent Catholic) the visit to Vatican, the Catholic position, etc. The weakness of his presentation was the lack of interest in local, especially economic problems, although people on some islands live difficultly. The visit contributed to the friendship with Yugoslavia. Introducing me as a Partisan, Sukarno spoke about the heroic struggle of our people against the imperialists, colonists. At all meetings he stressed the help of Yugoslavia and President Tito to Indonesia. He took FPRY as an example of the unity of the nation. Similarly, Abdulgani regularly mentioned FPRY. At the insistence of Sukarno I gave a short speech in Lombota before more than 200,000 people and mentioning Tito caused particularly strong ovations. Speaking about the possibility of breaking the economic relations with the Netherlands, Sukarno again mentioned FPRY as a serious partner who would be willing to help. He said they were just buying ships for civil and war fleet in Yugoslavia. He certainly exaggerated our capabilities and easily got over the fact that the Dutch were holding a major part of their economy in their hands, especially transport.

We had extraordinary reception on all islands regardless of their political or religious affiliation. The people of the islands are in the phase of national awakening. They are becoming increasingly aware of the fact that they are an integral part of free, big Indonesia. Sukarno was received as the personification of sovereign Indonesia.

On his way back, he attended the opening of the Technical University of Surabaya and the Military Academy in Magellan. It was a tiring trip. We have visited 2-3 cities a day. We flew more than 10,000 miles, mostly by the amphibians.

Some observations:

In Kupang – Timur, Sukarno was met by the governor of the Portuguese part of Timor. Although official circles emphasized they have no other pretensions except the West Irian, the people of Timur openly say that the day of liberation of the entire Timor will come soon. The Portuguese colony represents an anachronism of colonialism. Indonesian part: 700,000, Portuguese part: 300,000 inhabitants. As for Ceram, the Westerners claim that it is almost all in the hands of rebels – autonomists who strive for the establishment of special Moluccan Republic. The Westerners were surprised when Sukarno invited them to attend the laying of the foundations of the new capital city of Ceram – Masohi – deep in the interior. Security measures were relatively weak. Local factors argue that the autonomist movement, supported by the Dutch is in decline.

The people are poor but not starving. Necessary minimum is provided. On many islands feudal relations are still present – sultanates, Rajas, three degrees of serfs. The power of religion is very strong. Little has been done in the economic field; much more in the field of education.

I was assured that there was a common Indonesian language that everyone understands. The Westerners deny the fact. This is a great advantage of Indonesia in relation to many other countries. Understandably, the language is in the process of development, but it exists and is accepted in all parts of Indonesia.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1957, F-38, dos. 2, no. 424877

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About the talks of the Ambassador of Yugoslavia Pavlič in Jakarta with Indonesian and other political figures

DSIP-VI Department
No. 423216
December 5, 1957

Mail from Jakarta
Received on November 5, 1957

Mail contains 32 notes of Ambassadors Pavlič about the talks with Indonesian and other political figures from March to October 1957.

The notes are treating the following problems:

Internal political situation. According to the head of the Nationalist Party of Indonesia the situation in the country is improving although the implementation of the conclusions of the National Conference has encountered many difficulties. The above mentioned believes that PNI and PKI are likely to maintain cooperation and provides for the possibility of cooperation with Masyumi in certain districts. However, it excludes the creation of an earlier bloc PNI-Masyumi-Ulama. It is believed that Hatta who has recently showed quite a lot of flexibility will not accept the participation of the Communists in the government or other authorities.

The Secretary-General of GKPI considered that the recent victory of the Communists at municipal elections in Java was primarily a sign of the people's discontent with the parties that have been in power so far. In his opinion, the strengthening of KPI influenced the turmoil within the Nationalist Party. He is concerned that the cooperation between PNI and PKI could be ended soon. This means that the earlier coalition between nationalists and reactionary, religious parties could be re-established.

Former President of the Indonesian Government Dr A. Sastroamidjojo believes that the Darul Islam rebellion is impossible to be destroyed militarily. He argues that the Western powers are supplying rebels with the modern weapons. In his opinion the political consolidation and economic prosperity would mean the end of the Darul Islam.

The Vice President of the party Nahdatul Ulama points out that it is high time to change the existing electoral system that has enabled the creation of a large number of parties. It anticipates that only four parties will endure, namely: PNI, Ulama, Masyumi and PKI. Ulama party cooperates with the nationalists for tactical reasons. It is trying to bring nationalists and Masyumi together with the aim to separate them from the Communists.

The Chairman of the Socialist Party believes that nationalists rely heavily on the middle class, merchants, teachers and administration. He says that Sukarno takes account of the interests of 40 million Javanese and forgets about the people of Sumatra, Borneo, etc. The Socialist Party gives some support to Djuanda's Office. He is of the opinion that the Djuanda's government will succeed, because it includes capable people.

Economic situation. The economic situation is difficult. The people are seriously affected by the constant rise in the price of basic consumer goods. Golden coverage of the Indonesian rupee fell in June this year for about 13%, which is well below the legal limit. The government has taken certain measures to stabilize prices at a higher level. However, if the government retains the control of price rise, it is necessary to solve the issue of relations with peripheral islands which export rubber, copra etc. and provide the most funds to the central government. Likewise, the government should provide economic instruments that will stimulate manufacturers to increase production and prevent the illegal export of Indonesian products in Singapore, Malaya and so on.

Hatta's visit to China and relations with China. Secretary General of the KPI Aidit estimates Hatta's visit to China as a positive move of Beijing. Regarding relations between KPI and Communist Party of China (CPC) he says that CPC has a lot of understanding for their problems. Due to the position of the Indonesian bourgeoisie towards the Chinese minority in Indonesia, which holds important economic positions, KPI avoids any publicity regarding the contacts with the CPC. According to the Embassy, Indonesian Communist Party together with the Chinese puts Moscow in the first place, although contacts with Beijing are stronger.

Situation in the army. The Air Force Chief of Staff presents the difficulties in the organization of the army and air forces. The army is made up of diverse elements. There is still a great dichotomy between personnel who have served in pre-war colonial army and personnel of the national liberation struggle. The army and officers are influenced by political, religious and local factors. Therefore, the discipline in the army is very weak and achieving discipline is designated as a priority.

Relations with Japan. Secretary General of the MFA says Indonesians are concerned about the recent political developments in Japan. The Government of Kishi is associated with the United States. He does not agree with the initiative of the Japanese to create a separate fund for the development of Asian countries. The Indonesians were surprised by the efforts of Japan to obtain a temporary place in the Security Council as a representative of Asian countries. Indonesian MFA will not support the Japanese request until the issue of reparation is resolved. Relations between Japan and Indonesia are at the consular level.

Relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. According to the Chief of Protocol of MFA, the Netherlands and Indonesia will not exchange the ambassadors until the question of the West Irian is resolved. The Indonesians have earlier suggested to replace the High Commissioners by the Ambassadors and the Dutch have agreed.

Relations between FPRY and Indonesia. Ambassador Pavlič handed an invitation to the Minister of Defence asking the Indonesian military mission to visit Yugoslavia.

Vice Admiral Subyakto said that Indonesia was particularly interested in buying a large number of smaller warships in Yugoslavia. The problem is the lack of the foreign currency. He launched the question of a loan.

The Minister of Education expressed his desire for the exchange of material in the field of education and cultural cooperation.

Secretary General of the KPI highlights the need for unity of the Socialist Camp, including Yugoslavia in the Camp. He proposed the exchange of material and expressed the desire to come to Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). He would be grateful if SKJ could enable the holiday in Yugoslavia to several of its members, as it was done by other Eastern European countries.

Other major Indonesian parties also show interest in the exchange of material.

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-1

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**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the conversation with Indonesian
Prime Minister Djuanda, January 3, 1958**

Top Secret

I have paid a visit at his request.

He says that the term suggested for his visit to FPRY between March 25 and April 15 suit him. He is looking forward to the visit. Until then President Sukarno will return and there will be plenty of time for solving the most urgent issues with the President after his return.

We are talking about the situation in Indonesia. He is more optimistic than he was during the last meeting two weeks ago. There are things that concern him but he says that the government is able to prevent any attempt of the violent change of the regime. The absence of the President suits the opposition. They do not exclude the possibility of terrorist acts. It is about him. The opposition is determined to bring down the government. Having failed to make him resign, the opposition is ready, i.e. the terrorist groups are ready to physically liquidate him. Last night, he says, about one o'clock in the morning and again about five o'clock in the morning there were two shots at his residence. The investigation is confidential, without publicity.

I tell him him to pay the full attention to the issue of security in the interest of his country.

Djuanda confirms that certain countries are pressing him to resign. However, the Government is determined to work together with the Army to maintain the status quo during the absence of the President. He assured me that the government and the army have taken necessary measures to implement it.

He regrets that Hatta has published the article criticizing the government for not being prepared or not properly acting in relation to anti-Dutch campaign. The article, Djuanda says, has served the opposition in the country and reaction abroad to use the name of Hatta and start the whole series of attacks on the government and President Sukarno. This article primarily suits the Dutch and weakens their front. He replied quite sharply to Hatta, but he refrained from even sharper response only because it would further benefit to the foreign countries, primarily the Dutch. He does not understand how Hatta could do something like that. He is Hatta's old associate. They were very close, especially in 1949 during RTC negotiations. He says that Hatta at that time accepted his every suggestion regarding economic financial provisions of RTC agreement having full confidence in him. Hatta did not know some facts, e.g. that in October the Dutch demanded 40% increase in tariffs for maritime transport KPM. This meant a knife under

its throat and the government was forced “to beg” the Dutch to wait for two months. The government has also decided to once and for all solve this dominance of the Dutch in maritime transport.

Asked whether he would be able to organize a meeting between Sukarno – Hatta and nine-member parliamentary committee responsible for the solution of Sukarno – Hatta cooperation, he said in confidence that the next day – on Saturday – Sukarno and Hatta will have a private meeting and lunch together. Only he, Djuanda, will attend it. They were of the opinion that such an intimate meeting would be of greater benefit than a formal meeting with a nine-member Committee.

There was a rumour that on December 31 in the middle of the night “Negara Sumatra” would be declared, i.e. independent state Sumatra by Hussein, the commander of the Central Sumatra. However, nothing happened. Yet Central Sumatra is the biggest concern. More than the others they are going their own way fully ignoring the provisions of the Central Government. Certainly, during the absence of the President new difficulties can emerge in Sumatra and Sulawesi.

He is sorry because of the publicity regarding their mission to purchase the weapons from Yugoslavia and other countries. Their ambassador in Washington Mukarto was to be blamed for this because he brought this to light without the knowledge of the Government.

He thanked for the New Year statement of President Tito. This statement was a serious help at the right time.

He does not believe that President Sukarno will be able to fulfil his plans until the end of the holiday. In fact, he is no longer on holiday; he is visiting countries that could significantly assist Indonesia in in fight for the West Irian and against the Dutch. The invitation of President Tito to President Sukarno to come to vacation and talks in Yugoslavia is very alluring and of particular importance but would be hard to realize. Even Egypt is too far. (I refrained from any statement, although personally I regret that he would not be able to pay a visit. But invitation itself had a positive effect. The visit may have been realized if we have actively worked on it.)

We have arranged the meeting with newly appointed Yugoslav military attaché Comrade Marković for Monday, 11a.m. Djuanda is also the Minister of National Defence.

I asked for help in finding a residence. An economic secretary has been in the hotel for two years now, there is a new first secretary, and I am without real residence. There are certain possibilities since the Dutch are leaving. But military administration already has its eye on these houses.

Djuanda promised the full support and to deliver a personal letter to the Commander of Djakarta Col. Dahjar whom we should visit together.

Pavlič

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**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the talks with the Secretary General
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Suwito, January 7, 1958**

Top Secret

I have visited him to introduce him to Comrade B. Ristić, the Secretary of the Embassy.

He says that the visit of President Sukarno to Brioni and the talks on that occasion would be of the utmost importance for Indonesia. Therefore, we decided to meet. This is the attitude of MFA and Sukarno, and even of the Government. Indonesia is fairly isolated; the pressure on both sides is growing. The responsibility of the countries implementing the policy of independence outside the bloc, the policy of active coexistence, is growing. Therefore, the talks of "the big four independent" i.e. Tito, Nehru, Nasser and Sukarno can be of the utmost importance. The eyes of the AA world, regardless of the present bloc membership and connections, are pointed to the work of these four. If the cooperation of these four failed, it would mean the collapse of the policy of active co-existence and "the collapse of a peaceful world." There would be only two blocs left and one alternative – war.

For them, meeting with Tito and the Yugoslav government was of special importance not only because of the great experience Yugoslavs has in implementing the policy of independence and the policy of active coexistence, but also because of the reputation Yugoslavia has as the only European country in AA world. He stresses the importance of anti-colonialism and the role of FPRY.

He says that all external and internal actions of the present government are based on the policy of independence.

He wonders whether the four-engine plane with President Sukarno and 17 delegation members could land on Brioni. I reply negatively. President Sukarno may continue his journey from Cairo to Brioni by a Conveyor, or fly over Belgrade and Zagreb.

The relations with Japan will improve. This will help them break the pressure of isolation. However, Japan concerns them. He states confidentially that Mao Zedong advised Sukarno to get closer to Japan and to help Japan break free of the United States' tutorship. According to Mao Zedong Japan finds it difficult to cope with this tutorship; the Japanese character cannot stand it. Suwito says that Japan recognizes India as a leading political force in Asia, and Indonesia as the most important economic partner. On the other hand, Indonesia is also interested in developing cooperation with Japan. However, in Indonesia there is a dilemma whether it would be better to align with Japan or China. Both options ha-

ve negative moments. It is hard to perceive the consequences of Tokyo and Beijing joining their forces in expansion. Indonesia would be the first under attack (the same opinion was expressed by Subandrio at the meeting with Tempo).

Since he made reference to the “big four” once more I wonder what happened to Burma and the meeting between Sukarno and U Nu. Suwito corrected himself saying that there were actually “five” of them but emphasizing only four was not a coincidence.

As for the Philippines, he says that they are being increasingly degraded as a satellite of American politics. The Foreign Policy of the Philippines is led by the commander of the VII Pacific Fleet.

He interprets his conversation with Allison, the US ambassador. He seriously drew his attention to the fact that US should not even think about tearing Indonesia apart. The revenge would be hard. In this case, Java would become communist and an integral part of the Moscow system, which would mean a definitive collapse of the American SEATO policy. It is in the best interest of the United States to allow Indonesia the continuation of the policy of independence.

He is an optimist strongly believing that the government has everything under control. He interprets the circumstances 1945–1949, when the situation was far worse; now they are much stronger by themselves and there are also the Bandung countries, there is Yugoslavia.

He adds that Allison shows understanding for their policy. But the policy in the Far East is under the Pentagon and not US. Certainly, Dulles is negative.

He is sorry for Hatta’s public criticism. Hatta, as the number two man, should consider the consequences of such a criticism abroad because it is objectively helping the enemy. He had plenty of opportunities and ways to express criticism directly to Djuanda who is his best associate or to Sukarno who has come to visit him twice at his (Hatta’s) home. Hatta intended to continue debate but gave up at the suggestion of MFA.

He speaks about the forthcoming crisis of the Dutch Government regarding the tax increase, which is in relation with Indonesia. He says that Drees is more conciliatory, more reasonable, trying to establish contact with Djuanda. He was only looking for a formulation which would not explicitly mention the transfer of sovereignty of West Irian. However, Lunds is irreconcilable. He says Drees does not know Indonesians. Lunds wants everything to go through diplomatic channels, at the ambassadorial level, similar to China-USA.

In strict confidence, he says that yesterday Zhukov, the Russian ambassador, visited Djuanda and Subandrio and offered, on behalf of the government, to “borrow” 10 cargo ships for the period of three months to assist Indonesia in a given situation. USSR is ready to sell ships to Indonesia or to let Indonesia chart them. He says that this offer, although it is about freighters, has political considerations. They will see.

Sukarno will not be able to accept the invitation of Kuantlio. Sukarno leaves Egypt on the 17th.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-40, dos. 2, no. 45415

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**Talks of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Koča Popović
with the Ambassador of Indonesia Sudarsono on military, economy and
non-bloc cooperation, January 7, 1958**

Top Secret 6

Belgrade, January 7, 1958

I came at his request. I stayed for 25 minutes.

He informs me that their first military delegation has arrived. He asks us to provide assistance as much as possible. They are interested in obtaining the weapons as soon as possible. They estimate that everything they need (not only from us) will cost around \$150 million, at least. That is a great sum and therefore, he is asking for a long-term loan, i.e. 10 years. I say that we understand their position, that we will help them as much as we can, that it will depend on the type of their orders, whether these are dollar goods, the ratio of weapons and ammunition, etc. Sudarsono says that they count on getting most of infantry and navy weapons from us, and aviation weapons in Czech Republic and Poland.

He asks whether we have made a decision regarding their demand that, if required, we can stand in defence of their interests with the Dutch. I reply affirmatively. He says that they have learned also about India's opinion, so they could decide when and if the case happens. I say it is natural.

He mentions the need to speed up work on economic cooperation. They expect arrival of our unofficial delegation in the near future. They approve the form of mixed societies.

In reply to my question, he says that their domestic situation is very complicated, but "not so bad".

Regarding other matters of interest, I mention his question regarding our potential thoughts on having a meeting or a treaty of non-bloc countries, which would, later on, suggest a meeting involving some bloc countries. I say we do not exclude the possibility.

Koča Popović

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-2

Talks of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Koča Popović with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandria about China and the Soviet Union, at a dinner with the president of Yugoslavia, January 17, 1958.

Conf. No. 4950

Belgrade. January 18, 1958

The conflict with the Dutch has a social content, but a national form.

Parliamentarism of Western type was proved to be completely unsuitable for a newly liberated country such as Indonesia. The multiparty system is a means of foreign influence.

They must not quickly adopt or implement the Soviet offers, as it would be considered as surrendering positions to the Communists.

The Chinese are different from the Russians. Mao is flexible in applying Marxism. They do not follow the patterns. Every individual is refined as a result of the old culture. You can talk to them even when they do not agree which was impossible with Russians until recently. Now the Russians follow the example of the Chinese and the Yugoslavs. He takes Zhou Enlai in Bandung as an example, who could speak in a friendly way even with extreme reactionaries. The Chinese are very diligent. They have achieved a lot. The only question is whether the amount of 600 million, used for Socialist internal policy, will also be used for Socialist foreign policy.

Indonesian communists are more related to China than to the USSR. They are by far the best organized political force in Indonesia, not only at the top. In the current conflict – confrontation with Netherlands – they “stay aside” because they do not want to complicate, it is very well understood. They have their own Indonesian traits; they are not “classical” orthodox communists.

MacMillan surprised them with his constructiveness. He was the first to launch the issue of West Irian and showed understanding for the Indonesian stance, stressing the need to avoid further tensions.

Countries like Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand are in complete disorder. They cannot move on without ample foreign aid, and even with foreign aid they cannot prosper. Indonesia is in a completely different position.

He asks whether we have the border with the Soviet Union and Turkey. Do Russians appreciate Sukarno? Is the position of Khrushchev still solid?

The man as Gromyko has nothing to do with ideology and revolution. From his youth he performs as a representative of the great powers, and therefore is nothing more than that. Khrushchev and Molotov are something different, be-

cause they were the part of the revolution. The rise in the standard of the Soviet Union and the formation of increasingly capable intelligence will have a positive impact on the internal movement in the USSR.

In the West, there are no more great statesmen. Either MacMillan or Eden are certainly not so. The last one was Churchill.

If Indonesia had not faced the conflict with the Netherlands, it would have found itself in a chaotic position in which Egypt was before Nasser. It would set it back for a long period of time, and it would lose independence.

Koča Popović

AJ, KPR, I-5-b/40-2

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The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade to the Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta on clarification of Tito's attitudes on the Indonesian foreign policy

Belgrade, February 1, 1958

To Pavlič. – Subandrio's statement that the President is for the termination of relations with the West is unfounded, your ref. 29. The President pointed out explicitly that they should maintain contacts with Western countries and to use all the opportunities both in the West and the East. He also mentioned that it seemed that some Western countries were scared of the Dutch scenario, and were therefore supporting the Dutch. Visit Subandrio and remind him of the President's attitudes in order to avoid misunderstandings. Also ask him to keep the term of the President's visit in secrecy for the reasons of security.

For your information, please note that we expressed no pessimistic views of the situation in Indonesia during the talks. The President wanted to have more direct information on the situation in Indonesia, particularly if the last action has been sufficiently prepared with the people. He explicitly supported them in terms of the West Irian, pointed out that we noted the support of the masses when taking over the Dutch companies and said that this policy should now be vigorously enforced.

Vidić

AJ, KPR, I-5-b/40-2

Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about his meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio and Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Suwito on the rebellion in Sumatra and non-bloc cooperation, February 11, 1958

Top Secret

Since Mr Subandrio was at the session of the Government, I was received by Mr Suwito.

He says that last night at 11 o'clock, Sukarno and Djuanda were delivered an ultimatum by the commander of the Central Sumatra Hussein with a five-day term, which ends in the night between the 15th and 16th. The ultimatum demands the resignation of Djuanda's government or its revocation by the President, giving a new mandate to Hatta and Buono IX, the acceptance of the new government by Parliament, limiting Sukarno only to the constitutional duties and nothing else. If the conditions are not met, Hussein will no longer be considered loyal to President Sukarno.

Mr Suwito says that the situation is serious, that this ultimatum is contrary to earlier optimistic information he has received from the Central Sumatra that the rebels will not resort to ultimatum. Ultimatum cannot be accepted.

He says that MFA has called the ambassadors from the Philippines and West Germany, who are Sumatran and sent them to Sumatra with the intention to act in moderation rebels and send direct information to MFA, i.e. Government. According to this information, it is about a narrow circle of disgruntled officers and politicians. He adds that the Central Sumatra is a special problem because there is still a feudal system. Hussein enjoys a great reputation and is regarded as their feudal ruler. If Hussein moved to PKI, the masses would follow him simply because of feudal relation.

Suwito presents the already known differences between the rebels. He still believes that Hussein is a patriot but influenced by negative figures like Lubis and Simbolon.

He emphasizes the unconditional support of the Muslim Party of NU, which states that there is no other government except Djuanda's.

He says that Bung Tomo Sutomo, the ex-general, now the head of a smaller party PRI, was the Minister of Social Welfare in the Harahap's Government, that he is a very capable speaker with special merits during the war but politically rather confusing. His party does not fall within a standard division to nationalist, religious and Marxist parties. It is a little bit of everything. It is only clear that it is resolutely of anti-communist orientation.

He says that Subandrio told him they were surprised by Belgrade's certain pessimistic estimate of the situation here, but that they were satisfied with the visit as a whole.

Subandrio says that he comes from an emergency government meeting regarding the ultimatum tonight. He says in confidence that the government is compact and firmly resolved to make an end to such ultimatums. The Government is aware that this is not about Djuanda's resignation. If that was the case, Djuanda would not hesitate for a minute. However, the final target of the rebels is Sukarno. But they want to eliminate Djuanda first and give more power to those who would be willing to make more concessions, and thus weaken Sukarno. The second step would be the request for sharing the presidency position i.e. duumvirate Soekarno – Hatta, meaning that Hatta would have a stronger position since he would lead the government and be the most influential figure whereas Sukarno's role would be reduced to the representative function of the President of the Republic. The third step would include the elimination of Sukarno from political life.

The government did not want to take responsibility upon itself to begin solving armament issues. However, they have no choice. The acceptance of the ultimatum would only strengthen the rebels who would come up with the new requests.

He says in confidence that Djuanda as the Minister of National Defence has already met with the chiefs of staff of three corps to take urgent measures. In this regard, he asks the Yugoslav Government to show understanding of their condition and to defer the payment of 10% advance payment as agreed in the sales contract for the purchase of weapons. They ask for a 3-month delay. Their golden cover fell below 10% compared to the earlier 25%. If they had to pay those advances, further decline in gold coverage would echo hard in already difficult situation. The same request will be sent to other interested countries.

He promised to immediately forward the request hoping that, however difficult, it will not be impossible for Yugoslav government to meet them.

Subandrio points out to the harmful effect the ultimatum could have regarding their struggle against the Dutch. There were signs that the Dutch Government would show understanding and agree to the proposed negotiations. However, using the specific situation in Indonesia, the Dutch Government states that it would not negotiate with the current government because it thinks that the new central government will be much more attentive towards the Dutch interest than the present.

He does not rule out further difficulties with the West.

Concerning this, I point to the need of maintaining relations with both the West and the East. Passing on your tel. . . . in order to avoid any misunderstandings in the interpretation of the Belgrade talks. Subandrio says once more that

they were really surprised by the pessimism pervading the beginning of the talks, and especially by the questions of President Tito. However, they want to say that President Sukarno was very pleased after the talks and thanked for the visit to Belgrade. They were somewhat surprised by the reserves which were formulated by Nehru and Nasser almost in the same way as by President Tito. They were surprised about them not being informed about the events here. The similarity of attitudes with Nasser and Nehru was particularly noted by President Sukarno. It is considered as minus that President Sukarno, who may be the best speaker of Indonesia, does not want to discuss at mass meetings. He is not persuasive with words. Sukarno has a personal charm that wins but he is often difficult in discussions. The talks in Belgrade would have been different if he had previously exchanged the views with Minister Koča but to their fault – Indonesian – it was impossible. He is sorry that I was not in Belgrade because a lot of things would have been explained earlier. But he underlines that he considers a visit to Belgrade a greatest success and especially valuable for them. He also underlines that the conditions made by Tito, Nehru and Nasser on the need for unity and control and economic readiness for such actions as the eradication of colonialism in all its forms that still exist in Indonesia, also apply to them. However, it should be taken into consideration that unity and control are not present to a similar extent as they are in Egypt and India or Yugoslavia, but economic conditions are much more favourable since Indonesia cannot liquidate. He continues that in terms of the practical application of democracy, it cannot be implemented as it was advised in Belgrade due to the opposition and the rebels. The conditions here are specific. But today's decision of the Government to use weapons to liquidate rebellion in Central Sumatra is in line with this interpretation of democracy.

He says that Hatta wants to distance himself from this reckless ultimatum. Yesterday, he talked to Hatta personally. He thinks they will find a common platform of cooperation.

As for Sukarno, he says he will not be back before the 15th. He will come to dinner on the 26th.

Pavlič

**The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia:
note on the delivery of war material to Indonesia**

Belgrade, February 20, 1958

Ref. DSIP note no. 43368 of February 14, 1958

The terms of delivery and payment given to Indonesians for the agreed portion of war material worth \$14 million represent the maximum of concessions from our side, quite unusual for that type of arrangement. These conditions are the reflection of our willingness to fully facilitate the payment of such material. The conditions are as follows:

15% in the form of an advance payment immediately upon the signing of the contract (approximately \$2.1 million)

85% the loan with 8-year repayment period

4% annual interest on the remaining portion

Deadlines and value of the delivery provided by the contract between the company "Jugoimport" and the Indonesian land forces are as follows:

3 months	\$	5,294,015.20
6 months	\$	121,776.50
12 months	\$	6,552,232.00
20 months	\$	1,820,000.00
20 months	\$	1,820,000.00
		Total: \$ 13,788,023.70
Transportation costs		275,000.
		Total: \$ 14,063,023.70

According to the company, the factory would hardly be able to realize the first delivery in exactly 3 months. This deadline is accepted under the pressure of Indonesians and is based on the predictions that the advance would be paid about a month after signing the contract and opening a letter of credit on the entire amount even later, so the first delivery was really expected to be 4-5 months after signing.

Before receiving the advance payment, the factories expect to solve some problems of technical character which are not related to higher material costs. From the moment of receiving the advance payment to the moment of opening the letter of credit, they could make necessary preparations to meet the deadlines

under the terms of the contract, as well as various tools, supply of materials, orders from abroad, etc.

In this regard, we refer to the following:

a) If the proposal of the Ambassador Pavlič to postpone the advance payment for three months was accepted, the postponement would be counted starting from the day of acceptance, which means that the payment deadline would be approximately the end of May. However, the delivery time would remain unchanged, so that the first delivery in the amount of approximately \$ 5.3 million should be realized around May 9th.

b) There are already about 100 people working on the improvement of technical conditions set by the contract. In case of delayed payment, the company "Jugoimport" and the factories would be brought into a difficult position, since there is no guarantee that the contract would be cancelled in case of a changed political situation. On the other hand, "Jugoimport" would have the obligation not only of \$5.3 million which is the value of the first delivery, but the value of the whole contract, i.e. \$14 million as it would have to put in motion the factories, the entire system, to pay interest to the banks etc.

c) However if, for political reasons, we want to meet their requests and defer the payment of advance, we should insist on Indonesians giving us an irrevocable letter of credit in the full amount, so that the Bank of Indonesia could take on the obligation of the Government arising from the contract. It should be noted that during the negotiations Indonesian delegation did not want to accept the idea that Bank of Indonesia should guarantee for the entire amount. Later, it was agreed that instead of guarantees, they would open irrevocable, but unconfirmed letter of credit. If we agree to the postponement of the advance payment, the deadline for the delivery should run from the moment of opening letter of credit, since the schedules containing technical conditions of the contract have not yet been signed and that the factories could really use such an extension.

V. Velebit

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-2

**Talks of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Koča Popović
with the Ambassador of Indonesia Sudarsono on the rebellion in Indonesia
February 27, 1958**

Top Secret 72

Belgrade, February 27, 1958

He came at his own request – stayed for half an hour.

He says he comes following the order of his Minister to hear about our assessment of the situation in Indonesia and about the case of “Slovenia”, since they could have a similar thing happening.

When asked, he states that his minister is directly interested in this.

I say I would like to hear his opinion on the situation in Indonesia. At first, he speaks very generally, and only later, during the interview, gives more precise information and reviews.

I have been cautious during the talks. I say that the unity of the people is fundamental. The bigger internal conflicts, the greater are the chances for interference from outside, and so on. He says that the recent attempts of agreement between Sukarno and Hatta have failed mainly because of different views regarding the participation of Communists in the Government. He does not speak negatively of the rebel government. Its program? “More Democracy”, the agreement Sukarno – Hatta. He is of the opinion that the central government should not opt for austerity measures, as this would enhance the chances for foreign intervention. He suggested finding a compromise. I tell him that the value of one or another kind of measures depends on the strength with which one disposes, and that any extension of the disorderly situation represents a further complication. However, there is also a discontent in the army. There are those who are for the elimination of both Sukarno and Hatta, so that they could take matters into their own hands. In reply to my question, he says that the soldiers are not unique.

Also, the US Seventh Fleet is near – based in Singapore. The central government gets no more petroleum from Singapore. The Dutch seized an Indonesian boat (which has previously belonged to them). They do not even get oil from Central Sumatra. He asks if I believe that the US will intervene. Russians maybe? I try to evade: it mainly depends on whether Indonesia will solve its internal problems, and that foreign intervention would threaten the whole international situation.

He asks whether they could have the scenario of “Slovenia”. I say that they are not in a state of war, although the French action was also unlawful, and so on. He says that some ships with weapons from Sweden have already been detained

in France. The cargo from Italy that was already supposed to be in Indonesia has not come yet. I say that to some extent, western solidarity will be sure to act and there will be a variety of sabotage – keeping...

(From the very beginning I have had some doubts whether these talks were conducted by the orders of his government – or anyone else. He is pessimistic regarding the position of the Central Government. It is not clear whether he is a supporter; he shows a lot of distrust. I must say that, just before the talks there was a telegram from Argentina – talks Fejić – Sastroamidjojo – that Sudarsono supports the rebels. Perhaps Pavlič should check with Subandrio whether Sudarsono was given such directives.)

Koča Popović

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-2

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**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade on Sukarno's reliance on socialist countries**

Jakarta
TS 104
March 20, 1958

When the Czech ambassador handed him the various gifts, Sukarno said that he counted on greater support of the socialist countries, especially the USSR, CSR, and FPRY. Only in that case, Indonesia would be able to resist the Western pressure. Sukarno said something similar to the Russian ambassador who gave him gifts on the occasion of the birth of Sukarno's son. The Russian and Czech say that Sukarno repeatedly mentioned FPRY, primarily the conversation with President Tito as well as the assistance we provide by delivering weapons.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-42, dos. 1, no. 47641

Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on the talks with Indonesian Prime Minister Djuanda on the rebellion in Sumatra, March 21, 1958

Top Secret!

I have paid him a visit at my own request.

I have informed him about the developments regarding economic cooperation. He is very interested in operation of Rijeka. He calls for flexibility on both sides in terms of percentage – costs and fees. They have no experience. The practice will show which percentage is suitable for both sides.

The establishment of a joint maritime association requires time. Interested. They wish Yugoslav ships visited Indonesian ports more frequently on their way from Europe to China and back. When it comes to paying the tolls in rupees or pounds, we should find a compromise. He thinks that the establishment of a mixed company for the placement of the Yugoslav products would be useful. It would be economically and politically desirable if indeed we were able to build one or even several smaller objects, such as shipyards and the like. I informed him that today their Commission should deliver a list of fields in which they expect our technical assistance or cooperation.

He apologizes for not being able to devote enough attention to our talks. He will try to compensate.

We discuss a political situation. First of all, he appreciates the statement of President Tito in which he strongly condemned the foreign intervention in Indonesia. The Indonesian Government knows how to appreciate this statement while others rush to proclaim their neutrality regarding both the legal and revolutionary government, no matter what lies behind it.

He believes that the present rebellion will soon be suppressed. He tells me about their plan: it is impossible to continue the talks with the opposition. Government unanimously supports Sukarno in this respect. The rebellion needs to be crushed militarily. Serious measures are taken. Soon there will be an operation directly on the Padang. This is needed to bring the opposition to senses and to prove that the government is able to crush the rebellion by its own forces.

However, immediately after they reach the first success i.e. after they take Padang, they will make utmost efforts to immediately, without further delay and hesitation from either side, find a political solution. Personally, he advocates the attitude of wide flexibility in finding a platform for a political solution. He is convinced that it will also be the case with the opposition when they realize that the government can crush the rebellion militarily. A political solution

is the only guarantee for establishing the peace and ensuring independence of their policy.

He says, "Immediately after we achieve the success in Padang, I am ready to resign and thus make President Sukarno find a political solution that requests the unity of people".

Their concept seems realistic and probably the only possible which could bring about the unity of the country and prevent foreign intervention, i.e. expansion of the rebellion beyond Indonesia. I have two remarks. First, are they sure in the success of such a military operation, because the success is the condition for finding a political solution? It seems to me that Hussein's people in Padang will provide serious resistance. The failure of Padang operation would have the most serious consequences on the attitude of Barlian, the commander of southern Sumatra, who is inclined to Hussein and waits for a chance to cross to the other side. It would be very unfavourable for them if they let the rebellion spread to the whole of Sumatra. It would change the international character of the rebellion and give some countries, which are just waiting for a chance, an opportunity to recognize the rebel government.

And secondly, will they have enough time to finish military operations and find a political solution before the side intervention becomes too efficient.

In reply, he says that time works for the rebels. They are aware of that. That is why they have sped up the preparations for the attack on Padang. It will happen these days. The preparations must be serious, just as they were in case of Pekanbaru (American petroleum fields in central Sumatra). He completely agrees that they must not allow the failure of Padang operation. He agrees that the Hussein's people will fight back but only at first. He's convinced that if they break the resistance in the first attack, they will cause a complete confusion. Thus the attack must be comprehensive and efficient enough in the beginning. I completely agree as far as Barlian is concerned. He is weak, just waiting for a chance to cross to the other side. Measures have been taken to prevent it. They have already sent 200 paratroopers with a mission liquidate Barlian and other leaders at the first attempt or movement of Barlian and his people. Barlian has been told about this. Barlian is informed that the central Government will respected the neutrality, i.e. that it will not use airports, general communications, etc. But they must not damage petroleum fields in Palembang, which are of vital importance for the whole of Indonesia. All octane gasoline is obtained from Palembang. Their air forces would be completely paralyzed if they cut off or damaged Palembang petroleum fields.

He thinks they will have enough time to crush the rebellion in Padang and solve a political issue. They need to work fast in both directions. He has talked about it with US Ambassador Jones. He is convinced that Americans will wait for a few days. Americans find this solution acceptable. In the end, Americans want peace in this part of the world. They are resolved to limit the power of Su-

karno and potential communist threat. The political solution involves the cooperation of the opposition and suits the Americans to a certain extent.

He says that Jones shows understanding of their condition. The problem is the State Department and Dulles himself. He said that Allison, the former ambassador, announcing that he has been recalled, told him they could expect a serious change in US policy towards Indonesia. All these difficulties, rebellion, ultimatums of opposition etc. are somehow orchestrated by the Americans. There are also their own faults that Americans can use, primarily dissatisfaction of the region, corrupted parties.

He says there are some twenty foreign instructors, mostly Americans, British and Australians located in central Sumatra. Clearly, the governments know nothing about it. They have come as tourists, primarily as journalists. They are training Hussein's people and organizing resistance.

He says they have decided to organize an exhibition of cutting-edge US weapons seized in Central Sumatra. The exhibition could be seen these days in Djakarta. They will invite the heads of diplomatic missions. There are bazookas and 75mm (I think he said anti-tank) guns. They are not familiar with these weapons.

I thank him for trusting me and explaining his government's program. Personally, I can only wish him success in the interests of his country. I express readiness of our government to help them, as much as we can and as much as they need. He interrupts me saying that he knows that they can always count on our support.

He apologizes for having agreed to visit FPRY, then delayed and now, given the situation ... I interrupt him to say that I have received a strict order from my Government not to start this issue as we are conscious of his personal situation and the needs of his country. We fully understand his decision and even the delay and his report on it. I tell him that I have been given the order to establish a program of his visit, the exact date of arrival etc. However, because of the situation I did not want to bother him. I am sorry because he has wasted the opportunity to see my country, because this visit would have contributed to further strengthening of relations. I hope he will have another chance. It is not a moment to discuss about it. He says he is happy he did not cause too many problems and especially not to the Yugoslav government.

As to the visit of a military mission which was planned for April, he says it would be very useful from a political point of view. There are certain technical difficulties and their biggest holiday – the great lent – which lasts until the end of April. Just for this reason it would be perhaps better to postpone the visit of a military mission.

He says he would like to give a dinner party for me and my wife at his place. He would invite several ministers. I gratefully accept. I ask if perhaps he co-

uld invite the Head of Business Delegations. He readily accepts. He says he would like to meet our businessmen personally. To this end, he could give a lunch for the delegation. I thank him and say it is not necessary and that he is too busy.

He asks about the health of my older daughter, who is in hospital due to rheumatic fever. He is well informed of this disease because his son has been suffering the same, and today, after two and a half years must be under strict medical supervision and permanent treatment. He offers his services and primarily suggests that his and my wife should exchange opinion because of their difficult experiences with the illness. I am very grateful.

The conversation was really friendly. It took an hour. I have tried to leave, knowing he is very busy but he has kept me. Yet I have forgotten to thank him for helping me get a residence in the city centre, which none of the Heads of Mission has managed in recent years, which is particularly important for me due to the illness of my daughter and wife.

Pavlič

MSP RS DA, PA, 1958, F-41, dos. 21, no. 410421

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**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on a conversation with
President Sukarno on the rebellions in Sumatra and Celebes
and cooperation between Yugoslavia and Indonesia**

Jakarta
TS 123
April 3, 1958

I was invited by President Sukarno half an hour earlier. This is probably due to my talks with his first adjutant Abdulgani who is with Sukarno at the moment. More or less a private meeting. He is interested in the health condition of my wife and daughter. He thanks for the greeting cards sent by Madame Kartini for the birth of Sukarno's second son and shares the impressions of his visit to Belgrade. He regrets for not having met Augustinčić whose work he knows from the publications donated by Madame Kartini. He says he will use the first opportunity to visit Augustinčić in Zagreb. On this occasion, I give him your 41834, saying that President Tito would be very glad to take further care of his order of Kršinić's statue. S. warmly thanks. He rejects any idea that he has been indisposed due to a pessimistic views and questions asked in Belgrade. He mentions that

only President Tito had a wish to receive information directly from him. S. says he is sorry if we have been misinformed. Interview with President Tito has been most helpful. He says that President Tito's attitudes are different in a way that he stresses the unity of the country, mobilization of the masses and material preparation as a condition for the successful development of the campaign against the Dutch, while he is of the opinion that the Dutch are the main reason for the current disunity of the country, since they skilfully use the contrast between parties and between the regions and Djakarta. He is convinced that the liquidation of the Dutch government would create conditions for real unity of the country. He underlines the readiness to restart the talks with the opposition and Hatta, but first they need to crush the rebellion and take Padang. He says he does not expect much success in the talks with Hatta. It is about "two worlds, not just two concepts." He says he has been thoroughly discussing it with President Tito. He believes in a relatively fast fall of Padang. They lack parachutes and chariots. He observed that the fall of Padang will have a double positive effect. Firstly, it will show the power of the central government to crush the rebellion using the weapons, and secondly, it will bring the opposition to senses and create conditions for reasonable solution. He has emphasized that the rebellion needs to be suppressed soon since the foreign countries are becoming increasingly involved in supporting the rebels. He mentions yesterday's speech of Vargas, Minister of Defence of the Philippines who warns about the communist threat in Indonesia due to the planned rebellion and due to the direct assistance of the USSR to Jakarta in warships, tanks and planes. Similar to this is the speech of Serrano, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. I inform S. that pro-Western embassies have received a call of the revolutionary government for recognition. All this is part of the same plan. S. says that the localization of the rebellion in the northern part of Celebes would end the danger of disintegration of Indonesia and open intervention. He says that there is a regular air line between the rebels in Menad (Celebes) and Manila and that Simbolon, the foreign minister of the revolutionary government is in contact with the US and the Dutch. Certain mitigation or underestimation of the dangers of intervention could be decisive for Sukarno's attitude on a political solution. If he is really convinced in a stronger involvement of foreign countries, then he will try to avoid any compromise or concessions to the opposition.

S. is optimistic. He primarily expects the crush of the rebellion. He may be under the influence of the initial success in the military field. He thinks that the US will be forced to come to terms with the collapse of the rebellion. He is interested in my opinion about Jones. I say I believe that Jones will accurately inform US about the situation here, but that he will also follow the Dulles's line which was not quite the case with Allison. S. is of the same opinion. (I met Jones in Berlin in 1951 at the opening of the industrial exhibition. He was in Belgrade to control the use of assistance).

During the interview S. says he would like to get more help and especially “Military assistance” from us. I say that we have already done much; I mention the purchase of arms and military units and the credit of eight years, the only exception and outside of our normal possibilities. I have also mentioned our readiness to lend them \$ 10 million for a period of 5 years. He is interested in canalizing their exports over Rijeka but does not know the real possibilities. He says he has already given the order to prepare the hunt on the occasion of the visit of Comrade President. He mentions the visit to the islands of Flores, the last habitat of Komodo dragon. He speaks of the date of the arrival before the national holiday in August. I express doubts that this will suit the other countries of the Far East. I ask him to pay maximum confidentiality to the time of visit. He sends greetings and gratitude to the Comrade President. The speech of the Comrade President of the 16th is not mentioned, neither Sudarsono nor American initiative. The talks lasted three quarters of an hour. S. is moderate, friendly.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-42, dos. 7, no. 48772

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Talks of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Koča Popović with the Ambassador of Indonesia Sudarsono about the riots in Sumatra and Celebes, April 4, 1958

Belgrade
Conf. no. 47898
April 5, 1958

I came at his request – stayed for 45 minutes.

He has just come back from Indonesia. He says the situation is very difficult and unpleasant. The secret US intervention has already started. The US supply rebels with modern weapons. If no agreement is reached between the government and the rebels, there will be, in his opinion, an open US intervention. The Spain or Indochina scenario will be repeated.

In order to prevent it, the first step is to reach the agreement between Sukarno and Hatta on suspension of the operations against the rebels, and making settlement. Sukarno and Hatta already made an agreement in February, and then suddenly there was a military operation. The newly-founded government would include both Sukarno and Hatta. The question whether to continue or suspend the operations is now the only question that divides them. Such a solution would be

acceptable for Americans, who he believes would be satisfied with neutral Indonesian politics under the given circumstances. After the liberation of Padang (by the government troops), he does not believe that the rebels will agree to negotiate. They will withdraw into forest and form a long-term guerrilla. The rebels have a particularly strong base in the Celebes.

He spoke to Sukarno. He says that Sukarno agrees, but wants to liberate Padang first. He spoke to Subandrio. He does not believe that there will be an open US intervention, because it would lead to the intervention of the Soviet Union. Military circles in Jakarta are for the armed conflict with the rebels.

Circumstances in Java are also difficult. Prices are increasing, there is a shortage. Administration is partially disorganized, it does not work regularly. It includes officials from various islands.

After the return of the ships to the Dutch it can be expected that the British – where these ships were insured – will take a tougher stance. The Italians are also active. The Seventh Fleet is still anchored in Singapore.

The relations between Java and other islands should be set up differently. Sukarno is quite ready for it, but after the liberation of Padang.

It is believed that the Indians have also advised the compromise with the rebels. He thinks it is Nehru's personal plan. Indians also think the intervention of Tito-Nehru-U Nu with Americans would be desirable.

The Russians have provided assistance in food and textiles. He asks if I believe that they, too, after the Americans will openly intervene. I reply with suspicion or indefinitely.

Everything he has said was at his own discretion and responding to many of my questions. I have distanced myself saying that I ask "theoretically", to inspect all the possible variants, with no intention to give specific advice, which would be very delicate in the given circumstances.

He implied that we could make Sukarno ask for the agreement immediately.

Within the "theoretical" questions I ask him if they have thought of bringing an act to establish new relations with the provinces – the islands. He says they have not – because of prestige. I ask him if they have thought, for example, to do so along with the temporary suspension of operations, to create the conditions for their suspension or to take the political arguments from the rebels. He says they have not thought of that either, and repeats that after the rebels are banished from Padang they will not want to negotiate.

I ask him, in the same spirit, whether they have, despite the lack of an open intervention, thought of bringing a question before the UN – although it would represent an "internationalization" of the problem. He says they have not.

I say that we are ready to help as much as we can. We know how much they would be set back by a long civil war. I do not see the use of some platonic

intervention with Americans. We have publicly and clearly expressed our position. It would be different if it was related to some new conditions, i.e. a real solution formula where Americans would hinder, and so on.

I tell him in the end that I will inform Comrade President and other comrades about his notion of the situation.

He speaks of the fact that now Rome has become the centre of the rebel and political actions in Europe. Their ambassador in Washington has disappeared.

Sudarsono was altogether pessimistic. The situation in Jakarta is deemed to be confusing; no one knows exactly what one wants. It turned out that he himself does not know exactly what should be done, but believes that there can be a rapid suppression of the rebellion, in order to start negotiations with the rebels. He expressed his opinion to Sukarno.

It is also clear that he has confidence in our friendship. He thanked me for the in-depth conversation.

Koča Popović

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-2

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Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade about the conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio on the withdrawal of ambassador Sudarsono from Belgrade because of the sympathies for the Sumatran rebels, April 10, 1958

Top Secret

I asked for the reception.

The resignation of their ambassador in Rome Rasjid who is a prominent leader of the PSI, has just been announced. On his return, Sudarsono has visited Rasjid. In contact with Hatta. Regarding his earlier statement that Sudarsono withdraws from Belgrade, I ask him about the attitude we should have towards Sudarsono. To avoid any misunderstanding, I say I am just asking a question, not making any complaints. I have remarked that Sudarsono while in Djakarta was very useful in ongoing economic negotiations and informed me about his political activities. Subandrio says it is very good that I have come; otherwise, I would have been called. It is true they have decided to withdraw Sudarsono. Belgrade,

for them, is too important, and they cannot afford to have an ambassador who is unable to interpret the line of Indonesian government. However, during the discussion when they have openly expressed their dissatisfaction with Sudarsono, Sudarsono assured them in his loyalty to President Sukarno and Djuanda. He says that it is only a minor disagreement regarding the ways of solving issues. Sudarsono have referred to his personal, family circumstances (illness of his wife) asking to stay in Belgrade. They accepted. But I have just received a telegram about the recent talks of Sudarsono with Koča Popović. Sudarsono has made the same mistake presenting the line of the Government through his personal views and political reserves. They are seriously dissatisfied with such acts. He has given the order to seriously object to such Sudarsono's act. They respect his personal reserves, but as an ambassador, he has to interpret the line of the government. As far as Rasjid is concerned, Sudarsono gave him Subandrio's letter. They have a serious problem with ambassadors from Sumatra. 50% of their Heads of Mission are from Sumatra. They are very competent but want to dominate the whole of Indonesia. As for Sudarsono, he thinks we can keep a normal attitude. But in two weeks he will invite me again, in the meantime, he will talk with the President and then make a final decision. He wants to avoid recalling an ambassador due to his political affiliation with opposition. But in this particular case I think there is no other way than to recall him as soon as possible from Belgrade.

On Saturday, he is going to Japan for ratification – amendment of the Peace and Reparation Agreement. I say that I think it is a positive step in every respect. There are indications of a certain progress in Japan's foreign policy. The conflict with Chiang Kai-shek, the difficulties with Syngman Rhee, economic agreement with the People's Republic of China, Fujiyama's statement that the Japanese will continue to support the central Government of Indonesia even though the Americans have established relations with the rebels, have alarmed the United States. Subandrio completely agrees, saying he has been guided by this when he proposed his visit and, at the same time, by the desire to break the pressure from the West and certain isolation because of which his one-sided orientation towards the eastern countries seems too evident.

He condemns White's statement on the purchase of arms from Indonesian side. Dulles's statement is moderate. Dulles tactically attacks Eastern bloc for selling weapons to Indonesia while White attacks Indonesia. He thinks that Jones is capable, active, committed to improving relations between Djakarta and Washington. He is ready to implement, without reserve, the line of Dulles which has not been the case with Allison.

He says it is true that Sudarsono has come out with the initiative that Belgrade – New Delhi – Rangoon could make a diplomatic approach with the Government of the United States in favour of Indonesia i.e. with the aim to stop their interference. The proposal has been heard and immediately rated as unreal. However, Sudarsono has insisted pretty much. I notice that I have heard that, regar-

ding this, they have sent instructions to their missions in these countries but that I do not know if this is true. Subandrio says he has never even thought of sending such instructions.

He says he has got the impression that the State Department has become somewhat sensible saying that Indonesia should be given another chance to solve its internal issues. He believes that Padang will be taken some time next week. After that, they will initiate the talks regarding a political settlement. He personally considers this necessary. There are realistic prospects for such a solution. He says that Masyumi leadership officially proposed Djuanda to enter the government. This creates a new perspective. Still remains the question how to prevent the opposition from asking more once it consolidates its position.

The relations with the Philippines are considered worse. Serrano's last statement in which he openly says he does not believe the report of the Indonesian Embassy in Manila that Indonesia is not receiving weapons from Eastern Bloc, is considered impossible. On the way to Tokyo he will have serious talks with Serrano and if necessary with Garcia.

I inform him on the signing of conclusions from the session of the Joint Commission scheduled for the next day, and the arrival of permanent correspondents of "Borba" and "Politika". I say that we are obliged to make more efforts on both sides for the purpose of mutual understanding through the press. These permanent correspondents will enable the people of FPRY to get to know and properly look into the problem of Indonesia and no longer be directed to receive information through the prism of bloc policy. I suggest him to give an interview to "Borba" and "Politika" on first occasion. He gladly accepts the suggestion and will do so immediately after his return from Tokyo.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-41, dos. 21, no. 410421

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on his talks with Indonesian
Djuanda about the rebellion in Sumatra, relations with
the Philippines and cooperation between Indonesia and Yugoslavia,
April 16, 1958**

Top Secret

Indonesian Prime Minister Djuanda hosted a dinner in my honor and friends. Also present were the vice president of the Government Hardi, Minister of Industry Ingkiriwang, Minister of Maritime Affairs Mazir, Secretary General Burhanudin, representatives of Foreign Affairs, Head of Protocol, and on the Yugoslav side: Embassy staff, Hofman, and journalists.

Before dinner, I talked to Djuanda and Hardie alone, but during and after the dinner, the talks was attended by journalists, Mraković and Ingkiriwang.

He says that Sukarno becomes more resilient and flexible, but Hatta is becoming surprisingly more insistent, however it is expected that after the failure of the rebellion in Sumatra he will become more reasonable and willing to compromise.

He still hopes that the agreement is possible. They are working in this direction. He stays with his earlier position that we interpreted at the last meeting. Everything is ready for the liquidation of Padang and Bukittinggi. The final attack starts today or tomorrow. Then they have to find a political solution. When asked what he will do if it turns out that it is not possible to reach a compromise with the opposition after Padang, he says they will look for another way. He is still ready to resign after Padang but only if it meant a way to the solution. Answering the question, he says he has really been offered by Masyumi to enter the government, but has corrected himself "most of the Masyumi". On the question who represents the power of Masyumi, he says Sukiman and Iskandar (or something like that). He notes that Masyumi is willing to cooperate after Padang, not conditioning its cooperation by the breach of military operations.

Relations with Australia are getting better. Recent statements by Helm and Casey are considered more reasonable, less emphasizing the communist threat in Indonesia. Generally, English policy is considered more moderate and realistic. The Relations with the United States are somewhat better but this may be only temporarily. Serrano's statements considered stupid. In two or three months Serrano has made a few missteps. He likes to talk a lot but he is irresponsible. He mentions the case of Senator Peleaz whom Serrano has forbidden to vote in favor of Indonesia on the issue of West Irian if the Netherlands and Australia have not

agreed. Now he also disavows Indonesian ambassador Pamuntjak in Manila and his ambassador in Djakarta. Fuentebella is glad for being able to publicly confront his minister. This means that Fuentebella knows he enjoys the support of influential part of nationalist parties. This is why he is of the opinion that it would be wrong to react strongly to Serrano's statements. Therefore, he agrees that Subandrio should talk to Serrano on his return from Tokyo. It would be wrong to shut the door in their relations with the Philippines and thus prevent the action and support of those circles in the Philippines who criticize Serrano's statements.

He welcomes the efforts of Japan to escape the American tutorship to some extent. He thinks that after the election Casey will be even stronger in the Parliament. After the war, Japanese politics is characterized by realism and Japanese by anti-American mood despite the dollars they keep receiving. The reparations and loans which it will receive from Japan will be useful to Indonesia, especially at this time. They are immediately starting the implementation of this Agreement.

He adds that he does not exclude the possibility of certain changes in the foreign policy of the Philippines.

On my remark that it would be helpful if they were able to speed up the latest legislation regulating the issue of decentralization, including the economy, since it would disarm the opposition, and since it is a basic requirement of disgruntled provinces, preserving the unitary form of the state, which at the moment seems to be the only involved, he says that the Government seriously approaches the solution of this question, that he is personally deeply aware of the urgency of meeting the demands of the opposition but even without that, it is more than necessary as a security for the development of their country. However, the Government faces various difficulties. The basic regulations have already been prepared and would have been legalized, if the rebellion had not interfered with the work of the Government. They will try to finish the job as soon as possible. Asked whether the decentralization will include currency area as the most sensitive and most controversial i.e. whether it will provide the probable participation of regional areas in their exports, Djuanda says that in the first phase they will not handle it but recognizes the necessity of such an action.

Having expressed the thought that the constant and hard work with AA countries is needed to introduce them to the issues of Indonesian, that will enable greater understanding of these countries for the actions of his government, Djuanda says that it is true that they are not enough engaged, but that it is true that there are reserves by certain countries in Asia and Africa, but must say that to some extent they consciously give up the greater engagement on the issue of AA countries. AA countries belonging to the Eastern Bloc are always ready to come out with statements that are in favour of Djakarta, but sometimes too sharply or perhaps too unilaterally formulated, thus creating problems. Just

because they are afraid that a single action at AA countries would engage the countries that belong to the Eastern bloc, they think that moderation in this regard would be very appropriate.

He says he finds it hard that Kawilarang, their military attaché in Washington, formerly the commander of West Java pleaded for the revolutionary government, beside other military attachés. He is considered the most experienced commander of Indonesia, personally impeccable, great patriot.

I have been surprised by his statement that “for a long time he had no contact with Sukarno.” He wonders if there was something new in the talks with President Sukarno at a dinner last week, and some time before that at his residence. I felt some bitterness in his words when he said he had no contact with Sukarno for a long time, so I added that it must be nice to enjoy the full freedom of action and President’s trust. Djuanda observes he “does not think so.”

He is very much interested in a just signed agreement on economic cooperation. The greatest attention is paid to directing their exports over Rijeka. I have informed him about our principles regarding the creation of joint ventures. He welcomes our willingness to enter into such arrangements without asking any concessions and without setting time limits as something new in international relations. We are ready to withdraw if the other party finds it useful. The joint ventures should represent real interests of both partners based on full equality and reciprocity.

He is interested in our youth working actions. He wants us to provide him the material on our organizational experience and problems, the economic side of those actions; he is aware that the focus is on the political engagement of young people from different parts of our country, which would be of particular importance for their country.

S. Pavlič

At the request of the correspondents of “Borba” and “Politika”, I managed to enable their presence at dinner, and secondly, asked Djuanda to give a statement in which he stressed that our countries share the same views regarding foreign policy and our advantage because we have already found our identity regarding internal issues, identity which corresponds to the interests of our people, which is not the case with them. He expressed a desire to get to know our reality.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-41, dos. 21, no. 410421

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in Belgrade about his talks with President
Sukarno on the relations of Belgrade with Moscow and Beijing**

Djakarta
Top Secret no. 235
June 20, 1958

As usual, Sukarno avoided talking about the political situation. Subandrio was more in the mood for talking. However, after lunch, Sukarno listened carefully to our interpretation of the reasons that led to the recent development in our relations with Moscow and Beijing. He was interested in the reasons that made the Chinese raise tensions and in general the attitude of Moscow and Beijing towards the policy of active coexistence. He did not want to enter into discussion and bring out his opinion. He has said once more that he is confident that this time we will overcome the difficulties. Subandrio says that we add too much attention to the statements of Moscow. According to him, Moscow has returned to its old frases and we should not be too upset about that. On my remark that it is not just about frases but about returning to earlier methods and cutting the heads, Subandrio admits that things have gone too far. The Nagy case has also been mentioned. We have accepted the discussion although it was imposed. It is well-known that Sukarno's views are somewhat different from our interpretation of the Hungarian events. He is intrigued by the similarity of the situations in our two countries. As a comparison I mentioned the accusations of Beijing – Moscow that we are becoming capitalists and their agents and all this just because we refused to get into the camp to which, according to them, we belong. On the other side, Indonesians are accused of communism just because they refuse to join SEATO to which, in the opinion of Americans, they belong. I particularly stressed that I want to inform the President about the actual situation, about our experience which can be useful for them, but with a full understanding of their situation.

During the lunch Sukarno asked about the visit of the Comrade President on three occasions. He wants to fix the date. He wonders if he could come earlier to visit given the news of the meeting Tito-Nehru. He says that the state welcome committee is ready to begin preparations. They want to prepare the greatest possible reception. He forces a program that would enable relaxation and a lot of security. I reply that there is the obligation and desire of Comrade President to visit Indonesia and Sukarno, and that it will be of particular benefit for developing relations between the two countries but that he would probably come sometime later, probably towards the end of the year. Sukarno recommends September – October since the conditions for visiting other countries are more

acceptable then. Subandrio adds that an earlier visit would be of particular interest due to the current international situation as well as the policy of active coexistence of non-aligned countries which is directly affected by the attack of Moscow and Beijing to our country. Sukarno again offers the plane which would allow the Comrade President to find time to visit. Sukarno deliberately stresses that the rebellion in northern Celebes will be crushed in the course of a few days, which means that the circumstances in Indonesia will soon normalize. Prasad is expected in August on Independence Day.

During the lunch they have exchanged toasts. Tanjug is informed of the content. He sends greetings to the Comrade President and Jovanka. Sukarno has gratefully received a photo of Augustinčić. I have also submitted a large group photograph of President Tito and Sukarno, which is intended for the residence. He was really happy to be among us, despite the shortcomings of the building. It was very warm because the building is not set for the receptions in general and least for the head of state. He travelled 60 km from Bogor and back again just for the lunch. This was arranged with the special security measures; three battalions of military police were hired. The residence was guarded by 350 soldiers – police officers with resistant cars.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-42, dos. 1, no. 415592

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Message of President Sukarno to President Tito saying they should initiate the conference of non-aligned countries

Belgrade, July 21, 1958.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency the telegraphic message of President Soekarno – as follows:

“Thank you very much for your message. Meanwhile my government has recognized the Republic of Iraq. I think at this stage the best contribution we can make is a conference between Yugoslavia, United Arab Republic, India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia at the level of Head of Governments. This conference should be collectively initiated by you and me (Tito-Soekarno).

For geographical reason we should take Delhi as the meeting place. Time: if possible in the course of next week.

I would be very much obliged if you could give reply as soon as possible. If you agree it would save time if you consult immediately those governments especially Nehru and Nasser.

Immediately after receiving your agreement I will do the same.

Soekarno – Presiden Republic Indonesia.

Djakarta, 20 July 1958.”

I express herewith the assurances of my highest consideration.

Soedarsono
Ambassador

AJ, KPR I-1/422

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Note on the meeting between President Tito and Ambassador of Indonesia Sudarsono, who delivered Sukarno’s proposal for a conference of non-aligned countries

Brioni, July 22, 1958

He delivered Sukarno’s message. Sukarno proposed an emergency meeting of the heads of government of Yugoslavia, UAE, India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia in Delhi. Comrade President is reserved regarding the necessity of such meeting at the present moment: it would look like the attempt to create the third bloc, it might interfere with other initiatives that are underway, it is not certain whether the others would accept. However, he agrees to ask for Nehru’s opinion.

Koča Popović

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-9

**Reply of President Tito to President Sukarno that it is too early
to organize the conference of non-aligned countries**

Thank you for your message. I was glad to receive the information that you share the view expressed in my message to you and information about the recognition of the Republic of Iraq.

The situation in the Middle East is estimated as very serious, although we believe that in the present moment there are encouraging signs that indicate the possibility of settlement. This break needs to be used for finding a real solution to the crisis and preventing new tensions. Therefore, we are still of the opinion that the most realistic solution to the crisis can be reached on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops and reinforcement of the UN observer group, we actively support efforts to achieve a meeting of heads of government of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France, India, the Secretary-General of UN Dag Hammarskjöld, with possible participation of representatives of some Arab countries. We note with satisfaction the fact that the form of seeking solutions within the framework of the UN. We will continue to develop our activities within the organization.

I have received your proposal for convening the conference of the heads of state of Yugoslavia, UAE, India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia in New Delhi. I have contacted Prime Minister Nehru from whom I received the answer, which you may already know.

On receiving your message, I told your ambassador that I was not sure that, at the moment, the conference would bring the results that we want. There is a danger that our actions might be assessed as hindering the actions that are now underway in the framework of the UN. Also they could get the impression that it is a creation of the third bloc, which would also have a negative effect.

From the response of Mr Nehru I see that he is of similar opinion.

Although I consider that the situation is calmer, I think it is still necessary to closely follow the developments and provide active support to actions that are already underway.

I want to carry on with the useful exchange of views. I find it particularly important for our representatives in the UN to continue close cooperation which we appreciate a lot.

Tito

Draft initialled by Tito.

**Note on the talks between President of Yugoslavia Tito and Indian
Ambassador Jung, in Brioni, July 22, 1958**

He presents their position in detail and asks for the opinions and suggestions of our President.

They are for the emergency session of the General Assembly.

Then, they are for the immediate withdrawal of Anglo-American troops, but also against sending UN troops. It is enough to have the observers, maybe reinforced. UN troops would be quite an awkward precedent. Some of great powers, either East or West, could send the troops where it finds it convenient and then ask UN to send their troops as a condition for their withdrawal (I have Kashmir in mind). It would be a kind of blackmail by UN.

Japan's resolution has other drawbacks: There is no mention of, for example, the English intervention in Jordan. Therefore, in relation to the resolution they will stay restrained.

As for the conference proposed by Khrushchev, they are for it if everyone else is. They are against extending the agenda: It should include only the situation in the Middle East.

He says they have received the written assurances from the United States and Great Britain that that will not extend intervention to Iraq. Great Britain specifies that it will not do it not even through the others.

He mentions the writing of London "Economist" that there should also be the rebellion in Iraq and Jordan, but that the conspiracy was discovered in Jordan two days earlier. There are those who think that Hussein knew at least one day in advance about the break of the rebellion in Jordan. The president says he does not believe that.

There will be more problems in Lebanon, especially in Jordan. In Lebanon, Samuna is done; they are looking for a compromise. Murphy is working on that. But in Jordan, 24 hours after the departure of the English, Hussein would be overthrown, and it will make the departure of the English difficult.

He asks whether the Russians will intervene if the West goes East. Tito replies that they certainly will, most decisively, and the form would depend on the specific circumstances.

He informs him about Dulles's letter to the President to which we are preparing a response.

The President informs him about Sukarno's proposal, expressing his opinions and asking him to seek the opinion of Nehru. Jung agrees with the president's assessment.

Koča Popović

Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the talks with President Sukarno on Tito's and Nasser's response and on foreign policy issues, July 31, 1958

Top Secret!

I have asked for the reception. The President received me at the Merdeka Palace. I handed the message. He thanks. Immediately after reading the message, he says that he has come up with the proposal of a meeting of the heads of government of 6 non-aligned countries regarding the first message received from President Tito proposing a joint declaration of the two or more governments of non-aligned countries. He believed that, at a given moment and in relation to a common opinion that the situation is very serious; the quickest way to reach a joint declaration would be the meeting of the Prime Ministers of those countries.

Since I noticed that he had hard time accepting the rejection of his proposal, I felt it necessary to emphasize that, at that moment, it was probably the best way to mobilize the country to condemn the aggression and maintain the peace and order was received that way, but the events at the international level regarding the Middle East developed very quickly, the situation has become less tense though still dangerous, especially regarding the acceptance of the surprisingly large meeting within the Security Council initiated by Khrushchev. In addition, certain reserves in the countries concerned, regardless of their aspirations and justification of their reasons should be taken account.

Conditions are considered somewhat more favourable. He asks for my opinion regarding the meeting of the big ones. I answer that it would be more important to hear his opinion. Since he has asked again I say that I do not have specific information from Belgrade, but that personally I think it will not soon come to the meeting, that there will be more reluctance but that it will eventually come to a meeting. He asks why or how to interpret the reluctance of Americans. I say that there is news that President Eisenhower did not want to meet with Khrushchev at that moment due to his physical mood. Certainly the United States want to gain time to avoid the situation that they find themselves in the dock at the Security Council triggered by the Soviet proposal. Finding a formula to get out of it without losing much of prestige, may be an important moment.

President Sukarno fully agrees and says that yesterday he talked to their representative in the UN Ali Sastroamidjojo, who claimed to have recently watched Eisenhower on television and that it was obvious that Eisenhower is no longer what he used to be not only in a manner of speaking – physically, but also in the quality of response, flexibility and responsiveness, resourcefulness.

The evaluation of forces over Iraq is postponed. The use of armed forces is not popular. Pakistan recognized Iraq, and the recognition by the United States and Turkey is encouraging.

Again, he says he thinks that the United States are looking for solution in postponing discussion with the Russians, and in the meantime they are trying to find a solution in Lebanon, by holding new presidential elections.

I agree that the situation has calmed down, but at the same time the revolt against American aggression in Lebanon and England aggression in Jordan is decreased, which could lead to some kind of *fait a compli* mood. Sukarno agrees and adds that this tendency was very dangerous and precedent for the future.

He says he's leaving tomorrow on holiday to Bali for a week to prepare a speech for Independence Day – August 17th. He says that the speech will last one hour and forty minutes, it will include an overview of the internal situation in the last year and the circumstances at the international level. He will once more formulate the attitude of Indonesia in terms of colonialism and all forms of colonial aggression.

Asked whether it is necessary to take action at this time, he says that right now the focus is not on diplomatic action, that the action will take its turn through the UN, that in his opinion they should concentrate the efforts of non-aligned and recently colonized countries to mobilize masses against the threat of aggression. When asked in what way Indonesia should engage, he says they should make use of mass rallies, press releases, and statements.

He says he has not yet received a response from U Nu, that he is familiar with U Nu's difficulties, that he is informed that the brother of the assassinated Aung San has created a new party within the Anti-Fascist League.

Due to the arrival of the Vice President of the Government Chalid we interrupted conversation that lasted 25 minutes.

Pavlič

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**Talks of President of Yugoslavia Tito with Indian Ambassador Jung
about Nehru's response to Sukarno's proposal, August 2, 1958**

Jung is handing a new message – Nehru's reply. Estimates are still similar, although the content of Nehru's message is already outdated by the events.

Specific issues: Jung is interested in the president's assessment of the current situation. He agrees. He speaks about a great reputation and influence of the President Nasser. He believes that all these new regimes do not pay enough attention to internal problems.

He sees "summit" as a possible risks of new Yalta.

He criticizes Bourguiba that he has gone too far in seeking a compromise with the West.

He believes that Russians will never come to terms with the special position and role of Yugoslavia, or at least not for a long time. In fact there is no difference between them and Americans, they think and act exclusively like great powers.

He talks about great interest in diplomatic corps in Belgrade for every meeting of the President with one of the ambassadors.

He thinks that the meeting of the heads of non-aligned countries will be good at a convenient moment.

He thinks the emergency session of the General Assembly of the UN is not necessary, but totally agrees that it was very useful because it was raised at that time.

He is at our disposal, if and as soon as we have something to tell him.

Koča Popović

Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about his talks with the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Suwito, August 8, 1958.

Top Secret!

I asked for the reception.

I come for an informative exchange of opinions. I ask for their opinion regarding the Khrushchev's new proposal on holding the General Assembly instead of Summit Conference. What can we expect from the GA meeting in the given circumstances? Is there a possibility of some joint actions and suggestions?

Mr Suwito says that they generally support GA. It should be prevented and reduced to measuring forces between Moscow and Washington, followed by propaganda objectives. There is no chance that one side could get a two-thirds majority for making a decision.

I notice that we have supported the actions of the UN from the very beginning. The Extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations represents the best forum for resolving the issue. It would have been even more useful if it had been convened earlier. The attitude of non-aligned and AA countries will be much more evident at the meeting of the Assembly than at the Summit Conference. President Tito in its second message to President Sukarno stresses the importance of supporting the actions of the UN delegation and joint cooperation between delegations of the two countries in New York.

Mr Suwito is not familiar with the second message since President Sukarno went to Bali a day after delivering the message and has not come back yet. I inform Mr Suwito about the content of the message. I emphasize the desire of President Tito to continue the exchange of views. I wonder whether he has any suggestions in this direction.

Mr Suwito says they are seriously considering the possibility of finding a solution that would be acceptable for both sides. The Government has not yet taken a formal position. However, he wants to inform so I could explain it to our government but only as one of possible ideas, which may suffer various modifications. First of all, we need to find a realistic approach to the whole issue. Yugoslavia and Indonesia have nearly identical views on the Middle East. The Indonesian Government thinks that the proposals on the GA, starting from the Eisenhower's claim that they are sending their troops only to ensure democratic order and independence of Lebanon, to prevent so-called indirect aggression and that they are ready to immediately withdraw their troops when such danger ceases and to form a commission of non-aligned countries with the task to:

1 / control the withdrawal of troops

2 / ensure the holding of free elections

In addition to that, Indonesian Government thinks it would be useful to impose an arms embargo to the Middle East, understandable, with the obligation of the great powers to respect it.

I have immediately noticed that the idea can be helpful, but

1 / The Commission should be the Commission of the UN and not the Commission of non-aligned countries. It can be composed primarily of representatives of non-aligned countries.

2 / Commission could control the withdrawal of the troops only if there is a decision of a two-thirds majority that the troops must be withdrawn. That is a big problem since such majority is difficult or even impossible to achieve.

3 / USA are of the opinion that their troops should be replaced by police forces of the UN and not with a commission.

4 / In his second message President Tito proposes strengthening the observer groups. Some other countries have proposed something similar. This is a lot closer to the idea of forming a special committee with the above tasks.

5 / As for the embargo, the question is to which countries of the Middle East it should apply. What about the countries of the Baghdad Pact?

Mr Suwito says that they are aware of the difficulties but believes that this is a way out of the deadlock otherwise inevitable. The idea has already been conveyed to the ambassadors in all big cities asking them to immediately state their opinion and how this idea was received. Once again he asked us to do the same. He thinks it would be very helpful if at a given moment, to avoid deadlock, we could fund this proposal.

Ali Sastroamidjojo has already been instructed to most closely cooperate with our delegation.

He says again that this idea would be quite realistic if the UN took over the responsibility for ensuring the independence of Lebanon, then there would be no reason to send the US troops.

As for Jordan, we jointly conclude that any further support to Hussein would unnecessarily complicate the situation in the Middle East.

I ask what he knows about the meeting Khrushchev – Mao Zedong. He says they do not have direct information although they pay the full attention. He states the already known reasons which have led to the meeting in Beijing. Their ambassadors in Moscow and Beijing are unable to get hold of any information, but he says that they have noticed a change in the attitude of Ambassador Huang Chen, who has just returned after a three-month absence. He has become much more rigid, he is not as open as before. His attitude shows that he wants to make clear that the People's Republic of China is a great country, which was not the

case before. Now, they want to be consulted by Djakarta, to take account of the existence of Beijing. Huang Chen has not been talking about China before, but rather about the problems of Indonesia. Now, he uses every opportunity to highlight the successes they have achieved and even greater perspectives that are yet to come. He claims that the People's Republic of China is already capable, thanks to industrialization, to surpass the Western countries including the United States. Huang Chen argues that only People's Republic of China can help Asian countries in their development seriously and on the basis of full equality. Suwito agrees that tension rising in the international arena suits Beijing and facilitates the overcoming of their internal problems. This is reflected in the commitment of Beijing to further tighten relations with Yugoslavia, by introducing Stalinist methods in China itself and within the socialist camp. Suwito says they have received classified information that Huang Chen would be recalled. The Beijing Government apparently was not satisfied with him because he was too "soft" to Djakarta. Huang Chen returned after three months saying that he remains, and as it has already been said – with quite a different attitude.

They do not know what is the final idea of the meeting Khrushchev – Mao Zedong and it disturbs them.

As to the question whether there are any objections to the changes of Malik's candidacy for the President of this year's session of the GA UN, he says they will support the candidacy of Koča Popović. He does not see a problem in Malik regardless of the fact that Shehab and Shamun agreed to his candidacy. The problem is more that some Asian countries want an AA country to take presidency since Monroe was a candidate of the West, including the European countries. So far, there have been no concrete proposals from AA countries. He thinks Koča Popović stands a good chance. Off the record, he has learned that the Russians advised Nosek (ČSR) not to candidate.

He says he remains a candidate for one of vice-president positions. I tell him that that we have been informed by their Department that they gave up. He denies. However, they give the candidacy for Guardianship council. MFA has recommended to the Government not to include the issue of Western Irian in the agenda for this year's session. The Government's decision has not been made yet. He proposes a meeting in the coming days to discuss in more details the points of common interest that will be at this year's regular session.

When asked about the possible subject of the talks between Zhukov and Subandrio three days ago, he says he thinks that Subandrio called Zhukov simply to keep some kind of balance in visits of Zhukov and Jones. Since Jones asked to be received together with the Director of ICA, Subandrio called Zhukov as he has done it before and they were both received the same day.

At the meeting of military commanders, they agreed the measures to be taken to ensure the final crush of the rebellion and general security in the country. Discussing the situation in Sumatra, Suwito recognizes that it is very difficult but

that the Government is against political talks with the opposition, which many suggest. I say that in my opinion it is not about the talks with the opposition and concessions but necessary military measures combined with persistent political work in the field. We get the impression that everything is reduced to military action. However, the issue is eminently political, and requires political action. They need to convince people that Djakarta is not communist and to suppress the propaganda of the rebels and the West. This requires persistent political actions, which cannot be replaced by machine guns. I mention our experiences during the war when there was a focus on political work which was a requirement for a military victory. He agrees. He recognizes their mistakes. He says he regularly interprets my remarks, primarily to make PNI leadership recognize the necessity of activating the political work and so on.

I ask him, as a member of PNI leadership, what he has to say about the establishment of a new party Partindo, formed by a group of PNI dissidents. Suwito says it has no chance to survive and will experience the same fate as the nationalist party "Merdeka" which was formed of PNI dissidents two or three years ago. I am concerned that the split in the PNI will further weaken the role which PNI should play in the life of Indonesia and that it is difficult to deny the objections of Partindo dissidents saying that the PNI leadership has lost its revolutionary spirit, grit, and Marxist-Marxist basis. Suwito accepts remarks by stating that PNI leadership takes seriously into account the latest developments. He agrees with my remark that PNI is scared of the cooperation with PKI since it is much more active and combative, but now that they are detached from the PKI, instead of being actively involved, they simply cede the ground to PKI, which skilfully uses slogans of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, national momentum and so on. In short, observing from the side, it seems that after the separation of PNI and PKI, the situation for PNI is even worse and all this just because of the inactivity of PNI. Program, political party machinery, propagandists, activists, fieldwork, mobilization of the masses on the most current issues and so on. Suwito agrees, but there is little to it.

I ask him about Subandrio's reception of Hasselman, Charge d'Affairs of the Dutch Embassy, since he has not done it in the past year, Suwito says that Subandrio wanted to restate Indonesian position on the issue of West Irian and mutual relationships, before Hasselman's consultations in The Hague. He says in confidentiality that they have documents on the concentration of Dutch troops in WI.

The talks lasted an hour and a half.

Pavlič

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about his meeting with Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio on foreign policy and internal political
issues, August 28, 1958**

Top Secret!

I visited him at his request.

He is interested in the mood in Djakarta (referring to the diplomatic corps) as well as the opinion of Belgrade regarding the concluded agreement on the delivery of weapons from the United States.

I say that the agreement has aroused much attention, that it is difficult to say something more since it is extremely difficult to acquire some specific information about the agreement. We are surprised by the speed at which it has been concluded and the pace of delivery. The agreement is mostly received as a favourable sign of improving relations between Indonesia and USA, which is of particular importance at the moment. There may be those who do not agree, but personally I do not have contact with them. It is their internal issue, but having been asked I say that we consider the agreement as a good sign. I ask about the background of this agreement, the reasons and details. I interpret my personal view of the moments that have influenced the State Department to advance the delivery of weapons.

Subandrio agrees with my interpretation. He says that it is true that Americans think that the signing of the agreement will, at least to some extent, affect the speech of President Sukarno. However, they instructed Jones to receive weapons without the slightest attempt to exert any pressure. The fact that Jones asked for the reception with Djuanda five days after Sukarno's speech and expressed dissatisfaction of the State Department with Sukarno's speech, tells us that United States are not so much dissatisfied, just the opposite, they are informed that, in general, the speech has been positively received. There is something in the fact that they want to stabilize the situation in Indonesia, even though their regime does not suit them best. He does not exclude the possibility that the meeting Mao – Khrushchev contributed to it. The uncertainty of Chinese policy concerns them. More on this later. But, off the record, he wants to say that the main reason for the rush and the goodwill of Americans is their fear that Indonesian Government i.e. Ali Sastramidjojo at the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations may present all documents about American interference in Indonesian internal affairs. They have instructed Ali and provided complete documentation to make him be prepared for such an eventuality. It would be extremely uncomfortable for Americans if these facts denied the essence of Eisenhower's speech.

Although, he did not talk to Jones about this, he was sure that this was the main reason.

When Jones came to inform him about the readiness of the US to supply arms, general Witropo was in the Philippines waiting for an invitation to come to Djakarta. At the same time, preparations for the transport of weapons have begun. Generally, financial part has not yet been discussed. Americans have not inquired about it. It is a small quantity of small arms, only 10 battalions. He does not rule out the possibility of increasing the quantity.

In this regard he asks me to use the good relations with Jones and tell him to give up any thought of using this agreement as a way to exercise any pressure on Djakarta. He expects the State Department to try something like that.

The United States seem to remain of the view that Indonesia did not need other weapons except light. They are against the strengthening of Indonesian fleet and Air Force.

He says it took them long to figure out our advice to devote maximum attention to the development of the Army because without strong army there is no question of an independent foreign policy. He says that it is often easier to maintain balance on two hostile sides than to maintain balance on friendly terms. Americans are often naive and rigid. Everyone can see their true intentions. Now that they have showed little will with this Agreement, they think they can look for something in return. They forget that they have come only now when they have overcome the most difficult crisis. It was a matter of survival. Today he can say that. Even then, the first to help them endure were the Russians, China and other countries, while the Americans have done everything to make Indonesia disappear. To avoid finding themselves again in such a situation, they have decided to strengthen the army by taking weapons from both sides. They believe that by the end of this year they will be better armed than any neighbouring country. Despite the number of victims killed in the rebellion, the Army proved its existence which many countries overseas did not believe.

We talk about the President's speech on Independence Day. I emphasize the importance of the speech and good reception in Indonesia and abroad. A copy of the speech is delivered to the Office of President Tito. We move on to talk about the internal situation. I agree with his view that they will be able to overcome economic difficulties. They have all conditions. I add that Indonesia is perhaps the only country in Asia that may soon become truly independent, thanks to its potential wealth. They need greater investments. Many of those who discuss the Law on the entrance of foreign capital in the Parliament, approach the problem incorrectly or superficially. Internal accumulation will not be enough to keep pace with their needs, taking into account the rapid increase in population. Internal policy is disturbing. It is not about compromise with Hatta or rebels. It is their internal issue, but what concerns us is the absence of any political action in the field, except PKI which has to act, while the pro-government parties care

only about the problems of Djakarta. Subandrio agrees with my remarks that PNI falls short. Subandrio even says that PNI does not exist as an organized force that could oppose PKI. They are become aware of the danger threatening from PKI which sees them as the only opponent that could prevent them on their way to takeover Sukarno. He says that only Sukarno is an objective force. Sukarno knows what he wants and persists in it.

I agree. Sukarno stands for a true and greatest patriot of Indonesia. He knows best what Indonesia needs. The problem is that, for some reason, he does not have manpower and the party, which could materialize his ideas. Subandrio says that this is precisely where they need to look for a solution. It takes time. The current party system must be changed, since it does not express the will of the people, but only represents a means for personal expression of political party leaders.

We turn to the question of the People's Republic of China. He says they feel that Beijing is trying to put pressure on them. Unlike before, Chinese are using all means to prove their strength and accomplishments. A few days ago, Chinese Ambassador Huang Chen said that in six months PRC would be able to put at Indonesia's disposal everything it needed for reconstruction, stabilization of the markets and weapons. It is believed that the Chinese have achieved serious progress. He spoke to Hatta about this and he confirmed it. He does not understand why Beijing is so sharp in its attacks to Yugoslavia. Earlier, China was typically more moderate than Moscow. Zhou Enlai even visited Gomulka. Example of Bandung. Yugoslavia cannot be a problem for the People's Republic of China neither as a country nor as a political factor. Could it just be one more way to blackmail and put pressure on Moscow? According to their information, they do not need this for internal reasons. They have achieved serious success and are in a more favourable position than e.g. Nehru in India who is still struggling with basic problems. Young people are impressed by these achievements and are on the side of the regime.

I am interpreting our view. Chinese achievements and their efforts should be recognized and welcomed. The enthusiasm of youth and others who are aware that they are becoming a recognized nation represents an important factor but it would be wrong to overestimate the success and think to have overcome all difficulties. It is still necessary to confront serious problems. The political approach to further internal development – construction is of particular importance. They seem to have started along the already known Stalinist way, by means of pressure, and achieving objectives at any cost. Therefore, China itself needed a shift in terms of democratization. What has left of Mao Zedong's famous slogans? Pro-Stalinist elements dominate in Beijing. Escalations on the external level correspond to overcoming their difficulties, which in turn gives special value to the PRC in relation to Moscow. Beijing is against the policy of negotiations East-West and against the policy of easing tensions. Beijing adversely affects the acti-

ons of Moscow. The orientation of Chinese foreign policy, their view of the UN as an instrument of US imperialism, can become dangerous. It is interesting to analyse the true interest of Beijing and Moscow regarding the issue of the Middle East.

As to the relation of Beijing towards FPRY, they are only a part of the general policy of Beijing. Recognition of the specificity of the road to socialism and the policy of active coexistence do not correspond to their practical implementation of internal and external policies. Yugoslavia represents a negative example for them, because it uses power to suppress any deviations from the dogmatic interpretation and setting the lines. The existence of such Yugoslavia does not suit them either at their internal or Asian plan. The Indonesian press, at least part of it, has properly observed when commenting on the communiqué Mao – Khrushchev that the essence of the attacks on Yugoslav revisionism is in the fact that Yugoslav policy and Yugoslav reality collide with the core interests of China, which goes towards building the Asian Communist bloc.

Subandrio asks about the situation in Moscow, the position of Khrushchev, the relation Khrushchev – Mao. Beijing supports the Stalinist line in the country and is inclined to Khrushchev who has more or less successfully liquidated the main Stalinists.

Subandrio seems to be very much occupied by the problem of China and relations between China and Russia. Indonesians have one potential fear concerning the future policy of China. They will be the first in the line of attack taking into account the economically strong Chinese minority in Indonesia. It's hard to say what was the purpose of the questions which Subandrio more or less asked to himself: Is there a possibility that Moscow would distance itself from Beijing; maybe the Russians already fear the Chinese. The Russians might be willing to accept co-existence with the West whereas it does not seem realistic as far as the Chinese are concerned. Perhaps the United States would be ready to enter in a certain arrangement with Moscow. Is it possible to exclude the possibility that, at the last meeting with Khrushchev, Mao set before him the following alternative – the full support to China on the internal and external level, which would speed up the China's development, overcoming all internal difficulties, or PRC will be forced to look for a *modus vivendi* with the United States.

I do not let myself into discussion. I note only that these are interesting questions, connected with the fate of mankind. But, right now, they belong to the sphere of academic theorizing. There are no indications that could serve as the basis for such idle talks.

In this regard he wants Belgrade to be absolutely sure that today more than ever we are "in the same boat." Moscow cannot be reconciled with the existence of an independent Yugoslavia since it threatens the whole system of Russian forces. Similarly, the US cannot be reconciled with the existence of an independent Indonesia, as it interferes with their system i.e. the system of US forces. Both

parties do not choose offensive means to achieve their goal. There is a difference at internal level since in Indonesia the United States can use the existence of the opposition, various parties, rebels, etc.

Answering the question, he says they will support Comrade Koča for the presidency of the GA UN. Joint Resolution of the Arab countries in which Malik participated and unanimous acceptance of the resolution does not create, in his opinion, new opportunities for Malik. According to their information, the new Government, when Shehab comes on power, will not keep Malik at the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

We talk about Djuanda. I say that invitation is still open. However, I do not believe that Djuanda would be able to leave the country in the foreseeable future. His visit would be welcome in every respect, for the purpose of strengthening relations and for him personally to take a rest. Subandrio says it would be really difficult for him to go but if we arrange the visit in late October and early November if time permitted Djuanda a short break, maybe in Brioni, he believes it would be very useful to realize the visit. The political effect would be definitely positive.

The talks lasted an hour and a half.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-41, dos. 21, no. 423793

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**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about his talks with the leader
of the Communist Party of Indonesia Aidit, September 9, 1958**

Djakarta

TS. no. 305

September 9, 1958

To Vlahović. At the reception made by the Vietnamese we talked to Aidit and Njoto. This time Aidit was much more critical and even rude. I invited Njoto to come to tea and take a consignment addressed to him from the country. Aidit interrupts "There will be an opportunity to meet later. Send what you have to CC". Aidit claims he would have gladly come to visit our country had he been invited. He suggests that you have promised to send a personal invitation, you have not done so. I remind him that he refused to come with a pretext that he was busy

and that he was ready at the same time to go to the Congress of the Indian party, and a month later on a two-month trip around Yugoslavia.

He has mentioned several times the faith in Yugoslav people, and in connection of Yugoslav people with Indonesian nation and class movement. We reject this famous theory that people are good and the management is bad. I say it is a shame he could not stay at least one day with us so he could be convince of the unity of the people and leadership. If nothing else Njoto could convey this from the Congress in Ljubljana. Aidit says that there is a dangerous tendency towards chauvinism in Indonesia. He blames us. He mentions national communism. I recommend him to read carefully the speeches of the Yugoslav leaders who condemned the formulation of the existence of national communism. Since he was continuously using internationalism as the main objection, I recommended him to read the speech of Comrade Tito who formulated the concept of the obligations arising out of international solidarity.

Aidit also attacked Tito's last statement about the existence of two types of revisionism. There is only one alternative Marxism or revisionism.

Regarding the fact that more has to be done for the purpose of informing the people of Indonesia and Yugoslavia, we emphasize the role of the press. Aidit pointedly says that "he would be happy to have the speeches of Tito printed if they were good, if he attacked the United States and that was not the case. Just the opposite, Tito used the West to attack his brothers." We react presenting our views on Iraq, the landing of US troops, Tito's messages to President Sukarno, etc. – their press is silent about this.

After this conversation, we came to the conclusion that there was no use having conversation with Aidit. Njoto uses his head but is helpless compared to Aidit. Lukman is only the instrument of Aidit. They seem to deliberately seek contact with us in public places. They need this to show, first of all to nationalists, that their accusations of them being the satellites of Moscow – Beijing in terms of SKJ [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] are false. Probably the Russians and the Chinese to explain the need for such tactics. We will continue with moderate contacts, but relations are becoming tense.

For your information, Zhukov, Russian ambassador remained correct. He is leaving now. At the farewell dinner, in the presence of Chinese he said he would be glad to meet with if he came to Belgrade or I went to Moscow. This is just a formality but it is alright. Huang Chen broke off all contact with us, and so did we with him.

Pavlič

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the talks with the Prime Minister
of Indonesia Djuanda on his visit to Yugoslavia and on foreign policy
and internal political issues, September 30, 1958**

Top Secret!

The meeting was agreed a week before when I met him in the Parliament with the intention to talk about the general situation in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the day before, I was invited by the Minister Subandrio who among other things informed me about the Djuanda's readiness to visit FPRY in October. Since my meeting with Subandrio finished in 1 p.m. and Djuanda was absent in Bandung, the meeting with Djuanda could not have been postponed which would be in the given situation better because I had no response from Belgrade. The meeting was scheduled for the next day early in the morning.

I / Djuanda immediately starts talking about the visit. He says it was discussed at the Government's session on Saturday afternoon. He says the same as Subandrio. He stresses the political expediency of the moment, expressing a desire to have a good rest.

I thank him for his willingness to visit FPRY; I agree with the importance this visit will have in a given situation and so on. I say that the only problem about his visit is the date. As far as I know, the end of October would be suitable for the visit. I am not sure if earlier would be possible. At the moment, Norwegian Prime Minister is visiting Belgrade. I do not know the obligations in the coming days. It is a short deadline for the preparation of an official visit.

Djuanda says it can be done sometime later, he knows it would be difficult to set off on the 5th as proposed by Subandrio. It is true that Sukarno and Subandrio want him to go back before the 23rd, i.e. before Subandrio leaves for Colombo session. However, when he is already travelling thus far, a couple of days more do not matter.

We talked about international situation and internal issues. He wants to hear our views on their problems. They would appreciate our experience in building the country, in foreign trade. He wants to pay a special attention to the perspective of the relations in the Middle and Far East. He thinks about the comprehensive exchange of opinion, without obligations. There will not be a problem as their views on the external plan are almost identical. He thinks that the publication of Communiqué could be important in the given conditions.

He wants to visit our brigade on the highway. He has been interested in this for a long time. They could use something similar. He is interested in economic moment, organization and political moment of bringing together young people from different parts of the country.

After the official talks that would last two or three days he wants to visit a part of our country. He leaves this to us. He has seen many places things in the world. He is particularly familiar with US industry and Japan. He wants to see what is typical of our system, our achievements, primarily those that might be useful for them. He is interested in Bosnia, which is less developed and of mostly Muslim. He is interested in the way we have arranged our relations with the church. If possible, he would like to meet Reis-UI-Ulema.

During the talks, I suggest him that on his way to the highway – brigades, he should visit Zagreb and Slovenia. Further on, he expresses a desire to become acquainted with our shipbuilding. The journey over the country should take about 5 days. He admits that he could use some rest. This is his first vacation after a year and a half as a Prime Minister. He would be grateful if he was allowed to rest a few days and if climatic conditions were favourable. I notice that such a program will take more than 10 days, which will be hard to fit in with the return on the 23rd, taking into account his visit to Cairo and the trip there and back. Djuanda has said more than once that if he goes, he will stay at least 10 days in FPRY.

He says that the Secretary General of MFA Suwito would accompany him. They are old associates. Subandrio is against it. First, Sudjarwo is already in Europe and second, he needs Suwito if Djuanda does not return on time, and Subandrio has to go to Colombo session.

He would be accompanied by one senior officer from the Ministry of National Defence in his capacity as the Minister of Defence and probably by one representative of the Ministry of Information. I remind him that admiral Subyakto and the Minister of Veterans Chaerul Saleh have been the part of the delegation. Djuanda says it is true and it would be very good if admiral Subyakto accompanied him. He will speak with the Government. He does not mention Saleh.

He asks for material in English. He is especially interested in our constitution. He urges the response, saying that I should call him immediately when I get an answer from Belgrade. He apologizes for the short notice and the difficulties made.

2 / We talk about the recognition of Algeria. He says that they have deliberately chosen the formulation on the recognition of Proclamation of Independence of Algeria without mentioning the government. This is different from the recognition of Iraq. They want to make a difference. In the present case it is not a government that has all the elements. It does not exercise its authority, and has no territory. He thinks that this kind of help to Algeria is enough. As to Paris, it is all the same to them. Paris is against the recognition of the Algerian independence. They have taken into account the possibility of economic measures on the side of France, which is building a hydroelectric power plant in Indonesia, a port and airport near Surabaya. They do not leave out the possibility of severance of diplomatic relations and even the recognition of the rebel government. Djuanda is

very much angry with the French ambassador because of his statement which is cynical and that is unusual in the diplomatic world. Still, little can be done because France would appreciate it if they asked for the withdrawal of ambassador regarding this statement.

3 / I ask about the establishment of the National Planning Council. He says that it is true and that PNI is asking him to take over the leadership of NPC. PNI wants this position but is ready to cede it to Djuanda. He says he would be glad to take that position although he is already too busy as a Prime Minister, but would certainly ask to be released from the duties of Minister of National Defence. There is no solution for this. No person is acceptable for all circles. He personally thinks it would be best if the head of NPC was from the ranks of university professors, and NPC a non-political body. I notice that this differs from the idea of President Sukarno. He agrees, but President has already made so many concessions that this may be another one.

4 / We talk about the situation in Sumatra and Sulawesi. He admits that it is difficult, there is some kind of truce. There are no major actions on either side. He says, in confidence, that he advised Masyumi leaders to make the heads of the rebellion leave Indonesia for several years, until things stabilize. He believes they will take his advice. This would be the best solution. Otherwise, he hopes that the most of them will have been captured by the end of the year. He would personally like to avoid escalations and processes.

He says that the government has serious problems in the Parliament. Masyumi fractions and PRI – Bung Tomo – suggested that together with the representatives who participated in the present rebellion, they should convict representatives who participated in “Madiun” rebellion. This is very uncomfortable. Directed against Aidit, Njoto, Njono, Lukman etc. PKI is already feeling down because of the cooperation of the Government with the opposition in terms of the investment law, delaying the elections and so on.

I say I do not see any problems for the Government. The Government should avoid linking the present rebellion with that of Madiun. The Government asks for the condemnation of the members of Parliament who participated in the conspiracy against the current Government. This government cannot be held responsible for things that happened 10 years ago when in the meantime more than 10 governments have been changed.

5 / As for Hatta, he says he stands still and shows more understanding for the work of the Government. Hatta admits that the Government is not only a tool in Sukarno’s hands, that it has made Sukarno modify his stance more than once. Yet, he thinks it is not the moment to approach the solution of the issue of cooperation Sukarno – Hatta.

He keeps good contacts with Masyumi. Masyumi shows a willingness to cooperate. It is believed that at the January congress of Masyumi parties, they

will elect moderate leadership with which it will be possible to cooperate. In particular, Mohammedaniah – the largest organization in Masyumi develops in favour of the Government.

6 / He says that cooperation with Sukarno is getting better, he is helping the Government and becoming aware of the full responsibility for the work, which has not been the case before. The Government asks for his opinions and his responsibility. He says confidentially that Sukarno has made several mistakes in the past months. Not knowing the real situation and details of some of the problems, he delivered speeches or made statements that were not convenient. He mentions Sukarno's speech in Malang. Sukarno has seen the mistakes. He is keeping the general line, which he knows best, leaving free hands to Djuanda in daily work but still finding time to be informed by Djuanda and to take responsibility. He becomes aware that he is sharing the fate of the government. He says Subandrio is exhausted and needs a break. He says Subandrio has a hard job since it is his first time in the Government while he is used to this after 12 governments.

We talked for an hour and a half. Djuanda was very straightforward, careful.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-41, dos. 21, no. 423798

90

The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia: Note on the delivery of military equipment to Indonesia

October 11, 1958

From 1954 until the end of 1957 we delivered Indonesia military materials in the amount of 2,399,588 dollars. We delivered the following materials: flame throwers and appropriate ammunition, ammunition for small arms, plastic mines, signal ammunition, amphibians and combat boats. Out of the above amount, we have collected 1,183,952 dollars, while the remaining amount relates to the material that was supplied on the basis of credit transactions.

Besides, there are five arrangements for the delivery of military equipment in the amount of 24,566,987 dollars. Except one contract in the amount of 177,000 dollars, the remaining four arrangements include loans, which make 23,389,987 dollars. On the account of the advance payment and transport costs

we have so far collected 3,352,171 dollars. The largest part of the loan transactions is concluded on the period of 8 years, with the advance payments of 15 percent. The remaining \$ 7 million are concluded on the loans with a four-year and three-year repayment period.

Based on the interest, we have also made an offer in the amount of 246,000 dollars for explosives, gunpowder and other military supplies. We have not yet received the response to this offer.

There are also requests for the purchase of ammunition for aviation in the amount of \$ 2 million, ammunition for the Navy and for the construction of a munitions factory.

These days, through our Embassy in Jakarta, we have received a request for two destroyers of "Dearing" class fully equipped and armed whose value is \$ 12 million each. The tonnage of destroyers is 1,200 tons. They further request two antisubmarine ship and two anti-aircraft ship of 1,300 tons (this request is unclear). In addition to this, they request three ships for unloading tank with the capacity of 4,000 tons. For this procurement, they want a 10 year loan with a 10 percent advance payment, and a three-year delivery period. Based on the preliminary opinion of our experts, regardless of loan problem, this is hardly an option as weapons and equipment have to be purchased abroad.

However, we can supply them with our submarine hunters.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-11

91

Note on the visit of the Prime Minister of Indonesia Djuanda to Yugoslavia

October 1958

Dr Djuanda Kartawidjaja was delivered an invitation in August 1957, during the visit of the Vice-President of the Central Executive Committee Svetozar Vukmanović to Indonesia. The visit was scheduled for the spring of 1958, but on March 29, 1958 Indonesians postponed the visit for an indefinite period of time. The reason for the postponement was a rebellion that broke out in Indonesia. Since the rebels, in military terms, were mostly defeated, at the end of September this year Indonesians have announced that Djuanda is ready to visit Yugoslavia immediately, as well as to stay 10 days in our country. Since we have accepted the proposal, Djuanda's visit has been agreed for the period from October 13 to 22.

During his stay in Yugoslavia, beside Belgrade, Djuanda has also visited Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. When visiting these republics

Djuanda visited some industrial and military enterprises, youth working brigades on the highway Zagreb – Ljubljana, and also a shipyard in Rijeka. The achievements and management system in our companies have left a deep impression on Djuanda, which he emphasized in his statements both in our country, and on his return to Indonesia, underlining the need to strengthen economic relations with Yugoslavia.

The political talks in Belgrade and Brioni, where Dr Djuanda Kartawidjaja was received by the President of the Republic, were held in an atmosphere of cordiality, friendship and mutual understanding. They have acknowledged similarity of views on all major international issues, such as e.g. the struggle against colonialism, cooperation among peoples regardless of the social structure, consolidation of peace, the right of all peoples to independence, free national development, territorial integrity, etc.

Djuanda showed special interest in our assessment of the events in the Middle East, noting that Indonesia is following these events with great care and interest, but that the great distance from that part of the world prevents them from timely and proper assessment, as well as that our assessment will be valuable. Particular attention is devoted to the issue of Algeria. Explaining the reasons for the recognition of the independence of Algeria (Indonesia has not directly recognized the Algerian government in exile, but only the independence of Algeria), Djuanda stresses that, at this point, they are guided primarily by their consequent policy of struggle against colonialism in all its forms and help to all colonially enslaved people. They do not have to take account of the reactions of France, as they are far away and relations with France are not so developed that Indonesia could have some damage from possible disruption of these relations. After hearing our assessment of events in this part of the world Djuanda has thanked and showed a lot of understanding for our position regarding Algeria.

Djuanda has also showed particular interest in conflict with East European countries and China, as well as the relations between the socialist countries. The explanations regarding these issues given to Djuanda, shed light on the background of the conflict and contributed to more clear perception of the objectives of the Soviet and Chinese foreign policy.

However, beside the exchange of opinions regarding the above issues, we get the impression that Dr Djuanda Kartawidjaja used his stay in the country to better and more thoroughly examine our social, political and economic development, to be able to use some of our experiences in their own country. Thus, for example, he has showed a special interest in industrialization, the relation between individual branches, industrial staff, workers' management and so on. He has also asked for more detailed information about the problems of agriculture, about the financial system and organization of banking network, about the investment policy of the union and the republics, the rights of the communes and their funds, as well as about solving the problems of underdeveloped areas.

In the course of the conversation the great attention is dedicated to the further development of mutual relations. It was pointed out that economic cooperation lags behind political and that mutual endeavour is needed to make economic relations of our countries develop more, especially because there are good conditions for it. He underlined the need for activation of the Joint Commission, whose establishment was agreed last year, we have restated the approval for the loan of 10 million dollars for investment equipment to Indonesia, both sides expressed interest in opening the consignment stock for Indonesian goods in Rijeka. We have also pointed out that we are ready to send experts for geological research, we are able to produce various projects in order to improve their economy, and that we can start building smaller shipyards, which is of particular importance for Indonesia.

The Prime Minister of Indonesian Government Djunada and his associates, were very satisfied with the visit and the explanations that were given in all matters. They underlined that during their stay, they gained valuable and useful experience that would help them in solving their internal problems. Djuanda's visit has contributed to the deepening of the existing friendly relations between our countries and will be of mutual benefit.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-42, dos. 8, no. 432032

92

Office of the President of Yugoslavia on the possible private visit of President Sukarno to Yugoslavia, December 23, 1957

Belgrade, December 23, 1957

Ambassador Pavlič informed the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs that President Sukarno would be visiting India and its neighbouring countries and possibly Switzerland for holidays in January and February 1958. Comrade Pavlič is of the opinion that it would be useful if Sukarno came for a private visit on that occasion, e.g. for a few days holiday on Brioni, having in mind the fact that it is not so likely that Sukarno will travel to Europe. However, Comrade Pavlič thinks that it would be useful to invite Sukarno and adds that the Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandro is enthusiastic about the idea.

The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs has criticized Comrade Pavlič for starting such an initiative without a prior consultations, considering the uncertainty of Sukarno's trip to Europe and furthermore considering the situation in Indonesia and uncertainty of the Sukarno's position.

Regardless of that, Comrade Koča Popović is of opinion that President Sukarno could be invited, in the name of Comrade President, to pay a short private visit to our country, but with a remark that the invitation is valid only in case that Sukarno is coming for a vacation to Europe in January or February.

We are asking Mr President to make a decision.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-8

93

The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Embassy in Jakarta on possible invitation to President Sukarno to visit Yugoslavia

Belgrade, December 26, 1957

To Pavlič. If you find out that Sukarno will visit Europe during his next trip abroad, you may in that case send him an invitation, in the name of Comrade President, to visit our country. Please note that the invitation should not be sent in case that Sukarno is not visiting any of the European countries, e.g. if it becomes clear that Sukarno is withdrawing from his current position.

AJ, KPR I-3-a /39-8

94

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Cairo to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about Sukarno announcing the visit to President Tito

Conf. no. 38

Cairo, January 13, 1958

This morning I have met Sukarno in the presence of Subandrio. He has expressed the greatest satisfaction for he will be able to see Belgrade and his friend Tito, with whom he wants to exchange the opinions about the issues that concern him. He has left India satisfied and believes that it will also be the case with Belgrade. Irian is neither the only nor the biggest concern: the matter will be resolved if the West refrains from economic and military intervention. He is interested in hearing Tito's opinion about the situation in the world, prospects for development, and the way out of the present difficulties.

He would appreciate if the program of his visit was not too crowded, primarily because he wants to have more talks.

He thanks us for offering the plane, but because of the large luggage and escort he must use his chartered PAA plane.

He is leaving on the 17th in the morning, and will certainly be in Belgrade about 2 in the afternoon.

In the morning of the 19th he would like to leave to Syria.

Sukarno feels good; he is fresh, and obviously pleased with the trip and meeting with Tito, whom he called a friend two or three times. He is little afraid of winter – he is not used to it – so you should take care of this, because he is sensitive.

Derda

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-8

95

Note on the talks of President Tito and President Sukarno Belgrade, January 17, 1958

On behalf of Yugoslavia, there were: Vice President of the Federal Executive Council Svetozar Vukmanović, State Secretary for National Defence Ivan Gošnjak and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Koča Popović, and on behalf of Indonesia their Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio.

At the beginning, President Sukarno expressed his gratitude to the President of the Republic for the support he provided to Indonesia in his New Year message. He then said that the Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio would present the current situation and policies of Indonesia regarding the West Irian and relations between Indonesia and The Netherlands.

Minister Subandrio says that during the last seven years Indonesia has been trying to solve the issue of Western Irian through peaceful negotiations with the Netherlands, either bilaterally or in the framework of the United Nations. To this end, in the last four sessions of the General Assembly of UN Indonesia proposed a resolution and requested the United Nations to assist the negotiations. However, it became apparent that the Dutch do not want the solution. They are holding West Irian as a means of blackmail, bargaining and pressure. On their economic benefit nothing (no materials), but rather represents a burden for them, because it costs them around 8 million guildens a year. The Dutch have felt that they will not be able to maintain their privileged economic position in Indonesia

for long. They have, for example, invested the total capital in the amount of 4 billion guildens (state) during the past seven years making net profit of 1 billion and 400 million guildens per year, i.e. 35%. To preferably prolong this state, they are actively developing internal strife and subversion, for what purpose they have used and 9,000 (out of 50,000 idle Dutch), who lived on the budget of the Dutch government.

The Indonesian government is no longer able to suppress national and anti-colonial sentiment of the people or to tolerate the Dutch subversion and has therefore decided to implement a new policy. It also led to the takeover of all major Dutch companies in Indonesia. They are not nationalized nor confiscated, since that would seriously disrupt production, but only taken over by the government.

The new policy was met with general support of the people and political parties except for certain sceptics in the ranks of intellectuals.

President Sukarno and the government believe that this new policy is the way to strengthening national unity, the inner rebirth of the country and the completion of the revolution started in 1945 both at political and economy field. It will also enable the implementation of the President's concept of guided democracy.

In response to the new policy the Dutch and some western countries began exerting pressure on Indonesia – first political and then military (concentration of the Dutch and the British fleet in Singapore and the infiltration of weapons) and, finally, economic. In the last field, the Dutch stopped the operations of their shipping company that has been maintaining the maritime transport between the islands, hoping that it will cause chaos in Indonesia. When that failed, they have started withdrawing professionals. Since the Indonesian government has showed its willingness to grant them exit visas, and after seeing that they cannot harm Indonesia that way, they have suspended mass evacuation. Although the main crisis has passed, Indonesia still had a problem at international market. So far, they have been oriented towards the Netherlands, and now they need to create a new connection. The answers from Germany, France, England and other countries show that they can hope for success. They have also decided to orient their trade to this part of the world, including Yugoslavia.

Also, they want to strengthen the army and want to buy weapons for that purpose. They are convinced that they cannot rely on their neighbours, because they are surrounded by the countries of SEATO pact.

When Minister Subandrio ended his speech, Comrade President said that he and his associates were familiar with many of these things, because they had followed the events, even though they did not know some of the details that Minister stated. Comrade President says that he and his colleagues are interested in the internal situation in Indonesia, i.e. whether the country and the people are prepared and united enough for such policies and actions, and whether these me-

asures in relation to the policy are premature. He does not refer to the policy of Western Irian. He agrees that the policy regarding the Western Irian cannot be considered premature and that the issue should be kept constantly before the eyes of the people. This is a typical example of the anti-colonial struggle that is facing a widespread support and sympathy of the world today. He thought of some internal events and difficulties, for example, in Sumatra, then disagreement with Hatta, economic relations with the Netherlands, the Dutch capital in Indonesia and the problems that are the result of the fact that Indonesia was economically oriented mainly to the Netherlands.

In connection with this Comrade President presented our experience and difficulties after 1948 when, due to the long-lasting one-sided orientation in foreign economic relations, we have found ourselves in a very difficult position. That was not due to our actions, but the actions of others. Then we were posed serious conditions by the Western countries. They were looking for very high interest rates, up to 11%, and setting up payment requirements for confiscated property and investments ever since the time of the Ottoman Empire. That was not a help, that was exploitation. Therefore, we have become more cautious in making various arrangements with anyone. We have, for example, received military aid from the Americans. However, the US has constantly questioned the aid and our foreign policy. And this year, when we have been able to do so, we gave up further assistance. In connection with this Comrade President expressed the opinion that the economic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands should have been more steady in order not to have too great difficulties. Among other things, due to this impact of the Dutch, it seems that other Western countries feared that the same could happen to them, so they provided support to the Netherlands.

President Sukarno and Minister Subandrio responded that the new policy has not started too early. One might, perhaps, say that first they should solve regional demands for autonomy, and then take action against the Dutch. They will solve this issue and will give autonomy, but in fact they do not have an alternative. If they continue with the old policy of appeasement and compromise with the Netherlands, Indonesia will dissolve in a year. The Dutch have already tried to bring discord and develop internal subversions, and Indonesia with its foreign policy of non-alignment, represents the obstacle to the policy of Western powers. They have been leading quite a definite policy of breaking up Indonesia into several smaller states, some of which, for example, Sumatra, were West-oriented, and Java, as well as the most advanced, with the largest population and large resources, was isolated and subjected to even stronger pressure. This led to the rebellion of some military commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi, but the nation was behind them and now they slowly tightened their hold. However, the pressure of the Western powers over the SEATO pact intensified, especially after the "Sputnik". Western powers also bothered President Sukarno, who together with

Nehru and Nasser was a major figure of non-alignment policy in Asia. That is why they tried to eliminate him.

Also, even in economic terms a new policy is not considered premature, but the only alternative. For example, in Indonesia there are so called “Big Five”, i.e. five large Dutch companies holding imports and exports and also having influence in the countryside. Hatta was of the opinion that they should touch them, but gradually get stronger and then one day eliminate them. However, the opposite is happening. These companies are now stronger than before the war, and if Indonesia gets stronger, they will grow stronger even more. They also rejected all other parties interested in Indonesia, telling them about the country’s chaos, insecurity, etc. By its actions, the government has broken this monopoly.

When asked about Hatta and who stands behind him, President Sukarno replied that he was a liberal economist of the Dutch school (studied in Rotterdam). Orthodox Muslims, who are against him (Sukarno) and know that Hatta disagrees with Sukarno in certain matters, are pushing Hatta in certain direction.

Continuing his speech, Minister Subandrio stated that the aforementioned Dutch shipping company for maritime transport between the islands had an annual profit of 48 million guildens. In addition to that, the representatives of the company were very arrogant and blackmailing the government. Thus, among other things, they sent a request for increasing revenue and an ultimatum to the government saying they will suspend traffic, if this request is not fulfilled immediately. The government could no longer stand being dependent on them and realized that for the amount of the profit they could buy the necessary vessels for the transport.

Making concessions in the economic field led Indonesia to disaster. Therefore, they have decided to make a change, even at the price of a certain risk. If they had not had the support of people, they would have collapsed in a week. However, this did not happen. On the contrary, they were ready to make sacrifice when it comes to achieving national goals. For example, in times of crisis the price of rice increased from 4 to 10 guildens, and then fell to 5 to 6 guildens, i.e. still above the normal price. All this would have caused a revolt in normal circumstances, but that did not happen.

Comrade President stated that Indonesia enjoys the support of many countries in its struggle, not only moral but also material. To this end, we should take advantage of all the opportunities that are offered in the West and the East. They should also establish contacts with Western countries and not make enemies without the need. These countries usually do not have identical interests and it can be used.

Minister Subandrio said that they were taking care about this and had already achieved certain results. They were, for example, given a bid for the loan

of 70,000 tons of ships, and 100,000 tons from Germany. The Soviets offered them a free loan from January to March, 20,000 tons of ships, and then to be able to use these ships during the repayment. They have not yet accepted the offer. All these arrangements together are already exceeding their needs. It is also characteristic that Germany, France and England, although they expect certain sanctions (as Egypt), have agreed to trade with Indonesia, because they know that, not counting China, it is the third trading nation in Asia after Japan and India. It is particularly important that England, although giving political support to the Netherlands, first agreed to take over the European account of Indonesia, which was previously conducted together with the Netherlands. Some countries that, in time of crisis, asked for a 100% deposit for goods purchased by Indonesia, are not asking it now. He also had important talks with Brentano and Pino. They told him that both Germany and France, if Indonesia decided to completely terminate economical relations with the Netherlands, are ready to “jump in” immediately. During the recent meeting in New Delhi, British Prime Minister Macmillan said to President Sukarno that he was very interested in the faster solution of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands, because he would not want to spoil the relations between England and Indonesia.

Subandrio also stated that the fact that they have not accepted the Russian offer, nor accessed the realization of the concluded loan of 100 million USD, is a proof that that they do not want to break with the West.

He added that from the technical side it may seem difficult to reorient their exports of raw materials from Amsterdam to other European ports, such as Hamburg and Italy, but they want to expand it, including Yugoslavia, and hope that in the next 5 to 10 years they will have no difficulties.

In concluding, Minister Subandrio said that, they strongly believe that the Indonesian new policy is correct and that it is supported by the masses, who have gained new confidence, which had been in decline since 1950.

Comrade President said that we had noticed that the takeover of Dutch companies in Indonesia included workers and the masses and said that they certainly could not go back, but that this policy should now be implemented vigorously and energetically, strengthening confidence and unity of the people. In this regard, Comrade President expressed the opinion that they should create an organized all-nation movement – front, that would unite all political forces and parties. It should not be a coalition of the leaders, but rather a unique movement built from the bottom of the masses based on certain issues of national interest. They should also strengthen their own armed forces and devote full attention to moral and political factor in the army, because it is of decisive importance.

President Sukarno declared that he fully agrees with these ideas, which he himself stated in his speech on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Republic. His conception of “People’s Congress” exactly corresponds to this.

As for the armed forces, there is a problem because when transferring the sovereignty, they established a new army including both guerrilla units and Indonesians – members of the Dutch colonial army, which was the result of negotiations led by Hatta. President Sukarno completely agreed with the statement of the Comrade President on this issue.

Having concluded that Comrade Koča Popović and Minister Subandrio should draft press releases, they ended conversation.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-8

96

Communiqué on the visit of President Sukarno to Yugoslavia

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Subandrio, Head of the Office of the President of the Republic Dr Tamzil Sutan Naharau and other officials paid a visit to the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito in the period from January 17 to January 19, 1958.

On this occasion President Sukarno and President Tito had extensive friendly talks on the issues of common interest.

The talks were also attended by Dr Subandrio, Vice President of the Federal Executive Council Svetozar Vukmanović, Secretary of State for National Defence Army General Ivan Gošnjak and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Koča Popović.

They once again emphasized the validity of the request of the people and the Government of Indonesia to resolve the West Irian issue in accordance with national rights and dignity of the Indonesian nation wishing to develop in freedom, independence and peace.

The greatest attention was dedicated to exploring the possibilities of further friendly development of mutual relations, especially in the economic field. For this purpose they would soon establish a joint commission and take measures to increase the exchange including the sale of certain military equipment from Yugoslavia for the needs of the Indonesian armed forces.

During the talks, both sides expressed their concern about the international situation which was burdened by big unresolved problems and came to the conclusion that the priority of the mankind should be putting an end to the senseless arms race and the development of atomic weapons and other enormous destructive powers, and to conclude an international agreement on disarmament.

They expressed mutual satisfaction due to the fact that there is a wide action aimed at maintaining an international conference that would end the Cold War atmosphere and lay the foundation for resolving the outstanding international issues.

Both sides expressed the opinion that countries that do not belong to any of the existing blocs can significantly contribute to the development of international cooperation and the strengthening of peace.

The satisfaction because of the reunion of the two presidents was emphasized and the visit of Tito to Indonesia arranged for this year.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-8

97

Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič about Sukarno's visit to Yugoslavia

Jakarta

Top secret, no. 22

January 17, 1958

Sukarno's visit to FPRY is a complete surprise to the public life and the diplomatic corps. It was announced only after Belgrade. Earlier announcement was not opportune due to the long distances. They were afraid that the extreme opposition could take advantage of Sukarno being so far from the country. Only inner circle was informed about it. The Easterners criticized for not being informed, but comments were generally favourable, they focused on Sukarno's meeting with the heads of "Non Committed countries", highlighting the role and support of FPRY, President Tito, and linking the visit to the purchase of weapons.

We note that the Embassy is not informed about the discussions regarding the visit, since from 6 o'clock when we informed Subandrio, we have not received a slightest notice from Belgrade.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-42, dos. 6, no. 41986

A letter from President Sukarno inviting President Tito to visit Indonesia

Djakarta October 10, 1958

My dear President Tito,

I am very happy that Prime minister Djuanda at last can afford to leave the country to pay a visit to Yugoslavia.

I know it will be a short visit, still I regard it highly useful to strengthen the bonds of friendship between both our nations, and for an exchange of views about topical problems affecting both our countries or international relations in general.

As you are well aware, after our last meeting in Beograd we in Indonesia faced a turbulent period as the reflection of our national growth. I can say with a certain measure of confidence now, that we have overcome either the rebellion or the foreign intervention which very much complicated our domestic difficulties.

I myself – as I told you in my talks with you in Beograd – am not surprised about these emergencies, since I am convinced that we have to introduce new standards of judgement in the process of our developments. I know the world was used only to one of two standard of judgement, which before was (were) regarded more or less as a law for us all. It is this conservatism, commonly more well known as reactionary, which will always become an obstacle for the introduction of new thoughts. So the reaction against the principles of my guided democracy (we talked about it) was to be foreseen.

I am glad to note that my conception about the process of our national growth is no more questioned in Indonesia, even no longer bitterly criticized in foreign countries.

Before Ambassador Pavlič left for Beograd, he informed me about your desire to visit Indonesia during this winter. It will be very convenient for me, if you could visit Indonesia at the end of December, so that we can celebrate together New Year's Eve in Bali. Needless to say that I am very much delighted to hear that at last you can accept my long standing invitation to visit Indonesia, together with your wife. I can assure you, that the whole population of my country are looking forward in seeing you within our midst.

Your sincerely
Soekarno

**Letter of President Tito to President Sukarno
about his forthcoming visit to Indonesia, October 27, 1958**

October 27, 1958

Dear Mr President,

I was given your message by the President of your Government, Mr Djuanda.

We all agree with the fact that the visit of Mr Djuanda to our country was of great benefit to the further strengthening of the friendly relations and comprehensive cooperation between our countries. Mr Djuanda has left great impression with all with whom he came in contact. The talks we had were very useful because they were exhaustively informative. We are very glad that you have successfully overcome the vigorous riots in Sumatra and other islands. That is why we are deeply convinced that they were largely inspired from outside. I have to admit that we in Yugoslavia have been very concerned, because we have seen the risk of intervention by some countries which were not happy with unique and independent Indonesian Republic.

Our ambassador Comrade Pavlič will be able to tell you in person when and how I imagine my visit to your beautiful country. I am looking forward to visiting Indonesia and exchanging the opinions with you about everything in detail.

Yours sincerely J. B. Tito

AJ, KPR I-1/423

**Note on Yugoslav-Indonesian talks during the visit of President Tito
to Indonesia from December 23, 1958 until January 1, 1959**

Bogor, December 26, 1958

Attending on the Yugoslav side: Comrade President, B. Jovanović, I Maček, S. Penezić, V. Mićunović, Mates and Pavlič; Attending on Indonesian side: President Sukarno, Prime Minister Djuanda, Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio and Ambassador Sudarsono.

Sukarno proposes starting the talks by determining what Indonesia wants from Yugoslavia and vice versa, and then talk about attitudes towards certain in-

ternational issues. In this regard, he asked Prime Minister Djuanda to present the Indonesia's point of view.

Prime Minister Djuanda states that they have already discussed how to expand economic relations. Indonesia wants to sell more goods to Yugoslavia, to begin using Rijeka as an entry port not only for importing to Yugoslavia, but also to the area that naturally gravitate to Rijeka, especially to Eastern Europe.

President Tito states that the attitude of Yugoslavia is identical to Indonesian's. He agrees that economic cooperation is very important for the development of relations. Although some results are achieved and the cooperation is growing, it still does not correspond to the political and economic conditions provided by the existing relations between the two countries. Economic relations need to be further improved, if possible. If one of the countries, or both, need to buy more goods than is necessary for their own use in another country, this problem can be solved by re-export. He underlines that the question of re-export should not be set unilaterally, but bilaterally.

In respect to this, Prime Minister Djuanda notes that Indonesian Government is not satisfied with the results achieved in trade relations and considers that they have not accomplished everything that was set out in the agreement signed in Jakarta on April 12, 1958. He would like to explain the situation from their perspective. When the contract was signed on April 12, Prime Minister Djuanda said, we in Indonesia were going through one of the most difficult periods in our history. Let me remind you that it was the time when the rebellion started and fully engaged our forces. During the rebellion, and even before it, our economy was at a standstill. Our capabilities and capacities in terms of international trade were very limited. Now the situation is much better as it can be seen from the exports during the year. We hope that the next year will be even better and our government is very optimistic regarding the further development of trade relations with Yugoslavia. However, we are still not sufficiently familiar with Yugoslav economy; we do not have enough information about the possibilities for imports from Yugoslavia, nor for the placement of Indonesian goods in Yugoslavia. We think that these difficulties will be overcome. For this purpose, we have already appointed a trade representative in Rijeka, which will be on site to examine these possibilities and regularly inform Jakarta. We want to extend the trade agreement. The agreement includes a provision which provides the possibility to revise the agreement each year. In the meantime, we will, in cooperation with Ambassador Pavlič, do everything we can to overcome the difficulties, and I believe that we will be able in the course of developing relationships that improve the possibilities.

President Tito says that we are familiar with the difficulties they were going through. It is understandable that under these circumstances they were not able to accomplish everything they wanted. We are glad to hear that the situation is far better now and that they are expected next year with optimism. Regarding

our export possibilities and import needs, our situation is such that Yugoslavia is becoming increasingly industrialized country. We feel that the current scope of foreign currency is narrow, so we want to expand it, particularly with friendly countries, such as Indonesia. We already have the ability to export various kinds of equipment for factories, various machine, etc. while our industry needed raw material that Indonesia has. On the other hand, we also need various types of consumer goods that Indonesia exports. Comrade President has stressed that he thinks, and this opinion is shared by the political leadership of the country, that our trade relations with friendly countries, such as Indonesia, have to be set in a way to be in line with our political relations. For example, the issue of lending needs to be approached in this way. We know that, at this stage of development, Indonesia cannot dispose of cash for the payment of necessary industrial goods and it is therefore important for them to get a loan. Comrade Tito states that he is not satisfied with the conditions under which they have been granted a loan of 10 million. He thinks that conditions are unfavourable for Indonesia. The interest rate of five per cent seems high. He is of the opinion that Yugoslavia will not be able to compete with other countries that trade and provide loans based on dumping and that our conditions have to be realistic, they must not be unfavourable for Indonesia. I think, Tito continues, that interest rates should be reduced, and I will do it as soon as we get home. All those who discussed this issue agreed. We think it is not only in the interest of Indonesia, but also in our own, as that creates opportunities to absorb our products and our entire economic exchange more vivid.

Prime Minister Djuanda says he is very pleased with the generous statement of President Tito. To be honest, he continues, our government has difficulties with financial and economic experts. They, and it is their responsibility, compare the conditions offered by one country with those offered by other countries and are looking for the most favourable. The government itself observes these issues from the political point of view, whereas experts are not very much concerned. I belong to a group in the government, Djuanda says, that wants to quickly develop economic relations between Indonesia and Yugoslavia. Therefore, I express my satisfaction that President Tito has mentioned the possibility of reducing the interest rate for a loan of \$ 10 million. In this regard, I would like to ask you for one more thing – to examine whether it would be possible to extend the deadline for the repayment of the loan. Ambassador Pavlič is familiar with the wish of Indonesia to buy ships from Yugoslavia. At the present moment, the problem is that Indonesia cannot accept the provided terms of payment. I would like to ask if Yugoslav side could re-examine and mitigate these conditions. In addition, Djuanda says, we would like Yugoslav side to examine whether it would be possible for Yugoslavia to fund, or to include in the loan of 10 million dollars, the training of Indonesian technicians in Yugoslavia. Our experience is that the language barrier can be overcome. We have seen that the interns, after six months to a year, can attend lectures at universities. We shall try to send our technicians in several countries where there are conditions. In particular, we wish

our young people to go to Yugoslavia because in addition to training in technical fields, they can acquire knowledge in the management of factories and enterprises. I have had the opportunity to personally see the Yugoslav factory, to talk with management, and after that I have read a lot about it, and I think there are a lot of new ideas that can be applied in Indonesia. Also, I would like to take this opportunity on behalf of the Army, Navy and Air Force to ask Yugoslavia to provide further opportunities for the training of their staff and to thank you for what has been done so far. The next year, the number of interns should be 300. Once again, I repeat that we would very much appreciate if a portion of the loan of 10 million dollars was used to cover the cost of interns. For us, it is of unusual importance, because we think our young people would benefit a lot from going to a country like Yugoslavia. First of all, they are then located in a country that leads the same independent policy and our country, so we are somewhat confident that they will not fall under adverse influence. Also, it is important that we have a lot of things in common in our history, and it represents a solid base for this type of cooperation.

Then, Prime Minister Djuanda says he would like to ask a question about the experience of Yugoslavia in terms of Soviet loans and aid. We just want – he says – to use the credit of \$ 100 million for the construction of facilities for the use of experts. So far we have used the loan for procurement of transport and the like, and now we should use it for objects. Just after noon we will have crucial talks. It seems to us, I'll be quite honest, it's too many experts that the Soviets sent in connection with the construction of buildings and, secondly, that the deadline for the preparation of plans and works is too long, especially when compared to the conditions provided by the West Germany. We do not know how what to think about it. We believe that the Soviets want to be cautious, but it is possible that they have other reasons. Considering these Soviet proposals, we find it hard to make a decision, especially when we compare their conditions with the conditions of West Germany, especially with the conditions of Krup. We would like to hear your experience in the construction of certain facilities by the Soviet Union. For us, this is an important issue, but it is important to make good use of credit offered. We think it is politically wise to use Soviet loans. We want to do business with the EXIM bank, but it is good if we can also use others. Our experience in the US is that they are very slow in making decisions, but once the decision is made, performance very fast.

President Tito replies that he agrees with their idea to use a part of the loan of \$ 10 million for the training of professionals. He is convinced that the other delegation members also agree. In terms of spending loans on equipment, I would like to say something about the military industry. As to the equipment of the factory for the production of 105 mm cannons, things are like this. Our military industry is too big for some types of products. There are machines that are not used, or used very little. Would the Indonesian side agree to equip the factory

with the machinery from our existing industries, and these machines are almost new. In the first case we would be able to set up the factory very quickly. In the second case, we would produce the necessary equipment for the plant in the process of our regular production. In the first case, both for the cannons and ammunition, the factory would be set up very quickly. In the second case, we could produce new machines, but the delivery would take longer. Also, we would have to import some parts from abroad, especially electronic devices, which we produce but not everything we need.

As for the deadline for the repayment of the loan, Comrade Tito says he believes that this period should be extended and will insist on it.

In view of our experience with Soviet loans, Comrade President says he is not able to praise the Soviet side. We had some agreements with them to help us in carrying out the first five-year plan. But in 1948, they broke off relations with us not having built a single factory. It was agreed that the Hungarian would transfer equipment for aluminium factory, but they broke and we only had damages. In fact, they have not built a single factory, nor have they sent their experts, so we do not have any experience.

As to the question why they send such a large number of experts, Comrade President thinks it is their practice. They always send a large number of experts. They have a mass production of professionals. I do not know about any other intentions, Comrade President continues, but it is possible that they exist. It is possible to send large numbers and because they still do not have a great experience to work abroad, and by a large number they want to be on the safe side and shorten the deadlines. However, it all depends of the agreement. Indonesia will be able, if it wants, to reduce the number of experts during the execution. He adds he has no other information, but wishes to underline that the Soviets have cooperate with us on a reactor of 10 000 KV. It was done by our experts working with their three experts. We were pleased. They have finished their work solidly.

We had an agreement with the Soviets to build us an aluminium factory in Montenegro and fertilizer factory in Pančevo. But when the relations tightened, they cancelled everything. We have already started working in Pančevo and, when it came to the termination of agreement, we have suffered damage because we had to get machines in the US, where they are different. During the design phase, before the worsening of relations, we have worked together. They were sending their experts to us, and we were sending ours to them, and collaboration in the design phase was running its course. If you ask for my assessment, Comrade President continues, I dare say that the USSR will endeavor to perform the works in Indonesia solidly, because they would like to demonstrate their technical ability *vis a vis* with the United States and other Western countries. In this respect, I think there is no place for concern.

President Sukarno says that during his visit to China, he visited the metallurgy plant in Aum Saa /, /. The Chinese then told him that the conglomerate

was built by the Soviet Union within two years and that they were very satisfied with Russian experts, who, having completed the construction of the factory went back to the Soviet Union. Today, this conglomerate employs only Chinese experts.

In this regard, President Tito says that our agreement with the Soviets in terms of building aluminium conglomerate was to build it within five years, and when Prime Minister Djuanda had asked whether this applied only to the factory or to the construction of energy sources, Comrade President answered that the period of 5 years applied to both.

President Sukarno then asked what kind of products Yugoslavia could purchase from Indonesia.

President Tito replied that he could not give a complete list, but, for example, it could include rubber, tin, technical fat, then spices, coffee, and tea. There are also other items, especially for the needs of the Yugoslav textile industry.

Ambassador Pavlič says that Yugoslav delegation in Indonesia wants to buy 5,000 tons of rubber, some fat and other goods, but that Yugoslav side has difficulties purchasing, although it is ready to pay in cash. If allowed, he would like to take this opportunity to request the establishment of the Mixed Commission, which could permanently take care of trade and new opportunities. We also intend to establish mixed companies. All this would help increase the exchange of goods.

Prime Minister Djuanda states that he will, in turn, support the proposal of Ambassador Pavlič regarding the Mixed Commission. He has said that their CDC started promoting their organization. We manage to restrict smuggling and arbitrary compensation deals, and things are moving forward. As to the export of a complete factory he wants, above all, to thank President Tito. He thought it would be best if Indonesia on this point send a small team to Yugoslavia. Luckily, they have a man who has already been in Yugoslavia regarding some previous works. Also, in the meantime, the Yugoslav military attaché should visit Bandung to see what is already there and what needs building. After that, Indonesian mission will come for further arrangements.

President Sukarno proposes moving to international problems and asks Minister Subandrio to present details on his recent trip.

Minister Subandrio says he will talk about it later, as he himself wants to say a few words about our economic relations. He wishes to express his gratitude for President Tito's offer. He draws a conclusion that President Tito shares the belief of Indonesian leadership with respect to the further developments in Indonesia. Indonesians are optimistic by nature, but this year is a proof that things are really getting better. President Tito will remember that a year ago, Indonesia was experiencing difficult days. There was a crisis of democracy, a crisis in relations between the centre and the provinces, and the uprising was raised and there was a

conflict with the Dutch. Now, the things have changed and President Tito can see that President Sukarno is much happier.

President Sukarno has protested jokingly that even then he was cheerful and optimistic.

Minister Subandrio goes on to say that Indonesian nation is confident about the future. He believes that our cooperation should be placed on a broader basis. Our nations should cooperate. More Indonesians should go to Yugoslavia and more Yugoslavs should come to Indonesia to get to know the language, customs, culture and other aspects of life. Perhaps, at first glance it does not seem so important for economic exchange, but he is convinced that this will help the development of economic relations. Why, in fact, is it so difficult to replace the Dutch in Indonesia? It is because of their knowledge. For economic cooperation, it is necessary to know each other. He would like not only President Tito and Tempo, but also other Yugoslavs who can find interest, to come to Indonesia. Language, culture, the problem of rehabilitation, tropical hygiene, etc. are things that may have no direct connection with the economy, but actually affect the economic cooperation. The exchange of students, doctors and others will assist and facilitate other connections. We are also prevented by bureaucrats, continues Minister Subandrio. If it is about transferring the trade from Amsterdam to Rijeka, then there is a real variety of calculations and, if the calculation is positive, they do not oppose. However, the position is in the hands of the Government and not the Dutch, so it has the ability to guide things in the right direction. He wants to take this opportunity to announce that Indonesia has decided to take a certain amount from domestic funds, to cover the costs of Yugoslav students who came to Indonesia to get to know it better.

Minister Subandrio then proceeds to the exposure of his trip abroad. Actually, I was delegated, he said, to represent Indonesia at the meeting of Colombo countries, but also entrusted with other duties. I was supposed to see the way the USA and GB perceived the situation in Indonesia and to examine the development of international problems which were taking quite explosive form. On his way, I had the opportunity to talk with Dulles, Macmillan, Lloyd, Brentano, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Široký and David.

As for Indonesia, the US and UK have totally modified their earlier cynical attitude. There are no more cynical suspicions and it may be said that they have some faith in development in Indonesia. They particularly revised their position regarding President Sukarno. For them, Sukarno was seen as a negative item in the balance, and now he is referred to as a claim. They think that, as a nationalist, he represents a positive item. The change in GB is particularly noticeable. They now see greater opportunities for the development of direct trade with Indonesia. While before they were only able to trade over the Dutch, we see opportunities for broader trade. The British have shown a great interest in developing economic relations. Lloyd has told him personally that he would rather want to hug him, but that he should not show so much for the Dutch.

As far as the international situation, there is a growing awareness, especially in the United States, that the balance in Asia has not yet been established, that things are still unstable. While in Europe the borders are clearly underlined in the military, political and other terms, in Asia, the situation is still unstable, not only in this respect, whether it will be one or the other country to fall under the influence of the USSR or the USA, but also in the internal development of individual countries. In connection with this, it is of particular importance that what happened in Pakistan and Iraq. Dulles told him personally that the US are familiar with Indonesian attitudes, while this cannot be said for many other countries. It is, in fact, a big concern for US. They are afraid of two things. First, that parliamentary democracy in Asia is not working well, but that economic development in Asia is not fast enough, and that the United States are to be blamed for that. In the United States they see that their economic assistance is greater than that provided by the Soviet Union, and yet Soviets are praised the United States blamed for the slow progress. Apparently, Minister Subandrio continues, US tend to think about other lines, to reduce military aid to provide economic aid more on a multilateral basis, mainly through the Colombo Plan, as well as through the UN based on the latest proposals / Technical Assistance /. It seems that the US are closer to adopting multilateral assistance.

Minister Subandrio further states that he has an impression that the US want at all costs to prevent every move to the left in Asia. The issue is not that they are afraid that it will become a communist country because of communist propaganda, but they are afraid that this shift will occur based on fundamental mass discontent. In this way, military coups have become an instrument of the Cold War. It can be felt in Indonesia. He feels the systematic propagation of General Nasution as the future head of the military regime in Indonesia. From the standpoint of the USSR, military coups, even if they turn against him, meaning more discontent among the people, for the people are never satisfied with the military regime, and this dissatisfaction can be used for their own purposes.

He has had talks with Dulles, Lloyd and Brentano regarding Berlin. Everyone thinks it is less a matter of Berlin and that the real goal of the USSR is to distract the attention of the West from the main battlefield. The Soviet Union is fighting a big battle on the territory of Asia and Africa, especially in the countries that are not aligned to the blocs.

He has talked about these issues with Khrushchev and Mikoyan and got the impression that the aim of the Soviet Union is to be fully engaged in the game of competitive coexistence. The USSR is fighting on two tracks. First – to catch up with and surpass the capitalist countries, and second – to show what is better in terms of providing economic aid: private investments, as proposed by the United States, or the state aid through the government line. Eisenhower has recently declared that the United States will not be able to indefinitely provide assistance on the basis of state aid and that real help should actually come from private so-

urces and from private initiatives. The USSR, on the contrary, wants to prove that the help on the government level, even if it is small, may be more useful to the recipient. That is why they agree with the president Tito that the Soviet Union will do everything to make this right. They have other data for that. The information we have from India and Afghanistan also showed that Russians are very consistent in performing these tasks.

Also, he thinks that in view of the Soviet Union China should be kept in mind. Soviet Union cannot conclude an agreement on disarmament primarily due to China. In the USSR it is believed that China makes great progress in the development of their material forces which is of great importance for military and economic balance in the world. The USSR is waiting for China to become strong and wants to include it in the contest with the West, in both forms of the contest. The USSR believes that China will overcome their difficulties. When he was in Moscow, Khrushchev told him that. Khrushchev said that Stalin knew only about other communist parties, and not about other communist countries. He did not realize that until it was just a party it was enough to give instructions and all had to go to the way the centre wanted. However, when other socialist countries appeared, they had their obligations towards their own people, had its own problems, as Stalin did not understand that the socialist countries could not be given directives, as communist parties. Khrushchev said that during Stalin the Soviet Union was static, while Yugoslavia and China went on developing the theory applying it to the new circumstances. Minister Subandrio further said that they were following with great care what was happening in China. So far, their experience with China is very good. China has always been specific to Indonesia, provided help whenever requested, and always on time. They do, however, need to closely monitor new developments and to be vigilant. They have a desire to re-establish good relations between Yugoslavia and China. Indonesia would not like to see a split in the socialist camp or among the countries of Asia and Africa. Indonesia is now at a very important stage in its development and believes that any disorder can only be harmful to Indonesia.

As for Berlin, his opinion is that this is the question for the USSR, after the action around Quemoy and Matsu, just a small game. The USSR does not want to make peace for the West; it constantly tries in one way or another to expel the West out of balance. During his trip he got a lot of information about it, especially in Prague, Berlin today is actually the largest centre of subversive activities. This is not such a problem for the Soviet Union, which has its own mechanism and can cope with the West, as it is for Poland and Czechoslovakia, against which there is a constant subversive activity in Berlin. Subandrio further states that he believes that the Soviet Union does not give Berlin issue the character of ultimatums; it is more about the struggle for a better position in the Cold War. The news of Mikoyan's visit to the United States leads to the conclusion that the question of Berlin will not be sharpened by the Soviet Union. It is quite strange

that a man of such high-ranking travels to a private visit to a country like America. On the other hand, regarding the questions of Berlin, it is important that ČSR and Poland are interested more than the USSR itself. It is not excluded that the Soviet Union has raised this issue at the insistence of Široký and Grotewohl to comply with their request.

In terms of disarmament Subandrio says that he has got the impression that it would be possible to reach an agreement, if it were only about the Soviet Union. However, the USSR cannot enter into any agreement, at least as long as China does not become a nuclear power. Mikoyan has told him that the situation is now very favourable to the Soviet Union, because the ratio of 1:2 in favor of the West, not to speak of France and possibly other countries that could soon become nuclear powers. I would say, Subandrio continues, the USSR is waiting for China regarding disarmament. After all, it is not possible to conclude an agreement which would exclude China. Such an agreement would certainly have a large hole and would have no significance if China itself would not respect it.

Indonesian assessment is that China now has its hands full at home. Industrialization, problems with the new communes and others engage all of its strength. The fact is that the Chinese development both worries and fears many. After all, history teaches us that in every major country should be seen as a potential imperialist. That is the way it has been so far. The new history has witnessed major socialist countries. Indonesia can only hope that the history will show that the socialist countries have become major imperialist. As to China, Indonesia deems it very important to fight all together against stupid American policy, which advocates that China needs to be pushed into a corner. Naturally, every country fights against that policy and China will become more decisive in the fight against this policy. Indonesian assessment is that the development in China has not gone so far that it could be said that China has become expansionist. True, China is angry with the US, and is determined towards them, but it also wants to keep good relations with all other countries. Regarding Yugoslav-Chinese relations, Minister Subandrio continues, our wish is that the split is not final. Indonesia cannot intervene, because it has not been requested, but would really like to see it as a quarrel between brothers, as Tito himself has said. Indonesia thinks we should focus on the greatest tasks and, if we want to succeed here, then we should not allow a split in the socialist camp, either within AA countries.

If during his trip President Tito was able to do something to improve relations between AA countries, at least in the cultural and other fields, he could help avoid unintended consequences. Indonesia believes that after Bandung the West has realized what solidarity meant for Asian – African countries and worked towards its dissolution. Unfortunately, the West has been more successful than the Asian – African countries in their attempt to strengthen the unity. This could be seen through the problems in the Middle East, and India – Pakistan etc. Indonesia believes that the reaction of the West to Bandung was positive. There is also the

problem of the Second Asian-African conference. Although Indonesia responds positively to individual initiatives, coming especially from Ceylon, it believes that because of the success of the West, the circumstances for holding the second conference are not favourable yet. The West will certainly keep on trying to break this unity. The most important task of the countries like ours is to prevent this. We need to be very flexible in our policy and not to let them separate us.

“Galeb”, December 28, 1958

Attending: President Tito, Comrades Mićunović, Mates and Pavlič, and on behalf of Indonesia: Djuanda and Subandrio.

President Tito said that, considering the fact that Prime Minister Djuanda had recently been in Yugoslavia, and that international issues had been discussed extensively, both with Comrade Kardelj in Belgrade, and after that in Brioni, these things should not be repeated, and that only recent moments of time after that visit should be presented. President Tito said that later he would like to speak about our position in terms of the relations between Yugoslavia and the East, particularly regarding China.

A new moment in the international situation is the Berlin issue, which has been launched by the Soviet government through Khrushchev. We do not perceive it negatively. We believe that this is a positive step that would raise the issue from the dead point. President Tito adds he would not talk about other moments that the USSR might have had before its eyes when it raised this issue, and continues that we think that reaching agreement would be difficult because of the way the Soviets raised this issue. Namely, the Soviet Union is asking for the resolution of the question of West Berlin only, not the whole of Berlin, both East and West. However, Tito continues, I think that the Soviet Union has not said the last word. If it comes to negotiations, the Soviet Union will probably be ready to discuss about the entire Berlin, to make the whole of Berlin some kind of a free city or a small independent state. This is a very clever move. The Soviets know that the West is stiff and slow to react; they know the weak points of western politics and want to draw political benefits for themselves. Although I'm not completely familiar with the matter, Tito says, I would like to say what is, in my opinion, the main objective of the Soviet action. I think that the Soviets believe they will not have difficulties in achieving this goal.

It is now clear that on previously emphasized grounds, namely – free choices on one hand and the direct contact between the two German states on the other, cannot easily come to an agreement. However, with this agreement, the Soviets want both East and West Germany to address the issue of Berlin. In this way the Soviets wish to create the possibility for the Western powers, especially the United States, to somehow recognize East Germany as a state. Thus, they would solve the problem of non-recognition of East Germany, which prevents any progress on issues of Germany. It is, in my opinion, the new moment in Berlin is-

sue. It is clear that we would welcome such a solution and consider it positive. We were the first, two years ago, who said that creating some kind of federation or confederation was the best solution, because it would preserve existing regimes. We are still of the same opinion. In accordance with this attitude, and of course for other reasons, we have recognized East Germany.

We believe that it is now up to the West to make a statement regarding the Russian steps. We think it is wrong to assume that it has been a propaganda gesture. It is a real proposal that would, if accepted, move an important question from a standstill. We believe that it is an unrealistic speculation of some circles in the West and a part of the press that the Berlin issue is raised because the Chinese action in relation to the coastal islands failed. I think, Tito says, that it is not true. It is true that China has not succeeded, but it could not have been known in advance, because it could not have been assumed that the US would capitulate in this matter. I think it has to do with the question of Berlin and that this is independent of the USSR's initiative. I should add, continues Comrade Tito, we do not believe that the question of Berlin will lead to stronger conflict, but in the present situation it certainly is an element of the Cold War.

President Tito then says he would like to say a few words about the relations of Yugoslavia to Western countries. Has anything changed in a positive or negative sense, after the visit of Prime Minister Djuanda to Yugoslavia? We can immediately say that it has not. Our policy with respect to the West is the same as it has been before. We consistently lead principled politics. Certain sharp criticism from the East has not made us weaken our ties with Western countries that want to collaborate with us on the basis of equality. Even though we were in a pretty delicate situation, especially in economic terms, we have not noticed that the West wanted to exploit this situation or tried to exert pressure or to extract some benefit. In reactionary circles of the USA and the UK there have been some allusions that this situation should be used to put pressure on Yugoslavia to release Đilas and three former socialists who have been convicted, then there have also been hints that there should be more freedom in Yugoslavia and the like. However, all this had no effect on the attitudes of some governments toward Yugoslavia. We could even say that this time West gave a positive response even more quickly than before. Our economic relations with the USSR and other eastern countries were damaged by worsening relations, but we have met with the understanding of the West in this respect, so that we can minimize the damage we suffered. We can say that this time the attitude of the West was different than in 1948. They did not try to exert any pressure, nor did they express the hope that Yugoslavia would now be able to be drawn into the Western sphere of influence. It seems that the West has become aware of the policy of Yugoslavia, as an independent country that does not want to, because of some difficulty, change its principled stance. They have realized that Yugoslavia stands firmly and that any attempt to pressure would be futile. In particular, the US have approved loans in

the amount of \$ 95 million to Yugoslavia for the purchase of wheat and \$ 20 million for the construction of the plant of nitrogen compounds. In this respect, we have met with understanding, which is of great benefit to us.

All this is influenced by the fact that we are now much stronger than we were in 1948. Because when you are weak, the pressure immediately increases. The West knows that it Yugoslavia will not allow it. In the meantime, we have grown economically, and our reputation in the world has been much increased, thanks to our principled foreign policy. It has become clear that different speculations cannot disturb us. We can see that this is correct and that the West has realized it by the fact that it has not changed relations with us, even though in international field, and the United Nations, and almost all important issues we have similar or identical views with the USSR. Our principled policy has not been affected either by the East or by the West. We take our stand on the basis of our own analysis and our attitudes are often similar to or identical with the attitudes of non-aligned countries. When taking position we do not look up to the East or the West. This could be best seen at this year's session of the UN, when we made a joint draft resolution with India and other non-aligned countries.

President Tito emphasizes that this year it could be seen that the close cooperation of non-aligned countries in the United Nations made a major contribution to mitigating the passions, which have been flared up and threatened to lead to a stronger conflict. The unique appearance of non-aligned countries regarding the aggression against Egypt, pressure on Syria and other issues, have made a strong impression and shown the necessity of cooperation.

President Tito then moves on to the exposure on our relations with the East. He states that there has been an attack to Yugoslavia and that criticism of Yugoslavia has been low. After the Congress, we have not reacted against their criticism, because we have not wanted to make things too tight. Based on some of their statements, we have expected that there will be no disturbance of state relations, but only discussion at the ideological level. Later, however, it has become obvious that this criticism is not of ideological character, that it is not only about this or that interpretation Marxism-Leninism, but a state conflict. They have, in fact, begun criticizing the Yugoslav foreign policy, calling us "the servants of imperialism", "fascists" and in general using vocabulary that is not at all common among those who want to keep normal relations. Our silence and our desire to avoid tensions have been interpreted as weakness. They have said that we do not have anything to say, and that we cannot answer because we are guilty, and that we should be pressured even harder, and thrown to our knees. Then in August – Comrade President continues – I held a speech in Labin on the occasion of miners' celebration and responded to these attacks. I did not attack, but I gave the facts. I set the record straight and say that it is a conflict at the state line, the attack on Yugoslavia. It should be underlined that the speech in Labin was actually the first answer. Until then, there was no mention of it in the press, because

we waited for things to settle down and expected some kind of ideological discussions. However, they refused such a discussion, because they are weak in the ideological field. They cannot prove what they claim – that we deviated from the Marxist line. So, they took the rough tone and rough terms, calling us revisionists – and it did not prove anything. In fact, it all boils down to the fact that they claim that we are revisionists because we do not want to get involved in the lager. After their first attacks and claims that it is an ideological dispute, they cancelled contracted loans in May. It is clear that this is not an ideological thing, but it is about state relations. Speech in Labin, although he did not attack anyone and was defensive, provoked a sharp reaction in the East. It cannot be said that the Soviet Union was in the front line, but China and Albania and Bulgaria. They started offending us, and then moved on to the irredentist propaganda. They began to argue that Albanian minority was harassed in Kosovo and Metohija. Bulgarians launched Macedonian issue. They wrote that Macedonia is part of Bulgaria, that there was no Macedonian nation and so on. They talked about the same things as before them, during the Kingdom of Bulgaria, Bulgarian-speaking bourgeois circles, bourgeois politicians. It is clear that we have to react to all of this, as it caused a strong reaction among our people. We had to react because of public opinion. We then condemned the attacks and stated that all this should not be the policy of a country that aspires to be Socialist. Consequently, the tension in the relations reached a high level. So far, we have not seen that the USSR supported such action. On the contrary, talking to our people, Soviets say this policy is harmful etc. However, it is also true that the Soviets were not publicly against this policy. The fact is that this propaganda did not have effect. They later realized they were going in the wrong direction. They have realized that people in these countries are reluctant to listen to this kind of propaganda phrases, since they are much like those they were listening from the old bourgeois politicians. So this propaganda manoeuvre failed. There is still a latent danger that they will come out with this action again. The fact that they ceased does not mean they will not come back later and try again.

It is necessary to say a few words about another element that contributes these relations, i.e. our position regarding Hungarian events. This year the Hungarian government has issued a White Paper in which Yugoslavia was charged as an accomplice of Nagy, as if Nagy and his government were working following the directions of our government. In a word, Yugoslavia was placed in the dock, as it was in the Rajk case, which later turned out to be all fake. This White Paper is now known throughout the world as it is sent to all embassies and widely circulates among the Hungarian representatives. We have not publicly responded to this White Paper, to deny it. But, we have written our White Paper containing the letters, telegrams, speeches and other original documents showing that this allegation is totally false. We, however, did not publish this White Paper because the West launched the question of Hungary in the UN, and we did not want it to appear that we are helping the West to discredit Hungary and the USSR in the

United Nations, since the West would certainly use data from our books. Then preparations for the Hungarian elections started and we again did not want to publish a book that could harm the Hungarian government that would lose a lot at the elections since the people's memories regarding the Hungarian events are still fresh. From this, it can be seen that we have been completely loyal to the Hungarian government. We did not want to weaken it, but to strengthen it. However, even though they know it, they are still pulling this question. Therefore, we cannot say that, if they continue with attacks, we will not publish our book. Regarding Hungarian White Paper, we have sent a note to the Hungarian government and attached our White Paper, to make them see we have documents for our defence.

President Tito has then expressed the desire to say something about the economic relations with the Eastern countries. The regular exchange of goods, it can be said, has not changed. Here and there, there are some delays, but we can say that it is going on, except for loans that are cancelled. As for individual countries, it can be said that we have exchange with all countries, but the worst with Albania and China. China, for example, banned the use of Rijeka for transport of goods to China or from China, and has also issued a general prohibition to use the Yugoslav ships. With the USSR and other countries economic relations are exercised on the basis of equal benefit for both countries. They set this principle saying that we wanted it set that way and that they only meet our discretion. There are certain elements showing a desire for easing the tensions, at least with the Soviet Union and some other countries. We can only hope that the economic relations will continue to develop, which will certainly be a positive element in our relationships. Our trade delegation has left to the Soviet Union and China, and we still have no reports on the success of their mission. President Tito says that he is little pessimistic about China, but as far as the USSR is concerned he is not so, and that he believes they will sign a new agreement based on the principle of mutual benefit. All things considered, our impression is that things are somehow calming. They appear to have realized that such attacks on Yugoslavia are not useful either for themselves. They have also realized that their tendency to discredit Yugoslavia with countries outside the bloc also failed and that even this kind of propaganda has caused a negative response among non-aligned countries. I must say, Tito continues, that we welcome every sign of good will, and that we will continue to do everything we can to avoid tensions. However, if they continue to attack, we will have to respond from time to time and to defend ourselves. We will even then respond en bloc, but specifically, to every attack. I would like to underscore, Tito says, that in our country there is a strong desire to improve relations. We hope it will come to that, because it cannot be otherwise. We cannot stop them from building socialism, nor can they stop us. So, our goals are the same, although there are differences in views what they should be. They believe they must be those of a camp, and we have our own opinion about it. However, we hope that one day it will be possible to build such relations among socialist countries and they really should be.

Comrade Tito proposes to end the meeting and continue tomorrow. Tomorrow, he will say something more about ME and other issues proposed by the delegation members.

“Galeb” December 29, 1958

The same attendants as on the first meeting on “Galeb”

President Tito wishes to say a few words about the talks he had with the President Nasser. These talks had a preliminary character and will be continued on our way back when we will stay in UAR. Then we will definitely systemize the results of our talks.

President Nasser talked about the relations of the UAR with Western countries and the countries of the Middle East. As to the general situation in the Middle East, after unsuccessful aggression against Egypt, and the resolution of the issue of Iraq and Lebanon by withdrawal of Western troops, is much easier than in August last year. On relations of the UAR with Tunisia Nasser said that Bourguiba took action against the UAR, accusing it of preparing acts of terrorism in Tunisia. All this, however, is not true and is probably a part of the desire of the Tunisian leadership, certainly not the whole, to discredit the president Nasser. The US cannot be accused of putting pressure on Bourguiba to take such action against the UAR, as the United States have condemned such Bourguiba's policy a negative.

Relations between Lebanon and the UAR were quite tense in the course of the summer, in August. According to Nasser, the situation has improved. The new Lebanese government is making efforts to normalize things and to strengthen itself. This is confirmed by the statement of the UN that the charges against the UAR are withdrawn, and that there are no elements of interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon and that there are no people in Lebanon plotting against their government on behalf of UAR.

At our request President Nasser said few words about the situation in Iraq. First, the situation there was not completely clear. Although the new regime was consolidated, although they preserved the revolutionary achievements, the overall situation was not clear. We discussed Arif, former Vice President of the Government, who was under arrest. President Nasser noted that Arif acted rather improperly when he started acting against Qasim. He himself was wrong to back away from the statements given during the revolution. He spoke of his associates in the revolutionary council and the democratic regime, and later in his statement gave it all up. In this way, he isolated himself from masses, and from the military circles which were loyal to him and with whom he collaborated in the execution of the revolution. That's why, when he came into conflict with Qasim, he had no support either in the army, not among the people. In a word, Nasser expressed disapproval regarding Arif's act and belief that it would harm the relations between Iraq and the UAR. Nasser has firmly rejected any idea that Arif had acted under

the influence of Cairo. During the talks Nasser said and we believe it is true, President Tito says, that UAR had no desire to force development in the direction of some integration. This is very hard due to different degrees of economic development. What Cairo wants is a certain political and cultural integration, a joint action in the common interest of all Arab countries. Nasser expressed the difference using English words unity and union, speaking of the Arab solidarity rather than integration.

Regarding our opinion about the situation in Iraq, we must say that there are certain things that are still unclear to us. There is, probably, interference from the side. We definitely cannot say that the situation there will remain stable. If the interference from the side continues Iraq may still be an element of concern in the Middle East. All the more so because its geographical and economic position is such that it represents a point of interest to the foreign countries.

President Nasser told us about the relations between Sudan and the UAR. Here, we are of the same opinion as President Nasser. We also think that some forces are using certain issues to exacerbate the relations between the two countries. In this regard, the issue of water regime of the river Nile is being used.

As to the general circumstances and attitude of Egypt, we think that the government of the UAR leads extraordinary good and realistic policy. It seems to us that two years ago, Egypt was not always able to lead such a realistic policy. The UAR policy now prevents the relations between the Arab countries tighten to such an extent to suit the West, which still has colonial interests. We think that this policy the of the West will continue and that the UAR government is in a very delicate situation, because on one side there is the pressure of the colonial powers wanting to preserve their privileges, especially in terms of oil, and on the other side there is the West trying in every way to break the internal unity of Arab world. It was also evident in terms of the Arab League, which was fairly consolidated. That is why the UAR needs to be extremely cautious and flexible in leading the policy and trying to keep previously won achievements. We believe that the UAR is leading completely proper policy trying to establish more or less normal relations even with those Western countries that have fought against it not only by means of propaganda, but have committed acts of aggression against it. The UAR shows the willingness to maintain economic relations with the West on the principle of coexistence, provided that these relationships are based on equality. Western propaganda which is hostile to the UAR, accuses Nasser of bowing to the East, and falling under the "communist" influence. We believe that the UAR have rightfully established economic relations with the East. In fact, it had no choice because of the pressure from the West. First to apply pressure and aggression, and then to accuse Egypt and UAR because of their connections with the East, in our opinion, is a nonsense. We think it is proper that the UAR, after establishing relations with the East, now goes to the West to build good economic relations. Such a policy balance is useful for the UAR. That is the only way

for UAR, if it wants to preserve its independence. Now there are signs that such a policy is successful because West Germany, the US and Japan offer to invest in the construction of the Aswan Dam. What the UAR have arranged with the US-SR regarding the dams, is really just the beginning and applies only to the first phase of construction. It seems that these days West Germany will send experts to the UAR to examine the possibilities for German involvement. This is a sign that relations of the UAR with the West consolidate a bit, because what West Germany does certainly is not without the knowledge of the United States and Great Britain. The government in Cairo certainly wants and welcomes the improvement in relations with the West, because it wants to unblock the assets which were blocked in the UK during the aggression and which amount to some 200 million US dollars.

Comrade President then says that the issue of recognition of the Algerian government was discussed during the visit of Prime Minister Djuanda. What has been said then still stands. We provide full moral support to the Algerian government as well as material help within the limits of our capabilities and political help wherever we can. Although we have not yet recognized the Algerian government, we do not hide the fact that our sympathies are on its side.

President Tito has finished herewith and asked the Indonesian side for their opinion regarding the issues mentioned, to make a picture complete.

Prime Minister Djuanda has stated the following: First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to President Tito for this detailed, open and honest presentation of his views. After his presentation the attitudes are pretty clear.

We have also followed the Berlin issue very closely, although we are farther away than Yugoslavia, and our interests are not so straightforward. But we are very interested to prevent the strengthening of tension in the world, because it affects both us and other non-aligned countries. In the given circumstances, the third world war would be a great misfortune for us and would put into question our efforts in terms of political stability and economic development.

We think that regarding Berlin, the position of West Germany is unusually important. Great Britain and America cannot afford not to take into account the views of West Germany. Although now West Germany may not be militarily strong enough to be a decisive factor, it should be expected that within a few years it will become very strong, both economically and in military terms. Therefore, the Great Britain and the United States give full support to West Germany in terms of Berlin. This is why we think we cannot expect quick solutions and that it will take for a long time. President Tito has expressed his opinion that Soviet initiative regarding Berlin probably has nothing to do with the situation in the Far East and the action of China in Quemoy and Matsu. Maybe it is not the most important. In our opinion, there is one another political fact that is more important and that is the fact that the Soviet Union wants to retain the initiative, i.e. not to leave it to the West.

Our assessment is that the tensions have recently subsided, or at least not increased compared to six months ago. We have the impression that neither side wants to start the third world war right now. Even if they had such an intention, they have postponed it. As for China, it is hard to go too far. President Tito has spoken about the fact that China has suffered a failure in Quemoy and Matsu. It is possible that the action has been premature. However, we do not believe that China would go too far now when it is in the midst of building the country, as well as making efforts about communes etc. All these efforts would be brought into question in the case of the World War II.

Also, we think that the United States do not want to go far. After the first terrifying reactions to China's action, they are easing the tensions and it seems that the United States do not want the third world war either.

Surely it would be most ideal if Berlin issue was resolved by mutual effort of interested parties i.e. East and West Germany. It is true, however, that this is very difficult. Too many interests are intertwined, so there is also a question of prestige and so on.

Now I would like to say something about the relations of Yugoslavia with eastern countries, with particular emphasis on the interests of some countries in Asia and Africa. I speak honestly and quite frankly when I say that for us Yugoslavia is the exponent of the policy of non-alignment, independence and active cooperation. Since our policy has the same character, we hope and we are always ready to offer our services and support to improve relations between Yugoslavia and Eastern countries. On our side, it is not about a desire to interfere in the affairs of others. We strive to have good relations with both blocs and know that Yugoslavia needs it too. Yugoslavia, as well as non-bloc countries of Asia and Africa, must work on good relations with both blocs and strengthen the cooperation. Our goal should be to get the full recognition of our independent policy from both blocs. On the other hand, we fully understand that Yugoslavia has to defend itself against attack. It is certain that under similar conditions, we would react in the same way. We are not too aggressive, but if we are attacked, we react the same and we want to make our position quite clear and definite not ceding to those who attack us. Speaking about the message of President Sukarno expressing his concern about the relations between Yugoslavia and China, I would say that this is more a concern of a friend. I do not yet know whether President Sukarno has got this explanation from the president Tito.

We are convinced that our common independent policy will eventually be recognized the West and the East. I think that Yugoslavia had already reached the stage that not even a country like the USA can doubt the actual independence of Yugoslav politics. We have not gone so far, yet. In our case, I think there are still doubts. There have been certain signs of improvement in recent months. However, I personally believe that we should not even be finally convinced that this will not change. Our buying weapons and equipment in the US is a sign that there

is more understanding of our independent policy. We are doing everything we can from our part, to make both the East and West understand just. We are doing everything we can to make the Soviet Union and in China realize that developing relationships with them does not mean that we want to stop cooperation with Western countries and we think this is quite clear. For us, the question of Irian is of great importance.

In terms of Irian, we think that seeking solutions by force would not be an expression of the wise policy. We are not considering such a possibility and there is no chance that we will make such a decision in future. We are not so much concerned by the Netherlands as we are by Australia, backed by the US and GB. If it was just about the Netherlands, the issue would be able to solve easily, but just because there is Australia, followed by the US and the GB, we have to be very cautious and realistic, because in the end these are two great powers. Therefore, we have formulated a long-term policy with respect to Irian. For now, we are trying to obtain political support of a wider circle of our friends, both in the East and in the West, including Latin America. We think it is especially important that our independent policy receives general recognition, and if that happens, then it will probably be easier to reach an agreement with Australia. In the Netherlands, the situation is gradually changing in our favour. We think that the current crisis, although it broke due to some financial issues, is not without a reference to the issue of Irian in the sense that economic pressure of Indonesia on the Netherlands creates considerable difficulties to the Netherlands and that is in the background of the crisis. In any case, it can be noted that the situation in the Netherlands is slowly changing. There are already individuals and groups of people who request negotiations with Indonesia. Indonesia is ready to negotiate about the recognition of the legal rights of Indonesia in Irian. If this recognition is given, then Indonesia will be ready to renew political and economic relations with the Netherlands. If the Netherlands was ready to deal, Indonesia would not lead the policy of discrimination towards it, either in political or in economic terms.

Since my visit to Yugoslavia, our concern about the situation in the Middle East has grown. Contrary to what Nasser has told you, we think that his situation today in the Arab world is more difficult than before. There are difficulties primarily in the relations of Egypt and Tunisia as well as the difficulties of financial nature. Then, in our opinion, in the entire African continent there is an unstated concern and fear that Egypt wants to impose / overwhelming /. I do not know whether Nasser sees this and takes it into account in his policy to other countries in Africa. We fear that Nasser's policy is not too wise and would weaken African solidarity, and thus solidarity of Asian – African group of countries. Therefore, we do not want to push the holding of the second AA Conference. We think that more time is needed to stabilize African countries a little. We are afraid that, if there is not a favourable atmosphere, the conferences could do more harm than good. Ceylon has been repeatedly giving the initiative for another conference.

We accept the initiative, however, we feel that the conference should not be forced too much due to African countries.

The situation in Iraq concerns us more than it seems to concern President Nasser. You, President Tito, have mentioned the issue of interference from outside. Nasser told you he did not affect Arif. We do not think he was influenced in this way. We would rather say there was a silent intervention of the great powers, the US and the USSR. It seems to us that great powers will not come to a conflict regarding Iraq. They support individual groups and let the Iraqis fight among each other. We would like to stabilize Iraq and to get a group of independent non-aligned countries. If there are unintended consequences in Iraq, it would be a major concern for us, because it is about weakening an Asian country.

We do not have much information about the events in Pakistan. It seems that in recent months there have been more concerns in India. They fear that Pakistan would force the Kashmir issue, which could very adversely affect the economic development of India.

As for Burma, according to the statement of U Nu, the situation is very unstable. I do not know the way the events would develop there. We can only hope that we will not lose a single non-aligned country.

The situation with regard to the Philippines has not changed. But there are political groups looking for closer ties with the Asian countries, especially with Indonesia, with which the relations have deteriorated during the uprising.

In terms of support and intervention of rebels in Indonesia situation has also changed. We have no more evidence of supplying the rebels with equipment. But unofficially, there are still attempts of intervention. They are still trying to exert some pressure, especially in the army. They are trying to intervene through some informal groups. They are promoting army as a holder of a future military regime. This is really stupid policy because of the fact that relations between Sukarno and Nasution are very good. There are no indications of a military coup. The Army is aware that there is no chance to do anything better without broad support. The last such attempt is found in an article in "The Times." It is, in fact, written on the basis of erroneous picture of the Indonesian army. In any case, navy and air force are against any such combination. Although the situation is generally better, there are indications that some persons abroad are still trying to use our difficulties. All this causes some difficulty, but represents no danger. But it does not improve our honest opinion about the United States. Because of these things we have to be very careful. You have said that in your relations with the West you have not noticed any attempt to exert pressure. This means that Yugoslavia has already received a lot of recognition for its independent policy. As for us, we are not in such situation. That is why we have to be very careful. For example, we are very aware of the nationalization of oil. First, we have no financial possibilities for such a step, and secondly, we know that we have very serious political consequences. So far, we have overcome the difficulties we have had

regarding the nationalization of Dutch property and have come to the point that we have control over our economy.

As to the Communiqué to be issued, I would like it to somehow express the confidence in non-bloc independent policy. In my opinion, it would be a useful encouragement to younger AA countries. I need to somehow say that for us it is the best policy.

President Tito says he has already talked to his associates about issuing a comprehensive communiqué, in which our common views would be presented. We have already made a first draft, so you should arrange to see if the Indonesian side has its own draft, or we can put together a joint draft. We agree that bringing our views would be useful for other countries. Our communiqué should not provoke blocs, but to honestly express attitudes, to make the communiqué a real reflection of our conversation.

Subandrio, Mićunović and Mates would meet for the purpose of drafting a communiqué.

President Tito thanks Prime Minister Djuanda on exhaustive presentation and suggests the minister Subandrio to express his views on issues mentioned during talks in Bogor.

Minister Subandrio says that he cannot help feeling that there are many similarities in our attitudes, even though we are threading different paths to the same end. He refers to President Sukarno's speech in which he says that the aim of Indonesia is social justice. He thinks we are in a similar situation in terms of our position in the world, and when he asks himself about the reasons, he comes to the conclusion that the reason lies in the fact that our countries are too nationalistic. It is not that anyone is afraid of us, but that our nationalism will affect other neighbouring countries that are under the influence of the great powers. They are afraid, for example, that Yugoslavia has its own way that is not doctrinal. He thinks that the Soviet Union does not oppose the views of Yugoslavia, but they are bothered by the fact that Yugoslavia is the first one to find new solutions. There is an impression that the Soviet Union is still experimenting, getting things reorganized, and they see that Yugoslavia has already found its way. Mikoyan, for example, told him that he had the impression that in Yugoslavia things were stable. He / Subandrio / thought that the Soviet Union feared that there would be a strong influence of Yugoslavia to neighbouring countries, and less feared that Yugoslavia could affect the development of the Soviet Union and China. Indonesia is in a similar situation. The US is afraid that it will affect countries in its vicinity. If the US claims that Sukarno has joined the Communists, or fallen under their influence, it is still a lie. Sukarno's attitude towards communism was set very clearly way back in 1950. The point is that the US are afraid of Indonesian nationalism. Because, if the Indonesian nationalism succeeded, it would be attractive to all neighbouring countries, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, and if it broke through in these countries, if it aroused aspirations for national indepen-

dence, then SEATO would no longer exist. Also, if Bulgaria, Albania and other neighbouring countries looked up to Yugoslavia, then the Soviet sphere of influence would be over. The same situation is also with Nasser in terms of the Baghdad Pact. Just because we are considered very dangerous for ourselves, we must be very cautious in our policy. US still aim to involve Indonesia into SEATO, as well as to the USSR wants Yugoslavia in the camp, or as much as the West would like the UAR to enter the Baghdad Pact. Because of these similarities, they are watching us with the same eyes. They understand that we have essentially the same policy, and if there are differences between us, it is actually a difference in emphasis rather than at the core. For example, in terms of Berlin, the interest of Indonesia is not the same as Yugoslavia, which is understandable because of the geographical location and other moments. He would also like to say that Lloyd and Brentano asked him to tell Khrushchev that because of Berlin they should not exacerbate the overall situation. He can say that Khrushchev was flexible, not stiff.

Summing up, Minister Subandrio says that, from whatever side we observe things, the same things are always seen. Great powers do not give up exerting pressure, but on the other hand there are no reasons not to be optimistic. Things are developing somehow. In countries such as Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, even though there is no change in the policy of the government, it could be felt that people are for the withdrawal from military blocs. People see that membership in the bloc does not provide a faster development. Moreover, in some cases they can see that non-bloc countries are better-off. The fact is, for example, that in addition to the huge aid received by Pakistan, the country is not very useful, because 60% goes into the pockets of politicians in various corrupted ways, and people see it. This is a lesson for Indonesia. Minister Subandrio has said that Indonesia is not free from corruption and therefore the government needs to be careful not to ask for more help than the country can absorb. In connection with the optimism which Subandrio justifies, he has noted that there are still countries and territories in Africa which are our potential allies in non-bloc policy. Such countries are, for example, Ghana and Morocco. These are potential allies. The fact is that we have been quite isolated before and that now the situation has changed a lot. How cautious we have to be in our policy is shown by the fact that the West does not see such a threat in India, as in Indonesia. India is a big country that has a great reputation, and yet the West does not find it as an attractive power for smaller countries. They are more afraid that Indonesia will affect other countries. That is, says Subandrio in the end, where I see the similarity of our situation. I think that you have achieved more and gone further than we have in Indonesia. With your independent policy you seem to have already succeeded. Initially, we were naive and thought we could achieve recognition of an independent policy based on the policy itself. Now we see that it does not go that way, we need to be strong to be respected. Previously, we have not been taken seriously, because we had no po-

wer. So now we are paying utmost attention to building up our military strength and we are convinced that it will bring us the needed prestige and opportunity for our independent policy to be recognized by all.

Tampaksiri, 30 December 1958

Attending are all those who attended the first meeting in Bogor.

President Sukarno says he has been informed of the talks being successfully continued at “Galeb” and communiqué being drafted. He wondered whether they reached a final agreement with respect to the formulation, especially in regard to the paragraph about China, which was subsequently submitted by the Indonesian delegation. He read the paragraph containing two parts, first: the statement that the two heads of state have confirmed their view expressed in a joint statement during the visit of the president Sukarno to Yugoslavia in 1956, and second, the note what was said therein – namely, that the recognition of representative of China in the UN would contribute to reducing tensions in the Far East.

President Tito proposed the first part of the proposed paragraph to be entered into a joint communiqué, namely the conclusion that the two heads of state have confirmed their view regarding China contained in the joint statement issued in Belgrade in September 1956, and that the second part is omitted as unnecessary.

This was accepted and therefore the talks ended.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1958, F-42, dos. 8, no. 32270
AJ, KPR I-2/11-2

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**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on Tito’s visit to Indonesia**

Djakarta,
No. 1
January 5, 1959

To Koča. You will receive assessments and results of the visit from “Galeb”. These are my own observations:

1. Visit successful. Comrade President satisfied. He repeated he was surprised by the reception; he saw greater opportunities for expanding cooperation in all areas. Reception, visit to Java and Bali exceeded all previous visits. Sukarno was constantly with Comrade President, and then at “Galeb”.

2. Numerous discussions, fruitful, especially at "Galeb" with Djuanda and Subandrio. Delegations talked only about foreign policy issues and bilateral cooperation. Sukarno spoke with Comrade President, first in the car, on the problems of building Indonesia. Djuanda expressed a desire to speak on these issues but, it seems that there was no opportunity for this. He clearly expressed Indonesian desire to avoid weakening of the Eastern bloc. The Western bloc represents a primary risk in the given circumstances. Driven by the desire to improve our relations with the PRC, they offered their "good services".

3. Communiqué well received, subject of much attention. Sukarno insisted on inserting a paragraph on China. This was the first visit which was given such political importance. Last year's visit of Voroshilov and visit of Prasad ended with no communiqués and no official talks.

4. Press devoted full attention to the visit. Attitude mostly positive. Right-wing press intentionally stressed and then twisted our conflict with the countries of the Eastern bloc. Communist press the worst. The main advantages: the Balkan Pact as a link to NATO and just signed agreement on US surpluses. They tried to portray the visit as an instrument of the West to turn AA countries against Moscow and Beijing. Before the visit, he held a meeting with foreign correspondents of the foreign newspapers of the West and the East. As much as we know, Western correspondents stopped tendentious interpretations of the visit.

5) Arrival, receptions and departure attended by all the ambassadors, including the Eastern bloc. Our reception was attended by all political leaders including Aidit.

6) Perfect security measures. Our comrades have provided excellent cooperation. No actions known, although there were enough opportunities. President did not use our car. Often drove together with Sukarno in an open car, through the crowd. Again, he got out from the car and walked through the crowd. In Bali he even used a helicopter. This was an open denial to the press, which wrote about the extraordinary security measures, but we were not at ease. Organization of the visit was good. There were several irrelevant omissions on both sides. The reason is that our visit came just three days after the visit of Prasad and new people of the cabinet of the Comrade President. A particular problem was the position of Sukarno's woman. In Djakarta the role of first lady belonged to Mrs Djuanda, in Bagor to madam Hartini, in Bali to both of them. New Year's celebration unforgettable. Both presidents all through the night. On Bali arrived next Djuanda and Subandrio three ministers and first vice president of the government Hardi.

Please ask Mates for the texts of interviews. It is necessary to immediately begin the implementation of a bilateral part of Communiqué.

Happy New Year 1959 to you, Lepa and personnel of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs.

Pavlič

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Letter from President Tito to President Sukarno on international circumstances

April 9, 1959

Dear Mr President,

I would like to inform you, in general terms, about some of my impressions of the countries that I visited after departure from Indonesia and to exchange opinions on certain problems of today's international situation, in which it is very important that all those forces acting outside the blocs remain resolute and unique in their effort and search for the ways to preserve the peace and achieve a better understanding and cooperation in the world.

The talks I had in Burma during the unofficial two-day visit enabled me to meet with the leading figures of these countries and to meet the generals Ne Win, who left the impression of a very likeable, energetic and capable man. He has got a very difficult task to establish peace and security in the country and to prepare free elections. As you can see, he was extended the mandate to be able to perform this task. I believe that he will succeed and that, as the president of government has assured me, there will be no change either in internal development or the foreign policy of Burma that is in the policy of not-alignment, active coexistence, cooperation with all countries, irrespective of social systems.

Days I spent in India and Ceylon as well as the time spent in your country shall remain in my memory. Although my visit to India was not official state visits, the reception we had amongst the people and senior staff was extremely warm and cordial. The meetings with citizens and leading people of Ceylon were a very pleasant surprise for me; we were welcomed as old acquaintances and friends. In India and Ceylon we talked, among other things, about the basic problem of the relationship between Tamils and Sinhalese in Ceylon, which hinders a better understanding between the two countries, so close not only geographically but also regarding customs and history. I think it is not a big problem and I believe that President Nehru and President Bandaranaike, and leaders of both countries, will do everything they can to find a suitable solution. Even more today when new threats to world peace are coming from different sides, it is important that all of us who are still fighting against the war are unified and united, in the first place without such mutual problems that might disturb our relations.

Unfortunately, such elements that have to be removed can be also found in the relations between Ethiopia and the UAR about which I spoke to the Emperor Haile Selassie and President Nasser. There are two basic problems. One is caused by propoganda carried by some radio stations of the UAR and considered as detrimental to the interests of Ethiopia. Another problem is related to decisions on

the allocation of Nile water, because in the opinion of the Emperor, Ethiopia needs to participate in talks and resolving the issue. President Nasser explained that the propaganda led by some radio stations of the UAR aims to match and suppress propaganda of radio stations surrounding Egypt and day after day attacking the UAR, Cairo, Nasser and his government. Accordingly, propaganda of UAR radio stations is not directed against the interests of Ethiopia. But even so, President Nasser says he will see what can be done. Regarding the Nile water, President Nasser fears that participation of Ethiopia in discussions and agreements could create for them an awkward precedent that would make Englishmen come out with the request to participate, because the White Nile comes from the county they hold. But President Nasser is willing to talk about it with the Emperor, which will repeat the invitation to visit Cairo, as the Emperor, due to the tragic death of his son and bereavement in the family could not respond to the first call and come to visit Cairo. My impression is that with one and the other side there is a sincere desire that relations between the UAR, and Egypt and Ethiopia are not only fixed and repaired, but also further increased and developed.

And in Sudan, which is in good relations with Ethiopia, there is the same kind of desire in terms of future cooperation. Good relations between the three countries are of very great importance for peace in that part of the world and we all need to help them be achieved and secured. President Abud and his government have as well as all the governments of the recently liberated countries a lot of internal difficulties and problems, but their basic needs for further development of the country are material resources and skilled employees. After my departure from Sudan there were some changes in the government, which I think is positive, because I assume that the further development go in the direction of strengthening the independence of the country.

My visit to the United Arab Republic began in Egypt and was supposed to end there after a two-day stay in Syria, and Damascus, where President Nasser and I enjoyed enthusiastic welcome of the people. However, that plan was changed because on my second day in Damascus I expressed a desire to see some more of Syria. President Nasser accepted my proposal to go to Latakia by car and from there, instead of taking a plane from Damascus as scheduled, to take a boat to Port Said. But, on the way to Latakia, we were caught in a great storm with snow blizzard caught us in the mountainous region and we had to change the direction, so we headed towards Aleppo. Having changed the plan once more, and the days passed, we decided that the final part of the visit should be in Syria. On the road from Damascus to Aleppo and then from Aleppo to Latakia we were received so enthusiastically that both President Nasser and I were deeply impressed and surprised. I am convinced that it is an expression of sincere commitment of the people of Syria to the unity of the UAR and that the stories of Syrian people not being for unification with Egypt were not accurate. There were those who were against unification, however, but to those who were then and against the di-

vision of the country peasants from feudal estates. President Nasser, seeing excitement and mood of the people, decided upon our arrival in Latakia, from where I went by boat over Greece to Yugoslavia, to remain in Syria, in order to better meet the needs of various countries and peoples, especially in terms of the needs of the construction industry and the development of agriculture.

For all these reasons, it is absurd that some parties associate President Nasser with recent Iraqi events, which occurred after my departure from Syria. I am convinced that he did not know about it, even more so because I suggested staying in Syria, and that is why I believe that neither he nor the government in Cairo can be blamed for the events in Iraq. President Nasser told me that they did not consider unification with Iraq, but only about the need to strengthen the present union with Syria, with their friends in Iraq and those who were against unification advised not to intensify mutual relations, because it only went in favor of the imperialist powers at the expense of the people of Iraq, which now more than ever need internal unity. President Nasser believes that President Qasim is influenced by those who are interested in the economic positions in the area, especially English oil stakeholders as well as the others. President Nasser had in fact suggested President Qasim to meet and talk, either in the UAR or in Iraq or somewhere half-way, but he got no reply. The situation in this part of the world is still difficult, but in my opinion President Nasser reacted too harshly to the events in Iraq. I hope that President Nasser will overcome this situation and that in the future he will calmly and realistically look to further development, avoiding what could be used against the government in Cairo.

In Europe today, focus is on German question, which was raised from the dead point and which can be viewed with little optimism. The proposal of Khrushchev made the West take a little more serious approach to the matter, and the trip of Macmillan to Moscow proved that the conversations with the lowest results can also be useful. These days, I have been visited by the representatives of West German Social Democrats, some of whom have recently talked to Khrushchev in Moscow, and have expressed their plans for the solution of the German question, which is basically a lot like the one I mentioned as one of the possibilities. They feel that it is necessary to establish contact and cooperation between the governments of both Germany and gradually move towards the resolution of the German question. The union that would be created would resemble a confederation although it would not have to be called that way, and after a longer period through parliamentary elections establish the appropriate body which would handle certain activities in the field of the whole Germany, and so on. It is sure that this plan, which is quite realistic, may suffer many changes, but it is important to start the talks. Now I see that Americans are preparing a plan for the solution of the German question. All this shows that both sides want the situation to be settled in that part of the world, that is, if possible, to take the German issue off the list and to find a useful solution for international peace.

I would like to tell you, Mr President, that on my return I spoke at the session of our government on our political, economic, cultural and other relations with the countries that I visited. I can tell you that in this respect there is the greatest understanding and that we are all agree that these relations should continue to be placed on an even broader basis, to the mutual benefit of our countries. We are completely unanimous in terms of establishing closer ties and further development of our comprehensive bilateral relations, and the analysis that is being done at the moment will show us the biggest real possibilities in this regard, so that our future cooperation could provide better and more meaningful results than it has been so far.

Please, Mr President, accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Tito]

AJ, KPR I-1/424

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Note on the talks between the Ambassador of Yugoslavia Pavlič and President Sukarno, April 19, 1959

Upon the receipt of a telegram on the arrival of special courier on the 17th this month, I requested the reception from the Secretary Tamzil for 19th. The plane had been delayed for more than 30 hours, we expected to get there between the 18th and 19th. Tamzil telephoned the next day to say that the President is sorry that he would not be able to receive me. He explained that President had a very tight agenda, preparing the Bandung speech, consultations with the party leaders, meeting of the National Council, preparations for the trip, on 22nd – Bandung and on 23rd – departure.

In the evening of the 17th I talked to Subandrio. In the end, I mentioned the arrival of a special courier and the difficulty I had handing the message due to the President's tight agenda. Subandrio said he would talk to President Sukarno personally if necessary.

The next day when they received a message I told Tamzil that I felt compelled to personally deliver a message and that I was ready to meet with Sukarno anywhere and anytime. During the day, I received a notice that I would be received by President Sukarno in Bogor in the morning of April 19th.

I handed the message which he read immediately. He thanked for your message that came to him at the right time, on the eve of Bandung speech and on the eve of his trip abroad.

Having finished the reading, President Sukarno said he wanted to study the message carefully, that there were things to be discussed, but underlined that he expected somewhat different tone of the message now that President Tito and he became so close to each other. He wants Tito to “write as a friend, not in thus strictly official tone”. Since this was mentioned again, I replied that perhaps it was more due to the tone of the English translation than the original written in our language. He asked me to convene Comrade President his desire regarding the form and tone. He promised to answer by a dispatch, or maybe by a letter from some trip.

Saying goodbye, I suggested that President Tito would certainly appreciate if he received his observations regarding his trip. President Sukarno accepted this and said that he would certainly do so, since he would visit some European countries and South America, which may be of interest to President Tito. But, “Tito will see my form.”

He wants to hear my opinion about the problem of the Cairo-Bagdad relationship. He himself is concerned about it, although there are indications that the situation will calm down, and that Nasser is calmed. However, there may be surprises. Quite openly, he declares that Nasser reacted improperly, incorrectly assessed the whole situation and more or less helped imperialists with his reaction. For Sukarno, rebellion in Mosul petroleum fields, is identical to their rebellion in Sumatra – it is also about petroleum fields. Similar is the fact that the imperialists used the benevolent and politically undeveloped officers to rebel against the legitimate government in Djakarta, falling for the fact that the government in Djakarta together with Sukarno is communist; it is also the case in Mosul. This is all part of the great game between two blocs. He is not familiar with the factual role of the Iraqi Communist Party, which has been too weak before, and is now using this rebellion in Mosul – work of imperialists. He is firmly convinced that Iraq is on the path of progressive nationalism, which is also true for Indonesia. He mentions that he has sent a personal letter to Nasser. He does not say that he has received a response.

He is less familiar with the situation in Tibet, but he believes that imperialists are behind it. He believes that by his statements, Nehru provides support to the rebels, which he finds wrong. He says he has information on the concentration of many Tibetans – some kind of White Russians reactionaries – in India. He mentions the events in Laos. It is believed that all these are block machinations. Only Indonesia and FPRY persist in staying independent. But it has its price in every respect.

I agree that we should not lose out of sight the interests of the bloc, the machinations of the West and so on. But it seems that something is wrong with the attitude of Beijing to the Tibetan ethnic minority, which allowed the West to exploit dissatisfaction with the Tibetan people. We should observe the practical application of the Bandung principles towards national minorities by Beijing.

He is glad that President Tito is satisfied with his visit to Indonesia and other AA countries and that these visits have contributed to strengthening the political independence of these countries.

We discuss the internal situation. He is interested in the views of the diplomatic corps. I briefly say that some are expecting "crucial decisions" of his Bandung speech; some others claim that there will be no decisions. There are those who think it is a moment for President Sukarno to announce policy of appeasement as a way for the liquidation of the revolt, and there are others who expect a sharper course. The President says there will be no decisions, at least not concrete ones. It has prepared a speech on 73 pages. Not sure yet if he will come out with the whole speech or omit a part. Basically, he wants to convince not only the members of the Constituent Assembly, but the whole nation on the absolute need for immediate implementation of the Constitution of 1945, which will allow the old revolutionary spirit which represents a condition for concrete solutions. He says he has a decision already in the "pocket", but he will come out with it only after the return. He has invited me to attend a festive session of the Constituent Assembly in Bandung, which I accept.

I inform him about the execution of our obligations and joint communiqués thanks to personal involvement of President Tito after his return, as well as about the stay of Colonel Yani in Belgrade. Subandrio has already informed him about the problem of the Joint Commission.

As usual, we have talked about art, reason Kršinić's statue which settled in his studio, where I have been received. He is clearly exhausted but in good spirits and gives the impression that he is healthy.

The talks have lasted for about an hour, interrupted since leaders of Nahdatul Ulama with Vice President of the government Khalid were waiting.

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-3

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Letter from President Sukarno to President Tito, October 6, 1959

Translation

TS 904/1

Jakarta, October 6, 1959

My dear friend Tito,

First of all I would like to introduce Professor Muhammad Yamin, the President of the National Council for Planning, and the member of my inner cabinet. He is to visit your great country to study more aspects of your national planning.

He has already visited other countries and a study of the development in Yugoslavia will fulfil his view of the problems that are related to any national planning. As you may be well aware we have already planned and performed our first National Plan (1956–1960), although I'm not too happy with the whole structure. Returning to the Constitution of 1945, I am very often trying to emphasize and reinforce the socialist foundation of Indonesia and at the same time to speed up the process of industrialization.

Writing this letter, I would also like to present you the summary of my impressions during my last trip abroad.

It was really very encouraging. My experience in Latin American countries was indeed very encouraging and confirmed our understanding of the always increasing social prospects of people all over the world.

Liberal views, which by foreign value system were considered useful for newly developed countries, are now rejected as the most corrupt methods to establish prosperity and social justice.

In this regard, I have no doubt that we are on the right track for the abolition of exploitation of a man by a man. Now we have to find a suitable solution for ending the Cold War and the arms race.

Although it is too early to draw far-reaching conclusions, I think that Khrushchev's visit to the United States and subsequent exchange of messages between Eisenhower and Khrushchev can really open up prospects for better understanding and greater appreciation between the US and the USSR.

On the other hand, this progress on one side of the globe was weakened by new incidents in Asia. Developments in Iraq, border incidents between India and China, the civil war in Laos – all this, if not given the due attention, can really disrupt easing of international tension elsewhere in the world.

However, I am always optimistic and this attitude has never failed in giving results that were in line with my expectations. Knock on wood!!!

I am glad that you and I share the same views in so many issues of global significance.

I am really very determined to give more economic and cultural content to the relations between our two countries.

The report brought by the Indonesian trade delegation from the recent visit was indeed a very satisfactory.

At home I am now very busy destroying all the liberal conceptions opposing socialist principles, and finally I am finally given the chance to reorganize colonial heritage in real, advanced national instruments of the state and nation.

I hope to succeed; the first results and improvements are not disappointing.

I am just afraid that the initial steps, which I had to take, seem drastic and unpopular on the surface. However, I know that it will be badly received by cer-

tain interested parties from the liberal period, but will in the long run, serve the interests of the masses, including the workers and peasants.

I really hope that this letter provides a brief overview of some of my thinking at the present time.

Indonesian people still remember your visit to Indonesia. I hope it will not be the last one.

Please give my high respect to Jovanka and do not forget to convey my warmest greetings to all friends, your colleagues in Yugoslavia.

With most cordial greeting to you,

Sukarno m.p.

AJ, KPR I-1/425

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Letter from President Tito to President Sukarno

October 19, 1959

Dear friend Karno,

Thank you for the message that you sent me by the minister Yamin, with whom I had a long and interesting conversation, especially about your five-year plan on the development of your country.

I think it's very good that you have started building your country with so much resolution. Your plan has grandiose proportions and we all wish you success in its realization. Mr Yamin told us that it was worth five billion US dollars, over a period of five years. I'm just afraid that you will have great difficulties in terms of personnel, or that you will miss specialists and professional workers. In fact, we have had a bad experience in this regard during the first few years of building our country: the building of planned facilities often took longer than provided by the plan and when individual large buildings were completed, it happened that we did not have enough professional staff to exploit the capacity of these facilities. Therefore, sometimes the efforts we made and funds we invested remained unused for a long time. In our country, we often lavished material and built oversized constructions and constructions what at first were not necessary for the functioning of the company etc. etc. For all these, we came to the conviction that it was necessary to keep builders and other professionals under eye and not to allow them to scattering community material to build some of their monuments, instead to use it for a solid construction of what is needed for a faster and better production.

Mr Yamin spoke about the need for developing and expanding economic relations between our countries. You have also pointed it out in your letter, and I completely agree with it. We should well study the opportunities for increasing our trade exchange, as well as opportunities for Yugoslavia to participate in building your country. I know you have difficulties which cannot be solved so quickly, especially those regarding the participation of private capital in the construction, and it will sometimes hinder the proper development of economic relations of your country with other countries. But, in case of a halt or some mistakes in our economic relations, I believe you and I will be able to resolve such irregularities amicably.

From your letter, and even before that, I could see that you have started a very energetic stabilization of the situation in your country. I believe that you will succeed and wish you. You are surrounded by young and good patriots who are full of enthusiasm and determined to realize the development of your country. In your letter, you say that you're concerned that some of your initial measures might seem drastic and unpopular. I think it is nothing to be afraid of, if the masses and primarily working people are aware that such measures are going in their favour.

As for the foreign policy circumstances, I agree with you that our views are similar. Foreign policy which we advocated finally starts giving results; it is now well accepted by both the senior management of large countries and the West, in some matters, such as active and peaceful coexistence, resolving contentious issues in a peaceful manner, rejection of force as a means of pressure, etc. The trip of Prime Minister Khrushchev and his talks in America confirm it. We assess his trip and attitudes as very positive and we believe that this will yield results, although one should not be too optimistic and expect that it will go particularly fast. We think that Khrushchev's proposal at the United Nations on disarmament is very important. In our opinion, of course, that it only could be achieved gradually. We think that Western countries cannot look at this important proposal as a manoeuvre and ignore it, because it would mean taking responsibility for any consequences. Since the representatives of major countries in winter would meet at the highest level, it will certainly show the direction of future developments in international relations. But, it would be harmful to the further course of events to wait passively, without engagement. I think it is necessary to be more actively involved in the battle for those principles that can provide peace and constructive cooperation to the mankind.

It is difficult to understand the action of China towards India, i.e. the forceful resolution of the border issues just at a time when the Western great powers came to the conviction that various disputes could only be solved through peaceful negotiations. What prevented Chinese from asking the Indian leaders to discuss the border issues, if there were any? Nobody in the world can justify such action. Chinese leaders did their country a great harm, because they caused a dis-

trust of other countries, especially of the neighbouring. We are somewhat concerned about all this. One wonders about the motives, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that by such actions they want to bring even more turmoil and to prevent calming in the world. I do not say this because the Chinese press and propaganda conducted against us a vigorous campaign and insulted us even though we still support rights of China both in terms of Taiwan and in terms of participation in the United Nations. We feel it is our duty, in accordance with our position in respect of other still unsolved problems.

We are deeply shaken by the news that our friend Bandaranaike was hit by a villainous hand and deprived us of a sincere and persistent fighter for peace in the world, staunch fighter for implementation of Bandung principles. Another, similar case was the assassination of Qasim, although not comparable to that in Ceylon. It seems that there was one practice of individual terror, which we have always strongly condemned. I, of course, do not approve of everything that is happening now in Iraq, and especially not such a bloody settling of accounts with his political opponents, but even less I approve of individual terror, because nothing can be resolved by removing a single man. This can only lead to further internal shakes, which in today's international situation are not desirable, not a bit.

Otherwise, here in Europe, except the Berlin question which was left aside in the talks between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Khrushchev as a question that is not acute, there are no questions of concern. Everybody is waiting for the outcome of the talks at the highest level. Establishing personal contact between the great made people believe that the peace will be preserved. I think those hopes and expectations are not unwarranted.

Thank you, my dear friend, on behalf of my wife and on my own behalf, for your kind regards; please give your family our heartfelt greetings and best wishes.

[Tito]

AJ, KPR I-1/425

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**Note on the talks of Ambassador of Yugoslavia Pavlič
and President Sukarno, November 3 and November 4, 1959**

Top Secret!

President Sukarno invited me to join him on his two-day journey to Cirebon and Purwokartun. It was awkward to refuse one more invitation after refusing his invitation to go with him to Surabaya a week before, which I was not

able to accept due to the arrival of our military mission. This time, general Hidayat, “junior” minister of national defence agreed to come the same day, by the plane from Bandung to Jakarta to take me and we go together to the Bank Island (Ralaja mines) and to South Sumatra where our military mission is located. Because of the Mission and because this was a unique opportunity to visit this area I found it hard to accept the invitation of President Sukarno, but even harder for the second time to reject his invitation.

On his journey, Sukarno was accompanied by several ambassadors, Minister of Education Prijon, Minister of National Industry Suharto, and part of the way by Ruslan Abdulgani, Minister of Information Maladi, Labour Minister Ahern and Minister of Public Works and Manpower Dipokusumo.

The trip was very useful especially for me as I was with President Sukarno all the time and could solve some problems. Brief summary of the interview:

First, he received military mission in a protocol visit and said goodbye to it. Comrade Kreačić was pleased with attention given to him, the talks with President Sukarno. I promised him I would try to arrange a conversation with President Sukarno before I leave. I gave Sukarno a hint that one short interview with Kreačić as a prominent political leader could be useful, desirable. Sukarno accepted. When during the talks I intentionally mentioned Yamin’s visit, reception and lunch with President Tito, Sukarno laughed and said that he knew that I wanted him to invite the Mission for lunch. He scheduled lunch for the whole mission for the 14th or 15th i.e. a day before departure to Bogor. Hartin is present. He also invites my wife. (This is a remarkable gesture of Sukarno. So far, he has not organized lunch for any military or parliamentary mission. Subandrio could object that this is a difficult precedent for subsequent visits.)

Second, I inform him of the arrival of “Kolo”. It will stay here only for two days. It would be desirable to organize a performance for him at the Palace where he would call the members of the government and so on. Also, the heads of mission to whom I promised to enable to see the performance. He accepts.

Third, when talking about the great opportunities of Indonesia, I say that I am surprised because they are not using 10 scholarships that the Yugoslav government has approved for their students. Prijono, the Minister of Education, avoids the answer. (In the meantime, they have sent a hundred students to the East European countries. Prijono finds the excuse in the fact that these countries pay the travel expenses in both directions – at least half of the expenses. Sukarno dissatisfied. I recommend these 10 scholarships to be used for the Faculty of Mining and Geology, which is very much respected. They need this above all. To them, it facilitates learning and to us organizing language courses. Sukarno and Prijono finally propose to send seven miners – geologists, and three economists. They are very interested in the study of our economic system. Prijono asks for the payment of travel costs in rupees to be delayed until the beginning of the next year, although the students would already embark our ships this year. I accept.

Prijono says to Sukarno that the next day he is going to visit Djuanda to provide the necessary rupees in the new budget. (At the station Prijon is in a hurry and asks Comrade Ristić who has met me to come the next day with more detailed data. He claims that his apparatus failed and that he thought the scholarships have already been realized etc.).

4 / I inform him of finalizing the talks on the purchase of 10 ships and textiles. He asks us to take care to prevent any payment of various and illegal commissions as it was the case with several countries – in serious amounts. He mentions Japan and Poland. (Ratjani, the chief negotiator of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs has been arrested). He is interested in delivery deadlines etc.

5 / He mentions his intention to travel abroad. He plans April – May. He refers to the rigidity of our Protocol, unlike Mexican. (That part of the talks was attended by Mexican and Indian Ambassador.) I will take responsibility for the organization of his visit if he plans to visit FPRY. He wants to visit Cuba. He is dissatisfied with the English. Three years ago he was invited by the English government, but not by the Queen. He refused. He would like to be invited. The problem is Elizabeth is expecting a child.

He says Zavadski wants to come here. He has told him he can come whenever he wants except in April and May when he will be absent. Khrushchev's visits are not mentioned.

6 / We talk about our successes in agriculture. He presents their program. On this occasion we visit Djatiluhur, multi-complex program. Last year, they started building a huge dam which should enable the irrigation of 250,000 hectares, give yield greater than 300,000 tons of rice and six generators of 25,000 tons. Sukarno tells me that this project will be completed in 1962. The Director of the French company realizing the project tells me it will not be before 1964. Until then Djakarta will have severe shortage of electricity. They already have power interruptions.

7 / We talk about a problem caused by the departure of the Ambassador of UAR who was a doyen. The new doyen is Chinese. Political and personal problem. Most countries do not have diplomatic relations. The Westerners have done everything to prevent the departure of the Egyptian ambassador, the man of Farouk's regime, which has been here for over six years. A Chinese does not speak any language. He was with us on the trip but everything went past him. He is much interested in the health of my wife, daughter Tanja who in Belgrade, and whom he plans to marry to an Indonesian, etc. During the talks, he makes a joke that he will write to Marshal Tito to let me stay here for three more years, because he has been told that I have to go home because of my daughter and wife. Seriously, I have told him that I like Indonesia and that even after the departure I will live with them and everything that is going on here etc., but that because of family, school children, etc.. I have to go home during the next year.

On this occasion he says that the former Italian ambassador la Terza who left Djakarta six months ago after a six-year stay is back here, retired, to solve a personal problem. He is getting divorced, the problem is that he is a Catholic, and he has at least one and possibly two children with Indonesian woman here.

8 / He invites me to go with him to Jogjakarta on November 9th on the session of Colombo countries. On the 10th – the Heroes' Day in Yogyakarta, on the 11th – Sukarno opening session, on the 12th – return. I say that I have already made an arrangement with Hidajat to go to Surabaya on the 7th to join our military mission but I'm ready to get to Jogja on the 9th or 10th and to come back together with him on the 12th.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1957, F-41, dos. 7, no. 431125

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Note on the talks of the Ambassador of Yugoslavia Pavlič and President Sukarno, March 10, 1960

I asked for the reception on the 8th. On the same day I was scheduled for the next day. Rescheduled for the 10th. I was received at the Merdeka Palace where the day before an air attack happened. I stayed 40 minutes.

I expressed my best wishes to the President not mentioning the yesterday's event.

P.S. is in a good mood. He does not show excitement, very friendly.

Very busy. He has chaired Supreme Advisory Council for three days in a row. I thank him for his consideration, because he has received me immediately despite the extraordinary busy schedule.

I remind him about the talks in Bandung a month ago when he promised to send representatives of the future National Front to the Congress. I did not want to disturb him because he was very busy, although in Belgrade they would like him to appoint the representatives of NF. Since in Bandung he said that before his trip the preparatory committee for the NF would certainly be established, the leadership of the Socialist Alliance sent a letter addressed to the preparatory committee. The question is to whom to deliver it. I have talked to the First Minister Djuanda about the Congress. He supports the attendance of the representatives of NF in the Congress and advises me to solve this issue directly with the President of the Republic. He promised he would also talk to him.

P.S. tells me he will take it. I read, He says thanks for the friendly tone. He will not be able to send a delegation, as he has thought. It cost. But he will surely send one or two representatives.

He asks about the composition and work of our SS[RNJ]. He is vividly interested especially because our SS[RNJ] is essentially an alliance of representatives of functional groups and not the parties and that suits him. We have a short talk on leading SS[RNJ].

I suggest that Ruslan Abdulgani who wants to learn about the management of our alliance would be a great choice.

P. S. says it is not a bad choice. The problem is that R.A. is his deputy in the Supreme Advisory Council and very much busy. The head of the preparatory committee for the NF will be Djuanda; 11 members among them Abdulgani, Chaerul Saleh, Arudji, Kartawinata.

He promised to inform me who will be sent to the Congress within a week.

He asks what I think about the situation, especially after freezing Parliament. I express my personal opinion. The return to the Constitution of 1945, the implementation of the concept of guided democracy. To continue working with the Parliament which is a faithful reflection of the earlier party democracy and political parties' interests, would mean to stop halfway. This measure entails immediate measures on the establishment of NF which would mobilize the masses. It would be good to reorganize the Parliament as soon as possible. I fully agree with his speech on the occasion of the Women's Day (present as one of the few ambassadors), press incorrectly quoted his speech, subsequently corrected.

One could read between the lines that his intention is to reorganize the Parliament in a way that one half would include representatives of functional groups, and the second half the party representatives who acknowledge the political manifesto, which means that the new parliament only parties from Supreme Advisory Council i.e. PNI, PKI, NU. It will exclude Masyumi and PSI. P.S. says again that there are still no conditions to exclude this party and make the Parliament only of representatives of functional groups, organizations and the National Front. I agree. They will talk about that in Brioni.

He has to go to the session of Supreme Advisory Council. By Agenda, his and Ms. Hart's, he expect us to meet and talk separately, privately in Bogor.

He is not informed by Asmaoen on the proposal of a President Tito to take a short break after visiting the neighbouring countries and before leaving to African countries and spend it with President Tito. He takes it as a gesture of extraordinary attention and is very glad although he doubts he would have time due to already scheduled agenda.

We talk about an oil painting of Rudi, a famous Italian painter.

It is a good moment to say that I would be glad if I could give it to him for lebaran (end of fasting season, time to give presents. We do this every year). He accepts.

He sends greetings to Comrade President, and Comrade Jovanka.

Note: The adjutant of P.S. says that he was the father of a pilot who was found a weapons depot and who was arrested several weeks ago, organ of Perme-sta. This pilot was in a plane accompanying the jets during Khrushchev's visit.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1960, F-41, dos.1, no. 410192

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The talks of President Tito and President Sukarno during the visit from April 5 to 8, 1960

President Tito: To determine the attitude towards the proposal of Cuba on the convening of the conference of underdeveloped countries and for the assessment of its prospects for success it is necessary to take into account the relations of Cuba to Latin American countries. Most of these took a stand against the conference, at least most of them. Taking into account the real situation and avoiding a conference that was doomed to failure.

We agree with the opinion that other countries should also participate at the meeting of the Big Four, not only the countries of Asia and Africa, but all countries. The whole world is interested in peace.

It would be wrong to watch passively. There is an opinion that now there are no conditions for a meeting of the heads of the so-called non-aligned countries. But, we can act through the press etc. and influence the constructive work of the meeting of the Big Four.

We are not a priori against the conference in Havana. Basically, we are for Conference, but the circumstances are against, it seems unrealistic. There is a risk that a failure of the conference would isolate Cuba even more.

President Sukarno: There is no chance that Frondizi would support the conference.

President Tito: It is necessary that at least some of these countries accept the idea of the conference. Now it looks like no one does.

President Sukarno: Before the trip he was of the opinion that the Prime Minister Qasim did not know what he could and what he wanted. Now, it is the ot-

her way around, he admires him; respects him. Prime Minister Qasim enjoys serious support of the people, works closely with the army. He has extensive experience. He told him personally that he spent 15 years preparing a conspiracy against the royal regime and engaging individual persons who later participated in the conspiracy.

In addition to the army there is a “public opinion”. It is a politically important factor, which is mainly in the hands of the left. Qasim wants to balance. There are unfounded accusations that Qasim is a pro-Communist. He must balance between Moscow and the United States – the United Kingdom, and towards Nasser. The problem is that Qasim is unknown to the masses, unlike Tito and himself. Nationalist sentiment is prevailing. They should help Qasim. Qasim assures him that he was always defensive against accusations and attacks coming from Cairo.

One should be careful with Castro. They do not want to finance the proposed conference of economically underdeveloped countries. Castro has supporters in Latin America.

They want the same assessment of the situation in Iraq i.e. the same view with us. Qasim should be supported to “survive”. The fall of Qasim would adversely reflect on Indonesia and even Yugoslavia.

President Tito is interested in Khrushchev’s, for its success, Sukarno’s opinion about the visit and its consequences.

President Sukarno: cannot tell how deep it is but believes that Khrushchev personally likes him. And he likes Khrushchev. They share the same view that humanity is in progress, the socialist idea wins. The loan of 250 million dollars is easily obtained, an one-hour problem. One to two weeks later the US representatives have contacted him and Djuanda and expressed their readiness to provide loans to Indonesia and help in an unlimited extent. Khrushchev approves the participation of AA countries at a summit meeting, but there is no chance for this at the moment. Khrushchev did not say a single word on the issue of China. What entered the communiqué was intended for the outside world.

President Tito: There is a growing phenomenon of offering assistance to developing countries from many sides. But, this assistance is not without certain selfishness.

President Sukarno: agrees. Khrushchev promised a serious delivery of equipment units for their navy and air force and the engineering units in addition to the loan of \$ 250 million, under very favourable conditions. He mentions one cruiser, submarine, Ilyushin bombers of middle radius.

President Tito: Orientation of underdeveloped countries towards socialism does not correspond to the West. Our duty, as much as possible, is to help the newly liberated countries. This is the duty of all non-aligned countries. They need to united in operations. Help to these “new” countries should go primarily through the UN rather than bilaterally.

Atomic probes represent a more serious threat than it has been previously thought, and not only for the AA countries. What does “favourable weather conditions” mean? Certainly favourable for France. They have not taken sufficiently strong measures against the continuation of nuclear tests. The victims of this will be the future generations. Probes in the Sahara are much closer to populated areas than it was the case with Bikini – Japan, and there were serious consequences. The difference is that the natives in the threatened regions are not able to perceive the danger of radiation.

Algerian war is a matter of concern. De Gaulle is changing attitude. The latest information about the attack of the French troops to school officers 100 km inside Tunisia, who fortunately did not lead to major victims, points to the real attitude of De Gaulle. There is a possibility of aggression by the French Army to Tunisia. It needs more serious action to prevent expanding the war – aggression. President Sukarno is visiting those countries. He can do a lot to help in this regard. Algerians think that these actions of the French Army are taken with the approval of De Gaulle.

President Sukarno agrees. This is indeed the goal of his visits to the North-African countries. He wonders what is going on in Ghana and asks for the opinion about Nkrumah.

President Tito: Our mission has been to Ghana recently and brought favourable impression of Nkrumah and of Ghana which is the richest country in that region. There is certainly a strong external pressure on Ghana but he believes that Ghana is among the most stable countries in Africa.

President Sukarno asks about Ghana since Nkrumah did not show much interest in him visiting Ghana unlike the other four countries i.e. Guinea, Tunisia, Morocco and UARA, which invited him to come to visit.

Mates: on June 30, there will be a proclamation of the Republic of Ghana and its separation from the Commonwealth. They are expecting elections to take place and the Commonwealth Conference which all could be the reason for not inviting Sukarno to visit.

President Sukarno: What should he do with Ferhat Abbas, who wants to talk to him. What advise should he give?

President Tito: they sure need to keep on fighting. It is hard to give specific advice. Algerians cannot make any more concessions to the French. They must stick to the given proposals, to continue to contribute constructively to finding an acceptable solution. They must avoid a situation to be accused by Paris before the whole world for sabotaging “peace actions”. Of course they cannot depart from the principle of self-determination. They need patient policy. If it turned out that De Gaulle’s last statement is just the part of a tactical manoeuvre to appease the military circles, the Algerian leaders should see whether there is a possibility for a phased solution, making sure that they are capable of keeping on the armed struggle.

President Sukarno: agrees: to continue resistance or accept negotiations if the French offer. He asks what we think of Tunisia.

President Tito does not know Bourguiba personally. Bourguiba is invited to visit Yugoslavia and vice versa he is invited to visit Tunisia. Last speeches of Bourguiba point to increasingly strict attitude – resistance of Bourguiba.

President Sukarno: Some argue that Bourguiba is renegade. Is the help of Tunisia to Algeria coming from people or the government?

He says he ordered a special delegation from Arudji Kartawinata, President of the “National Front” (wrong, he is the President of Provisional Committee for the National Front), Ruslan Abdulgani etc. who will take part at the coming Congress of the Socialist Alliance of Yugoslavia.

Pavlič

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-15

109

Sukarno and the Prime Minister of Iraq Qasim meet in Brioni

Brioni, April 6, 1960

President Sukarno thinks that the information of a growing opposition against Qasim in Iraq is not accurate. On his journey, he got the impression that people were enthusiastic about Qasim just like the Egyptians were for Nasser after the revolution. Qasim told him that he had to defend himself from Nasser’s attacks, yet he refrained from holding the aggressive speeches. The question is whether it would be good to somehow make Nasser and Qasim meet.

Qasim spoke bitterly about the United States and England. He spoke well about the Soviet Union, in terms of economic and technical aid.

In terms of the political processes Qasim told him that the accused admitted receiving money and instructions from Cairo. He (Sukarno) found it necessary in the interest of the struggle against imperialism to end the conflict between Qasim and Nasser.

He was interested in the opinion of Comrade President regarding the proposal of the President of Cuba to hold a meeting of representatives of the underdeveloped countries and the forthcoming meeting of the Big Four.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-15

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**Talks of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Koča Popović
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio,
(April 6, 7 and 8, 1960), April 14, 1960**

Koča Popović's Office
Conf. No. 410142
Belgrade, April 14, 1960

He showed a very intense and detailed interest in the principles and operation of our internal system: decentralization, workers' self-management, etc. We talked about it couple of hours. Apparently, he tried to better understand, indicating that he knew very little about it. He says that he will record everything and asks for literature. At the beginning he could not even understand the difference between our and Chinese commune. Explanations are received with approval. It took him long to understand the concept of "social property" and the role of the state in general. He apologizes for being "so tiring," but he has to because it is extremely important for them. They have just completed the phase of the national revolution and they need to start social and political construction, so that every experience, especially ours, is of great importance. He reminds that until a few years ago they did not have their own staff, for example, they did not have a single economist. Stalinist solutions are out of question, so are Chinese, which represent pure imposing, dictating from above instead of encouraging initiatives of the masses. (He has used every opportunity to speak negatively about the Chinese conceptions and politics. Among other things, he says: "You should have seen a nice Chou En Laj when he tried to yell at us, demanding this or that!")

He has spoken positively about Khrushchev as a man and politician, as well as about the internal evolution of the USSR. He stressed that our concepts and solutions are close to them, Indonesians, that our communism in general, our social life and people are more attractive and more free, when compared for example to CSR.

They are now turning to the social and political construction, which becomes the main task. He says it is clear that they will have to go their own way. Clearly, they also need to go along the way which is similar to ours. The question is, however, an interim phase to that and appropriate methods. They are at a lower stage of development than we are. He therefore asks himself and me whether their material forces and the entire social and political life are developed enough to be able to apply solutions similar to ours. Distancing myself from giving direct advice I say that, as it seems to me, their circumstances are still not fit for it. He says that he is of the same opinion, and Sukarno's actions in recent months have just been the transitional phase, in which, for example, the role of the state will have to be bigger for some time etc.

He says they would be very interested in sending work teams that would be thoroughly acquainted with our experience. Their delegation at the Congress will work on it, but others will also need to come for a detailed and systematic study of our practice. I agree.

We hardly said a word about foreign policy.

Koča Popović

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1960, F-41, dos.1, no. 410192

111

Joint press release on the visit of President Sukarno to Yugoslavia, April 1960

At the invitation of the chairman of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, President of the Republic of Indonesia Dr Sukarno visited Yugoslavia in the period from April 5 to April 8, 1960.

President Sukarno was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Subandrio, Minister of National Industry Dr Suharto, Director of the Cabinet of President of the Republic Dr Tamzil and other senior officials.

In a friendly and cordial atmosphere, President Tito, President Sukarno and their associates have talked about extending cooperation between the two countries and exchanged views on current international issues.

Both sides have agreed that the direct contacts of the state officials were very useful for the development of comprehensive bilateral cooperation and strengthening friendship between Yugoslavia and Indonesia, and that such meetings and exchanges of view should be continued in the future.

The two presidents noted with satisfaction the similarity of their views on basic international issues. Acknowledging the views expressed in the Joint Communiqué of December 31, 1958 in Tampaksiring, the two presidents estimated that there has been a general improvement in international relations. They agreed that this improvement is the result of the growing commitment to the policy of peaceful coexistence, which is supported both by Yugoslavia and Indonesia. This justifies their hope and conviction that the efforts of peaceful forces in the world invested in solving the most important problems, such as the prohibition of all experiments with nuclear weapons, disarmament and other issues, can lead to a lasting peace in the world.

During the talks, they welcomed the latest activities of the statesmen in the direction of seeking solutions to urgent problems. The two presidents particularly stressed that in the efforts for a just and comprehensive solution of the problems

of today, due attention needs to be given to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and that, therefore, should provide an opportunity for all countries, both large and small, to be heard and that their interests should be presented on the future conferences.

They also underlined that the provision of international assistance to economically less developed areas, without political conditions and on the basis of full equality, and the elimination of all forms of colonialism are essential for the progress and stability in the world. As before, the two countries will try, primarily through the United Nations, to provide broad international economic and technical assistance and thus contribute to strengthening the independence of the liberated areas and speed up the process of liberation is still dependent nations in Asia and Africa.

Both sides noted with great satisfaction that during the previous year, tangible results were achieved in the development of friendly cooperation between the two countries in all fields.

Guided by the desire to further expand and make the existing friendly relations more comprehensive, the two sides agreed to further promote mutual cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and other fields.

So, having considered the existing forms of economic cooperation, both sides came to the conclusion that a long-term economic cooperation was of mutual benefit. They have also agreed to sign the Agreement on scientific cooperation in the near future.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1960, F-41, dos. 6, no number

112

Ambassador of Yugoslavia Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio June 13, 1960

The meeting was held at the initiative of Subandrio on the occasion of a private birthday party of President Sukarno in Bogor. (As usually, a day after the official celebration in Djakarta, Sukarno hosted a private celebration in Bogor. He invited a few ambassadors and members of the Cabinet). At my suggestion the meeting was postponed from Saturday to Monday. Conversation lasted for an hour and a quarter.

He asks about the situation regarding a meeting of the independent. He repeats that the Indonesian government is interested in holding the meeting. They have views identical to ours. Some improvement of the situation on the internati-

onal level can be the reason not to precipitate the meeting, but there should be no reason for rejecting the idea of a meeting. The meeting is needed: first, to make the Heads of Independent States provide “review”, analysis, assessment of the current situation and perspectives; secondly, the meeting may come out with useful suggestions; third, the meetings could become a particular form of expression of will and views of Independent States. Peace cannot only depend on the Great. The Great Powers should take account of other countries. They are convinced that the Great Powers would certainly account for the fact of independent countries meeting as well as for their suggestions. He repeats what he has already said in his statement, that the goal of the meeting is not to find someone to blame for the failure of the Paris conference. He says that wherever they have stopped for a visit along their way the partners paid special attention to the meeting and talks between Sukarno and Tito – this time more than before.

He complains about Nasser’s statement in Damascus on the “unreality” of the meeting of the independent, by which he obviously wanted to make a motion towards Nehru.

He repeats that the meeting should take place even without Nehru, but he is confident that Nehru will participate if he sees that the meeting could be realized without him. As usual, he criticizes the “big politics” of Delhi which is partly conditioned by the complex internal problems of India.

The place of the meeting would be discussed in the second stage. Delhi could be a concession to Nehru. However, another Sukarno’s journey abroad would be hard for them, but they will find a solution (an obvious desire to bring about a meeting in Djakarta).

He asks me to convey this suggestion to Comrade Koča.

I emphasize the confidentiality of these discussions without giving them any publicity. I do not mention his first statements. Although he does not say so, Subandrio has called me in relation to the visit of President Nasser to Comrade Tito where they assume they will talk about the meeting of the independent, and generally about the activities of independent country.

He says he would be grateful for any information about it immediately after it. If we share the same views, they are ready to actively engage in preparing the meeting. He expects difficulties with U Nu. Maybe it would be useful to invite Sékou Touré and Nkrumah.

In this regard, I inform him about the visit of a President Nasser, the delegation, the forthcoming visit of Abud.

2 /. About the journey of President Sukarno we will talk on special occasion. In short: they are satisfied with the results. Sukarno and he could have learned more about the circumstances in the world. He has repeated his old thesis that three-quarters of the world are in turmoil. Countries having a clear concept are making a progress. The classic example is Yugoslavia. Countries not having a

concept are stagnating. Indonesia is an example. It is essential to build a concept – a theory about one's own revolution. The talks in FPRY are of particular importance. Personally, they very much appreciate Comrade Koča whom he bothered with questions about our system, our experiences. He has the highest respect for Comrade Koča after the talks with foreign ministers of 18 countries. He asks me to convey his gratitude to Comrade Koča.

When asked explicitly, he says they are satisfied with the talks with Nasser. They think it has been useful to hear Nasser's views on the conflict with Iraq. Nasser is ready to negotiate. He has authorised Sukarno to write to Qasim in order to settle the platform of cooperation. Nasser is clear that, being stronger and having the orderly conditions in the UAR, he can and should contribute more. Megdavi has already been removed. After the visits, both countries have made serious efforts to stop the mutual attacks and accusations.

Nasser will come for a visit at the end of this year or early next year.

Currently, the situation in Japan confusing but basically clear. Ratification of Japan-US Security treaty is a done deal. But Kishi is leaving. Igatake, the current Minister of Transport is coming instead? The Japanese government will try to balance the ratification of the American treaty with certain converging to Beijing.

Relations Djakarta – Tokyo received a new impetus. He underlines the mutual benefit.

The talks with US are useful but nothing in particular. SD, Dillon promised he will continue providing help. Normal frame. The problem of arranging new loans. They do not have rupees.

3 /. Djuanda's visit. The focus is on economic cooperation. It is desirable also to discuss "ideological" and system issues with Djuanda. Djuanda is basically familiar, he is an honest associate in the realization of the Sukarno's concept, but not sufficiently familiar with the details.

He agrees with my remark that the visit of Djuanda and Chaerul Saleh, Minister of Construction and the presence of Ismael Thajeba and Sudjarwa etc. should be used to make a step forward in mutual economic relations. I would talk to Djuanda and Saleh personally. It is necessary to come to an agreement on long-term economic cooperation which is already provided for in the Communiqué Tito-Sukarno. He underlines their special interest in developing economic cooperation with us with special regard to the initiative of Moscow and Washington to bind them. During Djuanda's visit they could establish principles of the agreement if due to the duration of the visit they could not finish the talks. I inform him that tomorrow I will have lunch with Sudjarwo and Thajeb and their associates in order to establish the program of talks. He has promised to let me know about the talks with Djuanda and Saleh. I ask them to engage their embassy in Belgrade on the preparation of materials after Djuanda leaving Jakarta.

He suggests that my presence during the talks in FPRY would make them more productive. I say the chances are scarce since I have been to FPRY recently.

Djuanda will ask for three professors – economists.

4 /. Colonel Siswadi, chief of the Intelligence Service of Aviation comes to FPRY with a special task, if possible, and if we agree, to get information about our Intelligence Services – theirs is not good. Bitter experience. The pressure of the Great Powers. He asks for help.

In reply, I say that I am not able to say anything because of the special nature of the Service which I am not familiar with. He interrupts me to say that Sukarno and Nasser talked about it and that Nasser accepted the idea of Siswadi's visit. He leaves us to think about what we can do to help in this field.

Subandrio says nothing about what Djuanda thinks about Siswadi accompanying him as an expert in negotiations on cooperation with us in terms of production of missile weapons of smaller and mid-range.

I say that the visit of Siswadi will be useful, regardless of whether they will have talks on his special assignment, since this visit may lead to expansion of cooperation between the Air Forces of both countries which lags behind the cooperation between the Armies and Navies.

The subject of Djuanda's visit will probably be the financing of the new program of delivery of materials for the army – guns, howitzers, ammunition.

5 /. The internal situation is favourable. They are still determined to establish the National Front. Sukarno is no longer a constitutional President, he directly manages the executive power. They need to build a system – a mechanism similar to our Socialist Alliance. They are determined in their decision to go through socialism. Last year, he was preparing thesis for Sukarno's political manifesto which was published on August 17, 1959 (Abdulgani claims that he is the author of these, which is mostly true). Now he says he is preparing thesis for Sukarno's economic manifesto, which should be used as a platform for building socialism. That is why he spent so much time talking to Koča about our experiences and always asked for new material (on the desk, he has Kardeljev's brochure about politics in the countryside).

The parties are against the National Front, but the army is supportive.

6 /. On that day, the press published the news of the Luns's visit to Yugoslavia. He asks whether this visit has been arranged earlier. He says it is important because, if the visit is of later date, it may indicate an attempt of The Hague to find a way out of difficult situations through us which would also preserve our face. They have got the information that in The Hague the number of the supporters of the "holy mission" in West Irian is decreasing. It costs a lot. Australia disapproves of the willingness of the Netherlands to go for a three to five year period of giving independence to Western Irian for the purpose of reconciliation

with Indonesia. Australia is more involved in Eastern Guinea, so such precedent would not be welcome. Australia is more for a direct agreement between The Hague and Djakarta without changing the status of the population in favour of Western Irian.

The Dutch government is now aware that Indonesia is serious. Such a harsh response of Djakarta was the result of a famous statement of Visser, the Minister of Defence, who said that "the strengthening of the military forces of the Netherlands in the West Irian is a response to the aggressive policy of Indonesia". It is suspected that Visser said something like this without the support of the Pentagon, but the situation in the international arena now changed against such methods, which forces The Hague to make concessions, to withdraw.

He does not rule out the possibility that Luns will start this issue. He believes that Yugoslavia would be the best mediator between them and The Hague. Australia is not an option since it has its own interests. AA countries do not come to mind as biased in favour of Djakarta. The Hague would probably accept Belgrade. And he completely leaves to the discretion of Comrade Koča in whom he has unreserved confidence to assess whether to speak in that direction. He would appreciate a suggestion of Comrade Koča on the subject.

He asks me again to convey this immediately as his personal message to Comrade Koča.

I inform him about the allocation of ten new scholarships for full-time university studies, about our willingness to send eight doctors, they asked for ten.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1960, F-41, dos. 1, no. 418389

113

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia about the meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Subandrio July 14, 1960.**

Top secret

We spoke at the reception organized by the Iraqi. Subandrio came, asked and went immediately after the meeting. Subandrio was at the centre of attention regarding the statement of PKI and the articles in the Communist press that attack Subandrio, foreign policy of Indonesia, which they link to FPRY. We spoke in front of Aidit who also attended the reception.

Sukarno is not responding. He asks for materials, arguments. He is of the opinion that this statement is just an introduction to even harder attacks by the PKI. They expect systematic escalation by the PKI. Two reasons: first, PKI is firmly against the construction of Indonesian socialism that would correspond to the identity of the Indonesian nation, which could become an example to other AA countries. This is the reason for the attacks on FPRY. Secondly, the statement represents an integral part of a certain general line advocating the increase of tension with the United States. This is a Bucharest's line. In Bucharest, according to him, Beijing line won, which supports maximum increase of tension with United States, taking into account a number of moments that allow this kind of tension such as the presidential elections, the events in Japan, Korea, Turkey and so on.

They expect Aidit to come out with new attacks at the next session of the Supreme Advisory Council on the 18th. He needs material to arm Sukarno. Sukarno accepts arguments but requested material. He asks me to deliver, if I have, a declaration of Bucharest, the speech of Khrushchev in Bucharest and Khrushchev's speech at the XX Congress, published by the Americans.

I am suggesting that the latter may be most easily obtained from the American Charge d'Affairs. He will not be able to get the speech of Khrushchev in Bucharest, at least not the full text. It seems to me that the full text was not published even in Moscow. I'm not sure. The Declaration was published by the Information Service of the Soviet embassy here, as well as the excerpts of the Khrushchev's speech. He says that he will not deal with Russians have, but asks me to tell Henderson to get him the Khrushchev's speech at XX Congress, as he rushed to the reception with the French, and after that to the government meeting. He asks for our information – materials.

Several times he says that a conflict with PKI is necessary, it is necessary to separate Sukarno from PKI, and he will work on it.

I try to calm him down and explain that the problem is not in separating Sukarno from PKI, but the constructive work of the government, which should as soon as possible affirm itself in the nation, which seems not yet the case, to eliminate the weaknesses in the work of the government at the national level, which would prevent PKI from using these weaknesses as a propaganda tool against the government and Sukarno. He agrees and assures me that he will approach this task most seriously. He expresses the optimism that there are positive elements and signs that things are getting better.

He is of the opinion that, after Bucharest, there are new moments in attitude and work of PKI, which accepts the line of Moscow regarding the question of active co-existence, but in terms of attitude to the United States, to concrete measures in the area of JIA and in terms of revisionism and internationalism, leadership PKI wholeheartedly supported and followed the line of Beijing. However, the back of this statement is Beijing, which systematically works on sharpening

of the situation within Indonesia, on cracking down the structural forces – associates around Sukarno.

Essentially, it is good that PKI came out now with a clear attitude and this kind of criticism directed against Sukarno. This will facilitate many things.

Note: Subandrio looks anxious; He is not as self-confident as he was before. He is leaving an impression that he is personally offended, misled by Aidit, with whom he has always had the best personal relations. A bit misled by Aidit.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1960, F-41, dos. 1, no. 423431

114

Joint press release on the visit of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia Djuanda to Yugoslavia

Draft

At the invitation of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Djuanda Kartawidjaja visited Yugoslavia in the period from July 29 to August 3, 1960.

During the visit Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja was received by the president of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito.

Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja and his associates visited Belgrade and some other places in the People's Republic of Croatia and the People's Republic of Montenegro.

During his stay in Belgrade and Brioni Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja and high-ranking officials who were in his entourage talked to the Vice President of the Federal Executive Council Edvard Kardelj and other senior Yugoslav officials about the basic international problems and the possibilities of further promoting mutual cooperation.

The talks were held in a friendly spirit and in an atmosphere full of trust and mutual understanding. They were pleased to note a clear improvement in all areas of mutual cooperation. Both sides expressed the determination of the two governments to invest further efforts to improve the overall international situation.

I

The failure of the Paris Conference and the suspension of negotiations on Disarmament in Geneva adversely affected the international situation and hampered the peaceful and constructive resolution of most current world issues. Given that the promotion of international cooperation is one of the basic goals of their foreign policy, based on the principles of active and peaceful coexistence and the Bandung principles, both sides believe that non-aligned countries, and the countries that are not directly drawn into the Cold War, as well as all peaceful forces of the world in general, should make greater efforts towards easing the tensions in the world, non-interference in internal affairs of other countries and the elimination of power politics.

Both sides fully agreed that general and controlled disarmament should be negotiated more decisively than before. The two governments would continue to support the efforts towards disarmament, ban the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, convinced that they will thus contribute to easing tensions in the world.

During the talks the two sides highlighted the importance of UN Charter being respected and particularly expressed a need for further strengthening the positive role of the UN in addressing the most relevant contemporary issues.

The two sides welcomed the creation of new independent states and expressed the full support to the struggle for independence of still colonized nations. They see their liberation as a natural and unstoppable process of modern developments in the world, which will erase the remnants of colonialism and contribute to the strengthening of peace and wider international cooperation.

The two sides believe that the provision of international economic aid to the new independent states, as well as economically underdeveloped countries and areas in general, is essential to the achievement of progress and stability in the world. Therefore, it is necessary to invest maximum efforts in this field to provide economic and technical assistance, with no political or similar conditions, to all those states and nations in need.

II

During the talks, special attention was devoted to bilateral relations. They were pleased to note that the practice of maintaining direct contacts and exchanges of views between the statesman of FPRY and Indonesia could be very helpful and contribute to the comprehensive development of bilateral cooperation and strengthening relations between the two countries.

Both sides came to the conclusion that significant results were achieved in all areas of mutual relations and that there were conditions and opportunities for expanding the existing cooperation, especially in the field of economics.

The two sides expressed their great satisfaction about the signing of the Agreement on Scientific-Technical Cooperation and the Agreement on cooperation in the field of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, during the stay of Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja.

In accordance with the conclusion expressed in the joint statement issued during the recent visit of President Sukarno to FPRY, that the creation of a long-term economic cooperation was of mutual benefit, they considered and determined the principles on which to base long-term economic cooperation between the two countries.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-16

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Ambassador of Yugoslavia Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio, September 1, 1960

Top secret

At the reception with a Malay, we arranged the meeting in a few days. However, he called me the next day to come to him immediately. I stayed an hour and a quarter. We would have continued the talks but the US ambassador had been waiting quarter of an hour for the reception.

1 /. He is interested whether President Tito is going to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. President Sukarno will be ready to go. They believe that it will be useful. They believe that the Prime Minister Khrushchev would come. The US cannot prevent this. In this case Eisenhower will come. President Sukarno would make a decision more easily if he knew that President Tito was coming to New York. He repeats that it is not yet a final decision and that this is only a definite thought but still not mandatory. He would appreciate a lot if I let would let him know our attitude as soon as possible.

2 /. I take this opportunity to express our views regarding the tasks of the 15th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. I say that I visited Soedarsono several weeks ago regarding this, since Suwito and Sudjarwo were absent and I did not want to disturb him. In this case, it was only an idea that the exchange of opinions and suggestions between our two governments would be particularly useful given the importance and the atmosphere of the meeting. If non-aligned countries do not engage, there is a danger that this session will have the same atmosphere as the fourteenth session.

Soebandrio completely agrees with our concept – the atmosphere, disarmament, recognition and encouragement of the policy of coexistence, helping less developed countries, speeding up the processes in still dependent territories and territories under custody. He promised to study the issue in detail and continue the discussion.

He says he would be the head of the delegation.

3 /. He says he would appreciate my opinion regarding the problem and prospect of the relations Tokyo – Djakarta. He repeats that he does not want the opinion of an ambassador or the attitude of the Yugoslav government, but my personal opinion, as a friend of Indonesia.

He is surprisingly sharp when presenting the situation. It is about principles.

The Japanese need to learn to respect Indonesia. The Japanese want to be equal with Europe and America and watch with contempt the people of AA Countries. Suska, the head of the Asian political department who has just come back from Tokyo where he visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs Kosaku, says he has been told by the Japanese “that they felt honoured by the arrival of the Dutch fleet”. The Japanese government is now trying to reconcile Djakarta with the fact that the Dutch fleet will not return to West Irian after the visit to Japan. This has already been expected. It looks like they have agreed to make public the possibility of Dorman to West Irian and thus enable the Japanese government to score in favour of Djakarta. On my remark that diplomatic circles comment on the Indonesian government making the things public with such sharpness only when the Japanese government is already engaged regarding the Netherlands and when it is very difficult to expect from the Japanese government to revoke previously given consent, Subandrio says that this is not true and that their intervention in Tokyo was timely and that they deliberately did not want to publish this only to enable Tokyo to find a form to avoid the arrival of the Dutch fleet. They have made it public only when the Japanese government made a final decision about all protests and objections of Djakarta.

He says that the Japanese were erroneously convinced that the Djakarta was powerless, that they were too economically dependent on Japan, including the question of reparation. However, economic relations with Japan are just three years old. They are not yet deeply related with the Indonesian economy. They find it hard, but they do not see the way out except to stay on their principles even if this meant making a sacrifice. They have endured the Netherlands, they shall endure Japan. Asked whether they have made a final decision, I intentionally do not use the word severance of relations, he says that the decision has been made that it is only the matter of time when they will leave. Dorman comes to Japan on the 8th this month. Some still believe that the Japanese government will change its attitude. He does not believe. They have to be prepared for the worst.

He counts on our understanding. More than anyone we are often forced to accept sacrifices, to stay in line with the principles. We have briefly discussed the cease of the relations with Bono, the year 1948 and the year 1956, etc.

4 /. He asks me to send him as soon as possible the Kardelj's book "Socialism and War". He asks me, if I can, to get him a "Political manifesto" that Moscow allegedly sent to all communist parties regarding the conflict with Beijing. For them, this is of particular importance. They have tried to get to it via Moscow but they failed. As I say that I am not sure that any manifesto was sent to the parties and that I read somewhere in the press about a letter, he asks me if this means that I do not believe that there is such a manifesto or letter. He asks if I have any official information from Belgrade. He even says that he takes the request back if it is a top secret document that might have been delivered to our party. (I had a feeling that he had received information either from their embassy in Moscow or Belgrade that such a document was sent to us, and that he expected us to inform them). I reply that I have not received anything; I know that there is nobody in Belgrade during the holidays and that we have even stopped the radio link.

Several times returns to the problem of Moscow – Beijing, linked to Djakarta. He says that Beijing is making funny efforts to make up for what was lost including the Ambassador Kuang Chen. He has been ignoring him for a long time and tried to maintain direct contact with Sukarno. Even more, he knows that Beijing was behind the action of PKI trying to dismiss him. Now that all this failed Kuang Chen came to him a few days ago and assured him of his personal friendship, of his i.e. Subandrio's major impact on Sukarno etc. The reason for this change in the Beijing's attitude to Djakarta is in widening the relations Djakarta – Moscow. Secretly, he says that almost every 14 days Khrushchev sends private messages to Sukarno on all and even less important issues. Moscow provides them with virtually unlimited help. On that occasion he alludes to the great hotel that is being built by the Japanese in Djakarta. It would not be a problem to let the Russians overtake it. (From Subandrio's words, it could be concluded that they have secured the full support of Moscow and stock to help them if they would break the economic relations with Japan).

He tells me about Mihailov, since I asked him how it happened that such a person was sent here. He is telling about the importance of having Mihailov here. Beijing is concerned about this. Beijing knows that Mihailov will provide full support to President Sukarno not only in relations with the USSR, but also in terms of PKI. Moscow needs an independent Indonesia. Beijing could use the conflict. They need support from the PKI but PS wants to be sure of this support. This support cannot be dependent on a variety of suspicious combination of Aidit and the mood of Beijing.

5 /. We talk about the internal situation. He is pleasantly surprised when I tell him about the rapid increase in the value of rupee against the dollar. About 30% within 3 weeks. He is interested in the reasons.

I tell him my opinion. It is the result of several moments, the complex of positive actions taken by the government. It was contrary to the expectations of the West that the rupee will undergo a rapid depreciation in relation to the termination of the relations with the Netherlands. Just the opposite, the rupee recovers. It would be wrong to take this only as the result of recent monetary measures. As much as they were constructive they could not have done so much benefit in just ten days. Perhaps the most important is that in the course of July, and most clearly in the speech of President Sukarno on August 17th, a lot of decisions were made and a number of issues resolved that have been delayed for a long time, there was an overall enthusiasm, new dynamics, and the “period of action, of undertaking”. It might be worth to analyse the oscillation of rupee from the point of political stagnation in the country, delaying the decision which is maybe the worst, even if a decision is bad, it will be corrected. The rise of the rupee was intensified by the fact that the government managed to get over the crisis over the nationalization of Dutch assets; under these revolutionary measures, certain decline in production and distribution is inevitable. The reaction uses this moment interpreting it as a failure of national cadres. Chinese shops in the village also did not cause greater earthquake.

Subandrio thanks me for sharing my views and information. He admits that he lacks economic knowledge. Yet, it turned out that 95% of Sukarno’s speech and 90% of Political manifest is his personal work. Obviously, he is trying to present himself as a determining factor.

6 /. Bilateral relations. I inform him about the departure of the delegation of the Ministry of Industry of the FPRY and the program of their atomic centre, the engagement of our professors at the University of Djakarta, preparing their personnel etc., as well as that in the course of two days to get to the signing of a new, larger Contract on military deliveries whose figure increased to about \$ 80 million of the total military investment.

Subandrio is in touch with these things. He asks for the full support to the delegation of the Ministry of Industry. Dr Suharto, the minister of light industry appealed to him on the government meeting. He asks us to pay attention to teachers economists who go tomorrow at a seminar in Belgrade, at the express request of Djuanda.

I inform him about the arrival of a parliamentary delegation in October which will be the first to the Parliament.

We finish the meeting because Jones, the US ambassador, is waiting at the door. He says he has invited him to point to a critical situation. He does not specify.

He wants to continue the conversation next week over the lunch at his home.

Note: Subandrio has been constructive once more. This is always when he needs me. He seems to be very interested in Sukarno participating in New York. I have the impression that Khrushchev is behind this. He seems to have decided to

go to New York but he needs respected representatives of so-called non-aligned countries. Beside the wish of President Sukarno not to be alone with Khrushchev, but with President Tito and others, Subandrio seems to think the similar action is taken in terms of the presence of Comrade President.

It is not excluded that he really wanted to suggest the termination of relations with Japan and to engage us in this or to make it point to the Japanese the seriousness of the situation, the determination to go to the termination of the relations if the Japanese government does not revoke the visit of Doorman. He seems to have made it clear to Jones that he agrees to the intervention of the US. Jones immediately met the Japanese Ambassador Odo. Djakarta is interested in the presence of PS in New York on the issue of Western Irian, with regards to relations with the Netherlands, the expected break with Japan and as stated the desire of Moscow. With all the reserves that we have towards Subandrio, see earlier reports on Subandrio, it would be useful at least once to satisfy some of his requests, desires. Until now, it has never been the case. This becomes a problem of personal contacts. It is true that the desires of Subandrio are often delicate not to say provocative. But there are also some well-meaning ones. We should be given the answer so that we could preserve the form as to his requests.

Pavlič

P.S. We are talking about the banning of a PKI operations by regional commanders. He says this will be the subject of the Conference on the 12th. He believes that the commanders will obey Sukarno's orders. He claims that Nasution is strong enough to implement these measures.

Nasution is not a real Chief of General Staff from the standpoint of discipline, but at least commanders accept him as a "chairman" which was not the case before.

We talk about the PKI's criticism directed against him and the FPRY. He claims he did not change his attitude to FPRY because of this.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1960, F-41, dos. 1, no. 428573

Ambassador of Yugoslavia Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the talks with the Prime Minister of Indonesia Djuanda, September 6, 1960

Top secret

He invited me to come immediately. I stayed for almost an hour. He invited me in agreement with Subandrio who went to Bali to see the President.

1/. He agrees with our position regarding the nuclear armament of Bundeswehr. He has authorized me to convey his full consent to the government. To my remark that such armament will deepen the division between the two parts of Germany and endanger the world peace, referring to the two world wars, Djuanda says that this armament would be a dangerous precedent, particularly for Japan and the Netherlands – West Irian.

2/. He appreciates that I have come so quickly. He wants to talk to me as a friend but also as an ambassador. It is up to me to decide if I am going to convey this part of our conversation to the government. They decided that Sukarno should go to the session of the UN GA. They talked about it before his (Djuanda's) trip. He was against it because Sukarno's attendance would draw attention to the problem of WI. He was of the opinion that it was not the right moment. However, the recent developments, the increasing importance attached to this session, the determination of Khrushchev and other heads - Prime Ministers of the socialist camp to attend this session, brought about new circumstances. His government is of the opinion that it is the duty of so-called non-aligned countries to make use of this opportunity. It is necessary to strengthen the role of the UN; it is necessary to strengthen the role of non-aligned countries.

He is interested in whether Comrade President will attend the session. They wish he did, but they do not want to influence our decision.

I say I do not have specific information from Belgrade but I believe that President Tito would be willing to attend the session; the likelihood that the heads – prime ministers will participate promises certain results. I am afraid there is not enough time left for the preparations of such an important meeting at the highest level. Also, the presidential elections in the United States represent a serious problem for such a meeting. I ask him about their plans for President Sukarno's participation.

He says that President Sukarno will not go before the beginning of October, that is, after the Army Day (October 5th) – probably on the 7th. He would be absent for two weeks including the trip. Subandrio remains the head of the delegation. President Sukarno would address the GA making a reference to all the issues on the agenda – particularly disarmament and colonialism.

Strictly confidentially, he says Sukarno might not take sufficient account of the form of presentation. However, it should be taken account of. They do not want Sukarno's presentation be similar to that of Khrushchev. Therefore, they decided Sukarno should go later and remain in New York only for a week. He believes Khrushchev will still be there at that time. Sukarno would visit Washington. On his way back, he might talk to De Gaulle.

Once again, he says he wishes President Tito was present at about the same time, not exactly the same but it would be nice if the stays of two presidents partly overlapped. He points out that Khrushchev wants Indonesia to join other countries in the socialist camp. Khrushchev does not like the idea of Jakarta addressing Belgrade.

Asked whether Khrushchev in his message to President Sukarno suggested the participation of Sukarno at the session, he says that he has not seen the message because it was directly conveyed to Sukarno, but according to what he has been told by Subandrio, the message is about the decision of the Soviet government that Khrushchev will lead the delegation at the session with an explanation why. The suggestion of President Sukarno's attendance was probably communicated through Mihailov, but he cannot exclude the possibility that it was also included in the written message.

He says that, this morning, he has held an emergency meeting with Subandrio who went to Bali with the President. They are coming back tomorrow afternoon. Jamin would also go with Sukarno (later, he learned that Djuanda suggested Abdulgani should go since he is strong enough to hold President Sukarno within certain limits, which is not the case with Jamin).

He says he is having consultations only with us. He would appreciate an answer as soon as possible. He repeats it is a wish, not an action. He will notify Indian and UAR Ambassador about Sukarno's departure to the session. He does not know Nasser's position. He believes that Nehru will not go, but expects that MacMillan will.

He says that in his message H. suggests "joint efforts" of the Soviet and Indonesian governments on important issues on the agenda.

3/. He tells me in confidence that everything is prepared for the conference of regional commanders on the 12th, which will be led by Sukarno. He will be present. It was agreed to withdraw the current regulations under which regional commanders were authorized to make decisions prohibiting labor parties, publishing newspapers and so on. In the future, this will be under the jurisdiction of the central organs of military administration.

It has been agreed that the commanders themselves will withdraw the ban on the work of PKI in order to save their reputation. In the future, regional commanders will have the right to enact emergency measures only in terms of security, including the arrest of MPs if they were caught in the act.

4/. We discuss the economic situation. He is satisfied with my interpretation of improving situation, the tendency of falling prices and increasing the value of the rupee. He claims that by the end of the year the price of the basic living items will be reduced by 20%.

I congratulate him on the success in Doorman issue. Many are satisfied. He is pleased about the agreement on military deliveries worth \$ 8 million which was signed yesterday. I thank him since the contract is the result of his consent to this volume given in Belgrade. Again, he says that the larger aspect of cooperation in the military sphere will be discussed during Kardelj's and Gošnjak's visit.

I thank him for sending two professors – economists and delegation of the Ministry of Light Industry to FPRY. Without his personal efforts they would not get necessary foreign currency for the trip.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1960, F-41, dos. 1, no. 428573

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Ambassador of Yugoslavia Pavlič to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the conversation with President Sukarno, September 9, 1960

Top secret

On the 6th I received a dispatch – message from the Comrade President with an order to urgently convey it to President Sukarno. Sukarno was absent, supposed to be back at 7 p.m. Since I was invited by Prime Minister Djuanda regarding the same issue that could affect the content of the message, he asked in a dispatch to take into account my talks with Djuanda. However, on the 8th he requested to be received by the President. Within half an hour, his first adjutant Colonel Sugandi has called to tell me that I will be received the next day at 11 a.m.

I inform the President about the content of the message. I explain that the message followed the conversation he had with Mr Soebandrio on September 1st. I received a message on the 5th when he was absent, today is the 9th; meanwhile, he announced his departure to the meeting of the General Assembly in early October. I emphasize moments presented in the message which condition a constructive contribution of the so-called non-aligned countries, as necessary presence of both parties, the short time to prepare the meeting of the heads of state. I give him the messages text in English.

President reads and thanks. He is somewhat reserved. I have a feeling that the message has not been what he expected. On two or three occasions, he has emphasized that the session is extremely important and that he believes that his presence may be useful, and that this is why he has decided to go. It is expected that the West will boycott the session. According to the latest information available, MacMillan and De Gaulle will not go, but Eisenhower will if invited. Nehru fifty-fifty. He is waiting to see if his participation is needed. Nkrumah and Sekou Toure are going. He does not know about Nasser, but after me he will receive the Ambassador of UAR with Nasser's message (which has nothing to do with the meeting but is related to the problem of relations between Cairo – Baghdad). With some anger he says that the West wants to boycott, the matter of prestige, they are afraid of Khrushchev's propaganda manoeuvres, and forgets that it is about the critical issues that must be resolved and will be resolved, regardless of whether or not the West participates. These issues cannot be delayed due to the mood and prestige of the West. He will speak at the meeting in this regard. A lot of people here in Indonesia want him to speak about the West Irian and to put this issue on the agenda of the session. Personally, he is against. There are no conditions. Maybe next year, the atmosphere will be better and more constructive after the entry of ten African countries in the UN. He will speak of the disarmament, anti-colonialism, and the role of AA countries. In Surabaya (referring to a speech delivered in the presence of Khrushchev) he requested the engagement of AA countries in resolving the critical issues. He thinks that he enjoys the confidence of those countries and that he can speak on their behalf at the meeting.

He returns to the expected boycott of the West once more. He regrets that the condition mentioned in the message will not be fulfilled – the presence of both blocs.

It will stay at the session 7 to 10 days.

He does not ask whether there are still chances that President Tito will go (contrary to Djuanda and Soebandrio who expressed a desire for President Tito to go to the session). No mention of Khrushchev's message. It is strange that he does not mention the need for the participation of "Non-Aligned Countries", but only emphasizes the participation of AA countries. This is not accidental (the line of Moscow and PKI). When speaking of which African countries will come to the meeting, he mentions Ethiopia with undisguised contempt.

2 /. I briefly inform him about the attitude of the Yugoslav government on the issue of the arming of West Germany with atomic weapons, the threat to world peace, widening the gap between the two parts of Germany, a dangerous precedent to the third countries.

He says that our government can count on the full support of Indonesia on this issue and that in his speech he will mention the problem of armament in Europe with special reference to West Germany.

3 /. I inform him of our action regarding the Congo (since before the interview I managed to get only the beginning of a dispatch on the issue, saying that I will discuss it with Soebandrio).

He says that he is also concerned about the Congo and that he will talk about it at the meeting. Belgian troops should immediately withdraw and intervention from outside should stop. The overall situation is similar to theirs after the liberation. Pressure from all sides. The Yugoslav government can count on the full support of the Indonesian government. I congratulate him regarding Doorman. The question of principle. He says thanks noting that he has received congratulations from many sides.

4 / I inform him of the arrival of the parliamentary delegation. I regret that it would be during his absence. I am glad that Yugoslav parliamentary delegation will be the first to visit the new "Gotong-Rojong" Parliament. I mention Vlahović, Bebler and Jojkić.

He is glad the delegation is coming and suggests that delegation should wait him.

I express my satisfaction about the signing of a new agreement on military delivery in the amount of \$ 8 million, making the amount rise to nearly \$ 80 million.

He asks whether the agreement is signed by General Yani. Why, it seems that this had some meaning. Does the armament of the army – land forces – suits him? I remind him about Lukman's remarks.

He says they are sending architects to some countries. They will also send them to us.

He asks me to enable him to see some objects e.g. Brionka etc.

President Sukarno is too tired. He has been very engaged these days. In conversation, he is very friendly, attentive especially in personal matters (wants to know when my wife and daughter are coming back etc.). He has been quite reserved which is usually not the case.

Only when asked if he has a message for President Tito, he sends his warmest greetings to Comrade President, and asks me to convey him the content of our meeting.

After me, President Sukarno received the Ambassador of UAR who requested reception for two days before I did.

Pavlič

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**Meeting at the premises of the Mission of the United Arab Republic
at the United Nations, September 28, 1960**

We have discussed the benefits of the meeting H-E. T informed about the impressions from talking to X and Nehru's information about the conversation with Harriman. It was agreed to meet tomorrow afternoon in the Yugoslav mission Nkrumah, Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser and Tito, and to publish an appeal in which X. and E. would be invited to meet and to contribute to the reduction of tensions. Koča and Fawzi shall compile the project and make the necessary contacts. T. will try to meet with Sukarno tomorrow morning.

In terms of the Congo, he expressed the idea from the meeting T – Nehru. It was agreed to avoid extensive and necessarily fierce debate in the plenary before sending a special commission to the Congo.

AJ, KPR I-2/12

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**Draft Resolution of the representatives of India, Indonesia, Egypt,
Yugoslavia and Ghana at the XV regular session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations**

General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the latest decline in international relations which threaten peace with serious consequences; aware of the great expectations of the world to help prepare the way for easing the world tensions; aware that serious and urgent responsibility rests on the United Nations to be the initiator of useful effort, requires as a first urgent step the US president and the president of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to rebuild their contacts, who have recently discontinued, so that their explicit willingness to find the solutions to current issues through negotiations can be progressively realized.

Borba Daily, October 1, 1960, p. 1

Message of President Tito to President Sukarno

Belgrade, December 10, 1960

“Dear friend,

Few days ago, I sent you a message regarding the latest events in the Congo. I would like to add and specify some things regarding this message, and the steps we have taken. As you know, we withdrew our diplomatic mission from the Congo and technical and flight crews that were at the disposal of the UN forces in the country. We have done this in the first place to prevent provocations against our Embassy, which had no protection from the United Nations. Another reason for our decision was that we wanted to express our strong protest against the events in the Congo and the arrest of Prime Minister Lumumba and the ministers of legitimate Congolese government and concerning the passive attitude of the local organs of the United Nations throughout this case.

This step of ours should not be perceived as a position that countries having the troops there should do that. If we had had the troops there, we certainly would not have withdrawn either them or our diplomatic mission.

In my opinion, the moment has come for all of us who do not want a bloody civil war in that unfortunate country, and Belgian colonialists to get their hands on this country again and put it in a colonial situation, to get engaged in the utmost political activity, first of all through the United Nations. We pay utmost importance to current discussions in the United Nations, and in this regard we refer our Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Koča Popović to New York, where we together with representatives of other friendly countries seek to convene an emergency session of the General Assembly devoted to the Congo. I believe you would agree with me that there is not a need for the full solidarity of the Non-Aligned Countries and all those who care that Africa does not become a new and highest battlefield of the Cold War, and thus the possible focus of a new world conflict.

It is quite clear that we should act in the United Nations for their organs and troops in the Congo executed strictly those decisions that were made in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations in connection with the Congo. Since in Leopoldville, the occupants managed to seize power and overthrow the legitimate Congolese government, thus created such a situation that even today Mobutu ultimately seeks to control all the transport of the United Nations in the Congo. We are also aware that Mobutu's troops are preparing, with the help of Belgian colonialists to bloodily suppress the liberation movement in the country, primarily to take over Stanleyville. Since in Stanleyville there is another part of the representatives of the legitimate Congolese govern-

ment, we should not let these legal representatives of the Congolese government liquidate an armed force that is being prepared against them.

I'll be very grateful if you inform me about your view of all the questions that I have shared here. Otherwise, I think it is very important that we all maintain as close contacts for the purpose of mutual consultations and taking unique measures to prevent the worst that could harm not only the people of the Congo, but also other peoples of Africa and the world peace in general.

Best wishes,

Honestly yours, J. B. Tito.”

Report on the actions taken. Mates

AJ, KPR I-1 / 426, the message is sent from the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of FPRY in Belgrade to the Embassy of FPRY in Jakarta by a coded telegram conf. no. 698 marked “very urgent” with an order to be immediately handed over to Sukarno

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Message of President Sukarno to President Tito, December 14, 1960

Djakarta, December 14th, 1960

My dear friend Tito,

Thank you for your message of the 7th of December 1960, and followed by your personal letter dated Belgrade, December 10th, 1960.

I am very glad that we have exactly the same views with regard to the latest developments in the Congo which I will summarize as follows:

First: Whole contingents of Belgian civilians are returning to the Congo to occupy their previous position as a means to stimulate the setup of puppet government forces.

Second: The strength of Belgian military forces though disguised in civilian clothes are becoming stronger and stronger, and what is obvious for everybody the Mobutu forces are provided with up to date military armaments including tanks and paratroops.

Third: With these forces at their disposal the colonial powers are suppressing every national movement towards economic and social emancipation which should be the immediate purpose of any independent nation. Unfortunately there are still some people in the Congo who seem to be satisfied with so-

me kind of “political emancipation” which may give better position for themselves but in fact will not alter the social-economic condition of the nation as a whole.

Fourth: It is very regrettable that the United Nations Forces cannot prevent the Mobutu forces taking actions which are contrary to the spirit and content of the first Security Council Resolution. Instead it seems that the United Nations political and military command (Secretary General Hammarskjöld and General Horn) issued statements implying their full support to the Kasavubu – Mobutu forces which thus tolerates the pursuance of Belgian neocolonial policies.

Fifth: Under these circumstances I have decided to withdraw the Indonesian contingents since they no longer can serve our purpose to lend assistance to the preservation of the integrity and full independence of the Congo.

I would have liked to keep our contingents there in order to support the developments in the Congo towards a more favourable direction, but after the arrest and maltreatment of Prime Minister Lumumba and after the recent statements by Secretary General Hammarskjöld and the United Nations Military Command in the Congo, General Horn, it seems rather futile to entertain any hope now that the Indonesian forces are in the position to do anything useful in the interest of the people in the Congo themselves.

Sixth: I fully agree with your suggestion to reconvene the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to discuss the Congo problem.

I only regret that due to circumstances I will not be able to send Foreign Minister Subandrio to New York. On the other hand I assure you that our permanent representative at the United Nations has received appropriate instructions on this matter.

Very truly yours,
Sukarno.

AJ, KPR I-1/426

Talks of the President of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia Petar Stambolić and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio

DSIP
VII Department
434072
January 10, 1961

On behalf of Indonesia, the meeting was attended by: Dr Sudjarwo, Director of the European Department of the Indonesian MFA, Ambassador Asmaoen, and on behalf of Yugoslavia: Bebler, Đerđa and M. Kreačić.

In the beginning, Dr Subandrio outlined his conversation with the Pakistani president Ayub Khan, who, when asked why he was going to Yugoslavia – a Communist country – said that perhaps in Yugoslavia one could learn something.

Speaking about the conversation with Khrushchev, Dr Subandrio says that when he asked Khrushchev about the relations with Yugoslavia, he said that the relations were “perfectly normal.” Subandrio further states that some countries may be great countries and technically highly developed and that they (Indonesia) may need their help. Although Yugoslavia is a communist country, they appreciate it as a country with which they can reasonably talk and discuss, it is mentally healthy and that by its influence and importance in the world it is objectively equal to big countries and that for Indonesians this spiritual help is equally if not more important than economic help.

Speaking of the West Irian Dr Subandrio said it was true that the Dutch had somewhat improved the measures to strengthen their military positions. He said that Indonesia is very concerned about the West Irian not because they would be directly threatened by military actions in the West Irian but because they are afraid that West Irian could become the basis of international colonialism from where they i.e. colonialists would systematically reinforce and lead subversive action as it was the case in 1957/58 when they supported the rebellion in Indonesia. Dr Subandrio added that it should not be neglected that Indonesia is surrounded by the countries of SEATO pact and the members of the Commonwealth and that this could hinder its development because every political and economic success of Indonesia and its development would be appealing to the neighbouring countries, the members of SEATO pact or the Commonwealth. On that occasion, he mentioned that the Philippines which were the property of the United States and its 400 families and where every form of nationalism has been previously suppressed; today, influenced by the developments in Indonesia, the Philippines are beginning to awaken the national feelings etc.

Speaking about the machinations of the colonialists around West Irian, about the way of Indonesia's development, Dr Subandrio added that they need military help to achieve this and that they do not care about what West would think of their action in Moscow.

Speaking about the internal development in Indonesia Dr Subandrio said that Indonesia has traced the path of development and built a concept but that there are still a lot of specific things to be done in the scheme. The basic idea is to go through the political unification of the masses that were divided by different parties and different ethnic, racial and social contradictions and differences. After the revolution, they had a nation united under the leadership of President Sukarno, who had a direct influence on the unification of the nation, but after that, a lot of political parties were established and this unity was broken. Now, the question is whether they could restore the unity of the people under new concepts that have already been outlined. They do not have to use rigid forms and go along the way of China and the USSR, i.e. they could evolve in the direction of socialism along a little less painful way by taking more account of the standard and the freedom of the people. Therefore, they are of the opinion that it will be more useful if they give people more freedom, if they look for some economic interest in production that could be stimulating and make people materially more interested (Subandrio talked about some dividends noting, however, that from 1958 the state has 60 to 80% of the means of production which enables them to go along their own way to socialism because they do not have big capitalists – these are foreigners – nor landlords like India). In this regard, they are relying to people, to a broader initiative, and so on which makes our ideas close to them.

Speaking of KPI Dr Subandrio said that while their communists attacked Yugoslavia regarding the Moscow Declaration, after the Conference he was told that they would have somewhat kinder attitude. Answering the question of what is the attitude the Communists toward their internal issues, Dr Subandrio, said that for now the Communists supported the policy of the government and that it was easy because until now Indonesia had not had its own development program so that the Communists were able to make noise and use phrases and emphasize their support to the principles of Panca Sila. However, we are now expecting, said Dr Subandrio, that in the process of building socialism when their general conception of all concrete forms indicate their own roads have necessarily come into conflict with the communists who will want to impose their dogmatic beliefs.

Dr Subandrio said that he suggested Khrushchev that it would be useful if various socialist forces, countries and groups advocating socialism occasionally met and exchanged experiences but not using dogmatic vocabulary, but attitudes that proceeded from life and that people would understand which Khrushchev denoted as “a good idea”.

When discussing the changed attitudes towards Yugoslavia, Subandrio said he fully agreed with the assessment of Comrade Kardelj that the perspective of humanity would ultimately depend on the relations between socialist countries and not on the relation socialism – capitalism.

Subandrio spoke warmly about the importance of friendship and exchange of experience with Yugoslavia.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-17

123

Letter of President Sukarno to President Tito

Djakarta, February 28, 1961

My dear Friend Tito,

Thank you for your letter dated February 17, 1961 which I regard as very useful to keep ourselves current about our respective policies with regard to the Congo.

As you know we also immediately recognize the succeeding government of Prime Minister Lumumba under the leadership of Hr. Antoine Gizenga. As I see it, the situation in the Congo is now becoming a clear confrontation between puppet leaders supported by colonial forces on the one hand and on the other hand sincere nationalist leaders now headed by Mr Gizenga, who are trying sometimes desperately but nevertheless full of determination and courage to save the real national independence of the Congo. I fully agree with you that the attitude of the United Nations Command at the very outset, by ignoring Prime Minister Lumumba, made it possible for the colonial forces and their Congolese henchmen to fortify and consolidate themselves.

In carrying out our anticolonial struggle in the Congo, our delegations in the United Nations will continue to cooperate closely with each other and meanwhile I am preparing for the establishment of Indonesian representation in Stanleyville. Lately I have been pressed by many quarters to reconsider the withdrawal of the Indonesian battalion. At the present moment the repatriation of our Garuda battalion has already been fixed for the 9th of March, 1961 and I do not think that I will consider any change upon the time of its departure. Anyhow, the six months period for the battalion has already elapsed. Whether or not I will send replacements depends upon the actions of the United Nations forces to carry out a clear anticolonial policy for the maintenance of a stable and healthy national independent leadership in the Congo.

I know that the latest Security Council Resolution of February 21, 1961 indicated a more favourable trend, but the colonial forces can always water down the practical implementation of such resolution as happened in the past. Already press comments in some influential Western countries voiced objection to the latest Security Council Resolution.

With personal esteem and warmest regards,

Sukarno

AJ, KPR I-1/427

124

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about inviting Sukarno to visit Yugoslavia

Jakarta
Number 92
March 1, 1961

Your ref. 45572. Late last year, we informed you about PS's journey which included the visit to ČSR and the USSR. We received no answer regarding their interest to visit.

Upon the return Subandrio and Sukarno informed us that Comrade President unofficially expressed a desire to have PS come to visit, "if he is somewhere near." Subandrio noted that the visit was not planned because of "a comprehensive program, lack of time." In late January, he was told about the conference, tied with PS's journey. Subandrio was given Mates's dispatch on the 10th of February. During the talks on 18th PS insisted at the conference. The visit was mentioned only in this context.

The conference is uncertain. Time wasted because of Asmaoen. Consultations are just starting. Then, we have not yet received a position towards the conference. I asked you to authorize me to officially convey the invitation of Comrade President to visit FPRY regardless of the conference and especially if you agree with the idea of PS being a guest of the Comrade P. for Sukarno's birthday – our ref. 78. PS has never refused when being personally communicated the desire of the Comrade President, whereas the mediation of Subandrio was often problematic.

Note: MFA takes into account that this would be the fourth visit of PS, the second of Djuanda, plus visits of Subandrio, Saleh, Abdulgani, Jamin, planned

visits of Nasution and Martadinata, while from our side, only Comrade P. and Tempo visited Indonesia. It is necessary to plan the visit of Komrade Koča and realize the announced visit of Comrade Kardelj.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1961, F-38, no. 46558

125

Note on the talks of the Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič with President Sukarno, March 7, 1961.

Top Secret

Embassy of FPRY Djakarta

I asked for the reception. Admitted to the “Palace of freedom”, stayed for 20 minutes.

PS was extremely busy. When I came to the Palace, there were waiting for the reception: 1) Ruslan Abdulgani, with the attention to inform Sukarno before the session of the Supreme Advisory Council which was to begin half an hour later 2) The Supreme Public Prosecutor with all the assistants, 3) Delegation of USDEK-MANIPOL with Professor Iw Kusumasumantri, General Moestopo, who wanted to hand over a memorandum to the President. I was warned to cut short the visit as much as I can because the President was very busy. I was received before my turn. The President received me very warmly.

I came regarding his visit to FPRY. At the beginning of January in a conversation with Subandrio, President Tito expressed his wish to have Sukarno as a guest. Personally, I repeated this wish to Subandrio on February 10, asking him to convey this wish – invitation to him and to inform me. No answer. When, 14 days ago, I was received in Bogor and kept for lunch I personally conveyed this wish once more. But then he remarked that the prospects of visit are weak. I informed Belgrade therein. I received an order to come once again, to repeat the invitation, to get a clear response, a positive response and to express on behalf of President Tito, his desire to have President Sukarno as his guest and to celebrate together his – Sukarno’s birthday.

PS literally responds: “I am deeply moved by the attention I was given by President Tito. I’m very grateful and very much obliged to President Tito. The fact that you are coming back with the invitation and now even with an invitation for my birthday is just one more proof of the President Tito’s friendship. But as

much as I would love to, I would not be able to. I have to repeat what I have already told you and what Soebandrio has already told you, that there will be no time, unless there is a conference in Belgrade. Again, I say I would love a conference in Belgrade, but if this is not the case I will not be able to come to Belgrade. I have again reviewed the program, no place.”

I say that I am sorry. However, I believe that he will find a day or two, which he could use as a holiday. It was unforgettable when President Tito was called to celebrate the New Year in Bali. I believe that his birthday would be something similar.

He says: “Pavlič, it is very hard for me that I will not be with my children and wife for my 60th birthday. I do not know where I am going to celebrate it. I am almost certain it would be somewhere on the plane.”

He tells about numerous invitations he has received for this journey (mentions a two-day private visit to Spain, a two-day private visit to Riul where he wants to meet with Kvadros and maybe West Germany). I got the impression that he wanted to say that these were the countries that had not been visited or at least not for a long time (not quite true at least not in case of Japan, since he is going to Japan again as to the USSR).

However, he believes that the conference will be in Belgrade. I let myself notice that preparations are going slowly, and that he and Subandrio are leaving as early as mid-April. Again, he says he is waiting for the return of Ms Supeni. On my remark that she will not be back before the beginning of April, he says it would be really good if Subandrio gave her an order to precipitate her return. I inform him that I have officially informed Ichsan that President Tito went to visit some of African countries deeply convinced of the usefulness of this trip, that Koča has already said something similar to their Charge d’Affair two days ago noticing that we accept the location of the conference somewhere closer to AA countries if necessary, and if possible as early as possible. There is a problem of harmonizing the agendas of the Heads of state – Prime Ministers.

PS responds that it should not be a problem and that they need to decide without many complications.

During the talks he says he will be accompanied by nine ministers, divided into three groups, i.e. not all at once due to their obligations in the country. He mentions Subandrio, Suharto, Suprajogio, Hidayat, Notohamiprodjo, Leimena.

I was already on my way out when he said he would give a third negative reply to Hammarskjöld. “I may look stubborn,” he says, “but this is a principled stubbornness. In this way I express my protest against the acts of the united command in the Congo. If they change their attitude and their acts, I will change the decision – not the other way around. I do not believe in promises.”

At the door, I say that I regret that my last mission (visit) failed. I ask him to reconsider the decision. It is hard to leave with a negative response. He has

promised to reconsider and give a definitive answer within a few days. As I leave, Abdulgani enters; Sukarno, walking by my side, asks me what I meant by “the last mission”. I reply that the next visit will be a farewell. He shakes his hand saying: you will come again – more than once.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1961, F-38, dos. 29, no. 412094

126

**State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia to the Embassy
in Jakarta on the exchange of opinions on Belgrade as a possible host
to the conference of non-aligned countries**

Number: 49237

March 25, 1961

To Pavlič.

Rangoon reports quoting the Indonesian ambassador:

Last night, the Ambassador had a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Burma, regarding the proposed meeting of neutrals in Belgrade. He reported that Tito had accepted to be the host. He said that, in Sukarno’s opinion, May would suit best.

We deliver you the above for the purpose of harmonization.

Without going into details regarding the time of the conference which will be easy to agree – because May is quite acceptable, try to negotiate the place in a friendly manner, because we still have a number of reasons for holding a conference be somewhere in Africa. Please inform.

Derda

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1961, F-116, dos. 2, no. 49237

**State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia to the embassies
of Yugoslavia in Jakarta and Cairo as possible hosts to the conference
of non-aligned countries**

Number: 49263

March 25, 1961

Embassy of FPRY: Jakarta – Cairo

Ms Supeni in Khartoum presented to Simić:

1) As an envoy of Sukarno she visited – Cambodia, Burma, Ceylon, UAR and Sudan. Objective: Studying the views of these countries in terms of AA Bandung Conference and the conference of independent states.

2) Sukarno wants an AA conference as soon as possible and according to him it is possible this year. Many agree. Nasser is reportedly ready for holding the conference in Cairo.

3) Sukarno would like the conference of independent states to be held during his visit to Europe. Nasser suggested the holding of this conference in Cairo during the month of April when Tito is coming.

Ms Supeni thinks – and believes that Sukarno is of the same opinion – that Yugoslavia is a more convenient place. Sukarno is for the conference on the broader level while Nasser is more inclined to the conference of countries with active independent policy [...]

Derda

MSP RS, DA, PA, 116, F-116, dos. 2, no. 49263

128

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign
Affairs of Yugoslavia on the Sukarno's opinion about the hosting
of the conference of non-aligned countries**

Number: Number 147

April 1, 1961

Ms Supeni met with Sukarno yesterday. Djuanda and Suwito were also present. Subandrio, unfortunately, absent with Chen Yi. She says:

Sukarno thinks they should immediately prepare the meeting of the five founders of AA to which they would invite some new African countries. It is desirable to hold the second AA conference before the autumn session of the General Assembly and discuss all the "current" issues.

Belgrade Conference should be held in late May, but only according to the opinion of Algeria. She recommends the holding of the meeting of Foreign Ministers to prepare the conference of independent.

U Nu sent a letter. He is ready to participate in both Conferences, but not in April and May because he is feasting then.

She says that Djuanda was against holding the conference of independent states before the second AA conference because taking attitudes in advance by the independent could complicate the convening of the Second AA Conference.

Fahmi Syed and I acknowledge that this deviates substantially from what Sukarno said and what we were told by Subandrio two nights before. While Sukarno is still talking about the conference of Independent in May, Subandrio moves it to the time before the session of the GA. Sukarno proposes the second AA conference before the session of the GA. The second AA would discuss the "current" issues on which AA countries have different opinions while independent conference was limited to Algeria. New ideas about the meeting of Foreign Ministers. The question is Algeria is in a hurry when Subandrio recommended waiting for the outcome of the talks in Evian. Some time before, they welcomed the idea of Kvardros participation at the meeting of independent and offered their services therein; now they link LA countries with other AA countries.

FS and I agreed to clarify this with Subandrio this evening at the reception in Bogor. Ms Supeni says she has completely lost orientation, obviously because she was on two tracks. She says there will be a conference of all AA ambassadors on April 4th which will discuss the issue of both conferences.

It is too early for any conclusions if these changes in attitudes of PS and Subandrio and differences between the two are the consequence of the talks with Chen Yi. The focus was obviously on the second AA conference in addition to

the the desire for pulling in LA, which was the old desire of Sukarno. I report only for information purposes. Wait a few days to see where we stand. It will be difficult to find an opportunity for a serious conversation with PS and Subandri before Chen Yi leaves.

Pavlič

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1961, F-116, dos. 5, no. 410350

129

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Cairo to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on the views from Cairo about the conference of non-aligned countries

Cairo

Number 228

April 3, 1961

I talked to Ali Sabri.

1) Still no answer from India. However, he informed me that in an interview with K. R. Nehru who stayed here for a few days Favzi got the impression that the Indians were more decisively against the conference than it seemed out of the conversation Nasser-Nehru. Favzi informed Nasser who said that they should go to the conference regardless of India which would probably join just later. Talking to Bandaranaike, Favzi got the impression that she was not against it, but was waiting for the attitude of Nehru with whom she probably talked in London. They also talked to Mexican Ambassador Carillo and they assume that Mexicans would come. Talking about the preparatory committee, he said that Latin American countries should not be taken but invited. I informed him about the consent of Keita, Nkrumah and S. Touré.

2) Preparatory Committee. I told him that we generally agreed with the idea of the committee and asked him for his opinion on the composition, level, tasks and more. He started by saying the best would be if P. Committee included two Arab, two African and Yugoslavia. [...]

[...] He presented some new moments regarding the convening.

a) The invitation could follow from the Communiqué Tito-Nasser. The problem is that Indonesia, which has also been working on the preparation, is now excluded.

b) Invitation could also follow from the letter jointly signed by Tito, Nasser and Sukarno. In that case, they could immediately establish a tripartite secre-

tariat to organize the administrative technical side of the conference, and thus avoid a procedure that could hinder the holding of the conference. (We observe that Sukarno will be here in mid-May).

We have not accepted nor rejected any of the alternatives and we have agreed to meet again as soon as possible since he is still talking to Nasser, i.e. as soon as I get your opinion. [...]

Dugonjić

DA MSP, RS, PA, 1961, F-116, dos. 8, no. 410170

130

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on the opinion of the President of the United Arab Republic Nasser that it is better to hold a new Asian-African Conference

Jakarta

Number 150

April 4, 1961

Fahmi Sayed and I informed Subandrio about the talks with Ms Supeni (our ref. 146). Subandrio starts by saying that he is the Minister of Foreign Affairs and that what he tells us is very important. He repeats that he does not see the possibility of holding the conference of independent countries in May, but rather some time later between July and September. He says that they will also agree to an earlier term if other countries request it.

We are surprised to hear that Nasser asks for three months to prepare the conference and that he does not see the need for holding two conferences at almost the same time: AA Conference and the conference of Non-Aligned Countries on more or less the same problems. Nasser is more inclined to AA Conference, says Subandrio, where FPRY will be invited. According to Subandrio AA Conference has more chances than the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. I tell him that few days ago he insisted on FPRY being the host of the conference and now he reduced it to the observer.

Fahmi has no information from his officials. He promised to immediately inform about the talks and Subandrio calling upon Nasser.

[Without signature]

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1961, F-116, dos. 5, no. 410315

Information on the economic relations with Indonesia

Committee for Foreign Trade

April 18, 1961

Belgrade

Commodity exchange

1. Commodity exchange with Indonesia so far has largely depended on military supplies since they accounted for about 90% of our exports. As for regular commodity exchange, cotton textile comes first.

Commodity exchange between our country and Indonesia was: /in million dinars./

Year	Exports	Imports	Balance
1957	126	8	+ 118
1958	6	129	- 123
1959	4.304	234	+4.070
1960	3.553	200	+3.353

Although our exports have increased, our imports have remained at more or less same level. The main reasons were, on one side the impossibility of obtaining rubber from state plantations until 1961, and on the other side our perception of Indonesia as a unilateral source of foreign currency.

The main problem of the current Yugoslav exports is to increase the exports of goods other than military. The increase in export is not hindered by the Indonesian side. It is our fault because we cannot offer sufficient quantities of goods or deliver the goods on time. We can take textile as an example. Specifically, when the Indonesian authorities make a plan to buy textiles, we apply to cover for 10 million meters, but our realization is far below this.

In 1960 we concluded a contract for the sale of textiles in the amount of 700,000 pounds with June 1960 as a deadline for delivery, but due to the inability of our factories the deadline was extended to December last year, and then to June 30 this year.

In terms of equipment supply, the performance of our companies has been alarming. The problem of micro switch boards and tannin plant was prolonged over two years; Definitive offer for the conclusion of the contract has not been given before earlier this year. The main problem was in the bidder who did not have his own production.

Some jobs failed because we failed to deliver the equipment due to the fact that our company was too slow in giving an offer / the meeting with exporters and manufacturers of equipment was held in KST where these and other issues were discussed/.

Regional commodity exchange program for the year 1961 predicts the increase in both exports and imports. Thus, they project the export worth 2.221 million dinars /without military delivery/. In the period from January 1 to March 31, the worth of concluded export arrangements was 650 million dinars, 80% of which accounted for textiles, i.e. 540 million dinars /not including the export of textiles agreed in 1960, worth 590 million dinars/. Then, engine parts worth 96 million dinars, enameled wires, calcium carbide, pens, etc.

Program for 1961 projects the import of Indonesian goods worth 2,221 million dinars which is a large increase compared to 1960 /200 million dinars/. The main article of imports for the year 1961 is 6,000 t of rubber worth about 1.520 million dinars /this will be realized in full if we solve the problem of local currency funds, since this is the first time we have received big quantities from the state plantations; so far we have signed contracts for 5,200t have been signed /.

Then we plan the import of oilseeds worth 300 million dinars / about 5,000 tons /. As for oilseeds / copra / the situation in the past years was such that we stimulated imports of oil / from Western Europe / instead of copra, but now we are for importing copra; 300 tons of tin worth 200 million dinars; coffee – 50 million dinars; sisal fibers – 86 million dinars; spices – 65 million dinars; exotic wood – 30 million dinars.

According to the projections, we plan to increase our regular export /to 2.665 million dinars in 1962, and to 4,057 million dinars in 1965 and/ as well as to increase import /to 2.665 million dinars in 1962 and to 4.057 million dinars in 1965/, however the problem of payment balance will remain due to large military supplies and great assets on our behalf.

2. We plan to sign a long-term agreement on commodity exchange with Indonesia. According to materials prepared for negotiations, the regular commodity exchange / not including military supplies and the loans / would be:

		/in million dinars/				
		1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Export	2.221	2.665	3.117	3.582	4.057	
Import	2.221	2.665	3.117	3.582	4.057	

In addition to textile, which accounts for 40-60% of the export, the most important products being exported are the products of engineering industry 35-40% /tractors, road vehicles, products for construction and others/, shipbuilding, chemical products, etc.

As to imports, rubber accounts for 30-70%, then copra, tin, sisal fiber, spices, etc.

At the same time, the companies would sign long-term contracts for both for import and export of products.

Loan

The loan of 10 million dollars given to Indonesia has been used in the amount of 5.5 million dollars, for ships. Now we are making deals for the jobs that would engage the rest.

However, Indonesia needs to be given another loan /probably about. USD/ through which we would try to get some of the object from their eight-year plan. This problem has been discussed with the SSK, Jugobanka and the enterprises and a list of specific objects has been compiled.

Due to delays in negotiations /Indonesians have not yet replied to our proposal/, there is a risk that the remaining objects would be taken by other countries. For example, there are only two electrical facilities left for which our companies are interested, while other facilities have been granted to other countries.

Balance of payments

Based on the projected regular exchange of goods, given loan, and the income regarding military supplies, the balance of payments with Indonesia would be as follows:

	/in million dinars/				
<u>Income</u>	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
export					
/not incl. military/	2.221	2.665	3.117	3.582	4.057
loans	—	120	167	186	186
<u>military supplies</u>	<u>2.580</u>	<u>2.460</u>	<u>2.490</u>	<u>2.070</u>	<u>1.620</u>
Total:	4.801	5.245	5.774	5.838	5.863
Expenditure	—	—	—	—	—
<u>for imported goods</u>	<u>2.221</u>	<u>2.665</u>	<u>3.117</u>	<u>3.582</u>	<u>4.057</u>
Balance:	+2,580	+2.580	+2.657	+2.256	+1.806

If we are going into new business arrangements, new loans for military supplies and equipment, the situation will be changed and we will have an even bigger balance payment asset.

Consignment stock

The question of consignment warehouse in Rijeka is quite open. The agreement on consignment expired in 1959 and has not been renewed due to their lack of interest. However, this warehouse is still in use and they occasionally send certain quantities of goods, mainly cinnamon, although we insist on a wider range and larger quantities of goods.

This issue as well as the conditions of consignment have been the subject of discussion. We have asked them to send us the terms and conditions under which their consignment warehouse in Hamburg works, so that we could study them and give an answer. We have not yet received these.

Our company is interested in rubber, coffee and other products, but this is not the case with Indonesians.

Scientific and technical cooperation

Last year, the Indonesian government has sent a request for the engagement of our 13 doctors and three senior economists who would work as teachers in Indonesia. Selected doctors, having waited Indonesian approval for months, refused to travel to because the wages they were offered by Indonesians were very small, and would not have covered their basic needs. Our efforts to improve these conditions remained unsuccessful, and this issue is still open.

Personal administration of the Federal Executive Council has not yet finished the selection process regarding three economists.

The company "Energoinvest" – Sarajevo has taken the initiative and during the visit of their delegation to Indonesia have offered scholarships to 10 Indonesian students in Yugoslavia, to take five engineers for training, as well as to finance the visit of a delegation of power supply experts to Yugoslavia. They are also studying the problem of cooperation with Indonesians.

In the field of maritime cooperation nothing has been done so far but they are making preparations for the forthcoming negotiations.

In order to address the above problems, as well as the obligations of the Agreed Minutes of August 2, 1960, we have given instructions to our Embassy in Jakarta to propose the negotiations to Indonesians, as follows:

1. The signing of the Long-Term Trade Agreement with the aim to expand exchange of goods, as well as the signing of the long-term agreements for individual goods
2. The question of the participation of our companies in the execution of their eight-year plan /and the question of giving new loans therein/.
3. The question of consignment stock, maritime cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation and others.

However, we do have not yet received the answer from Indonesians, even though we are in a hurry, because it can easily happen that objects will be given to others. Our companies are related because it is about giving a new loan, and obtaining individual objects through the loan.

PROPOSALS

1. To handle the above mentioned problems and to come to their solution as soon as possible, it is necessary to establish a Joint Commission in Belgrade, since the Joint Commission in Jakarta started operating in March this year.

In addition to highlighting the problems arising from the current economic relations, we would introduce Indonesians with our proposal for concluding a long-term agreement, as well as other items on agenda for the upcoming negotiations between the delegations of Yugoslavia and Indonesia.

2. To start negotiations with the Indonesians as soon as possible and possibly at intergovernmental level, according to Yougoslav of August 2, 1960, as follows:

a / To conclude a long-term trade agreement / 5 years / with commodity lists for basic products and thus, inter alia, to create a base for the conclusion of long-term agreements between our companies which will create permanent bases in our exports and imports.

b / To enter a new credit agreement in the amount of 10 million USD, in order to allow our companies to get bigger jobs – objects from the Indonesia's Eight-Year Development Plan.

Terms and conditions of the loan would be as for other countries.

The new loan for military supplies is not included in this loan.

c / To consider other issues regarding economic relations with Indonesia such as: the question of consignment stock, scientific-technical cooperation, maritime cooperation and others.

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-4

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Pavlič to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the foreign policy position
of Indonesia and relations with Yugoslavia**

Jakarta
Number 210
May 1, 1961.

Last dispatch. A brief review.

There are real conditions for further strengthening of relations. The international situation and the internal development of Indonesia provide new opportunities. Indonesia, with the non-bloc policy, is on the line of active resistance against neo colonialism, on the line of progress. Any other orientation could jeopardize the survival of Indonesia. Far East is becoming increasingly important. The conflict of the great is about to happen. The new US administration is reviewing an earlier policy towards FE, towards Indonesia. They accept Sukarno as a real force. USSR managed to get the affirmation in Indonesia, political and economical, and to place the armed forces. For the first time, USSR appears in the area of SEA. PRC found it necessary to make a turn in its policy towards Sukarno. They shift focus to Sukarno instead of PKI. Japan looks for its position, and sees Indonesia as a natural partner against the PRC. Tokio-Djakarta link may become an important factor in the assessment of power USA-USSR even vis-à-vis ambitions of India. India is reserved to Djakarta, passive; Nehru is offended for not being consulted by Jakarta. In short, the position of Indonesia in the international arena, perhaps more circumstantial than intended was significantly improved during the four-year period, showing tendency of further strengthening. Today, no one thinks of the fragmentation and collapse of Indonesia which was the case two or three years ago. Indonesia endured a heavy pressure from outside and a crisis inside. Only exaggerated, unrealistic ambitions of the current regime in the international field can be a problem.

There is a real possibility that the political and economic conditions at the national level will be consolidated. Rebellions are mostly liquidated or at least paralyzed. Complete pacification is a long-lasting expensive process. The opposition is powerless for the time being. General Staff is divided, mostly accepting the line of Sukarno. Anti-communist slogans of the West are becoming less effective. Parties are eliminated or at least weakened. Sukarno was buying time. His political concept, formulated with Usdek and Manipol, as well as the path to socialism, is problematic. Far from being able to really grip the masses. There are chances of at least partial realization of the Indonesia's Eight-Year Development Plan. Loans are not the problem but the internal accumulation and staff. There is

a danger of being dissolved to a big number of large projects. Sukarno is not familiar with this. He confuses the real possibilities and propaganda goals. Economy leadership, which is responsible for the implementation of the plan, is not nearly up to the task. The USSR uses situation skilfully, offers new services, making Sukarno increasingly dependant and unable to go back. According to Mihailova there are already about 500 Soviet citizens here and the new are coming. Kennedy has promised economic support to Sukarno. Both USA and Indonesia are interested. The question of balance.

AA countries are following Indonesia on its way to socialism. It is the matter of model, experience. In addition to the favourable political conditions, both external and internal, it should be taken into account that Indonesia is a country with great potential that could enable the rapid economic development with relatively small investments as well as first class human material.

Mutual relations: Indonesia is an important political partner. It is worth the efforts. It takes more patience and effort to get to know the mentality of FE. It is necessary to follow (the great) in the field of Indonesia. They are investing big efforts, giving up the rough pressure as previously was the case, but trying with new forms. They should pay more attention to internal development, particularly to PKI. PKI masses are looking for the way: between Beijing and Moscow, for or against Sukarno lines.

Insufficiently achieved in the economic field. It is more our fault than Indonesian's. The work of our companies is insufficient, too stiff. The same stands for Jugobanka and SSTK. There are serious opportunities for our participation in investment constructions, even more through technical cooperation where almost nothing has been done. Our neglect towards sending specialists to Indonesia is impossible to understand. Finding ways to cover small wages. It is worth investing relatively small amounts. Indonesia, more than any other AA countrys, provides opportunities for cooperation in the field of economy.

Serious results have been achieved in the field of armed forces. The visit of Nasution, Martadinata and Hidajat is opening new opportunities. Political and economic interests on both sides. Indonesia will be a long-term buyer of our military industry.

It is necessary to strengthen the Embassy, in number and quality of staff. Beside ambassador, there are one or two members of staff. This is no good. The possibilities of propaganda in economic field are unused. It is necessary to enable the learning of the Indonesian language which is a political and practical problem.

Pavlič

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**Agreed minutes of the Permanent Joint Yugoslav-Indonesian Commission
on trade**

June 13, 1961

During the meeting of the Permanent Joint Yugoslav-Indonesian Commission held in Belgrade on the 3rd and 9th June 1961, the following questions were addressed:

1 / Both sides are of the opinion that the prospects for future commodity exchange give rise to legitimate expectations.

However, in order to be realized, all possibilities for increased volume and range of commodity exchange need to be fully exploited. Therefore, both sides propose making further efforts to increase the Yugoslav purchase of Indonesian goods and to expand the range of Yugoslav goods exported to Indonesia, taking into account the recommendations made during the last meeting of the Joint Commission which was held in Belgrade in 1960.

2 / After considering the issues of Indonesian consignment stock in Rijeka, the two sides are of the opinion that such a form of cooperation can play an important role in improving the flow of goods to Yugoslavia and other countries. The Indonesian side, however, pointed out the problem of the sale of lower quality stockpiles in Rijeka and drew attention to the unsold quantities of 13 1/2 t of C quality cinnamon and asked Yugoslav businessmen for help in selling the unsold stock. The Yugoslav side expressed its readiness to draw attention to the Yugoslav businessmen and proposed to find ways and means for the resolution of this issue through coordination of Yugoslav and Indonesian companies.

The Indonesian side is of the opinion that the positive resolution of this issue will make greater range of consignment stocks attractive and provide a significant influx of Indonesian goods in Rijeka for the local market as well as for the joint sale of goods in the markets of third countries.

The Yugoslav side expressed its readiness to help Yugoslav trade organizations in maintaining consignment stock in Rijeka, as well as in selling goods in the Yugoslav market and the markets of the third countries.

Both sides agreed that the liability with respect to delivery of consignment goods should be further discussed in Djakarta.

3 / In relation to the last meeting of the Joint Commission which was held in Belgrade in 1960, Indonesians informed Yugoslav side about the benefits of the funds for pre-financing the purchase of goods through authorized Indonesian trade companies, directly from the manufacturer when they cannot collect amounts sufficient for the ocean transport, in order to enable a regular supply of goods.

Detailed information with this regard will be given to the Yugoslav side as soon as these are received from Indonesia.

4 / Yugoslav side presented its interest in buying tin from Indonesia. Indonesian side will submit request to the competent authorities, and with respect to the obligations under the "Tin Agreement", examine the options to reconsider the allocation of the tin stocks to allow the delivery of tin to Yugoslavia during this year.

Loan Agreement

5 / Both sides expressed their desire to undertake intensive efforts to utilize unused loans granted to Indonesia. The Yugoslav side presented its capabilities to deliver the equipment corresponding to the request set by the Indonesian side at the last meeting of the Joint Commission held in Djakarta, as well as its ability to deliver the equipment for another project plan regarding the development of Indonesia. Attached to this Agreed Minutes is a list of projects in which Yugoslavia can take part in Indonesia's Eight-Year Development Plan. The Indonesian side, on the other hand, expressed the hope that the agreement will be reached as soon as possible, between the experts of both sides in relation to the technical data for the projects already signed.

Scientific and technical cooperation

6 / Both sides noted that the scope of the existing scientific-technical cooperation does not reflect the actual potential and interests of the two countries.

Both sides propose to consider new forms of scientific cooperation, such as the training of local residents simultaneously with the construction of the project and the training in the production process, also to establish centres for training instructors and introduce other forms of training that will match the needs and capabilities of both sides. Keeping this goal in mind, the Joint Commission is of the opinion that during the upcoming trade negotiations in Djakarta they should consider the issue of expanding the existing agreement on scientific cooperation or conclusion of a new agreement.

7 / Yugoslav side expressed its desire that both sides consider the possibility of industrial cooperation, because this form of cooperation may be one of the important characteristics of economic cooperation between the two countries. The Yugoslav side considers it necessary to study such cooperation from the standpoint of the deliveries that Yugoslavia should make in the process of the execution of an eight-year plan of economic development of Indonesia, as well as from the standpoint of cooperation in production between industrial companies that produce goods for both domestic market and the markets of third countries.

The Indonesian side stated that there are chances for industrial cooperation through participation in joint production, as described on the previous occasions

by the competent authorities of Indonesia, through expanding mineral and coal mines in Indonesia. The connections between the respective companies have already been established. The Joint Commission believes that its mutual support is needed for the realization of such cooperation.

8 / Both sides are of the opinion that the establishment of the Yugoslav Technical Bureau in Djakarta could increase the promotion of mutual cooperation in realization of the Indonesia's Eight-Year Development Plan and cooperation on technical field.

Maritime cooperation

9 / Both sides expressed their desire to enhance cooperation in maritime navigation. The Indonesian side informed that they have established a body for the maritime transport of cargo with the task to receive the requests for ocean transport of cargo for specific shipping companies. Approximately 40% of the load was reserved for the ships sailing under the Indonesian flag. Given the fact that Indonesia does not have a sufficient number of oversea cargo ships, there are great opportunities for cooperation in the transport of cargo between Yugoslavia and Indonesian shipping companies. It is proposed to make detailed consultations on the possibilities of cooperation in the field of maritime cargo and shipbuilding industry which should be done during the visit of the Yugoslav economic delegation to Indonesia.

The Joint Commission shall inform without delay the relevant government bodies about the results of the talks so that the recommendations of the Joint Commission could be taken into consideration during the preparatory work for the holding of commercial negotiations in Djakarta.

Drafted in Belgrade on June 13, 1961 in two copies in the English language, both copies being equally authentic.

On behalf of the Government
of the Federal People's
Republic of Yugoslavia President
of the Yugoslav section
of the Joint Commission
V. Gajinović, m.p.

On behalf of the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia
President of the Indonesian section
of the Joint Commission
Dr R. A. Asmaoen, m.p.

Attachment 1

Yugoslavia can perform the following deliveries for the execution of Indonesia's
Eight-Year Development Plan

A. List submitted by the Indonesian section of the Mixed Commission during a meeting in Djakarta:

1. Factory of small electric motors
2. The cargo and passenger ships 750-10,000 tonnes
3. Vessels towing
4. Hydro power plants
5. Small shipyard
6. Limekiln
7. Cement Factory
8. Soles Factory
9. Paper Factory
10. Technical assistance and equipment for agricultural experimental lots

B. In addition to the above, Yugoslavia also can deliver the following:

1. Cotton spinning
2. Plants of tiles and bricks
3. Grain Mills
4. Factory of calcium carbide
5. Factory of tool machines
6. Workshops for industrial repairs
7. Machine workshops
8. Factory of agricultural devices

Verifies the accuracy of the translation:

Deputy Head of the International
Senior Contracts Officer
(Ljubica Vitalić)

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**A toast of President Tito in honor of President Sukarno on the occasion
of the unofficial visit to the Indonesian President to Yugoslavia**

Belgrade, June 16, 1961

At the lunch hosted in the premises of the National Board of Belgrade in honor of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Sukarno, President of the Republic of Josip Broz Tito gave the following toast:

Dear Mr President,

Dear guests,

Allow me to raise my glass to the health and long life of our longtime, trusted and dear friend Sukarno, the President of a friendly Indonesian country.

Over the years, on many occasions I have had the opportunity to personally meet dear President of Indonesia. And every time I met him, even if it was after a long time, it seemed as if we had parted yesterday. This means that we are not connected only by our identical views on many issues, but also personally, by a great friendship that I personally feel about President Sukarno.

And today, when he is among us in an informal visit, we have had the opportunity to exchange views with him and his associates on very important international issues. Our unity is proved to be even bigger and stronger.

I think that this particular visit – although short, because it will last only for two days – has a great significance for future events, for the meeting that will soon be held here, in Belgrade, where we will have the honor of seeing, among other heads of state, our dear friend, President Sukarno.

Raising my glass I wish good health and long life to President Sukarno, and happiness and prosperity to the friendly people of Indonesia.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-19

**Note on the negotiations of President Tito and President Sukarno,
held on June 16, 1961**

VII Department of DSIP

Top secret

Attending on Yugoslav side:

- President of FPR Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito
- Vice President of the Federal Executive Council Mijalko Todorović
- Army General Ivan Gošnjak
- President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal National Assembly Aleš Bebler
- General Secretary of the President of the Republic Bogdan Crnobrnja
- Assistant of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Josip Đerđa
- Ambassador Stane Pavlič
- Acting head of department in DSIP Miro Kreačić
- Translator – Branko Novaković

Attending on the Indonesian side:

- The President of the Republic of Indonesia Dr Sukarno
- The Deputy First Minister Dr J. Leimena
- Minister of National Defence and Security General Abdul Haris Nasution
- Indonesian Ambassador in Belgrade Dr R. A. Asmaoen
- Vice President of the National People's Congress Colonel Vilujo Puspjudo
- Minister of Labour Ahem Erningpradja
- Minister of National Industry Dr Suharto
- Vice-President of the Parliament Mursalin Daeng Mamangun
- State Secretary Mohamed Ihsan
and Deputy Chief of General Staff Colonel General Gatot Subreta

The note includes basic attitudes and thoughts based on the notes. There was no stenographer.

President Sukarno was interested in the Non-Aligned Conference and in particular the meeting in Cairo.

President Tito: The idea of the conference was maturing from the the session of the UN in the United States and during his trip in Africa. I talked about it with everyone in Africa: with Nkrumah, Touré, Nasser, the Moroccan king and the others and all of them were of the opinion that such a meeting would be very useful. Triple letter for a meeting in Cairo was not the expression of the desire for sponsorship but someone had to start.

At the meeting in Cairo, the atmosphere was mostly good. The problem was the size of the conference. India proposed Europe and the like. We pushed Algeria and managed to overcome the resistance. But in terms of Gizenga, the majority was against, and we were not able to call him to the conference.

When inviting countries to the meeting in Cairo, we considered the circumstances because we did not want to bring some countries in a situation to refuse the invitation. We also wanted to invite to Cairo some countries that we wanted at the conference. We were sure that the majority on the Cairo Conference was for the participation of Algeria, and so it was.

We also thought that from the Latin America we should first invite Brazil, Bolivia and Mexico and later consider Cuba. It turned out the other way around and it caused the reaction in Latin America.

I clarify this because there is a lot of speculation on the account of Yugoslavia. From the very beginning East and the West were attempting to make a negative impact to those countries regarding the conference. Indian press openly attacked the conference. The situation in India but I still think that Nehru will participate because India is one of the countries that has launched the non-bloc policy of coexistence etc. If any country would cancel its participation, including India, the conference would be held anyway. We are expecting concerted efforts against the conference. Due to various intrigues both Indonesia and Yugoslavia have to be cautious and try not to lose it.

The conference location was also discussed. Yugoslavia was nominated by some countries, Indonesia in the first place. Cuba has proposed Havana. Cairo group later joined Belgrade group, only Cuba remained persistent. The Cuban representative even threatened that Cuba will not participate if the conference is in Yugoslavia.

Our general position is that the conference should not represent a frontal attack on the blocs, that it must not contribute to tension in the international situation, but that it should start from the session of UN. We were against the Cuban concept of the liquidation of capitalism because it is an internal matter of each nation. I believe that we need the utmost patience and prudence if we do not want to be accused of riding on the coattails of any great powers or blocs. We fight for our principles which are common to all non-aligned countries.

President Sukarno: Thank you for your presentation regarding the conference. On my trip, I have also discussed the conference with the statemen.

Nkrumah agrees with the idea, but requests the role of a sponsor for the conference. At the meeting Touré – Sukarno – Nasser everybody agreed that sponsorship should involve all nations. Sekou Toure was a little angry with Nkrumah.

In Afghanistan, the King and Daud asked to be mentioned as the conveners of the Cairo Conference.

In Prague, Budapest and Moscow – but not in Beijing – they declared in favor of the conference. There were comments that the conference is not necessary, and that nobody should intrude when Khrushchev and Kennedy began to talk, and the like.

Khrushchev told me that the conversation with Kennedy was polite, but toned and with little threat on both sides. Both are cautioned not to make the wrong calculations. I think that Vienna conference did not bring the blocs closer.

The idea of sending foreign ministers in Cairo was ours because we are afraid of the tendency of dilution. We knew about some of the Indian views. Many leaders of progressive countries agree that we should invite Sweden and some other countries.

When I was in Cairo Gizenga asked for help. Nasser told me that they were trying to help, but could not. Nowotny told him most confidentially that they sent a plane with weapons, but the plane was shot down in the air. Khrushchev was ready to help but said it was difficult. We recognize Gizenga but seek a way to help him. I talked to Nkrumah about sending troops. He insisted that we send troops to the UN. We are ready to send troops, but only to Gizenga. Khrushchev had told him not to send troops to the UN, because they cannot trust them.

As for the Parliament in the Congo, Nkrumah, Nasser, and I believe that Gizenga should convene it. I have sent a message to Gizenga that I think he should not go to Leopoldville if the Parliament is convened in Leopoldville.

President Tito: We have recognized Gizenga, sent our representatives and the plane through the Red Cross.

I would like to thank President Sukarno for his initiative and cooperation in connection with the conference, the contribution and commitment of Indonesia. I think we have to act together to prevent future attempts to weaken the conference by the exchange of letters, messages and the like. This is especially important for the issues related to the content of the conference. We will have to, especially through speeches and on various other occasions, lead and guide the direction and objective of the discussion. This will allow for better preparation and understanding.

President Sukarno: I am of the same opinion, and this is the idea that guided me when I suggested sending a minister of foreign affairs to Cairo.

President Tito: We have agreed and immediately decided to send state Secretary K. Popović.

President Sukarno: We need to help Algeria. We bought weapons from the USSR worth 5 million dollars to send to Algeria, but the question is how to send it. Gizenga requests everything: weapons, drugs, various goods.

President Tito: We have also talked about providing armed assistance to the Algerians. There are difficulties in transportation. There are three barriers.

President Sukarno: I think that Yugoslavia is buying little goods in Indonesia and that it needs to increase imports to settle the balance.

Ambassador Pavlič: Commodity exchange is fairly balanced. The imbalance is due to the military supplies.

President Tito / informed by Pavlič / In July we are sending a bigger government delegation to Indonesia in order to expand economic cooperation.

President Sukarno: How are you going to finance the conference?

President Tito: The same way Bandung was financed. Do you have any ideas?

President Sukarno / joking /: Yes, we have, to pay as little as we can.

Someone from the Yugoslav side / joking /: It is our wish as well, to Yugoslavia as little.

President Tito asks President Sukarno to say something about his impressions from the trip.

President Sukarno:

Thailand is very, very slowly but still moving forward towards more progressive beliefs.

USA. I had a friendly conversation with Kennedy. US cannot openly take the side of Indonesia in respect of the West Irian, but Kennedy promises the pressure on the Netherlands, by means of the opposition in the Netherlands. Kennedy has personally acknowledged the right to Indonesia.

Mexico agrees with the idea of convening Afro-Asian-Latin-American conference regarding economic issues, and later regarding political issues.

Ecuador. The government is against the United States, of course not as openly as Cuba. There is a government of white Spaniards, whereas natives, who make more than 50% of the population, are suffering. He feels that the US interfere too much into internal issues of the country.

Bolivia. Paz Estenzoiro is a progressive personality. Bolivia and Indonesia account for 42-45% of world production of tin and are working to create the union for tin. In Bolivia, two delegation members were seriously ill because of the height.

All Latin American countries want the heads of the non-aligned countries to come to visit.

Uruguay. Still not good in Uruguay.

Brazil. Kvadros is a very good person. Kubitschek organizes a strong opposition. Kvadros wants direct economic relations with Indonesia. In Brazil there is a lot of corruption. Kubitschek's brother bought up the land for a pittance and is now reselling it for big money.

Ghana. Nkrumah was against Portugal and we agreed in the terms of Angola.

Afghanistan. Dynasty is leading progressive politics. He says that there is a hot war going about Pashtunistan / 50,000 people are hired / and the world knows nothing about it. They have asked for the support of Indonesia. Later on they have sent me a telegram to complain about the Pakistan bombing.

Vienna. The stay was pleasant, but Šerf is quite right-oriented.

Prague. I had a long conversation with Novotny. We will increase economic relations with ČSR. In Prague, Budapest in Bucharest, they are positive about the conference of non-aligned. There will be visits from these countries. Mihin is coming in August, as well as Zawadzki and Malinowsky – only Tito is not coming.

President Tito: Individual countries are moving forward but the international situation worsens.

President Sukarno: This is because imperialism is in danger, and tries to fight back. Khrushchev will sign a peace treaty in December. Khrushchev told me that in December he would proclaim a new program of KP which would not be socialist, but the alliance of communist SRs. In Moscow in 1967, there will be a big celebration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary and all heads of state of all countries will be invited.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-19

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Statement of President Sukarno about the visit to Yugoslavia

At the invitation of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, President of the Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno paid a friendly visit to Yugoslavia in the period from June 15 to 17, 1961.

President Sukarno was accompanied by the first deputy minister Dr Walldorf, Minister of National Defence and Security General Nasution, Vice President of the National Congress Colonel Vilujo Puspojudo, Minister of Labour Ahem Erningpradja, Minister of National Industry Brigadier General Dr Suharto, Vice-President of the Parliament of Lieutenant Colonel Mursalin Daeng Maman-

gun, Ministry – State Secretary Dr Mohammad Iksan and other senior officials. During the visit, President Tito and President Sukarno exchanged the views on current international issues of mutual interest as well as the possibility of extending cooperation between the two countries. The talks were held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere that characterizes relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the FPR Yugoslavia.

The two presidents expressed their great satisfaction with the decision to convene the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries on September 1 this year. The two presidents expressed confidence that this conference will be a new contribution of the non-aligned countries to the peaceful development of international relations and an important step in their cooperation, with the aim to exert a stronger positive influence on resolving the problems which get in the way of the world peace and the free and unhindered development of all peoples.

Given the current tensions in international relations, the two presidents welcomed the recent efforts made in the direction of easing international tensions.

During the talks, the two presidents expressed particular satisfaction with the development of wider and more comprehensive friendly cooperation in all fields of mutual relations.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-19

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Letter of President Tito to President Sukarno on the occasion of the Conference of Non-Aligned in Belgrade

Brioni, July 19, 1961

My dear Bung Karno,

I take this opportunity, through our new ambassador, Comrade Bebler, to thank you, first of all, once again, for the extraordinary warm wishes that you sent to me regarding my illness. I am now fully recovered and ready for the meeting in September.

On this occasion, I would like to ask you to do something about the uncertainty of some heads of state and government, who are considering not to come in person to the meeting but to send a second-instance or third-instance delegation. You need to explain to them that this is a meeting of the heads of state and government, and not of any delegation, and that it is very important to come personally; thus, the conference will have a greater importance.

In this regard I was also sending letter to some other friends, so that they could also affect those who are hesitating.

Since I will have the opportunity to talk to you when you come I will not write more and our new ambassador, Comrade Bebler will tell you about the preparations for the conference.

With most cordial greetings I wish you all the best.

Yours
[JB Tito]

AJ, KPR I-1/428

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Note about the talks of state Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Veljko Mićunović with the Ambassador of Indonesia Asmaoen, August 8, 1961

The Ambassador asked for a meeting. He says he comes by order of the government. Powered by the following questions:

1. Balkan Pact. The Government of Indonesia and President Sukarno know that B.P. is gone. Others underline the existence of B Pact as the main argument in propaganda against Yugoslavia. The Ambassador says that both East and parties in Asia are using it. He asks for information about of B. Pact, saying that his government does not pay much attention to it. I briefly inform him about the history, emphasizing that the pact has never been what propaganda tries to show, that after the normalization of our relations with the East, Pact ceased to exist, that our relations with Greece and Turkey, not only military, but also economic and the cultural were never built on trilateral basis, but only on a bilateral, that the secretariat of the Balkan pact de facto ceased to exist, that several years ago Yugoslavia announced its negative attitude towards any attempt of the Balkan pact to play a role in our relationships, that are Greece and Turkey acknowledged it and reconciled with that attitude of Yugoslavia. The only role B. pact has today is to serve as a slogan in advertising against Yugoslavia.

Judging by the Ambassador's questions I have got the impression that the advertising and perhaps some diplomatic initiatives of the Eastern camp about the Balkan Pact had certain effects with Indonesians. If the camp has taken some new activities against us, then it probably has taken them not only with Indonesians but also with others. Certainly, today's intervention of the Ambassador of Indonesia is not random and shows the extent of anti-Yugoslav activities of the

camp regarding the conference: from asking to invite the delegation of East Germany to the conference to exposing Yugoslavia as related to the West through the Balkan Pact.

2. Ambassador raises the issue of the interpreter that we engaged from the UN. He finds it inconvenient for the confidential work of the conference because all the secrets could be transferred to the West. I do not accept this kind of reasoning. I say that Yugoslavia was entrusted with the organization of the conference of the heads of state and government, and that is why qualified interpreters are hired, based on the public interest and not the secrecy of the speeches and documents of the conference. So far, none of the participating countries came out with the proposal of the secret work of the Conference. Ambassador mentions committees. I say that no one has mentioned the committees, that political discussion in the committees will not have secret character even if not published. I suggest, if they plan to have some secret conversations, they can take their own confidential translators.

This issue is also by the influence of the camp i.e. CP Indonesia, which has publicly attacked Yugoslavia due to the engagement of the United Nations interpreter.

3. The ambassador asks our government to provide a villa for Subandrio and other high officials of Indonesia. Sukarno will be staying at the Metropol. They plan special activities for Subandrio in contact with the Yugoslavs (and others) that will add to the success of the conference. This is not possible at the Metropol because they will be exposed. I say that I will transfer their request and support it.

(I think we should meet their request within the possible limits. Subandrio is the First Deputy Prime Minister, and will be affected if these are not met, this may not be a precedent for other smaller delegations).

Veljko Mićunović

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-4

**Note on the talks of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia
Koča Popović with the ministers of the United Arab Republic and Indonesia
Favzi and Subandrio, August 31, 1961**

Belgrade
Koča Popović's Office
Conf. No. 426880
August 31, 1961

I received them separately at my request, first Favzi, then Subandrio, 45 minutes each.

I presented the way we imagine the work and the course of the Conference. They agreed to all major aspects. And this:

[...] there will be closed meeting of the heads (Favzi says that it is more important than the general);

[...] that, given the confusing situation and possibilities for imputations, they should not yet invite Adoula and Gizenga; Adoula may want to legalize their government here, so that later, he could deal with Gizenga more easily; and here, as the head of the delegation he will have the primacy, not Gizenga;

As to the absence of Sekou Touré; Favzi said that it is the result of serious conflicts that occurred among the Guineas themselves; part of them (an insignificant part) is for greater reliance to the West, part for the non-aligned, and the third part, very active, for the camp.

About the Russian nuclear tests. They have showed great concern. We have agreed to take a common stand, because all parties will ask for the slightest difference. – It is difficult to assume that there will be no need for our public reaction: because of the great importance and seriousness of the event, and because it is timed just before our conference.

I asked both of them separately who would be the first to address, because both Nasser and Sukarno expressed the same desire. Favzi said I should try to persuade Subandrio that Nasser should be the one; of course, it is inconvenient to insist too much. However, it is not upon us to decide. Favzi hinted that they might agree to be second, but that he should be the first on the next session, i.e. the first under the chairmanship of Abud. However, he must ask Nasser.

Subandrio says that Sukarno insists. I tell him the same I have told to Favzi, asking to make a concession to Nasser and that if they are not willing to do so, to solve it with the UAR. Subandrio says he will try to solve it with Favzi – he understands that it is very delicate for us.

With Favzi I talked about the Israeli press. It would have been better if we had not let them, now they are here, and so on. We are ready not to allow them

the access to the building and rooms where the sessions would be held. Favzi insisted on the safety and on keeping these journalists anywhere near the official Arab representatives. But, he will talk about it with Nasser, because it is not certain that this will please them. I asked him not to require extreme solutions. I think we could provide the above. [...]

Koča Popović

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1961, F-118, dos. 1, no. 426380

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Note on the visit of President Sukarno to President Tito, August 31, 1961

Top secret, no. 481/1

Attending:

- Indonesians: President Sukarno, Sastroamidjojo, as well as other members of the delegation and the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia
- Yugoslavs: Aleksandar Ranković, Vladimir Bakarić and Bogdan Crnobrnja.

Congo. Comrade President Tito informed President Sukarno about the contents of the latest dispatches from Stanleyville, which show that Adoul and Gizenga anxiously await the invitation to come to the Belgrade Conference. He said he was in favour of inviting them.

President Sukarno said he is also for inviting Adul and Gizenga to the Conference.

Belgrade Conference. President Sukarno stated that his country belonged to the Afro-Asian community. Belgrade Conference, therefore, cannot be a substitute for the AA Conference, but only a supplement.

Belgrade Conference should take energetic measures against imperialism and colonialism. That is its significance. In his speech, he will personally present concrete proposals on the issue of colonialism.

President Sukarno also stated that Belgrade Conference should not be an aim in itself. It should be the first step towards a further action.

The first step should be a declaration, statement or charter which will be accepted by the Conference.

The next step would be to fight for the objectives of the Conference in the UN.

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Welcome Speech of President Tito at the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade

Belgrade, September 1, 1961

I am gratified to be able to extend to you, on behalf of the government and peoples of Yugoslavia, our warmest greetings and wish you a pleasant stay in our country. Our peoples consider it a great honour to have such a distinguished gathering take place in Yugoslavia, particularly the citizens of Belgrade which has, throughout its long history, seen many wars of conquest, invasions and invaders, and which has now, for the first time, the opportunity to welcome, in its midst, the highest representatives of large number of countries – champions of peace.

I particularly wish to express to all of you our sincere gratitude for your personal efforts and your contribution which has made it possible to have this gathering organised and convened in such a brief period of time. Considering the tremendous responsibilities that every one of you, as a statesman, has in his own country, your presence here demonstrates most explicitly your concern and the concern of your peoples for the fate of mankind and your wish to exert concerted efforts in the existing international situation in order to find a way out of the crisis in which the world finds itself at present.

In a few days it will be exactly one year since a large number of heads of state and government of many countries assembled at the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly for the purpose of helping to ease, by their participation, the grave international situation and contribute to the maintenance of peace. At the aforementioned session the nonaligned countries displayed for the first time their firm determination to exert resolute effects toward the peaceful and correct solution of international disputes as well as their resolution not to allow anyone to play with the fate of mankind in an irresponsible manner. No one can deny the fact that this first concerted action of nonaligned countries was successful.

In the first place, a tremendous moral success was achieved. However, today, one year later, we must, unfortunately, note that the situation is much worse, as the cold war has assumed proportions liable to lead to the greatest tragedy at any moment. Precisely because of this, it is necessary for the representatives of nonaligned countries to examine at the highest level, in a more detailed manner and in greater numbers, the dangerous international situation and to take, in this connection, coordinated action, primarily through the United Nations, in order to find a way out of the present situation and to prevent the outbreak of a new military conflict. The fact that this danger has reached its climax is clearly shown by all the preparations which are now being undertaken. Overt preparations for war are being made, mobilization is taking place, the manufacture of the most modern

weapons is being intensified, hydrogen and atomic tests are again being contemplated, and so forth. Only recently we have witnessed an open military aggression against an Independent state, Tunisia, where the unrestrained French soldiery has not only shed much of the blood of the innocent civilian population of Bizerte, but is, at the same time, continuously threatening both the integrity and independence of Tunisia.

Never in the entire post-war period has it been as urgently necessary as today that those states which are not aligned with any bloc should set forth with the greatest degree of unanimity, clearly and unequivocally, through their highest representatives, their views on problems which are leading the whole world to the brink of the greatest catastrophe in its history. The idea that nonaligned countries should participate, in one way or another, more effectively in international developments, particularly in those which are of direct and vital interest to them, stems from the realization of the fact that, in our time, the responsibility for the future of mankind cannot be borne by only a few states, irrespective of how large and powerful they may be.

The Bandung Conference and the principles proclaimed there was, after the adoption of the U.N. Charter, the first powerful display of this contemporary view of international relations. It was no accident that these principles were proclaimed precisely in Asia, in the presence of the representatives of the peoples of Asia and Africa, the two continents inhabited by the largest number of people on our planet, who had been enslaved, deprived of rights, and subject to discrimination through many centuries. The Casablanca Conference also reflected the determination of the peoples of Africa to decide themselves about their own fate and not to tolerate any longer the existence of any form of colonialism on African soil. In the same way as the Bandung Conference and other similar conferences which followed did not intend to establish any kind of bloc, the present conference does not pursue any such aims either. On the contrary, this conference should adopt a negative attitude towards bloc exclusiveness, which not only constitutes a threat to world peace, but also prevents other countries from participating as equal partners in solving outstanding International Issues. The fact that discrimination of this kind against these countries is gradually diminishing is, to a large extent, the result of a greater measure of unity of action on the part of the nonaligned countries with regard to various problems which are endangering world peace.

As a result of the experience acquired in the post-war period, when groupings of individual states began to emerge, all the countries outside these groupings have become profoundly convinced that increasing tensions in the world have been, and are still, arising precisely from this division of the world. This conviction is also shared by the broadest masses of people, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the blocs, as they feel that the mechanism of the blocs is acquiring to an increasing extent, its own pernicious logic. This divi-

sion has demonstrated that outstanding international problems cannot be solved from a position of strength. Actually, constant efforts are being exerted for the purpose of achieving superiority, in order to attain specific goals from a position of strength; that is to say, to solve outstanding questions in one's own favour. In these efforts lies the greatest danger of an outbreak of armed conflict and of a new catastrophe for the entire world. The recent past has shown clearly that the grouping of states into blocs usually leads to a settling of accounts by the force of arms. The history of recent years has also demonstrated that there need not even be two blocs, but that it is sufficient to have only one bloc for war to break out.

I think that it is well known how, in what order, and for what purpose the existing military blocs were established, and I do not intend to analyse this matter in greater detail here at the present moment. However, it is obvious that such a course was most unfortunate and has led to the present abnormal and perilous situation in the world. I feel, therefore, that it is high time to have this division removed, at least gradually, and to embark upon a new and fresh road of understanding and cooperation in international relations by means of peaceful negotiations. However, the best way of proceeding would be to settle outstanding issues through the United Nations, and it is precisely for that purpose that the world organization was created.

Such a practice in international relations in keeping with our times has already been put into effect by countries nonaligned with any blocs. At this conference also, attended by such a great number of heads of state or government of nonaligned countries, new standards governing relations among states should fully prevail. On the agenda are problems of exceptional and major importance, problems that the great powers have failed to solve so far, precisely because they approached them in the old way, in this connection, an obsolete and, in the present phase, extremely dangerous conception of prestige is still playing a crucial role.

Furthermore, there still prevails, as in the past, the practice that only the biggest, the most advanced, and militarily the most powerful countries attempt to make decisions involving the fate of the world, while a large number of small- and medium-sized countries, which are not developed for well-known reasons but constitute the majority of mankind, have been unable, until recently, to participate as equal partners in taking decisions on questions of general interest. These countries were looked upon, and are even today considered, as a kind of reserve and voting machine in international forums such as the United Nations and others. This gathering of the highest representatives of nonaligned countries illustrates, however, that such outdated practices must be discarded, that nonaligned countries can no longer reconcile themselves with the status of observers and voters and that, in their opinion, they have the right to participate in solving problems, particularly those which endanger the peace and the fate of the world at

the present moment. This meeting has been convened, *inter alia*, for the purpose of asserting this right. The nonaligned countries do not, of course, pretend to be able to solve alone the problems that the great powers have not been able to solve so far. However, they can contribute much both towards this end and towards easing dangerous international tensions in general. The adoption at this meeting of clear and unequivocal positions on current problems of vital importance will make it easier for the great powers to approach more realistically the task of reaching agreement on outstanding issues and to pay greater attention to the views of the representatives of countries which are not aligned with blocs, and whose strivings are shared by the majority of mankind.

Fears that this meeting might mark the beginning of the formation of a third bloc are groundless. Would it be logical for us, fighting against the division of the world into blocs, to create a third block? Would this contribute towards the relaxation of tension in the world? Of course not. We cannot pursue such aims as they would run counter to the political concept of nonaligned countries. If we examine the actual substance of blocs, their characteristic features, we find that their first and most important feature is their military aspect, the creation of military power. An unrelenting arms race is being pursued to gain superiority. The economic arrangements within bloc frameworks have a discriminatory character in regard to other countries. Embargoes are imposed on various products with the aim of exercising pressure upon a given country or several countries. All this and many other characteristic features of blocs are in contradiction with the general Interests and views of nonaligned countries and, above all, with the fact that these countries preclude the use of military force for the solution of any dispute. This will suffice to demonstrate that it is absurd to impute to a conference of heads of state and government of nonaligned countries the intention to establish a third bloc.

The purpose of this meeting is to make the great powers realise that the fate of the world cannot rest in their hands alone. It is to demonstrate to the protagonists of force that the majority of the world decisively rejects the use of force as a means for settling the various important problems we have inherited from the last war.

I can state without exaggeration that the countries represented at this conference, as well as many others which do not belong to any grouping, represent the great majority of world public opinion. They represent the conscience of mankind. Those who are contemplating war adventures must bear this in mind. Such an example was also provided by World War II. This war ended disastrously for the mightiest fascist states, which had made tyranny and force the guiding principle of their policy and war a means for achieving their aims; that is, for imposing their domination upon the entire world, ignoring humane and other moral principles which are asserting themselves with increasing force in the present world. The political conceptions and aggressive ventures of the Axis powers

aroused the entire peace-loving world, and this was bound to lead to the defeat of the powerful and, at that time, the mightiest military machine. The moral of this story is very instructive and it should be borne in mind by those who are indulging in sabre-rattling and are holding the world in a state of constant tension and fear.

May I now draw your attention to a fallacy which makes its appearance from time to time, in the press and in commentaries in general, regarding the course that the conference of heads of state or government of nonaligned countries will take: whether or not this course will be pro-Western or pro-Eastern. There is no ground for such speculations because we have not met here in order to support blocs, but to define clearly and coordinate our positions on the most important problems which are besetting the world today, and then it will become clear where our stands differ and where they coincide with those of one or the other side. On all the most important issues we shall adopt positions which will be not only in the interest of nonaligned countries but will be, generally speaking, in the interest of peace and of the entire mankind. They will, in our opinion, contribute to the lessening of dangers to peace and will show to world public opinion that there is a better way toward understanding than the threats of war.

Similarly, there is no ground for assuming that this or that country will be attacked here. It would be erroneous if we were to attack certain countries here, as such, purely for propaganda motives, instead of voicing our resolute disagreement with the methods applied by some great powers towards other countries. Because if we were to act in this way, we would not bring about a relaxation of tension in the world, but would, on the contrary, add to the tension. There is no doubt that we shall examine such problems as the question of colonialism in a consistent and serious manner. We shall pose this question in a clear form and insist on the final and early eradication of colonialism. The question of disarmament and use of atomic resources for military purposes, the problem of assistance to less developed countries, and others should be examined here in the same manner, I believe that we all agree that the success of the conference depends precisely on our consensus of views regarding these major questions of paramount importance for the safeguarding of peace. There are also other issues of secondary importance. On some of them it is not easy to reach agreement and they could, if insisted upon, impair the success of the conference. I am referring in particular to disputes between some of the nonaligned countries. In my view we should, for the solution of such questions, have recourse to the method of bilateral negotiations on the basis of peaceful understanding, a method which should be proper to nonaligned countries and which is in harmony with our principles.

This meeting does not necessarily require us to reach unanimity on all questions, but it would be extremely useful to reach unanimity on those problems which are at this moment of vital importance for all mankind—and I am convinced that the world is expecting this from us.

Therefore, in the present, extremely tense international situation this conference is the most competent forum, outside the United Nations, where the representatives of nonaligned countries can state, as simply and as strongly as possible, their views regarding the question of what the relations among peoples and states should be and how the solution of outstanding issues by peaceful means could end should be brought about without thereby impairing, but rather promoting, world peace and constructive cooperation among peoples. Assembled here at this conference, we are conscious that we are taking upon ourselves a great responsibility before the peace-loving world, which rightly hopes that we shall do everything in our power here to remove the danger which is hovering over mankind. The peoples of the entire world are expecting to hear a unanimous and resolute call against all that hampers the peaceful creative life of people on earth. People are already tired of the cold war, which is assuming ever sharper forms, and they fear the possible catastrophe which could be caused by a new world war. Therefore, I feel that we shall render a great service to the world, if we indicate clearly and resolutely the road towards a relaxation of world tensions and to the freedom, equality, and peaceful cooperation of all nations.

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Greeting speech of President Sukarno at the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade

Belgrade
September 1, 1961

Allow me, first of all, to express my heartfelt thanks to you, President Tito, and through you to the government and people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, for the warm reception extended to us all at this conference. As you well know, I myself feel perfectly at home in this great country, and I am sure that my fellow participants will enjoy their stay here because of the friendliness and hospitality of the people.

May I also at this point extend heartfelt thanks to all those who have worked on the preparations for this conference. Their preparatory comportsment in Cairo produced very important spadework. The work they did in formulating an agreed set of criteria for nonalignment and in drafting an agenda for our meeting, as well as their suggestions regarding the organisational aspects of the conference, have greatly helped to assure its success.

It was only a few short months ago that I, together with my good friend President Tito of Yugoslavia and President Nassir of the United Arab Republic, took the initiative in calling for the convening of a conference of nonaligned countries. Our initiative was based on the conviction that nonalignment has become a growing force in the world, a force standing for friendship among nations, for peace, for social justice – and that the time has now come to gather this force together, to turn it into a coordinated, accumulated moral force.

We made this call in the conviction that such a conference was needed, and that it would evoke widespread response. Speaking for myself, and I am sure that my co-initiators will agree, the actual response to our call has surpassed our expectations.

We come together here not as members of a bloc. Indeed, the countries which conduct a policy of nonalignment do not constitute a bloc. We abhor the very idea of blocs. We have come together because we maintain the view that the collusion of blocs, especially when based upon power politics end the armament race, can only lead to war, which in this nuclear era can only mean the extinction of mankind.

There was no prior consultation and agreement between us before we adopted our respective policies of nonalignment. No, we arrived at this policy inspired by common ideals, prompted by similar circumstances, spurred on by like experiences. There was no attest at compromise among us, no attempt to rout our disagreements, to raise our policies identical.

But not one of us, I think, will deny that we did inspire each other. The experiences of one country in discovering that the policy of nonalignment is the best guarantee for safeguarding our national and international politics have undoubtedly helped others to come to a similar conclusion.

Nonalignment is not directed against any one country, or against any one bloc, or against any particular type of social system. It is our common conviction that the policy of nonalignment is the best way for each of us to make a positive contribution toward the preservation of peace and the relaxation of international tensions. And let us be quite frank: it is no mere accident that we countries gathered here happen to be the ones who have set ourselves on the path of nonalignment. Every nation without exception basically desires such a policy, knows that it could help preserve world peace with the adoption of such a policy. But the possibility of conducting a policy of nonalignment depends not upon desire alone. It may be that because of historical background, because of immediate national interests, because of the geographical position, many countries do not have the opportunity or even the capacity to conduct a policy of nonalignment.

The ideal of convening this conference, as I have said, was born but a few months ago. But the idea of nonalignment is not new. It is an idea that has inspired many nations for many years. I am indeed proud that the Republic of Indone-

sia was one of the first protagonists. Ever since our proclamation of Independence in 1945 our foreign policy has been based, in the first place, on the principles of nonalignment. The following words are from the preamble of our constitution drawn up in 1945:

“... To set up a government of the state of Indonesia which shall contribute in implementing on order in the world which is based on Independence, abiding peace, and social justice“.

I am attending this conference, which enjoys the full and united backing of the entire Indonesian people, because I believe in the fulfilment of this profound word.

We who are participating in this conference come from all parts of the globe. We come from Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Our peoples are different in many ways, our cultures differ, our forms of faith differ, and so do our political systems. But in an essential way we do not differ. And that is in our determination to implement a new order in the world which is based upon independence, abiding peace, social justice. We do not differ in our determination to have the freedom to be free.

Thus, ladies and gentlemen, independence, abiding peace, social justice, the freedom to be free – these are noble aims indeed.

Independence means putting an end forever to the exploitation of nation by nation – indirect exploitation as well as direct exploitation.

Abiding peace means not the mere absence of war. It means removing the causes of conflict which threaten the world and split it into camps.

Social justice means Justice for all nations. So, not for one nation alone, not for one power alone, not for one group of nations, or for one power bloc alone.

The freedom to be free means the freedom to determine our own national policies, to formulate our own national concepts, unhampered and unhindered by pressure or intervention from outside. It is the freedom to conduct our political, economic, and social affairs in line with our own national concepts; it is the freedom to cooperate with all nations, to be friends with all nations, the freedom to oppose anything which means the rightful and just interests of any nation.

These are the principles for which we are aiming. Inevitably they will bring us into conflict with the vested interests of the past – yes, with the vested interests of the past. Our own bitter experience teaches us that the old equilibrium is based upon the domination of a few nations over the vast majority of mankind. And within nations, too, the ruling few live their lives of affluence and luxury at the expense of the millions who live in poverty and misery. This old equilibrium is seething with social revolt, the revolt of subjected nations against the domination of other powers, the revolt of the subjected majority against the ruling few.

From this point of view nonalignment is not neutrality. Let there be no confusion on that score. No. Nonalignment is not neutrality. It is not the sanctimonious attitude of the man who holds himself aloof—a plague on both your houses.

Nonalignment policy is not a policy of seeking for a neutral position in case of war. A nonaligned policy is not a policy of neutrality without its own colour. Being nonaligned does not mean becoming a buffer state between the two giant blocs. Nonalignment is active devotion to the lofty cause of independence, abiding peace, social justice, the freedom to be free. It is the determination to serve this cause. It runs congruent with the social conscience of men.

And now, If nonalignment is to become the coordinate, accumulated moral force we need, powerful enough to make its impact felt on the two conflicting blocs, powerful enough to call a halt, to save the world from catastrophe, It must be based upon a common approach to the basic issues confronting our world today – a new approach that will startle mankind by its freshness, its frank recognition of objective reality, its resolution to grapple with world problems, its determination to cut the Gordian knot strangulating international relations at the present time.

Yes, to call a halt before it is too late, for time is running short! Many problems demand immediate solution. As long as we fail to get to the source of the tension and strife we shall be working like amateur plumbers plugging up a leak here only to find a bigger one spouting up behind our very backs, and another, and yet another.

We must get to the source of the tension end strife, and to do this we must first have a common understanding of what that source is.

Prevailing world opinion today would have us believe that the real source of international tension and strife is an ideological conflict between the great powers. I do not think that is true. There is a conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of men, and that is the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination, the one pushing its head relentlessly through the crust of the earth which has given it its lifeblood, the other striving desperately to retain all it can, trying to hold back the course of history.

The world must recognise this conflict between the old and the new, recognise the existence of this conflict, and recognize all it means. Socialist states have emerged. Newly independent states have emerged, and with what tremendous speed in the past few years, with what tremendous speed. And side by side with this, science and technology have taken gigantic strides, achieving breathless new successes, while at the same time winning smaller but no less significant victories every day in mankind's battle to master the forces of nature and harness them to meet the rising demands, the rising expectations of peoples everywhere.

These factors are living realities in the world today. Their contours line the political and economic map of the world. But these contours are changing very fast. They need continual remapping if we are to keep up with reality.

The world must recognise that the new emergent countries, as a coordinated, accumulated force, are striving for the establishment of a new, stable equilibrium.

What do we mean by this new stable equilibrium? We mean that all nations must become independent; all nations must have the freedom to be free, the freedom to arrange their own national lives in accordance with their own wishes. The freedom to be free to build their own national foundations, politically, economically, culturally. We mean that all nations must be free to arrange their international relations as they see fit, based upon the principles of equality, justice, mutual benefit. We mean that no power shall interfere in the struggle of any other nation to find its own national concept, which no power shall attempt to force any other nation to change its ideology.

The emergence of nations, their tenacious fight to preserve the independence they have won at so much sacrifice, their resolve to end economic servility, is a process which encounters the resistance of the old forces of domination at every turn. But this resistance is blind. It is resistance that refuses to recognize reality that refuses to recognize the mark of history. The old forces of destination must be made to realize this. Let us be quite frank. These old forces play on the fear of their own people, play on their ignorance of the past realities of colonialism, and play on their suspicions. They say: "these Africans, these Asians, these Latin Americans, they are a bunch of communists."

We, nonaligned countries of the world, recognizing and accepting the reality of the emergent nations, have the bounden duty to win the understanding of the peoples in other countries, to tell them quite frankly that they cannot go on living at the expense of millions of poverty-stricken people. Their affluent societies are built upon the sweat and toll and tears of millions who spend their evenings not with their eyes glued on their television sets, but in a darkness pierced by the flame of a single candle. Their days are tormented not by the desire to have a better motor car than their neighbor, but by the desire to get their children a meager bowl of rice a day...

Have no fear, gentlemen, we are not children. We know a colonialist when we see one. We shall deal as effectively with new colonialism as we have dealt with, and are dealing with, the old one. Do not try to divert our attention from the present cancer rankling our bodies. Rid the world of these festering sores. Algeria, West Irian, Angola, Biserte. And have no fear, we shall then be skilled in the battle against colonialism in its purest form. We will be well equipped to with any new imperialism that may try to rear its ugly head.

On the other hand, beware of colonialism in a new cloak, the so-called neo-colonialism. This is also an item to be dealt with in our agenda because this is a real danger.

It is common to all that the old colonial powers, in having to leave their colonial territories, want to preserve as much as possible their own economic and sometimes also their political and military interests. This is carried out in various ways: creating strife among all layers of the local peoples, provoking the secession of one part of the colonial territories from the rest under the pretext of self-determination, creating chaos through military provocation, or – and this is also cannon – by fortifying their economic interests at the last moment, using even the most unscrupulous of means.

For most of us it was not an easy decision to come to this conference. Many problems occupy us at home. We are moving from one urgency issue to another to keep pace with the process of national advancement. But we came, because we knew this conference would be important, that it would take us an important step forward on the noble path of helping to establish and preserve peace based on prosperity, social justice, and cooperation among all nations.

This conference is not an isolated event in the experience of the new social forces. It is one of a series of major events in this process of emergence. The first was the Asian Relations Conference held at New Delhi in 1948. One of the resolutions of this conference condemned the military attack of the Dutch on the Republic of Indonesia. That conference was a protest against colonialism in its purest form.

The next major conference, and echoes of it are still reverberating around the world, was the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. The purpose of that conference was to cement and consolidate the cooperation between the independent peoples of Asia and Africa in their struggle for a just and prosperous society and the continuation of the struggle of the colonial peoples against imperialism and colonialism in all its forms. Then we have the regional conferences of our African sister nations.

And now we have this present conference, the basic purpose of which is to draw the nonaligned countries into a coordinated, accumulated moral force in order to help preserve world peace and bring about a new stable equilibrium based on a world order of social justice and prosperity.

I have already explained that such an order is not possible without the eradication of colonialism and imperialism in the world.. Our conference today and the Asian-African conference are two comrades-in-arms. If we want to make dynamic progress in the struggle for liberation, emancipation, and world stability, I hope this conference will bear in mind the necessity for a second Asian-African conference in the near future.

I also deem it necessary to express my hope that at the end of this conference the international world will appreciate the compactness and dynamic unity inherent in all the decisions of the Belgrade convention. For this purpose, I hope that the conference can accept a charter of statements, or declarations, by our

convention in Belgrade. This charter will embrace all the decisive we will have taken.

The existence of the charter of statements certainly would facilitate the forwarding of the decisions of the convention directly to the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly, so that the benefits of the result of this conference as a complementary body to the Asian-African conference could immediately be utilised by the members of the United Nations. It is up to the Belgrade conference to determine the composition of the mission which is to present the charter of statements to the U.N. General Assembly this year.

Yes, Mr Chairman, let us bear in mind: Our purpose here is to contribute relentlessly to the struggle against remnants of colonialism and imperialism, to make a collective contribution toward easing international tension, to coordinate our efforts to facilitate the process of emancipation between nations, to build not only new nationhood, but also a new world, to build the world anew.

Yes, our purpose is to build the world anew. There is no alternative to that. The conviction that this is so much urging us to even greater efforts until our struggle has been crowned with success. Through the years our parts as independent nations have expanded and we cannot evade these responsibilities.

A glance at the agenda, ladies and gentlemen, of this conference clearly shows that the basic problem besetting the present day world arises from the two radical processes in the history of mankind: first, the process of liberation of the colonized peoples, and second, the process of emancipation of all nations from poverty and injustice. These two processes go hand in hand. They are inseparable. They are like Siamese twins. Try to separate them from each other and both will die!

I have already spoken at length about the process of liberation. Not a single person in this hall would dispute the fact that colonialism must be eradicated completely, irrevocably, for our own sake and for the sake of the whole world. There is no power on earth that can stem this tide of liberation...

We must demand, again demand, the immediate cessation of the colonial wars now raging in Angola, Algeria, Tunisia. We must not rest a moment until we have stopped these wars, until we have halted this criminal bloodshed and terror; all perpetrated so as to preserve the old order...

He must demand that a time limit be imposed for the complete removal of all forms of colonial subjugation of one nation by another. In the case of every single remaining colonial regime the time element must not exceed, two years and less, if possible less than that.

As you know, we in Indonesia have a colonial problem, because one-fifth of the territory of the republic of Indonesia is still occupied and dominated by the Dutch colonialists. It is the territory of West Irian. West Irian is an undividable

part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Indonesia. We demand that the authority of the republic be established in that region forthwith.

The problem of emancipation lies at the source of many of the international issues which have been put on the agenda of the conference. The problem of nonintervention and noninterference, the problem of peaceful coexistence, the problem of racial determination, yes, and even the problem of the structure of the United Nations – all these problems have been pressed out of the scene by the process of emancipation.

As a result of this process, new social and economic forces have emerged in the world. Socialist countries based on Marxism have emerged. Independent countries, big and small, have emerged in Asia and Africa and, side by side with other independent countries, they are pressing for national construction and for laying a solid foundation of the building of their nation based on the requirements of our age...

What is then the way to solve burning present day issues? Where the conflict of the old interests and the emerging forces has become very acute and explosive, we must as a first step accept the status quo. As a second step we must accept the principles of peaceful coexistence, not only in words but also in deeds. Concrete action must be taken to reduce feelings of hostility by urging the contending parties to initiate talks with the aim of beginning to understand each other. Do not befog the issues by standing stubbornly by previously adopted positions in order to save face. The aim must be to find an acceptable solution around the negotiating table so as to save the world from destruction.

Let me issue a warning. Miscalculation of the facts as they stand, bluffing in order to see how far the other side will go, may bring us to the verge of disaster. The alternative to peaceful coexistence between the two blocks is war, war of an unimaginable magnitude.

True, peaceful coexistence does not immediately restore the position to normalcy. It does not remove conflict, but it does remove acute feelings of hostility. And that alone is a gain.

This is why Mr Chairman, we in Indonesia firmly believe that the ideological conflict is not, I repeat not, the main problem of our time. It is not a problem which affects the majority of mankind, such as poverty, disease, illiteracy, and colonial bondage.

But people might ask, if they adopt the principle of peaceful coexistence, will this mean preserving the status quo forever?

My reply is quite definitely no. No, how can we expect to perpetuate the division of nations? How can we expect to prevent nations from evolving their own national concept of life, based upon their own brand of socialism, Marxism, or capitalism? How can we prevent nations from replacing monarchies with republics, or the reverse, if they wish?

No, peaceful coexistence cannot and should not perpetuate the status quo. It must allow every nation to develop as it sees fit. Unhampered by external pressure or interference.

Applied to Germany and West Berlin these principles can, I am sure, reduce the acute tensions of today. Formalize or legalise existing conditions, remove all possibility of a spreading of hostilities, accept the differences in social outlook, avoid every single step, every single act which might provoke greater mistrust and suspicion, withdraw all interference from outside, and let the Germans themselves decide their future destiny. Let them initiate talks in a serious effort to reach understanding. Let them take initial steps, however small, toward the creation and strengthening of a regular form of contact. Trade, for example, is an excellent example of this. After all, the Germans are wise enough to know the international conflict over Germany would obliterate their entire national life, and rearmament will not save them from this fate.

Commonsense, yes, commonsense must prevail. Commonsense demands the recognition of the temporary *de facto* sovereignty of two Germanys as a big reality. Commonsense also demands that West Berlin should not become the playground of big power conflicts, or ideological conflicts. The people of West Berlin should be left to themselves to conduct their lives without interference from outside. The people of West Berlin should have free access to the other part of the world and the people of the world should also have free access to West Berlin. This, I think, can be arranged through the recognition of both Germanys as the *de facto* position of two states. And, if the Soviet Union chooses to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany, let it be so.

To achieve this, the big powers must come to the negotiating table to end the present crisis fully conscious of their responsibility toward the world. The problem of Germany, a nation divided against itself, has too long been a threat to peace in Europe and the world. The nonaligned countries, by proposing principles for its solution, such as I have outlined above, can make a major contribution toward preserving world peace at a time when it stands in great danger.

Now something about the United Nations. The rapid march of developments in the past few years, the establishment of new independent states, the rule of nonalignment in international affairs, the growing desire for peaceful coexistence, the march of the revolution being waged by three-quarters of mankind, are showing with increasing clarity that the structure of the United Nations needs to be overhauled. The United Nations were set up in 1945. Who can deny that the political map of the world has radically altered since then? Who can deny that the composition of the big powers has altered? Who, for example, can deny that the People's Republic of China exercises authority over more than 600 million Chinese people?

The United Nations must not be allowed to become the instrument of any power bloc. We know from experience that the United Nations are not functio-

ning properly today... For all these reasons I strongly urge that the United Nations structure requires reorganization. This applies to the membership of the United Nations in general. This applies to the membership of the Security Council, as well as to the composition of the secretariat, and other U.N. bodies.

Another problem ladies and gentlemen, on our agenda, is the question of disarmament. No one here in this hall disagrees with the need for disarmament. Indeed, people all over the world are more and more persistently demanding disarmament; they demand this because history has taught time and time again that the armament race leads to war. They demand this because rearmament is one of the most effective ways of subjugating other peoples, because rearmament is the road to imperialism. They demand this because disarmament will release tremendous resources for construction and for raising living standards throughout the world.

The rearmament race is the result of fear and mistrust between the big powers. And, likewise, the rearmament race leads to greater fear, greater mistrust. Therefore, we believe that the key to success in disarmament rests where? In disarming mistrust, disarming fear, disarming men's suspicion of one another. The nonaligned countries must be given an active role, again, an active role in the path of finding a solution for this complicated problem.

We demand this because the decision of peace or war should not be left to the big powers alone, nor should the decision of peace or war be left mainly to the powers which possess nuclear weapons and metals. The decision of peace or war is a matter which should be in the hands of all people in the world. This alone is the surest way to peace.

International tension between the blocs reflected by the cold war is an obvious outcome of the lack of sufficient faith in the necessity of peaceful co-existence.

Peaceful co-existence cannot be an armed truce, it must be a creative and fruitful cooperation among all peoples and all social systems so that all may prove their efficiency in serving free men, and make room for a common reaction capable of promoting the political, economic and social development of all nations.

As a result of the lack of faith in peaceful co-existence, the hopes for finding a solution to the problem of disarmament have not yet been realised. In fact, despite the efforts exerted on disarmament and the banning of nuclear tests, an increase in armaments is the prevailing tendency today, while the only progress disarmament has attained is no more than a series of long and tiring talks which have yielded nothing fruitful or dependable.

Another cause for deep regret is that in this atmosphere billed with anxiety the Government of the Soviet Union found itself in a position which according to its own point of view, led it to the resumption of nuclear tests.

This decision shocked me just as it shocked world public opinion. Yet whatever the motive that prompted this decision, the most important thing about it is its clear bearing on the deterioration of the dangerous international position.

It is painful that the armament race was not confined to the United States and the Soviet Union alone, but we actually found other countries such as France which persist in provoking world public opinion by holding nuclear tests in the homeland of peoples who refuse to allow their land to be the field of such experiments. In the same way, aid and trade have been used as a veil to dominate the resources of nations and exhaust them for the benefit of the exploiters. The policy of economic and monopolistic blocs was equally directed to this end.

Then the imperialist powers resorted to partitioning of the nation and establishing bases in them, destroying the unity of the unified nation and establishing in its territory the base for aggression when the need arises, which we were able to witness during the War for Suez.

Furthermore, those forces used those bases in order for the purpose of a far-reaching infiltration. Casablanca Conference proved this fact when it condemned Israel, which served as a springboard to neo-colonialism in Africa and the tool of its ambitions...

Under the protection of imperialism, policy of racial discrimination has become more common and consistently reflected itself in exploitation of a man by a man. In fact, the logic of racial discrimination is identical to the logic of imperialism. Discrimination among people in terms of color represents only an introduction to discrimination in terms of their rights.

In this atmosphere in which peace depends on the frightening nuclear equilibrium, many forces attempt to exploit this situation to their advantage. At the head of those forces are the colonial powers and the reactionary elements hostile to progress...

The use of weapons in the fight against the Algerian people and throwing American bombs on the people of Angola, shows the ignoring of all principles of the United Nations under the pressure of bloc policy, as we have seen in the attitude taken by the US in relation to aggression in Bizerte during consideration of this problems in the UN General Assembly.

Neocolonialism appeared trying to achieve the same exploitative goals as the old colonialism, using new methods that are seemingly more in line with the spirit of the times.

In this field, military alliances were directed more against internal fronts of the nations that sought to free themselves from their present conditions than against foreign aggression.

There is no doubt in our estimation that the day marking the end of colonialism will also mark the end of racial discrimination...

If I were to move on to an attempt to think of a solution in the light of our principles, I would find the following:

1. It is now essential that sabre-rattling be silenced, and the opportunity be afforded for calm negotiations to be undertaken at the highest levels, for there is now no choice between two extremes, negotiations or war. It appears to us essential that there should be a meeting of leaders at the earliest possible time.

We should not be discouraged by the fact that our attempt in New York failed to bring about a summit conference at that time between the American President and the Soviet Premier, though more than forty nations supported this proposal.

We must also recall that the meeting held between Premier Nikita Khrushchev and President John Kennedy in Vienna last May was the realisation of this proposal. Nor must we be discouraged by the fact that the meeting held in the Austrian capital did not achieve the objective hoped for. Under the conditions facing the world today, none of us should despair; negotiations are essential and if they do not succeed, we must try anew. Negotiations are the only means to peace based on justice. Peace cannot be established on the bases of missiles with nuclear warheads.

However, it is our duty here to seek to bring about an atmosphere where such a meeting would be to our greater benefit and use.

It is now imperative that every effort be exerted to enable the United Nations to carry out its mission. With all the changes that have taken place in the world since the founding of this international body in 1954, it is essential that this organisation adapt itself to the present dynamic nature of the world.

In this connection, the constructive changes should extend to the administrative machinery of the United Nations itself since it constitutes an instrument to implement its will.

The changes should also extend to the distribution of power in its various centres, I cannot conceive why certain parts of the world should remain without representation in the Security Council, nor can I imagine how a country like the Peoples' Republic of China should remain outside the United Nations, while a quarter of the world's population lives within its borders.

The United Nations must then fulfill the aspirations for which it was set up and must become a sphere of work for peace and for progress. It is regrettable to see this international organisation representing the great hopes of humanity sometimes transformed into a field of conflict between the blocs, or that attempts are made to make of it a tool in the hands of colonialism. Matters have reached such a point that the very resolutions of this international organisation, in certain circumstances have no more life than that permitted them by the policies of the major powers. There can be no greater evidence of this than the United Nations resolutions concerning the rights of the people of Palestine which, after so many

years, have remained mere scraps of paper, because the policy of certain major powers in our area wished to bolster Israel in defiance of every law and justice...

It is essential now to afford the greatest possible chance of progress to the nations which have not completed their economic and social development.

We must bear in mind that there can be no stability in a world where such scandalous differences as we see today exist between the standards of living of nations.

The world we live in today is, one world; its fate, whether in peace or war, is one. We have all shared in the creation of Man's civilisation throughout history; the centres of learning have moved from one continent to another. Consequently, each of us has a share in the progress resulting from all human civilisation. We have all contributed to the creation of the prosperity of those privileged today, and although I do not wish to arouse ancient rancours, industrial progress in very many countries in Europe, for example, has been established on the wealth systematically dredged from Asia and Africa.

Hopes for progress would increase if the mad rush towards armament, particularly in the atomic field, were stopped and if the vast energies in this sphere were directed towards serving the realms of progress...

It is essential that the non-aligned states which have taken upon themselves the responsibility of working for peace, should continue with what they have started, backing their objectives with co-ordinated efforts for their realisation. This can be attained through constant co-operation and consultation as well as through coordinated efforts both within and outside the United Nations. It is not sufficient to begin, it is important to continue until we attain our goal, which is at the same time that of mankind throughout history and all over the world.

Our peace movement must remain free and powerful. We have to maintain the widest possible fronts. In addition to continuous contact between us, we should constantly encourage and show our full support for all common and constructive efforts aimed at securing peace by encouraging the preservation of freedom and development. You need to stay in constant contact with two opposing military camps, as non-bloc policy does not mean that we distance ourselves from the problem; it means that we have to contribute to strengthening understanding and creating opportunities to communicate ideas and thoughts over deep gaps caused by crises.

Međunarodna politika, no. 274-5, Belgrade, 1961, 9-10.

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Message of President Sukarno to President Tito regarding the visit to Kennedy

New York, September 13, 1961.

My dear Comrade Marshall Tito,

I herewith send through your Ambassador Pavićević in New York the reply I received from President Kennedy upon the message of the Conference. In short President Kennedy is in principle willing to meet Khrushchev in order to solve the German crisis through negotiations.

On the other hand, in order to prevent a failure of a summit meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy, it is regarded very desirable to have a meeting between the U.S.S.R and the U.S.A on the Foreign Minister level first, so that common meeting grounds can be established.

Kennedy regards a failure of an immediate summit meeting as tantamount to war and for that reason careful preparation is essential.

As emissary of the Conference together with our friend Keita my task is to urge Kennedy for a summit meeting.

My personal impression is that even on the substance of the German crisis, a compromise can be achieved between the U.S.S.R and the U.S.A, so that at least the acuteness of the situation can be removed.

Further I want to inform you that in the bilateral talks between Kennedy and me, Kennedy regards it desirable to have the American point of view on the German problem communicated to Khrushchev.

For this purpose I send Subandrio to Moscow.

Yours Sincerely,
Sukarno

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Letter of President Kennedy to President Sukarno on the message of the Conference of Non-Aligned in Belgrade, September 13, 1961

New York
The White House, Washington
13 September 1961

His Excellency Dr Sukarno
The President of the Republic of Indonesia

Dear Mr President,

I have carefully studied the message of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, which you were so kind to deliver personally. The US government is aware that the non-aligned forces gathered at the Belgrade Conference represent an important part of world opinion, and that preservation of peace is of vital importance for their and for our nation. We will carefully consider within the US government and our allies the message of Conference.

Regarding the proposal to get in direct negotiations with Premier Khrushchev, we are willing to use existing and appropriate channels to create a possibility for overcoming the current situation. Our policy was and remains to find a way to solve our problems peacefully. We are not trying to create a crisis, and we believe it is the duty of all responsible governments to find all possible ways, including negotiations at the highest level, to find mutually acceptable solutions of current international problems. However, if such negotiations are not carefully prepared in advance, they are subject to failure and can lead to worsening of the situation. Therefore, we believe that in a time of high tensions, the negotiations proposed by the Belgrade Conference should not only be carefully prepared, but also that there are reasonable prospects for success.

The foreign ministers of Western powers are meeting in Washington tomorrow. Next week, the Minister of Foreign Affairs will lead the US delegation at the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. We understand that the Foreign Minister Gromyko will also be present. This will provide the opportunity for serious talks regarding the Germany issue and other problems if the Soviet side is willing. Diplomatic channels are willing to make a constructive step towards reducing tensions. There are other means if they can serve a useful purpose. It is clear that it is of paramount importance to avoid unilateral acts that would hinder peaceful progress.

If we are pragmatic and if there is a genuine desire on both sides to reach mutually acceptable solutions, we see no reason why any negotiations would not be successful in overcoming the current crisis. However, we have no intention to

negotiate under ultimatums or threats. It is also clear that we are not proposing to discuss avoiding our responsibilities or waiving modalities for the implementation of these responsibilities.

However, we believe that it is possible to find a solution that would meet the vital interests of both sides in the current crisis.

The USA have carefully reviewed the text of the Belgrade Declaration that Berlin and the German situation are of vital importance for the future development of international relations. Our policy has consistently been and still is to resolve differences with realism and responsibility. We wish to point out that the initiators of this crisis are Soviet and not American acts.

We approve of the part of the declaration relating to the right of all nations to unity, self-determination, independence and its condemnation of pressure, intervention and interference in the right of self-determination. We assume that these principles should also be applied to Germany and Berlin.

Our policy in this area is to respect these principles. We have absolutely no intention to use force or threat of force in resolving the Berlin and German issue, but we are determined to respect our commitments and we are ready to respond to the force by the force if the same is used against us. While the US and its allies agree that negotiations on this issue are necessary, the Soviet Union must show the readiness to start negotiations based on mutual respect. The only readiness and willingness it has shown is for the consideration of the conditions relating to the transfer of Western law.

The US still believe that urgent conclusion of the contract regulating nuclear test bans and corresponding control. We want to emphasize, however, our belief that the negotiations on banning the nuclear tests should be conducted separately from the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Resuming of the Soviet tests in the atmosphere has reinforced the urgency of the conclusion of an agreement to ban tests. Comprehensive negotiations on general disarmament should not lead to delay reaching this step.

I regret that the Soviet Union refused the offer of the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States to suspend the atmosphere tests causing radiance.

After careful consideration of the security of vital interest to the United States, and after extreme provocation, we have announced our intention to continue underground testing. Non-Aligned countries can be sure that we are willing to negotiate an effective contract, but in the meantime national security interests of our country and our allies in the free world must be protected. The USA are hoping that the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations will devote full attention to the question of banning experiments, which will, hopefully, persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its opposition to effective control and will accept the treaty on banning experiments.

USA is pleased to note that the participants at the recent Belgrade Conference highlighted the importance of an efficient system of inspection and control. This is the core of the problem. It is clearly evident from the US proposals on negotiations on nuclear testing that the US has in mind the process of inspection and control in the field of disarmament in which the undeveloped countries, and others took part.

For several months the United States have been extensively studying the problem of general disarmament which resulted in a request to Congress to create an agency for disarmament. The study has also resulted in the elaboration of a comprehensive plan for general and complete disarmament, which is in the final stage of preparation for publication. This plan contains a program which provides general and complete disarmament, and according to which the war will no longer be an instrument for resolving international disputes, and that disarmament will be followed by the appropriate measures for the peaceful solution of conflicts and maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The American obligations towards these goals go too far. Our colleagues in the world community will not find us hesitant in this matter.

The talks between the United States and the Soviet Union which were continued on September 6 in New York invested efforts in order to connect the two sides and to form a satisfactory forum for disarmament. A proposal submitted by the United States during the negotiations provides for the participation of the non-aligned countries in the future broader disarmament talks. They also provide for negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations if the USSR agrees. The United States believes that the General Assembly will have the opportunity to enter more deeply into this matter as there is a special committee within the Commission for Disarmament, which may be called at any time.

Finally, allow me Mr President, to say that in the message and declaration we have found the elements that reflect a sincere desire for easing tensions, and which, if applied in a truly neutral and objective way, could be of positive benefit in easing global tensions.

We respect, as always, the desire of other nations to remain non-aligned. We understand with share their longing for peace. We are ready as always to cooperate with all initiators to improve the situation in the world. We look forward to continuing friendly relations with the governments and peoples who participated in the Belgrade meeting.

Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy

Letter from President Tito to President Sukarno regarding the Kennedy's letter, September 18, 1961

Brioni, 18 September 1961

My dear Karno,

I would like to express some of my thoughts on the contents of the response of the US President Kennedy to the message of the Belgrade Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries.

US President Kennedy and Prime Minister of the USSR Khrushchev do not reject the necessity and possibility of the meeting. It is a progress by itself. President Kennedy only insists on solid preparation and going to previous discussions on the lower level. It seems to me that the Soviet government agrees in principle with such a procedure. We suppose that neither non-aligned countries could be against it, because this time it is really necessary to approach such a meeting with serious preparations, so that it could deliver the deliver results.

Kennedy argues that the US government has no intention to negotiate under ultimatums or threats. I think it is right and it fits the views of the non-aligned countries.

In response, President Kennedy argues that the principles of the Declaration regarding "unity, self-determination ... condemning pressure, intervention and interference" must apply to Germany and Berlin. Of course we are for general application of these principles. But non-aligned countries are not responsible for the situation in Germany. Germany has caused two wars with tens of millions of casualties and huge destruction, and, therefore, these principles cannot be treated separately from the problem of demilitarization of Germany. In addition, the present situation in Germany is the result of the relationship between the two companies.

As for nuclear testing, we cannot agree that they should be restored by any country, but we believe that they should be discontinued immediately and to begin negotiations on their final prohibition; just as it was stated in the Declaration, either on the basis of a separate agreement or under an agreement on general disarmament. Regarding the insistence of the US government to control the "core issues", I do not think we can agree, although control is necessary. I believe that the US government should and could make concessions therein.

President Kennedy announced a new US plan for complete and general disarmament. Non-aligned countries can only welcome such a constructive initiative, no matter from which side it came. We can be pleased with the fact that the plan provides the participation of non-aligned countries in the disarmament talks,

under the auspices of the United Nations. Kennedy suggests the convening of a Special Committee of the Commission for Disarmament, but I think that, regardless of that, we should not give up the request contained in our Declaration about a special world conference or a session of the UN.

I consider it my duty to inform you that I have sent letter to the President of the Soviet government Khrushchev and US President Kennedy, and that so far I have only received a written response from President Kennedy.

I think that the events confirmed that our actions with the US and the US-SR were justified. I also believe that it will be very useful to stay in contact for the purpose of exchanging views on current events and coordinating necessary actions. I will be very grateful for any idea or suggestion, that you feel the need to tell me.

Finally, I would like to inform you that I have sent the President of the Soviet government Khrushchev a letter in which I have pointed out the serious consequences of nuclear tests, expressing an opinion on the urgent need for their suspension. I think it would be good if other heads of non-aligned countries did something similar.

I congratulate to you and President Modibo Keita on successfully completed mission – under the given circumstances. I think it is good that you have sent Subandrio to Moscow.

Wishing you all the best

Sincerely yours

AJ, KPR I-1/430

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Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on the reactions to the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade

Top secret, no. 16/61
September 19, 1961

Subject: Belgrade Conference and Indonesia

Although it is too early to give a definite and full assessment of the reflection of the Belgrade conference in Indonesia, however, we wish to point out to certain reactions that have already been noticed here. In doing so, we do not cla-

im that our assessments will not, later, depending primarily of attitude, explanations and activities of the leading people of this country, update and change.

In the beginning, as it is well known, the public and even the senior officials of political parties and a good part of the members of the government were not familiar with the idea of the Conference. Moreover, even for the Indonesian leadership, in the very beginning, the idea of the conference was limited to a pair of current international issues confined to issues of colonialism and primarily the issue of Algeria, Congo etc. Naturally, the Conference was expected to deal with the question of West Irian which would significantly strengthen the Indonesian position towards the Netherlands.

Together with the maturing of the idea of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (initially limited to eighty countries) political and state leadership of Indonesia was obsessed with the idea of holding the second AA Conference, and has even taken concrete actions in this direction. The success of the Bandung Conference and affirmation of Indonesia during this period, as well as the personal affirmation of individual personalities – President Sukarno, Ali Sastroamidjono, Ruslan Abulgani etc. – and the fact that immediately after the Bandung Conference came a period of fruitful cooperation of AA countries, fed the illusion in a number of political figures, that a new AA conference could achieve more or less the same results that it achieved in 1955. They neglected the fact that the situation in 1961 was different, that the bloc division was much sharper and the international stage had a new significant power embodied in non-bloc, non-aligned countries. They have also neglect the fact that a regional conference included a pair of non-aligned countries as well as the countries strongly related to the existing blocs can give the contribution to mankind that is necessary.

The idea of holding the second AA conference was quite strongly supported by the People's Republic of China, which, since its Cold War politics suffered a significant defeat in this part of the world, especially after the conflict with India, on the one hand and the solution of the border dispute with Burma and the Chinese minority in question Indonesia, on the other hand, was more or less trying to regain its former influence and take advantage of second AA Conference to achieve their goals. In addition to the People's Republic of China, this initiative was also supported by CP Indonesia whose representatives in the Supreme Advisory Council underlined the need for holding another AA Conference, clearly with a certain tendency to use the second AA conference for the purpose of further escalation of the international situation and its use in the bloc purposes.

However, the more the question of the Conference of Non-Alligned Countries was becoming relevant, the more was maturing the knowledge that the Non-Alligned Conference is a new phenomenon in international relations; that such a conference would inevitably contribute to the easing of the international tensions, peace and faster development of underdeveloped countries.

The statement of President Tito and President Nasser, as well as the letter sent by the heads of the two states to other countries and Sukarno's support have put the question of the Conference of Non-Aligned to the centre of attention, and also enabled the protagonists of the second AA conference within Indonesia to develop activities that objectively led to demobilization, suspicion about the conference of non-aligned countries. The initiator and the real leader of this action was Ali Sastroamidjojo who advocated the view that such a conference can discuss about anything except the matters which have already been discussed at the Bandung Conference or which will find its place on the second AA Conference; that the Conference of Non-Aligned was burdened by the risk of introducing a discord in AA unity, because it will oppose aligned to non-aligned countries, which would be very dangerous and so on. This attitude has encountered some support in the MFA with certain officials, and also imposed the pressure on the government, which was pretty much disoriented and insufficiently informed since during their journey President Sukarno and Subandrio had almost no communication with the government in Jakarta.

But it is typical that the provincial press at first supported the idea of the Conference of Non-Aligned, while the central press, with the exception of "Indonesian Observer" and "Bintang Timur" (a pro-communist newspaper that published a positive article immediately after the announcement, but was directed to "correct" it) mainly asked the question: Won't the Conference of Non-Aligned weaken the efforts for holding the second AA Conference, as well as what and whether Indonesia would have any benefit from the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.

The KPI press and generally the activities of KPI contributed to spreading doubt in the chances of the conference using negative attitude of Ali and PNI towards the Conference, never missing a single moment to attack our country, stressing "membership in the Balkan Pact" and its connection with NATO, etc.

This situation lasted until a short time before the preliminary conference in Cairo, when Subandrio directly from Vienna asked whether Jakarta had done anything in relation to the Conference of Non-Aligned. Thus, the government was forced to take certain steps and issued a statement in this regard in which it supported the conference, but with certain concessions to PNI and others, adding that the Conference of Non-Aligned countries will help keeping the second AA Conference. However, this statement of the Government did not convince Ali and others who still kept their reservations about the conference and persistently advocated second AA Conference and exerted some pressure. Furthermore, the confusion about sponsorship provided a fertile ground and allowed them to "justify" their activities by the alleged injustice towards Indonesia, because it was the initiator and FPRY and UAR stole it from its hands and so on. Also, the ambiguous position of India, and the rumour that it will be one of the sponsors of the conference, enhanced the already existing reservations about the con-

ference, all the more because the Indonesians on the whole could not stand being treated equally as India, whose policy they observed with a lot of doubt, belittling, and jealousy.

Also, it was expected that the preliminary conference in Cairo and the arrival of Subandrio would contribute to clearing up the situation and allow taking clear and specific attitude in favour of the Conference of Non-Aligned. However, he was confronted with the reserved attitudes of political parties and also with fragmentation of the significant number of members of the government, who were preoccupied with internal political and economic problems. In fact, as you know from our information regarding the President's trip to Indonesia, there was a massive surrender of the rebels, under certain conditions, without asking for the Sukarno's agreement; Army positions have significantly strengthened and, therefore, its demands; economic situation further deteriorated, so that part of the government who stayed here was more preoccupied with internal problems and could not have had, nor showed enough interest to observe the significance of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and Indonesian place therein.

It should also be emphasized that the confusing situation in government and political circles was due to Ruslan Abdulgani, who quite confidently stated that he did not see any particular benefit from the conference, thereby supporting the attitude of Ali Sastroamidjojo. I think that both Ali's and Abdulgani's attitude was affected by the fact that they were both too concerned about the problem of colonialism and through that prism watched and assess developments in the world. By all accounts, they both share the view that the basic contradiction in the world is that between colonialism and anti-colonialism and that by the eradication of colonialism the main threat to humanity would have been removed. In doing so, Ali is less and Abdulgani more prone to the tendency of bonding Indonesia with those countries that are "extremely" colonialist, anti-imperialist. That is why Abdulgani is inclined to the Eastern bloc, which is "essentially colonialist", whereas he overlooks the specific interests of the Eastern Bloc and the effort to use anti-colonialist struggle of individual states and movements in the interests of the bloc. In addition, we should not lose out of sight the fact that they have both experienced a significant affirmation at the Bandung Conference and, of course, have been hoping to re-experience the personal affirmation at the second AA Conference. With regards to Abdulgani, I think it is also very important his, to some extent, even openly hostile attitude towards Subandrio, who has strongly advocated the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.

Upon the arrival in Jakarta, Subandrio found a good excuse in signing the contract with Japan. He was to go there in person at the time when Sukarno was on his way back to Indonesia, and was to inform him directly about the situation in Indonesia. Also interesting is the fact that Sukarno immediately after arriving in Tokyo, said that he would personally lead a delegation of Indonesia to Belgrade. However, upon the arrival in Jakarta, although Djuanda in his opening speech

spoke about the role of Sukarno regarding the Conference, Sukarno did not say a word about the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in his speech, which came quite as a surprise and was the subject of various speculations.

Although the preparations for the conference in Belgrade started soon after Sukarno's arrival, there was quite some time before Sukarno in his speech in Medan for the first time clearly and openly spoke about the need for a conference and said that he would personally lead the delegation thus underlining the importance of the Conference. Preparations included large number of people, not only in the MFA but also in the Parliament, where they engaged a significant number of political figures and various parties, thus forcing parties to accept the conference. However, despite everything, we can say that he did not fully manage to break the PNI and in particular PKI, which until the last moment, used our alleged belonging to our Balkan pact, and Lebanon share etc., to convince the Indonesian masses that the Belgrade Conference "will not act in the best interest of Indonesia". He alluded to the issue of West Irian and that the conference will not be sufficiently anti-imperialist. The silence of the press regarding the conference, with few exceptions during July and August, also speaks in favor of the fact that the other parties still had certain reservations about the conference.

Sukarno's decision to take the party leaders to the Conference, even those who were against it, has forced the parties to take clear and precise attitude towards the Conference. Therefore as party leaders and members of the delegation, they were forced to take a positive attitude toward the conference, and in addition to general positive assessment, they underlined the hope that the Conference will provide support to the concrete demands of Indonesia. They primarily had in mind the question of West Irian. Furthermore, on several occasions the MFA underlined that they expected from the Conference, that it would take a stand on this issue by providing public support to the Indonesian request for the transfer of sovereignty.

The conference and its course caused a very vivid interest in Indonesia. In addition to the press which was writing very generously about the conference, we can say that the conference was the topic of conversation everywhere. In addition to speech of President Sukarno, which was understandable, also noticed and positively commented were the speeches of Comrade Tito, Nasser and others, while Nehru used the opportunity to immediately underline the differences in attitudes between India and Indonesia, mainly due to the statement of Abdulgani. We could say that there was even a certain dose of malice in relation to India, which was predicted by the already known attitude of this country towards India and vice versa.

The decision of the Soviet government to resume nuclear tests left a painful impression on everyone here. Almost everyone, with the exception of the KPI, which remained silent on this issue, was of the opinion that this action of the USSR was performed in time of the Conference with the intention to undermine and disrupt the Conference. The attempts of the Soviet Embassy here to ju-

stify through press conferences this act of the Soviet government, have failed, because the reaction was exactly the opposite. Even those who were reserved at the beginning started to understand the broader significance of the Conference and expressed the hope that the conference will contribute to easing the international tension.

It is characteristic that in the press (in a separate report) persistently emphasized the great merit of Indonesia and personally President Sukarno, who “gave the line” to the Conference, “set the things” in the right light, etc. However, on the other hand the disappointment by the fact that the Declaration of the Conference did not explicitly mention the right of Indonesia to West Irian was visible. One gets the impression that Indonesia was betrayed and that the Conference did not meet the expectations of Indonesia in this regard. Without any doubt, the statements of Ali, Aidit and Abdulgani contributed. The fact is also that the people from MFA were pretty much disappointed by the fact that the question of West Irian was omitted.

Although in the press and in the minds of people, there is a consciousness about enormous importance of the Conference and its extraordinary contribution to the struggle for peace, eradication of colonialism, principle of active coexistence, further development of socialism, etc. the fact is that all this is seen through the prism of West Irian tells us how much people are concerned with this issue. This issue could also be used in the direction of diminishing the importance of the Conference, the development of those forces that are trying to hold Indonesia out of the non-aligned community, subordinate its policy to the interests of the bloc etc.

Certainly, a lot of things will depend on the concrete actions of the leadership of this country, which is still on their way.

However, regardless of the fact that immediately after the Conference the issue of West Irian was used for the purpose of diminishing the importance of the Conference, the fact is that many people followed the Conference with extraordinary interest, that the Declaration and the issues it dealt with were accepted, we can say that they realized that the course of the non-aligned countries is the only proper and as such useful for Indonesia.

We repeat that it is accurate and definitive evaluation of the glare of the Belgrade Conference in Indonesia still too early to give. These are just first impressions, which of course, should still be corrected and amended.

It was our intention to use this letter to point out to certain issues that have arisen in the course of preparing the conference and after it.

Chargé d’Affaires
Advisor, Blagoje Popovski

148

**Note on the the talks between the State Secretary Koča Popović
and the Ambassador of Indonesia Asmaoen, December 5, 1961**

Koča Popović's office
Conf. no. 436151
Belgrade, December 6, 1961.

He came at his own request asking for urgent reception. He stayed for 65 minutes.

He came along with a new counsellor, who stayed for the entire duration of the talks.

The first topic – West Irian. He reports by the order of his government. First, he thanks us for our full support at the UN. Indian resolution did not get a two-thirds majority, and so on. They cannot wait any longer. They will have to undertake military operations in the W. Irian, i.e. to use the force. The problem is of course very delicate, for example, when to start. Then – whether VII American fleet will intervene. Their army does not have so much experience; there is also sea and it is not enough just to have the ships, it is necessary to be able to handle them, and so on. In a word, they are asking for our opinion. I say that is not easy to answer, we do not have all the elements necessary for a serious assessment. They will have to make assessment by themselves. We have always supported them wholeheartedly. We understand that situations may arise when you need to resort to force. I agree that the problem is very sensitive. It is relatively easy to make a decision, but what is important is to ensure success, based on an objective assessment of all the elements and features, etc. Anyway, I am not in a position to directly advise them what to do. (First, he said they would soon start an armed intervention, and then asked for advice what to do!) As an argument in favour of the action he states that the Dutch are removing all more progressive elements from the W. Irian, so that soon only Papuans will remain, i.e. people living in the Stone Age.

Then he asks whether the friendly countries may ask the Dutch government to accept bilateral negotiations – “just as they, Indonesia, have done with the French regarding Algeria.” I reply that such a commitment would be normal.

Since he has previously said he did not want the UN to deal with this issue, he is asking whether they should refer to the UN, anyway. I say that it may be useful in some aspects, because it is always good to have the support of the UN, and so on. A. says that he is not sure about the attitude of Austria which is negative at the moment, so he assumes it will remain so in the case of armed actions. He asks what we would do in this case, i.e. in what way we would engage (obviously he thought directly, not by means of policy and diplomacy!) I say that I do not quite understand the question. He does not insist.

Then he randomly asks how we assess the overall international situation, and the course of the USA, and whether Germany will get nuclear weapons, whether it will soon come to the general disarmament. I present out as well as my own assessments.

He spoke briefly and casually about a new Bandung, which could also include the countries of Brazzaville group. For them, it would be a school for the fight against colonialism.

Then he asks whether there were talks about the disarmament in Cairo. I say certainly, but not in detail. And what are the activities of the Non-Aligned in the field of economic cooperation, particularly in connection with the Western market? Have we already worked out a plan and settings? I say we need to work on it together. We consider it a very big problem. There are too many interested parties. It is necessary to hear what others think and study the possibilities of joint operations, and so on. Then he asks if anything can be done, since these are poor countries, dependent on the wealthy, and have different economic structures. I say that it is one more reason to have a good thought about it and take what is acceptable for a broader range. Yes, A. says, maybe thus we can bring Australia politically closer, since it is also concerned about the GB approaching Western market. Then he asks: how do you plan to defend yourself from the W. market? He mentions the news that the United States and Canada also intend to join Western market. He says it would be good if someone who is familiar with these problems is present when he visits Kardelj.

Then he speaks about the difficult economic situation in Indonesia. If they only had the youth as ours. Sukarno particularly liked the youth work actions, where there is a convergence of young people from all sides. They will have to do something similar, not just to talk about it but to take liabilities. They were wrong because they introduced liberalized foreign trade at the wrong moment. Then he speaks about our bilateral trade. He has the impression that it stagnates.

He does not understand why, but, nevertheless, he must honestly say that it was probably their fault – unregulated transitional period.

Our entire conversation was confusing. He was probably instructed to take interest in our position regarding the possible armed action in W. Irian, i.e. to get our general support. So, he was probably told to use the chance and get the opinion on major international problems – or he himself has decided to use it. Everything he said was confusing, very superficial and contradictory. Thus, for example, he spoke about the necessity of armed intervention in West Irian, and at the same time about the difficulties, so big and so numerous that they brought in question the possibilities and appropriateness of this action!

I did not want to end the visit at my initiative, because of the attention and because he rarely comes to visit. He asked everything that came to his mind.

He did not mention Gošnjak's visit. When I asked him if he was talking to Gošnjak about the WI he said he did not know, thought not... they talked about professional matters!

Koča Popović

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-4

149

Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Bebler to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about his meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Subandrio on political and/or military solution in West Irian

Djakarta
Number 722
December 30, 1961.

I was invited by Subandrio.

1. He is informed about the talks between Đerđa and Asmaoen. Having consulted Sukarno, he asks me to tell President Tito and the government that in terms of West Irian Indonesia cannot draw back. If efforts for a peaceful solution do not give the results they will have to resort to the use of force. Government and personally Sukarno have been engaged to such an extent that will lose "face" if they step back;

2. The Government is confident that it will succeed peacefully. Kennedy himself said to Sukarno that for the USA government it is no longer a question if, but only how to perform handover. The GB also agrees. For them, it is only the problem of modality, because they have to deal with the Netherlands and Australia. But now the majority of the Dutch government is ready, only Luns and his circle still resist;

3. These days, Americans have proposed solution in two phases. In the first phase, which would last five years West Irian would be managed together by three sides: Indonesia, Australia and Malaya.

In the second phase Indonesia would manage it by itself. The government has rejected the proposal and now expects a new and better proposal;

4. They must continue to exert pressure by military preparations and by mobilizing international public opinion. That is why last week the MFA sent a circular appeal to the ambassadors and friendly countries, the participants of the

Belgrade Conference and most AA countries, to visit the local MFA and ask for support. In this regard Asmaoen visited Đerđa;

5. I have mentioned several statements made before the visit and the latest article in the “Communists” (this is likely the result of the talks Asmaoen-Đerđa). S. is still talked about the desirability of support without explicit request, but with a clear subtext “the bigger the better”;

6. When I asked about the interest of Western and particularly the United States for West Irian as a strategic area and source of raw materials and in particular uranium, S. replied that, for the West, the entire Indonesia is more important. Uranium, for example is more abundant and much better on the eastern and south-eastern Java than in Irian;

7. S. apologized for Sukarno and himself for not having been able to hear my report on the Cairo meeting and said that probably next week, we would go together to Sukarno to discuss this and other issues. I warned him of those Cairo conclusions which refer to the preferred reaction of the Non-Aligned against the economic integration of the two blocs, only to give them time to think about it before the meeting.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-41, dos. 20, no. 4206

150

Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Bebler to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs Yugoslavia about his talks with the Ambassador of Great Britain on the question of West Irian

Jakarta
Number 17
January 15, 1962

British Ambassador asked (in private) about the conditions set for the submission of the Western Irian to Indonesia, answers: 1. In a Dutch military installations in Irian are not in question; 2. He avoided talking about possible political conditions; 3. He elaborates the thesis that the Netherlands set conditions regarding their property, old debts and future rights, especially in terms of maritime and air transport (he specifically mentions KLM). He points out that there must be a “package deal”, i.e. a contract that would solve the whole complex of Indonesian-Dutch relations. Director of PIA to Holjević: the dispute escalated over

the question whether West Irian on one side and all the other issues of bilateral Indonesian-Dutch relations on the other hand should be resolved together (package) or separately. Indonesians advocate the position that these are two separate issues and that they should be handed over West Irian without conditions, and only subsequently discuss everything else. This information provides fairly clear picture. The Dutch are trying to get economic concessions for West Irian. Indonesians are trying to get WI for free or as cheap as possible. In this light, it is understandable that the locals are disappointed by Kunc's statement and do not want to publish it. Perhaps for the same reason they did not publish congratulations of our President to Sukarno regarding the assassination plot. Indonesians criticize our statement for two reasons: 1. It emphasizes the need for a peaceful solution without further explanation which sounds like criticizing those who are threatening with the use of force, i.e. Indonesia. In regard to the use of force the locals are defending their position that they have the right to it by the fact that H. also uses force to keep the island and so on. The attitude of the local is further supported by the case of Goa which echoed wide. That is why PKI has publicly criticized us; 2. In the statement we ask for the recognition of the sovereignty of Indonesia, while Indonesia has been trying for years in the UN to prove that sovereignty is not the question, since it was granted by a 1950 contract. It is only about handing over the administration. It would be good to fix this on the first occasion and give a statement that would read like this: "We are of the opinion that the administration over West Irian should be given to Indonesia as soon as possible, because Indonesia has an undeniable right and because it would be useful for the peace." These conditions should not be mentioned for the time being because Indonesians do not mention them either, obviously because they are ready to accept some, not too big, conditions for example the autonomy for Papuans.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F41, dos. 20, no. 41658

**The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia to the Embassy
of Yugoslavia in Jakarta on Yugoslav position regarding the Western Irian**

Koča Popović's Office
Conf. no. 41658
Belgrade, January 18, 1962

Your ref. 17

1). Our statement for the press does not "highlight" a peaceful solution. This is maliciously imputed by "H. Rakijat". The statement clearly says that Yugoslavia has always been of the opinion that the issue of WI should be resolved as soon as possible in a peaceful manner within the justified demands of the people and government of Indonesia, that is ("that is" is very important here) by the recognition of the sovereignty, etc. This clearly means that the "peaceful way" stands for the recognition of justified demands i.e. sovereignty, and that the one who does not do this, makes Indonesia use the force, and takes the responsibility for it. This is the best possible presentation of the Indonesian attitude. The Chinese and "H. Rakijat" calumniate and weaken Indonesian attitude by principled opposition to a peaceful solution. Regarding this, we have given a statement at a press conference on January 12. Our press did not publish it, but some foreign agencies did.

Any other interpretation is the result of being malicious or falling for the Chinese or "H. R." misinterpretation.

In terms of sovereignty, in the above context, the criticism does not stand either, irrespective of what Indonesians "have tried to prove," it was not recognized. Our statement confirms that Indonesian thesis has been and remains correct. In this sense, "handing over the sovereignty" means "handing over the administration". We could have used the other term, and will try to use it in the future, in order to avoid any, even artificial, strained misunderstanding. Anyway, the statement is such that it provides all the arguments for proving its correctness, which means for the detection of misunderstanding or malice of those who are trying to assign another meaning.

2) Our practice so far has shown that it is not good to, in advance and totally identify with and commit to certain attitudes, even of a friendliest country. First of all, Indonesia did not consult with us before making a fateful decision, so it is not appropriate to expect that we are obliged to adopt in advance all the details of its tactics in relation to the situation which thus arises. Furthermore, we do not know whether it would or not alter anything in this tactic, which would then be turned out that would mean that we acted hastily. Moreover, the support we get from Indonesia when we have difficulties, for example with China, is not

even close to that of ours. Furthermore, it is not good to “have a feeling of total support” because they will ask for bigger maximum and lose interest in “fighting” for our support, and will attach less importance to it. Also, it is not certain whether it has been appropriate to unconditionally reject Dutch proposal on negotiations. And so on.

These are the considerations which are normally kept in mind when deciding on our position. Regardless of that, however, we have been and we will keep providing maximum support. We have nothing to “correct” about it nor do we have to account for it; this should be done by those who object.

I remind, as an experience, a precedent with the Algerian problem.

Koča

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-41, dos. 20, no. 41658

152

Yugoslav Embassy in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on the Communist Party of Indonesia

Top secret, no. 21/62

March 7, 1962

Belgrade

Some observations about KPI.

Although it was expected that the XXII Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union would have a visible impact on the Communist Party of Indonesia (KPI) and force its leadership to take the same specific attitude, these expectations were not fulfilled. Immediately after Aidit's return the resolution of the Central Committee of KPI was published approving the attitude of the KPI delegation at the XXII Congress and even providing support to China. But soon after that, in his speech before the New Year Aidit unconditionally supported the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, by which, in addition to resistance to new ideas of CP of Italy and polycentrism, Aidit wanted to keep the balance between the USSR and the People's Republic of China.

The reasons for such an opportunistic attitude of KPI management are mostly internal. For a long time, KPI has been under the pressure of the Army, which after crushing of the rebellion 1957-1958, when it even collaborated with PKI, assumed harsher measures against KPI in order to completely disable its work. In its attempt the army, besides being supported by the prohibited opposi-

tion parties Masyumi and PSI, enjoyed a considerable support of a large Muslim party Nahdatul Ulama, as well as of numerous PNI officials and other small right-wing parties. In contrast to this pressure of the army, KPI was trying through occasional cooperation with PNI and almost unconditional support to Sukarno's concept of guided democracy and economy, as well as West Irian issue, to decrease the pressure of the army, and further strengthen its position. At the same time PKI was expecting the support of Sukarno, who needed PKI as a counterweight to the army, for the purpose of maintaining balance, which is one of the essential conditions for his endurance at the present position.

However, constant worsening of economic situation in Indonesia over the past few years, which is reflected in the constant decline of production, high inflation, incredible increase in prices of commercial products and consequently a drastic decline in living standards, forced the KPI management to take a critical attitude and concrete actions against government policies. The economic situation of Indonesia is best illustrated by the following figures. In 1953 the price index in Indonesia was 100, only to be increased to 698 in January 1961, and to 1083 in January 1962, and in February 1962 to 1150. However, the salaries of civil servants and workers have increased by 25% only in the last year. Naturally, this disproportion caused profound disturbances in Indonesian society and even more increased the crisis. Dissatisfaction of workers, rural paupers and small producers, whose products – rice, rubber, copra and so on were purchased at low prices, often transcended the usual form, and manifested it in spontaneous small-scale strikes as well as very frequent demonstrations, which made KPI and other political parties to take a more definite attitude towards government policy. The first were PNI and KPI, who insisted on consistent implementation of NASA-KOM, i.e. the final liquidation of the military situation and the formation of the party government which would include KPI. KPI insisted on this, among other things, because the liquidation of the military situation would deprive the army of the right to interfere in the political life of the country, which would further strengthen the position of KPI. But this development would not be convenient either to the army or to Sukarno, because that would also mean the defeat of his concept of the guided democracy and sharing the power with political parties, which he strongly opposed. Thus, we come to look at a contradictory situation: KPI enjoys the support of Sukarno in its defence against the army, but Sukarno also enjoys the support of the army in the fight against parties that want to return to the parliamentary system.

Tensions with the Netherlands on the issue of West Irian seemed to have caused a break in this conflict. Nevertheless, the conflict started again and was even stronger. Like all others, KPI provided full support to Sukarno in terms of Western Irian and took a course of worsening the relations with the Dutch, starting from the presumption that Indonesia will need to establish closer and tighter bonds with the Eastern bloc, which will make the position and influence of KPI

stronger. KPI was very active in applying volunteers for the Liberation of West Irian demanding military training for the volunteers, and starting a campaign that led to a large-scale registration of its members. In addition to this, KPI has publicly condemned the “opinion of some circles” that the liberation of West Irian is necessary to create a real force, clearly alluding to the army. The request of the Communist Party for the military training of volunteers / mostly its members / linked it to the masses, since that the struggle for the liberation of West Irian was popular, and hampered any direct attack on it at the given moment. It also counted on the military training of its members in case it was forced into a final struggle. That is, after all, the reason why the army opposes such training that would equip its direct military opponents.

Meanwhile, a sudden increase of the economic crisis, caused by the drought and still extraordinary high expenditures for the preparation of the army in case of war with the Dutch, has put the party before big difficulties. On the one hand, it was the most energetic opponent of any attempt of a peaceful solution regarding West Irian and advocating a military solution, on the other hand, it could not remain passive before open demands of the working masses for the wage increase, reducing the cost of basic groceries, etc., because a passive stance on these issues could lead to losing the trust of the people. But organization and active participation in demonstrations against the high costs provided the possibility for its enemies to indirectly attack it, as it was the case in Surabaya ten days ago, for helping the enemies of Indonesia, since the demonstrations are weakening the united front and helping the Dutch. Defending itself against these attacks KPI starts the offensive and underlines that the reasons of economic breakdown lie in the fact that in some areas of Indonesia are still in the state of war, that NASA-KOM was not consistently implemented and that their request to participate in the government was not accepted their request to participate in government. Although Aidit attacked the government for the economic crash just before its reorganization and openly requested the participation in the Communist government. However, Sukarno refused these demands and what is more left Ruslan Abdulgani out of the government, who was in many respects close to the Communists.

It is also obvious that the KPI was afraid of a peaceful solution in West Irian. It starts from the assumption that it could be a settlement on its account /there is a lot of truth therein/. Solution of the West Irian issue would give Indonesia a wider field of manoeuvre, there would be no need for obtaining weapons from the Eastern Bloc, which means that Indonesia would become less dependent on the bloc. At the same time, the influence of KPI in the country would be reduced; the army and anti-communist circles would have a free hand regarding the offensive against the party. It is natural that the KPI leadership is considering this possibility, and taking certain measures in this direction. First of all, although some KPI leaders report that the party has almost 2 million members, it has reported to the government bodies only slightly more than 400,000 of its members. It

also notes that a good part of its members is infiltrated into other smaller parties, which is also the case with individual members of SOBSI (All Indonesia Centre of Labour Organizations) / largest trade union organization under the influence of KPI /, approaching other union organizations. We have also learned / which is difficult to verify / from fairly well-informed people, that KPI has been trying lately to supply its members with illegal weapons, especially in central Java, where its influence is the strongest.

Faced with all of the above difficulties KPI leadership is of the opinion that the party unity is necessary factor for its survival. Therefore, they tend not to discuss what divides them – which is somewhat in the mentality of all Indonesians. Besides, we must also bear in mind that is not easy for this kind of party leadership to take a definite stand on all the issues set by the XXII Congress. By supporting the attitude of the Soviet Union, the party would largely be deprived of the enormous financial help of Chinese traders through which Communist party of China directly affects the Communist Party of Indonesia and vice versa, by supporting the China's attitude they found themselves exposed to a great pressure from the Soviet Union which in turn would weaken the party. Starting from such unprincipled attitudes the KPI leadership closes the eyes before the current issues and attempts to preserve the unity and its positions by supporting individual attitudes of CPSU, and more often the attitudes of the CCP, but constantly taking a hostile attitude in relation to our country.

If unforeseen events do not prevent, KPI will hold its congress in April where it will come out with a new program and statute. Conference materials will certainly enable as to make a detailed analysis of the KPI.

At the request of the Ambassador, the Advisor
/ B. Popovski /

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-41, dos. 10, no. 48802

153

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in The Hague to the State Secretariat for Foreign
Affairs of Yugoslavia about the American views on West Irian**

The Hague
Number 36
March 16, 1962.

To the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs

Your ref. 47627. It is hard to find out anything else. It is believed that through Kennedy Sukarno made a broader agreement with the United States; US will resolutely advocate the solution of WI issue and provide stronger economic assistance to Indonesia because of the situation in the country and in SEA. It is believed that a "pro-American phase" in Sukarno's politics is coming; and in that phase people like Abdulgani and determined neutralists would be a nuisance. Sukarno and Subandrio are skilfully playing towards the US at the account of strengthening the KPI, influence of the camp and the danger of further deterioration of the economic circumstances to achieve two main objectives at the same time: get WI and dollars.

Štambuk

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-41, dos.5, br.48926

154

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign
Affairs of Yugoslavia about America's role in resolving the West Irian issue**

Jakarta
Number 195
March 18, 1962

Since the return of Kennedy Jr. to Washington the question of WI quickly moves towards a peaceful and negotiated solution. It is interesting that the locals have accepted the US initiative without complaint. Thus, the appointment of the "third party", i.e. of the president of the preliminary conference is left to the US government and is not the subject of negotiation. The implementation of the agreement with as little difficulty from the Western factors is politically facilitated to the US Government by the use of energetic measures. These measures in-

clude the government reconstruction and the mission of Muhammad Hatta in Western Europe. This was recently published an article in the US asking WI for Indonesia as a measure to stop the expansion of communism to the South Asia. Now, Sukarno has probaly entrusted him with the task to work on the main Atlantic West European governments. In other words, Sukarno accepts the patronage the US to some extent, and they once more play the role of the protector of Indonesia against the Western European imperialism to strengthen their economic and political positions here, which also corresponds to global Western interests. The possibility and probability of the agreement raises the crucial question for the future of Indonesia and its role in the international arena, and that is: to what extent it will be related to the US and West as a whole?

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F41, dos. 5, no. 49417

155

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on the reconstruction of the Indonesian government

Jakarta
Number 194
March 18, 1962

Based on the data we have so far managed to collect from the political, military and diplomatic sources, we have obtained the following picture of the importance of the reconstruction of the government:

1. Excluded from the government are those who were prone to closer cooperation with the Eastern bloc: Abdulgani, Suriadarma and Iwa Kusumasumantri. In terms of the most influential of them, Abdulgani, the intention was to downgrade him from the position of a Deputy President of the Supreme Advisory Council to the position of the First Minister. But his rejection of the position was accepted as corresponding, maybe even more, to the actual intentions;

2. They emphasized the role of the persons known by their "leftism" but only in the internal political issues (Yamin, Sadjarvo – a man quite persistent in the field of agrarian reform);

3. They created a third class of ministers without portfolio, who would be in session only occasionally (not knowing when) including among others, Aidit and Lukman;

4. The role of the army was somewhat increased in particular by appointing General Suprajogio at the position of the Economic Coordinator and by the removal of persona non grata – Gunavana from the position of the Attorney-General;

5. Thus, it can be concluded that the goal of the reconstruction was probably the meeting of the wishes of the United States and creating an impression in the West that Indonesia is not moving towards the Eastern bloc. To avoid the impression of moving to the right in domestic public opinion and to paralyze the criticism from the East about their moving towards the West, they have changed the Clause 2 and 3 (Yamin, etc.). Grouping of Ministries and slightly larger role of the soldiers correspond to the second important goal – creating more order, especially in economics because of the economic crisis and the need for greater efforts regarding WI;

6. Such reconstruction confirms the impression (which is acquired also from the public statements, press and government actions regarding the action in Washington) that Sukarno is strongly determined to resolve the WI issue with the support of the United States.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F- 41, dos. 5, no. 49416

156

Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the Indonesian Army possibly coming to power

Jakarta
Number 236
March 26, 1962

The perspective of the solutions of the Irian issue this year sharpens the question of internal political perspective. This is particularly notable in the position of major foreign diplomats. Indians are emphasizing more than before that the Army needs “healing”. On the other hand, Mikhailov insistently develops his theme that the Army is a chief “counter-revolutionary” political force. There are more signs of approaching storm. I have informed you that Nasution was offered to form a government and that the highest officers, as the leadership of a political party, rejected the offer because it was apparently about forming a parliamentary, multiparty government that would separate Nasution from the Army. Exactly at that time, Hatta and Nasution met on several occasions. These days we have he-

ard from several sources about some nervousness in PKI leadership. Obviously, external and internal factors count on different conditions after the unfolding of Irian crisis if it ends positively and with the help of US and with some involvement of the Army which is both possible and even likely. This would enable the right-wing forces and the Army to prevail over the PKI enough to impose a “military solution”. This perspective raises the question of our orientation in terms of internal development here. Some elements for the construction of such orientations: 1. The Army is “counter-revolutionary” force, politically heterogeneous, with certain prevalence of conservative elements and rather strong American influence, but is mostly “plebeian” by composition (officer corps are mostly from small, rural intelligence teachers and Imams, and soldiers are mostly from the middle and poor rural communities) and social structure of the country – an absolute majority of peasants – results in the fact that the majority genuinely accepts Sukarno’s line of democratic social reform (e.g. agrarian) and anti-imperialist orientation but without approaching Soviet block; 2. The right-wingers with whom the Army connects, e.g. Hatta – are far from being the extreme right; some even think that Hatta is a “socialist” who has been engaged almost exclusively in rural cooperative movement for years; – Extreme right – Darul Islam, rebels in Sumatra – is being fought by the Army; 3. The PNI leadership is mostly politician and corrupt; the same is true for a good part of other politicians mobilized by Sukarno (Murbaši as Saleh); masses that follow PNI are kept together by Sukarno’s plebeian program, but are dissatisfied with practical policy of the Government, the lack of visible results. This cannot last forever; 4. PKI leads a corrupted policy: they say they accept Sukarno’s internal and external orientation, but in practice they are against the policy of non-alignment. They are mostly sectarian regarding internal issues; in the economy sector, it is concerned about the wages and not productivity; in the country it does not appear as an organizer of resolving the issue of dispossessed but only intensifies the demands over the present financial and organizational capabilities, etc.; in a word, it hinders the progressive foreign policy and does not direct proletariat towards the role of hegemon in further internal development. Notwithstanding the desirability or undesirability of the Army coming to power, the likelihood of such an ending imposes to the embassy the need to increase the effort to connect with the officer corps and the political activities of the Army as a whole (supplying military institutions with our literature, movies, etc.). We could use your opinion.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F41, dos. 2, no. 410184

157

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Bebler to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on the assassination attempt Sukarno**

Jakarta
Number 379
May 14, 1962

This morning, while praying in a palace in the presence of about four thousand people, there was an assassination attempt on Sukarno. The assassin fired five bullets from a gun towards Sukarno, but only wounded: Zainul Arifin, the President of the Parliament, Idam Chalid President of NU and three security officers. In an official statement, it is said that terrorist organization Ahrul Islam is behind it. The assassin and two people were arrested.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-41, dos. 4, no. 415967

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**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Bebler to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the talks with the leader
of Indonesian communists Aidit, June 29, 1962**

Jakarta
Number 484
June 29, 1962

Aidit received me very kindly (holding my arm and shoulder). He did not mention the reasons for delay. Only in the end, perhaps as an excuse, complained about the connections of our embassy with the Socialists, which he says he has discovered few years ago. "Since the Socialists have inaccurate information about the conditions in CP. If you are interested, come to the CC for the information that you want to get." We talked for almost two hours. Bitang, who is in charge of international connections, was also present. Both sides avoided disputable issues, the talks were held in a friendly atmosphere. I started with the assumption that we should look for what we have in common: the struggle against imperialism, for peace. He agreed and in this spirit, we discussed a number of issues. The main points:

1. The fight of Indonesia for WI. I underline our material and moral – political help. The question about our desire for a peaceful solution came up (we were criticized therein). He speaks freely about the tactics of K. and that is to criticize negotiations especially because of US mediation. He says that such criticism facilitates Sukarno, making him more permissive before the West. “It is about job sharing”. He gives another example of tactics: negotiations of Chairul Saleh on petroleum. Criticism of KP strengthens his position in the negotiations.

2. The economic developments in Indonesia. He mentions our cooperation. He proposes technical assistance, scholarships. Then the question of the economic crisis arises and I am checking my opinion that it will be – at the political level – tightened after the liberation of WI. He agrees and praises Sukarno, who feels it properly and has devoted his last public speech to the economic and social issues.

3. He is interested in the EC. He listens to my information about the objectives. I mention the political background, which is the same as BK, mobilizing anti-imperialist forces on non-bloc basis, providing greater range. He does not respond.

4. He asks about the background of the speech in Split. I am explaining and underlining the struggle against the bureaucratic tendencies which are “like a shadow following the construction of socialism in all socialist countries.” He listens with interest but without comment.

5. He asks about our reasons for “some sympathy” towards the creation of Malaysia. He says it is an imperialist plan to “raise President Tenguki and oppose him to Sukarno.” I say that this may be true, but that it does not exhaust the whole truth. Imperialists may make the wrong calculations, both reaction and progressive forces will come together; economic development will create a new army of the proletariat, etc. I speak favourably about Abaulgani, Afi, and Subandrio. He listens more carefully and concludes, “we are not against it either, but we think that confederation would be better, that the social development of the most advanced parts, Singapore, would encounter as few obstacles from the Malay reaction”.

6. He asks me if I liked their last Congress. I compliment the way they have set up a series of new problems. I say I am sorry about the outbursts against us, especially the one in the speech of the present Bintang. I say that he did not mention our foreign policy but held up to individual sentences from the newspaper articles with which I also disagree, for example, “International Politics” of Professor Jamin. He does not respond.

7. Syahrir and Hatta are also mentioned. For the former, he says that his war marits are false. He hindered mobilization was liberation-oriented. In the subject of talks with help of the United States. Hatta is slightly better but still negative. I I mention that he wants to visit Yugoslavia and that Subandrio conveyed

the government's opinion in this regard. Aidit says he advises us to adhere strictly to these desires because the Sukarno's government is very sensitive regarding Hatta.

The talks were ended with the statement of Aidit that we have to meet more frequently and the statement of Bintang that he wants to talk as soon as possible.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-41, dos. 3, no. 422396

159

The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on economic relations with Indonesia

No. 425858
August 7, 1962

Economic relations between our country and Indonesia have shown tangible progress in recent years. Commodity exchange has increased substantially. Our exports rose from 126 million in 1957 to 4.533 million in 1961. And in the first six months of this year we have exported 4.525 million. This year, considerable efforts were made on the expansion of the nomenclature of exchange.

Commodity exchange over the years (in millions of dinars)

	<u>1959.</u>	<u>1960.</u>	<u>1961.</u>	<u>1962.</u>	<u>1962.</u>
				(I-VI)	(Plan)
Export	4.304	3.556	4.533	4.525	10.447
<u>Import</u>	<u>219</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>552</u>	<u>293</u>	<u>4.832</u>
Balance	4.085	3.356	3.981	4.232	5.615

The main characteristic of the exchange is permanently high balance in our favour. However, considering that payment is done in free pounds, the question of equalizing balances is not put in such a strict form. But regardless of that, as part of our general orientation to direct purchase from developing countries, we significantly increased purchases in Indonesia during 1962.

Exports. The major part of our exports to Indonesia is based on military equipment (about 80 percent). In terms of increasing regular exports we have not used all the possibilities yet. Interexport Organization is directed to pay fundamental attention to handling our exports.

We have recently concluded the agreement for the delivery of textiles worth 1.6 million dollars. Out of this amount, 55 percent is paid by cotton from the United States, and remaining 45 percent in free dollars. The perspective of our future textile exports to Indonesia will depend on the execution of this agreement.

Loans. So far we have approved two loans to Indonesia. The first is in the amount of \$ 10 million (approved in September 1959) and another in the amount of \$ 15 million (April 1962). Out of the first loan 6.5 million have been used (for ships and parts). For the rest of the 3.5 million, Indonesians are expecting our approval for deferment of payment, which has not yet been resolved.

Under the new loan we have signed a contract for the delivery of construction machinery in the amount of \$ 1.8 million. The preliminary talks for several energy facilities and the shipyard in Jakarta are underway.

Due to the difficult economic situation Indonesians officially requested the deferral of the payment until January 1965. We have taken a stand that because of our wealth and economic situation we cannot accept. They decided to go for the conclusion of the objects whose payment will not be due before the deadline, or to repay in goods.

Imports. In the past years, we imported insignificant amounts of rubber and spices from Indonesia. The purchases were made through London and Singapore. In order to provide direct purchases, this year concrete measures have been taken to prevent the purchase through third countries. Until now, we have arranged the purchase of about 9,000 tons of rubber and 5,000 tons of copra directly from Indonesia. In the beginning there were a number of difficulties on the Indonesian side. The above amounts were provided at the intervention of the embassy. However, due to the difficult situation with foreign currency National Bank was not able to open the letters of credit (the same cases for rubber, tin and dill). The delay is met with a sharp protest of Indonesians having a negative impact on economic relations. Perhaps it would be useful if we could openly explain the problems regarding payment. We believe that Indonesians would accept this explanation.

Cooperation in the field of research and exploitation of copper

On the basis of the Agreement on Economic Cooperation Indonesians raised the issue of cooperation in research and exploitation of copper. These days representative of "Geoistraživanje" who was at the scene to examine the situation has returned from Indonesia. On the basis of his report, the company will take concrete measures in this field.

Maritime cooperation. Indonesians raised the issue of maritime cooperation in the form of a ship rental, or delivery of the ships on long-term loan (ships over 10,000t). Interested companies are considering these proposals.

Consignment stock: Opening of the consignment stock has been subject of the negotiations between our and the Indonesian companies for a long time. Over the Rijeka port, Indonesian goods would to be exported not only in Yugoslavia, but also in several European countries. The relevant Indonesian authorities should approve the final text of the agreement.

Scientific-technical cooperation. Indonesians have requested several economic advisers from various fields of economy. Payment, mainly through the UN. Due to lack of personnel we have not been able to meet their request.

Networking. Compared to the previous state of the network, there is a certain progress. Now, there are 10 company delegates working in Indonesia. Interksport Company is well organized and employs a certain number of delegates. There are also representatives who operate independently. There are the representatives of Ingra, Energoinvest, KIZ, Rudnap and Jugoimport.

Given the complexity of the placements of equipment and other industrial consumer goods, it is necessary to establish a commercial-technical bureau which would analyse the Indonesian market and make presentations.

Conclusion. Despite a number of objective and subjective difficulties economic cooperation with Indonesia is becoming more intense and diverse. The volume of trade has increased noticeably. Further on, it would be necessary to pay considerably more attention to regular exports and appropriate payment modes. In terms of exports of capital equipment tighter coordination should be established with the purpose to examine the necessity of three companies working on the same job. In terms of imports National Bank should consider the possibilities of payment, or find other solutions together with Indonesians. Regarding scientific-technical cooperation we have not used the opportunities offered. We should work more intensively on finding the right specialists for Indonesia. In terms of other forms of economic cooperation, such as marine, copper, consignment stock, etc. it is necessary to work on finding appropriate solutions. The establishment of Commercial-Technical Bureau would significantly improve economic cooperation with Indonesia and facilitate the placement of our product in this market.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-42, dos. 25, no. 425850

160

**Congratulations of President Tito to President Sukarno on the occasion
of the signing of the West Irian Agreement**

Brioni, August 16, 1962

Dear friend,

I was very pleased to hear about the signing of the West Irian Agreement. I would like to use this occasion to extend my sincere congratulations on my own behalf and on behalf of the people of Yugoslavia, who followed with great sympathy the struggle of the Indonesian nation to achieve its legitimate national aspirations for full territorial unity of the country and elimination of the last remnants of colonialism.

Josip Broz Tito

AJ, KPR I-1/431

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**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Bebler to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on Sukarno's speech on the occasion
of exercising internal security and liberation of Western Irian**

Jakarta
Number 623
August 21, 1962

These are the important points of Sukarno's celebration speech.

1. Focus on the fact that out of the three big tasks set three years ago, the two have been accomplished: internal security (in 95% of the territory) and the liberation of WI. The process of accomplishing these tasks has been taking 75 percent of energy, which will now be focused on addressing the third task of the economy.

2. He refers to WI as a great victory but points out to some of possible accidents in the future (non-performance of obligations undertaken by the Dutch and their probable "Timebomb" (Dutch agency in WI). They expressed no gratitude to anyone from the outside, either to those who helped or to those who mediated. It is all the credit of the Indonesian nation and "history." The Dutch were offered a hand of reconciliation. They had harsh words only for Luns. The neces-

sity of solving WI is explained primarily by the need of liberation of Indonesian nation from inferiority complex (Sklavengistova – German word in original).

3. The central theme – a radically progressive (“socialist”) character of the revolution as a condition for its firmness. Conservatism (called Westernism, liberalism, parliamentarism) leads to the collapse of the Revolution (literally: Collapse). That is why the majority is against anti-communism, anti-peasantry, anti-labourism. From this point of view, the period before the introduction of guided democracy is seen a period of “deviations” and its introduction is presented as a salvation. Such policy is in the spirit of time and “decay of capitalism”.

4. In this context, the state apparatus is criticized as “a half” infected by “communistophobia” which makes it sabotage the execution of adopted progressive measures: the introduction of the Company Councils, profit sharing, agrarian reform. This must be such as to suit the Indonesian nation and not like that in Taiwan and South Vietnam.

5. In the same context they accuse “imperialists and their accomplices inside the country,” Western influence, textbooks, and quote the statement given by Sukarno thirty years ago about the necessity “to use all the forces to desroy capitalism and imperialism based on Indonesian resources.”

6. The speech is permeated by thought and size of Indonesia, for which there are no too big task because there are a hundred million people and incomparable natural resources, which could feed and clothe 250 million, which is big and strong, that is a “lighthouse” (and I quote: “one of the champions of the new forces that are born and whose voice echoes in all four sides of the world” and whose voice is “Universal”; that is why it was asked to take an initiative regarding the second AA Conference, while the “old-established powers” recognized that its revolution had become a “dangerous phenomenon” of world importance ... the country where “people listen to the universal voice of the Indonesian Revolution listed in this order: Congo, Algeria, Angola, Egypt (SIC), South West Africa, Cuba and other LA and the socialist countries.”

7. Non-Alignment, coexistence, opposition to the bloc division, the arms race and the like – these are nowhere mentioned.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-41, dos. 4, no. 427674

**Note on the conversation with President Sukarno at the Kemayoran Airport
in Jakarta, October 12, 1962**

Top secret 63
October 18, 1962.
Jakarta

I am standing with other ambassadors on the occasion of the visit of the President of the People's Republic of Romania, G. G. Dej and his entourage. They are passing and shaking hands with us: first G. G. Dej and other Romanians, then President A. Sukarno. Here and there he stops and says a few words. He comes to me, raises a finger and says: "I have to talk to you!" I say: "I'll be glad."

In the waiting room after the departure of the aircraft, Sukarno is sitting alone on the long sofa. I approach and ask for a permit to sit. S. Points to an empty seat beside him. I sit and we have /almost literally, as far as I can remember/ the following brief dialogue:

Me: "You have expressed a desire to talk. I will be glad. Should I ask to be announced by Ichsan?"

Sukarno is looking at me silently.

Me: "I've been here for 14 months and I have not had a chance to talk to you about political issues ..."

Sukarno / again looking at me silently; I fall silent; After a long time, "14 months? How do you feel?"

Me: "Good, very good."

Sukarno: "And your leg?"

Me: "It's always the same. It is forever."

Sukarno: "Your wife is not here."

Me: "She's here today with a group ambassadors' wives at the top of Bromo" / highest volcano in Java /.

Sukarno: "It's nice up there."

Me: "I believe it is."

Sukarno is silent again and is looking around the room.

Me: "When do you think you will have time to talk?"

Sukarno: "Actually, I have only one question: what is the position of Yugoslavia regarding Malaysia?"

Me: "Press occasional attacks, but the official stance is identical to yours, namely – is a matter of the population in affected territories."

Sukarno is silent.

Me: "And what is your personal opinion?"

Sukarno: "My opinion is simple and clear: it is the imperialist idea, pointed both towards the north and south, towards us. In our direction, the main goal is to attract Sumatra and separate it from us. In doing so, they primarily count on economic moments, the attractiveness of Singapore for a nearby Sumatra."

Me: "Such an opinion I heard last year from Nasution. It was very convincing and I wrote an article on this subject which was published in Borba under a pseudonym."

Sukarno: "I'd love to have it."

Me: "I can send you an excerpt in English."

Sukarno: / nods again silently /.

Me: "But here I hear other opinions, for instance that Indonesia has nothing to lose, and that the whole of Malaysia is small compared to Indonesia, and that Indonesia will be more attractive for Malaysia, than Malaysia for Sumatra."

Sukarno: "He who says so does not see the essence or does not see who is behind it. I know them all. The thing was invented by British diplomat MacDonald /?/, and adopted by the British government. Tengku is just an instrument in its hands. He is driven by personal ambition."

I: /since Sukarno was hesitating and looking around the room, I tried to make him say something/ "There is neither in nature nor in social events a pure substance, in nature for example, there is no chemically pure H₂O. Are there no other sides in case of Malaysia? Singapore is a Chinese-speaking city, and Malaysia will have a majority of the population speaking Malay, and that is your language..."

Sukarno is silent.

Me: "And what about the request of the Philippine for the North Borneo? It is artificial but strongly defended."

Sukarno is silent.

I: /after a long break/ "How are things going with West Irian?"

Sukarno: "Good" /he falls silent again/.

Me: "Diplomats are hoping that you will take them there on the occasion of takeover, May 1 to 2, 1963."

Sukarno: "I'm not there at the time. Probably just on my birthday, June 6th." /silent again/

Me: "I'm sorry, one last question. With Mr Ichsan, we cannot find a suitable time for the visit of Vice President Kardelj without your help."

Sukarno: "We are expecting Kardelj. I haven't been told that we have any difficulties arranging a term. What's the problem?"

Me: "Kardelj would like to come in mid-December. This is the only free date this winter. But Mr Ichsan says that December is crowded because Prince Sihanouk and the Sultan of Morocco are coming and that the preparatory meeting for the AA Conference will probably be held at that time."

Sukarno: "Never mind. It will be in December. I'm going on a long vacation in November. December can be harder. Tell Mr Kardelj I'm looking forward to his visit."

Me: "Can I communicate your decision to Mr Ichsan and agree on the exact date?"

Sukarno: "Yes."

The conversation was interrupted by the Chief of Protocol.

Aleš Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-41, dos. 40, no. 4383512

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Note on the talks with the Ambassador of Indonesia in Paris Tamzil, November 25, 1962

State Secretary
For Foreign Affairs
Stane Pavlič's Office

No. 439444
December 4, 1962

He invited me for lunch. Mr Tamzil is the Ambassador of Indonesia in Paris and Madrid. Previously, he was the Secretary General of the President Sukarno. He is our excellent associate.

He has just returned from Jakarta with a task to prepare the ground for the visit of President Sukarno to France in the spring next year. This is an old wish of Sukarno. The relations between Paris and Jakarta have significantly improved. He claims that French administration is trying to improve relations.

Subandrio and Sudjarwo / Indonesian Commissioner in West Irian / has recently been on his way through Paris. He shares his observations regarding the talks he had with Subandrio and Sudjarwo in Jakarta.

1 / Sukarno is stronger than ever. He has managed to eliminate all kinds of organized rebellion either party or military. Of particular importance is the liquidation of Darul Islam which has been terrorizing Java for more than 10 years.

Parties no longer represent a problem. The liquidation of Masyumi, the largest religious party, went smoothly. PNI / nationalist / is declining. PKI / communists / is also in decline. It is wrongly assumed that the Communists represent a direct threat to the regime of Sukarno.

He was surprised by the appointment of Yani for the Army Chief of Staff. Yani is known as a sharp, uncompromising, junior officer, with strong support in the junior officers' personnel. But Sukarno had no other choice. He had to put Nasution aside. Sometime before, Sukarno planned to appoint Yani as an ambassador and thus eliminate him out of the country. The death of Gatot Subroto, popular general, Deputy Army Chief of Staff forced Sukarno to accept Yani while eliminating Nasution. Solving the problem of West Irian will allow Sukarno to significantly demobilize the army and again rely on political authorities. The game of balancing between the parties and between the parties and the armed forces continues.

Syahrir / Socialist leader / Rohm, / one of the Masyumi leaders /, the heads of the revolutionary government Sjarifoeddin and others are in confinement or in prison. This applies to all the prominent Socialist leaders except Sudarsono / former ambassador to Belgrade / who is said to be completely changed after the heart attack. He became a religious man, went on a pilgrimage to Mecca and so on.

2 / Sukarno has a growing problem. Chinese doctors managed to cure his kidneys to a certain extent. On the issue of "women" he is less disciplined. The position of Ms Hartini has strengthened. The news about the possible termination of this marriage is inaccurate. This year, Ms Hartini went to Mecca, visited Poland and Romania, Cambodia and People's Republic of China, where she was received with the honors that belong only to the heads of state.

Ruslan Abdulgani is again in good relations with Sukarno. Sukarno appointed him Deputy Prime Minister to replace Jamin, who recently died.

Sukarno believed he would be able to shorten the deadline set for the takeover of West Irian. Sudjarwo works well. The natives wish to accelerate the process of the takeover of WI by Indonesia.

Djuanda's illness is getting harder and harder to Sukarno. I do not believe that Sukarno decided that Subandrio should succeed Djuanda. Sukarno was aware that the appointment of the Prime Minister Subandrio will lead to considerable difficulties since Subandrio enjoys no sympathy and support in the country. Subandrio is an excellent executive instrument of Sukarno, but nothing more. The problem is that there is not much choice about personality who could replace Djuanda. Economic situation is worsening. News confirms that the value of the rupee against the dollar fell within a year for ten times, i.e. today it should be around 3,000 rupees to the pound.

3 / In Jakarta, he noticed that there was something wrong in the relations with us. He is not able to say what caused it. He is making observations as, he underlines, a true friend of Yugoslavia.

He is of the opinions that we care too little about the character of Sukarno, and his sensitivity, the way of thinking and reactions of people from the Far East.

BC is one of the reasons, perhaps not decisive. Sukarno expected more attention on our part, perhaps recognition. He was the first who came up with the idea of the conference, and certainly the first who suggested Belgrade. He kept on insisting on it. But at the Conference all attention was paid to Nasser and Nehru who was all the time against the conference. Sukarno came to the conference with extraordinarily strong party-heterogeneous team. He needed support and recognition from us, from the Conference, to him personally in a complex internal situation in Indonesia. He came back dissatisfied, in a more difficult situation than he came. He also needed support in terms of West Irian of vis-a-vis communists and nationalists. However, this did not happen.

He is of the opinion that I have not emphasized enough the sensitivity of Sukarno and Jakarta to Nasser, Cairo, to our contacts on the line Belgrade-Cairo. They monitor all our contacts in Cairo and even the Delhi which are normally carried out by them.

Sukarno has a difficult character, even for them. You need to find the opportunity to shape how to adapt to his present mood. Sukarno is ready to discuss, but not at any moment and not in the way imposed by the other side. He knows it best as Sukarno's long time Secretary General. Sukarno is very complicated in his dealings. He is basically suspicious.

He recommends using the visit of comrade Kardelj for an open, versatile overview of the relations Belgrade-Jakarta. President Sukarno grows high esteem towards Comrade Kardelj. He will be ready for talks. The duty of the Ambassador is to find a moment and create an atmosphere. They also find it hard – this cooling of relations. Many in Jakarta regret. Subandrio is a story for himself. He is still a strong man. He needs to be devoted full attention during a visit. Subandrio does not make decisions but can greatly contribute towards improving, and even more towards worsening the relations. Attention to be taken.

We should not judge their foreign policy by their visits. Their policy remains non-aligned. There is no other way out. But on their own ground, the interests of not only Washington and Moscow, but also the interests of Beijing and Delhi are strongly opposed. He thinks we are not paying enough attention to this either. / In this regard he says that Sukarno has invited him to go with him to Japan but he has refused because it was only about having a holiday in Japan / and that President Kennedy invited Sukarno to visit the United States. He is afraid that President Sukarno will call him back to the position of Secretary General because he is not satisfied with the current – Mr Ichsan who is quite aged.

Stane Pavlič

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**Note on the talks of Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia Kardelj
and Prime Minister of Indonesia Djuanda in Jakarta,
December 11, 1962**

Attending on behalf of Indonesia: beside Prime Minister Djuanda, there were also present three vice-presidents, several ministers of economic sectors and Ambassador Asmaoen.

Attending on behalf of Yugoslavia: beside Vice-President Kardelj, also K. Gligorov, M. Nikezić, A. Vratuša and Ambassador A. Bebler.

Having expressed his satisfaction that Comrade Kardelj found the opportunity to visit Indonesia, Djuanda stressed that it was important to exchange views on many issues of interest to both countries. He also mentioned the Belgrade Conference as an important event.

He asked Comrade Kardelj to state the issues he wanted to discuss. Indonesians were especially interested in the development of socialism in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, in fact, is making efforts to build a system that will best suit its own circumstances. Indonesians are also building system, economic, and legal that suits their circumstances.

Yugoslavs are making constant efforts to ensure the country's progress. They are constantly changing what proves not to be suitable to their circumstances. They are not afraid to revise their attitudes in order to achieve better solutions.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-42, dos. 6, no. 443998

165

**Note on the second plenary meeting of the Deputy Prime Minister
of Yugoslavia Kardelj and Prime Minister of Indonesia Djuanda in Jakarta,
December 15, 1962**

Djuanda immediately gives a word to Comrade Kardelj, who presents the current economic circumstances in Yugoslavia and some issues of the economic system as well as some of the principles of constitutional development on the basis of the preliminary draft of a new constitution.

After Kardelj's presentation, Djuanda takes the word. He thanks for the information provided by Comrade Kardelj. He says that Indonesians are still very much interested in the latest events in Yugoslavia and the measures taken since Yugoslavia is learning in practice and constantly introducing new forms and new

methods when the practice denies old forms and methods. Djuanda says that Indonesia is facing very similar problems – both in economic and other fields.

In Indonesia, there has been a large decline in production in state-owned enterprises, which has caused serious consequences in terms of foreign currency; expenditures also increased. In state-owned enterprises they retained the old capitalist forms of organization. The only difference is in the fact that the shares have previously belonged to private owners, and are now in the hands of the state. They have not yet been implemented new ideas regarding the relations between management and workers. They have introduced councils in enterprises including workers, management and even, when necessary, the experts from outside. These councils control and improve the performance and productivity of enterprises. The time will show if these councils are a suitable organizational form.

As to taxes, the state takes a part of net income as it does in case of private companies. The state takes 55% of income, 7% of the net income is used for the social needs of the enterprises, and 5% will be paid in the form of production premium to the management and workers. If the enterprise operates well, much more money is granted to workers and administration staff.

In Indonesia, there is still – more or less – a system of fixed wages. Regardless of the operational success there are minimum and maximum salaries established.

The results achieved so far are disappointing, i.e. much worse than expected. Thus, for example, the state was supposed to receive – beside the taxes – another 4 billion rupees from the enterprises, and it receives only a billion and a half rupees (1/3). There are a number of reasons for this – lack of experience and technical knowledge, and moreover – part of import of raw material and equipment has been replaced by import for military purposes, which has slowed down the normal development.

The managers of state enterprises were the subject of criticism. However, it is very easy to criticize and dismiss, but it is very difficult to find a good replacement. Besides, it is not all about the organizational form. There are also difficulties in terms of planning, as well as estimates of production costs, price and so on. Salaries and wages are insufficient.

It is not only the fault of workers and management, but of many external factors. Starting from 1950 Indonesia has been spending too much. It has been necessary to make large expenditures for security and preparations for the liberation of W. Irian.

There is still a question what should be done. It is necessary to take short-term as well as long-term measures, to revise the Eight-Year Development Plan and adapt it to the current situation.

In this regard Djuanda has expressed the hope that the Yugoslav government will meet the request of the Indonesian government to send an expert when

this is requested. He should help Indonesian government with the reorganization of state-owned enterprises.

Then he mentions that the budget is not balanced.

Referring to the part of the presentation of Comrade Kardelj relating to the Constitution, Djuanda says that our election systems are different, but that there are certain similarities – for example, the so-called functional groups in the Indonesian parliament – peasants, workers, youth, intelligence and so on. He expresses the hope that the general elections in Indonesia will be held by the end of 1963. These will be the second elections in a row.

Then he moves on to international issues. Having said that he has asked Vice President Leimena to inform Comrade Kardelj on the policy towards neighbouring countries of Indonesia on his way to Bali, he referred only to the two current issues: 1) the attempts of Malaya to form Malaysia, by annexing Singapore and North Borneo to Malaya and 2) the efforts made to establish the Association of South-Eastern Asia (ASA). Indonesia opposes the creation of Malaysia, because it thinks it is imperialistic. Regarding the organization of ASA, Indonesia does not oppose it, but prefers developing cooperation on a bilateral basis. After all, the ASA stagnates.

Then he brings the conversation back to agriculture by saying that the Indonesian government is facing many problems in this field (modernization of production, prices, etc.).

Upon arrival of a Yugoslav experts they could discuss the issues concerning the introduction of incentives for workers in state enterprises, state production units. In this regard, Indonesia could use some of Yugoslav experience.

Comrade Kardelj expressed willingness to send an expert, but underlined the diversity of circumstances and emphasized that, after hearing our expert they will be able to find their own solutions. Our expert should be primarily a source of information about the Yugoslav practice in this area, and not responsible for drafting the definitive solution in Indonesia.

Djuanda agrees with Kardelj's opinion regarding the role of the expert. It is clear to them that the circumstances are different and that there is no formula that would be valid for all countries. Therefore, they sharply criticize some suggestions and advice that they get from the outside, which are based on general and moulded formulas (e.g. councils of experts of the International Monetary Fund).

As far as the state-owned enterprises, the experience of capitalist countries can be of no help to Indonesia. Therefore, they should become familiar with the experience of Yugoslavia, China, etc.

Having returned to the international issues, Kardelj presents information on Yugoslavia's relations with neighbouring countries, especially the relations with socialist countries, which have been successfully improved. This primarily

relates to Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The relations with the socialist countries have been disturbed by various ideological disagreements. Disagreements have emerged from a misunderstanding of the Yugoslav interpretation of the role of the policy of non-alignment, because some have been of the opinion that a socialist country like Yugoslavia must renounce its independent policy to be a member of the socialist camp. The current visit of the President to the Soviet Union is on the line of further improving relations with the Soviet Union and better mutual understanding. Of course, this is not about changing principled Yugoslav politics. This improvement reflects the attitude of both parties that ideological differences cannot hinder friendly cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, as well as a reflection of the fact that the Soviet Union has realized the importance of the policy of non-alignment in today's world. In addition, the USSR is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that there are a lot of paths leading to socialism, and that is the reason why USSR is tolerant towards other socialist countries tolerant. All this has created new conditions for cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union as well as with other socialist countries.

Our relations with Albania and China are still very weak. Albania is actually implementing China's policy on the Yugoslav borders. At the same time China attack the Soviet policy mainly over Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has long been silent. But such a situation cannot last forever, so the government has taken the position towards Chinese politics. However, there are no reasons for the relations to be weak either with Albania or with China. Interests of Yugoslavia should not come into conflict with the interests of China. According to Kardelj Yugoslav – Chinese dispute is obviously a reflection of certain dilemmas faced by China and all other socialist countries today, it is mainly about which way socialist countries should go in the present international circumstances. Kardelj says Yugoslavia fully understands the inevitability of internal mobilization of China to be economically built. However, China needs additional resources for this purpose. The help that the USSR and the socialist camp can provide is obviously not enough, because the USSR is faced with a very important task of their own development and raising standard. They also have to take the additional burden – armament. In Kardelj's opinion China as a huge country can obtain sufficient material base for its development on a pace imposed by the revolution only in the context of the global economy. Therefore, it is understandable that China aspires to become an independent factor in the creation of new relations in the world, which will enable faster development of underdeveloped countries and China itself. However, the path it has chosen to achieve a different division of wealth in the world can threaten the world peace. We believe that the pressure in this direction should be exercised not by the threat of war, but primarily on the economic front in terms of encouraging tendencies that lead to global economic integration, to the opening of world markets for all countries, including China. We do not blame China for the present situation, although we do not agree with its policy, because we believe that the primary responsibility for such turn in China is borne by the United

States because of its policy of blockade and isolation of China. Thus, China today is being imposed its orientation in terms of international relations, but also in terms of internal development.

We regret that China does not see that the policy led by Yugoslavia is actually in its favour and that it would be better if it is oriented in its foreign policy to the Soviet Union, because it would put effective pressure on the reactionary forces in the West. This would enable faster successes in the field of global economic cooperation and lead towards the breaking of the economic blockade around China.

Talking about Yugoslav view of non-aligned policy, Kardelj characterized this policy as a policy that has been consistently opposed to colonialism, imperialism, aggression and even politics from a position of power. In that spirit, he proposes participation of small countries in the preparation of the global economic conference. In doing so, he warns that this conference would be of little importance if it is more or less limited to the opposition of political thesis. Underdeveloped countries must come to the conference with a constructive program in relation to the problems of developed and developing countries, the problems of world trade in general, and organized global aid to faster economic development of underdeveloped countries.

Presenting Yugoslavia's relations with Western countries, Kardelj focuses on Yugoslav-American relations, which he marked as – from the formal side – more or less normal, in which, however, there have been some elements of worsening under the pressure of reactionary circles of the United States (depriving Yugoslavia of the status of the most privileged nation, burning Yugoslav products in the USA and so on) – it seems, primarily due to the improvements Yugoslav-Soviet relations. It seems to be the reflection of differentiation in the United States between the circles advocating coexistence and circles who think that the war is the only way to fix the international position of the United States.

Events in Cuba are also the reflection of such rivalry. We think that the Soviet government has acted very wisely when it withdrew the missiles from Cuba. And that is why we have given full support to Khrushchev. When he said that the world is on the brink of war, he sacrificed his prestige for preserving peace and thus emerged politically stronger from this conflict.

In such a situation, the Soviet government invited Tito to visit the Soviet Union. Tito's visit to the USSR will contribute to the consolidation of peace. It is our support to the Khrushchev's orientation. This invitation is also the reflection and recognition of the independent socialist position of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is, no doubt, interested in better relations and closer cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries. It should not in any way negatively affect its relations with Western countries.

As to Cuba, Kardelj says that Yugoslavia has always supported the Cuban people, but that the leadership of Cuba has not always been sufficiently realistic

in their assessment of these relations, even the international position of Cuba itself. Therefore, here were some acts and some attitudes of the Cuban government that Yugoslavia could not follow and support. So they created some difficulties and misunderstandings in the relations between Yugoslavia and Cuba. Our position supporting the Cuban revolution was not in any way altered or shaken. However, there is not enough warmth or mutual trust in our relations. We hope that – after a serious crisis – Cuba will begin assessing the circumstances more realistically.

Regarding the issue of Indo-China conflict, Kardelj said that we do not go into the question of the border as such. It is probably subject to discussion since the border is not exactly established. But these differences should not be an excuse for the war. We look at the conflict from the standpoint of the possible consequences if the war continues or if the situation at the border continues to be unclear. And these consequences can be very serious both in terms of disengagement of India and from the standpoint of further social development in the country. The conflict with China strengthens right-wing forces in India and pushes the country to the position of reactionary circles in the West. Thus, the main problem now is how to create conditions acceptable to both parties, without ceasing the truce and to start discussing problems at the negotiating table.

In the end, Comrade Kardelj mentions the question of Germany, which should be resolved based on the fact that there are two Germanys. Peaceful solution to the problem of Germany and Berlin would be a serious contribution to the stabilization of peace in this part of the world and would open the way towards a peaceful resolution of other outstanding issues.

After the exposure of Vice President Kardelj, Djuanda says that Indonesia follows with great care the relations of Yugoslavia with Albania, and especially with China. He would like to see that relations between Yugoslavia and China improve, in a way that the relations between the FPRY and the Soviet Union have been improved. But now China is leading a different policy compared to the Soviet Union. Indonesia is staying aside from the conflict. In this light, we should also assess our relation with KP Indonesia, whose views are closer to Beijing than to Moscow.

The Indonesian government positively assessed the policy now implemented by Moscow, and in particular the position taken by Khrushchev regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis. This attitude saved the world from nuclear disaster. It is now very difficult for Americans to organize an attack on Cuba. It is in Cuba's interest to understand this.

The development of relations between the USSR and China is interesting.

Khrushchev's speech before the Supreme Soviets clearly shows that the peaceful coexistence is the basis of Soviet foreign policy. It is also demonstrated by the way the Cuban problem is solved.

He has not yet seen the American and Chinese reaction to Khrushchev's speech. However, in his speech, Khrushchev has openly attacked China, namely a concept of Mao Zedong. Khrushchev said that the "paper tiger," had atomic teeth, and reminded those who attacked the policy of coexistence as a concession to imperialists, of the remnants of colonialism in the form of Hong Kong and Macao.

It is believed that the American response to the speech will be positive, while he fears that the Khrushchev's speech will make Chinese very angry. It can be abused by the USA, and Djuanda wonders whether there is another – more peaceful way for the solution of Soviet-Chinese conflict.

Referring to the conflict between China and India Djuanda says that Indonesians are not clear who is to be blamed for the attack. It is essential to keep India within the non-aligned countries. It is necessary to bring both sides to the conference table. He has not yet received a full report on the proposal, which, on behalf of the participants of Colombo Conference, Mrs. Bandaranaike will submit to Nehru and Zhou Enlai. However, it seems that the proposal is a compromise between the proposal of UAR (buffer zone) and the idea of Ne Win (compromise line). Indonesian position is this: Stay where you are; stop shooting; start negotiating.

Djuanda notes that between Yugoslav and Indonesian point of view there is no much difference in terms of the need to find universal solutions to some of the existing problems. Easing the tensions between the blocs might have a beneficial effect on China, in terms of mitigating its views. However, there is a difference between the estimates of England and America in relation to China. (Djuanda does not explain this difference).

The moral of the Cuban Missile Crisis could also affect the attitude towards China.

In accordance with the conclusions of the Bandung Conference, Indonesia supports the liberation movements. Indonesian sympathies are on the side of the new countries, such as Cuba. However, it does not approve all the actions of governments and leaders of these countries. Sometimes their statements and policies are not in line with their own interests.

In relation to the events in North Borneo, Djuanda says that there is one significant liberation movement. He says regretfully that Azhari has somewhat exaggerated in his statements, especially in relation to Indonesia. It is good to exaggerate to some degree, but not to cross the line (because it can lead to the loss of support).

Indonesia gives moral support to the liberation movement in North Borneo. It wants the people of the region all the best – to freely choose their government and to build their country.

There is not much time left to discuss bilateral relations. Kiro Gligorov gives a brief report on the work of the groups in the area of economic cooperation.

He underlines the sincerity in the talks, but expresses regret that the signed protocol has stayed in too general terms without specifying the amount of textiles that Indonesia will buy in Yugoslavia next year or which facilities they will build using the Yugoslav loans.

In response to Gligorov's report, Djuanda says that Indonesia is not able to take specific commitments at the moment. This year, they are late with the plans and budget for 1963. However, they will soon have to make a decision regarding textiles, because Elbaran holiday is near (in March), when the people are buying a lot of textiles, i.e. renewing their wardrobe. Thus, presumably, the plan for textile imports will be improved in two to three weeks.

Indonesia must be very cautious and critical in relation to the procurement of new equipment. Until now, it has paid too much attention to the new facilities, without taking much care of the existing plants, which suffer from a shortage of raw materials and spare parts. It will be necessary to revise the Indonesian policy on this issue. For now, they will postpone the construction of new facilities. The new priorities will have to be based on accurate figures.

Indonesia has already spent too much. It will therefore be necessary to carefully examine the new investments, both in terms of foreign currency, and in terms of expenditures in rupees. Regarding foreign currency, Indonesia wants to preserve the reputation of a good payer. As to rupees, it is necessary to prevent the large increase of the amount of money in circulation.

Last week, the Indonesian government has made the important decisions. It fully understands the benefits of concrete decisions, but – for now – it must be able to examine the country's ability to repay its debts. It will take some time to determine the definitive figures.

Vice President Kardelj agrees with the arguments presented by the First Minister Djuanda. Of course, both sides should benefit from the economic cooperation. We are interested in expanding our cooperation with, but we do not want to do anything that would create any difficulties to Indonesia. In any case, the development of economic cooperation and mutual assistance will contribute to the development of political relations. To keep good relations, it is necessary to develop economic cooperation on a sound basis. So, he agrees that, for now, we should only establish a framework, and then in shortest possible period of time start discussions on the concretization of the protocol.

In the end, it was agreed that a joint press release should not include theoretical issues of or ideological formulations. It should reflect a high degree of agreement between the parties regarding the international issues in the field of bilateral cooperation and specifically express the possibilities of future cooperation and its expansion.

Draft of Vice President Kardelj's response to President Sukarno's toast

December 1962

Your Excellency,
Dear friends,

I would like, first of all, to thank you for your kind and friendly words conveyed to me, my wife and my associates. Such expressions of friendly feelings and love have been sent to us by all of your peoples from the moment when we first stepped on the soil of your great and friendly country. Thank you, also, for the warm words to the benefit of the peoples of Yugoslavia. I am particularly pleased, Your Excellency, that in You, I can welcome our dear fellow citizen, a true friend, a great advocate for the preservation of world peace, equitable relations between states and peoples, and experienced statesman who persistently and vigorously fights to strenghten the international position of friendly Indonesia.

The people and the Government of Yugoslavia have shown the high esteem and particular interest in the huge efforts of your country towards building a better and happier life. From our own experience we know how difficult it is to make up for decades and centuries of the interference of various conquerors and colonizers. Through the implementation of your eight-year development plan, you will boldly and successfully build your country and I warmly wish you much success therein.

My visit to Indonesia is a continuation of a developed and so far useful practice of periodic exchange of opinions and views on issues of mutual interest, through personal contacts of Yugoslavia and Indonesian statesmen. So, it is my great pleasure that on this occasion I can say that the cooperation between Yugoslavia and Indonesia is manifested through frequent joint activities and presentations in international forums, especially on those issues that are of vital interest for the peaceful humanity, of course, in the spirit of the policy of non-alignment of our two countries. It is also my pleasure to be able to point to the fact that the cooperation between our countries constantly improves and extends to all other fields of bilateral relations. I am particularly pleased that the economic relations between the two countries have developed significantly in the recent years. While at previous meetings, we repeatedly emphasized that economic relations lag behind political, this time I can say that in this field we have achieved notable results: economic relations are becoming more intense and varied. On this occasion I wish to emphasize, and I believe I share the opinion of your Excellency, that despite all the success achieved so far, there are great opportunities for broader cooperation of our countries in this field. Bearing in mind the similarity of the issues, I think it would be in our mutual interest to proceed with more intensive

and comprehensive exchange of experiences gained in the field of internal development of our countries.

Yugoslavia and Indonesia which belong to neither of the existing blocs are bound by a very high degree of similarity of view on all core issues of the present day. It is manifested through the fight for the preservation of peace through active peaceful coexistence, the struggle for equal relations among all countries and peoples, for the non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, for the general and comprehensive disarmament, for the eradication of colonialism in any form and for effective international assistance to developing countries, without any political conditions.

Unfortunately, international situation is deteriorating. These days, the mankind is on the brink of global conflict which would bring about a complete disaster. In our opinion, the reason for this lies in the fact that there are still some circles in the world which tend to solve international problems from the position of power and interference in the internal affairs of other countries, only to protect their selfish interests and prevent the normal development and independence of these countries. Briefly, that is the essence of deteriorating international situation, which is roughly manifested in the case of Cuba, the Middle East, and until recently in your own territory around West Irian. The latest events on the borders of India cause the concern and fear of disturbing the peace, not only in this area but also throughout the world. We follow with great concern the development of these events. However, in such a situation, it is necessary to joint efforts of all countries, to access the peaceful resolution of outstanding issues with a lot of statesmanship wisdom in order to save humanity from immeasurable consequences. While, on one side the problems are being exacerbated, the basic problem of today are being pushed aside, i.e. the relation between developed and underdeveloped areas. We are of the opinion that opposing and hindering the solution of this problem – which is a historical necessity, and therefore cannot be avoided, – leads to constant instability in the world, which is charged with the constant threat of more serious disorders.

Your Excellency, dear friends,

My country has always highly appreciated the efforts made by the people and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia invested in the field of calming the international situation and solving the problems peacefully. These efforts are the result of consistent implementation of the policy of non-alignment, whose protagonist is your respected and highly esteemed President. Your words and thoughts expressed at the Belgrade conference, as well as in various other conferences and forums and in personal contact with our President Tito have had a profound impact on the present role of the non-aligned countries in this stormy world. We are deeply convinced that our joint efforts in this field in the future will be crowned with success, just as they have been so far.

Your successes Mr President, in the eradication of colonialism in the territory of your great country, the liberation of West Irian, – fills the hearts of our people with pleasure while they admire the heroic efforts of courageous Indonesian people who have the unreserved support of my country. We share your satisfaction with this major victory over the dark forces of colonialism. We are aware of the immense sacrifices that the brave and patriotic people of the Republic of Indonesia had to submit in order to persist in the long battle for the final liberation of their brethren in the West Irian.

Allow me, on this occasion on behalf of our Government to express confidence that the future of Yugoslavia, in accordance with their current principled peaceful foreign policy will invest efforts to apply the policy of peaceful coexistence, because it is the only alternative, which leads to the peace and security of mankind.

I am deeply convinced, Your Excellency, that my talks with you and your associates will contribute to further deepening and development of our friendly relations. In this regard, I wish to you, Your Excellency, and to you, my beloved friends, and through you to the great Indonesian people, personal happiness and prosperity.

Allow me, Your Excellency and dear friends to raise this glass for your personal happiness and health, for the happiness of Indonesian people, and for the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Yugoslavia and Indonesia.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-4, no. 444051

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Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on Kardelj's visit to Indonesia

Djakarta
Number 937
December 22, 1962

Kardelj's visit was finished by a protocol. You will get more detailed information from delegations (Nikezić) from Delhi. We hereby underline:

1) Kardelj received the honour and attention typical for the heads of state (except the presence of Sukarno at the airport on his arrival and departure). On the streets, there were big pictures of Sukarno and Kardelj, a large number of our flag, youth and children along hundreds of kilometres of the roads in the cities,

villages and wherever they drove, all of them having small Indonesian and Yugoslav flags and flowers.

2) They have taken good care of security. They mobilized all police and a lot of army. On the way from Medan to Prapat, there were over 100 vehicles of security forces. On the way through the jungle, there were machine-gun nests and so on.

3) The meetings and the talks were attended by almost all the members of the government. He had 5 meetings with Sukarno but without thorough exchange of views, due to Sukarno's usual avoidance. On the way, he exchanged views with Djuanda and Leimena on almost all issues including China. Two plenary meetings were dedicated to the exchange of experiences in the state, particularly economic development and the exchange of views on the world problems. They showed a great interest in Kardeljev's presentation on the methods for overcoming economic difficulties and our view on the issue of China, Cuba, and the question of the relations between developed and developing countries. Their presentations on economic difficulties, particularly on unsolved problems in managing state sector of the economy is very sincere, less on foreign policy and global issues. In the absence of Sukarno they largely repeated formulation intended for the public (neutrality in the dispute between China and India, etc.).

4) At the residence, the lunch with R. Abdulgani and Ali Sastroamidjojo, two main ideologues of the nationalist parties. The atmosphere was extraordinarily warm. Both anxiously listened and were very impressed by Kardelj's presentation of world issues, especially regarding China. Their occasional remarks and question showed a large measure of agreement. Ali has somewhat irrational tendency toward emphasizing the meaning of "Asian solidarity". This has been less noticeable with Abdulgani.

5) Economic Negotiations are useful, but unfortunately half a successful. Each side has the occasion to get to know the needs and the advantages of the other. Due to the present difficulties in balance of payments, they asked for the postponement of the final decision for a period of several weeks to several months. More details in a separate dispatch.

6) During the visit, Press and radio reported comprehensively, more than on the occasion of Dej's and Sihanouk's visit. Political and public presentations, speeches and toasts were reported in a few sentences. Therefore, the readers were not able to notice the difference between the two toasts Sukarno gave at his and our banquet, the first containing conventional and inappropriate jokes and the other being warm as in the "old days".

7) The results of the visit are absolutely positive. The public is reminded of Yugoslavia and Tito. For the first time after the EC, we were reminded about this event and our slogans at the BC. The leadership, and especially Djuanda, Wall-dorf, Ali and Abdulgani have got a strong shot of our views and this is likely to

produce the lasting results. Sukarno seems to have been particularly impressed because Kardelj did not use the opportunity to attack China in general and was extremely loyal. This should explain the friendly tone of the second toast and a public promise that he will re-visit Belgrade (off the record, he said it could be on his way back from the state visit to London). Personal relations between Kardelj and Djuanda even Kardelj and Leimena strengthened. Both men and their wives were extremely warm towards Kardelj and Pepica. Economists reinforced their belief that we are an interesting partner. The Minister of Finance became close to Gligorov and promised to come to Belgrade. The more will come.

8) PKI has given an internal directive to boycott. Their official press remained silent; under its influence it threatened. Neither one nor the other attacked. The absence of their supporters on the streets was not felt. There were no incidents (usual appearance before the Parliament probably failed due to PKI fraction).

9) They requested the Communiqué to be comprehensive. The attitudes in the spirit of BC were accepted without resistance. The main difficulty lies in their insistence on the words “new emerging SE forces”. This forced us to compromise and to include both their and our own views on the issue of the composition and role of the progressive forces in the world today (they exclude the role of the labour movement in the developed world). The full text of the Communiqué was published by the agencies and the press.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1962, F-42, dos. 27, no. 442296

168

**Letter of President Tito to President Sukarno on the visit to Premier
Nikita Khrushchev**

Belgrade, January 14, 1963

Dear friend,

Bearing in mind the major international events, I feel the need to exchange with you the views on some of the most important international issues. The year 1962 was quite turbulent and full of threats to the world peace, but it ended happily, owing to the victory of the common sense of those who are responsible for the fate of mankind and owing to the significant and constructive activities of non-aligned countries, which have made large and successful efforts at the Uni-

ted Nations regarding the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Caribbean Sea. I think we can still be confident about the future developments at the international scene and satisfied with the growing role of non-aligned countries, although I think they should be even more active and united in their actions at international level.

I believe that you will be interested in the results of our visit to the Soviet Union, which occurred at the invitation of the Soviet government and its president, N.S. Khrushchev. This visit had the character of a holiday, but we tried to use this holiday not only for the comprehensive study of Soviet achievements in recent times, but also for a thorough exchange of views on all major international issues, and relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. First of all, I must say that we are very pleased with the warm reception of the government and the people of the Soviet Union. Our talks were conducted in a spirit of friendly and realistic observation of international problems and our bilateral relations and I think it is important that we have been able to clarify many questions and to set the problem existing in our relations on the realistic base. We have agreed, or have come to the similar point of view regarding the most important international problems concerning the world. We have also come to a common belief that it is necessary to increasingly improve and expand our bilateral relations in various fields.

We have also discussed the importance of non-aligned countries in today's world and in this regard I have explained the policy of Yugoslavia. We have agreed that undeveloped countries are having increasingly important positive role in international affairs.

It seems to me that the most important position in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is the support of the Soviet government to the concept of peaceful coexistence with all countries, regardless of differences in their social systems, and it is considered that the disputed international issues should be resolved peacefully through negotiations. That is why there was an open disagreement with the Chinese leaders in terms of attitudes toward peace or war, the achievement of peaceful coexistence, on issues that are of vital importance for all undeveloped countries.

Talking to the Soviet Prime Minister, I have got the impression that there is no reason to be concerned about the outbreak of the conflict regarding the Berlin, issue, because it seems that the contacts between the USSR and the USA have led to some agreement, under which the Soviet Union agrees that American troops remain in Berlin under the flag of the United Nations, along with other troops that will be determined.

However, there is little hope for disarmament, because it seems it does not suit the Western countries for several reasons. Khrushchev believes that one of the reasons is the unresolved German issue. However, we have to make continuous efforts to solve the problem of disarmament since, otherwise, the arms race will be further increased.

We share the same views on the conflict between India and China. Given that the dispute is still not resolved, I share your opinion that all peaceful and non-aligned countries have to be most actively engaged in finding a peaceful solution, and to which your country has already made a concrete contribution. As a peaceful and non-aligned country, India deserves more support. This would also reinforce the position of India as a non-aligned country which is of the great significance to world peace. I know that the Indian government was not satisfied due to insufficient support of non-aligned countries, and I think that it was partly right. I would be grateful if you would inform me about the prospects for a peaceful solution of the dispute after a visit recently paid by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mrs. Bandaranaike and your Foreign Minister, Mr Subandrio to China. Also, I would appreciate your opinion on other international problems, for example, the latest developments in the struggle of the people of the northern Kalimantan for self-determination and the situation in South Vietnam.

Dear Mr President, I am very much pleased that the visit of the Vice President Edvard Kardelj to Indonesia, who was received very warmly and kindly, was so successful and that you personally had time for thorough and friendly exchange of views with him. We believe that this exchange of views was very useful and fruitful, especially in terms of our bilateral relations, and that will help our friendly cooperation become even more comprehensive, especially in the field of economy.

I am very glad to hear that you will, in the course of this year, be able to come to Yugoslavia, which will enable us to further discuss impressions from the Soviet Union and other international issues.

With sincere greetings and best wishes,

Yours T.

P.S. Many greetings to you and your family from my wife.

AJ, KPR I-1/432

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Bebler to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about misunderstandings
with President Sukarno**

Jakarta
Number 49
January 23, 1963

So called “critical remarks” of Mihailov, i.e. Sukarno, show that the time has come to start a dialogue, in that or some other form, between us and Sukarno on the basis of the “gap” between us. The gap has been there for a long time – we have convened Cairo, he has convened Bandung. We convene one kind, he convenes another kind of union conference. We both deal with Chinese-Indian disputes, each in his own way. His complaint to Mihailov breaks silence from his side. One can only guess that we have become a serious nuisance for his pro-Chinese actions, which already has a growing opposition in his own surroundings (ref. our 50 about Abdulgani’s opinion). We have never had any reasons to avoid any dialog, unlike him, and we do not have them now, when his Beijing friends have problems. For all these reasons, I suggest you to authorize me to get to the bottom of all those issues brought up by Mihailov, if possible with Sukarno himself, and if not with him, than with one of the two close friends with whom we have excellent relations – doctor Iksan, the Chief of his Cabinet, or Ms Supeni, his personal trustee in MFA. Regarding our reaction on “criticism” in such a conversation, it would have two positive and two negative points. More precisely, the “criticism” of Mihailov refers to: 1. convening a new Bandung, 2. Malaysia, 3. our relations with India, 4. convening international union conference. When it comes to point 1, Mihailov has stronger arguments. That has been my opinion for a long time and I’ve stated this to Kardelj. I had an impression that he mostly agrees. If such is our stand, than we should say that we understand the reasons for convening the AA conference and that we believe that it could be useful to some extent. We are ready to support it officially when it becomes necessary, etc. (Novotni agreed on longer positive section in communique). Point 2 it should be said that it was a misunderstanding. We were always supporters of nations’ right for self-determination and we are against forcing foreign solutions against any nation. It was not correct, if some of our moves were interpreted as opposed to this stand (my visit to Kuala Lumpur, Lee’s visit to Belgrade, etc.). The basic attitude is presented in Kardelj’s communique. Therein the full support is given to the democratic movement in North Kalimantan etc. If they want, we can clarify this attitude as soon as the opportunity arises. In the point 3, it is about principles, i.e. about supporting non-aligned India which is under pressure from China. Such support is the duty of every non-aligned and all peaceful countries

and world powers. In point 4, we should make a difference between the meetings of government officials and meetings of union officials. If there is an excuse to have the first group meet separately as AA – solidarity of undeveloped countries against colonialism and neo-colonialism – unions should be treated somewhat differently. The unity of working class across all geographic borders is the goal which complies with interests of both colonial and undeveloped countries, etc. That is why they should support our initiative. This differentiated reaction can be justified from tactical point of view. In two points we are “giving in”, being helpful, and in two points we are asking them to approach our stands.

Your opinion, please.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1963, F-38, dos. 24, br. 42726

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Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Bebler to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs on the talks with President Sukarno

Sukarno received me in the presence of four ministers of economy resors.

He immediately read the message from our President with great interest. After that, he said that the message was “very clear” and asked me to tell President Tito that he would answer it in detail. Then he asked, clearly in front of everybody about workers’ self-management and how the production plans were made in a company, how the profits were shared, etc, since ministers Suharto (of trade Dasaad, industrial, no resor) joined the conversation in Dutch. Sukarno asked several questions, not really related to each other, e.g. how the foreign exchange rates are determined, about the cash transactions in exchange offices and similar. At the end he asked me to prepare a full, systematic and comprehensive, but concise presentation of our economy system and said he would call to hear me up. I promised. Sukarno went on to ask about Tito’s health after the USSR tour. Was the winter severe? I said that Tito was feeling great and that probably the severe winter pleased him.

While walking me to the door (ministers stayed at the table), he asked me how Tito judges on the Chinese-Indian dispute and who is to be blamed in his opinion. I told him that I cannot say Tito’s opinion on the earlier stages of the dispute, but for the last stage, from last autumn onward, he thinks that China bears the unconditional blame. China used large military forces in that stage against weak Indian border forces and devastated them. It is certainly not a desirable be-

haviour towards a neighbour. Sukarno was quiet, but one could tell by his face that he regrets to hear that somebody judged his friends. I emphasize – regrets, not disagrees. He was very polite after that, as he was during the whole conversation. Finally, he told me that Mrs Hartini would like my wife to visit her again.

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1963, F-38, dos. 24, br. 42842

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**Instruction of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia
in Belgrade to the Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta on how to overcome
disagreements with President Sukarno**

Koča Popović's Office
Conf. 42726
January 28, 1963.

Bebler,

Your 49 and our 42494 bypassed. We add the following:

1. When things come through intermediaries, there is always a chance for misunderstanding. It should be borne in mind that some "remarks" may represent the opinion of Indonesian Communists.

2. If there had been any objections to our attitudes, it would have been presented during Kardelj's visit.

3. Our compromise regarding Bandung II is not a question because our position is well-known, so it could also be a misunderstanding or intrigue. However, committing in advance to the public support is not appropriate.

4. Of course, we are willing to solve any possible misunderstandings. It should be done on a higher level, but quietly and without dramatization through the natural exchange of views, depending on the circumstances, and not through the "package".

Koča

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1963, F-38, dos. 24, no. 42726

**Note on the talks between Assistant State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia Đerđa and the Ambassador of Indonesia Asmaoen,
February 1, 1963**

Josip Đerđa's Office
Conf. no. 43794

He came at his own request accompanied by an adviser.

He wanted above all to inform us about the evolution of his government's attitude in terms of the Malaysian Federation. When 1-2 years ago, combination of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and other British possessions in the Pacific appeared, Jakarta was reserved – neutral, believing that it up to the people in question to decide whether such combinations should be accepted or another solution chosen – independence or joining an independent country.

Over time, the real i.e. neo-colonial face of this combination was discovered. It was the United Kingdom which was feeling the need to change the shape of its dominance. Time has shown that in the foundation of this combination is a reactionary politics which is best presented by the Premier of Malaya – Ralman, with his belligerent anti-communism and agitation against all advanced in this part of the world. That is why Jakarta is taking a negative attitude towards that federation and is forced to more actively confront the activities of Ralmana and others like him.

The uprisings in Brunei which will certainly be followed by others impose the need for taking as precise position on all issues in that area.

Asked about the aspirations of the Philippines towards some current war British colonies – Asmaoen replies that those concerned are those who need to make a decision after receiving the possibility of free expression.

However, I feel that for some reason they do not care much about the Philippines' "wandering" in the area.

I have noticed that we are always reserved about the combinations of the colonists in the colonies, and that from the very beginning we were reserved and suspicious about the project of Malaysian Federation. As he himself and present adviser remember we have inquired about their position on several occasions – which at that moment was "neutral" and sometimes caused confusion. Because of this, we understand of the latest Indonesian attitude and we can only say that we were standing in a good position all the time.

After that we moved on to relations between East and West and in particular to the meaning of the breakdown of the talks in Brussels and the possible repercussions of that, and in general the crisis in the relations of France with the ot-

her Western powers. We agreed that all comes down to a certain crisis adjustments and regrouping in terms of easing tensions between east and West. We have also agreed that the situation is favourable for the acquisition of the non-aligned since their area of their operation is expanded.

Đerda

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1963, F-38, no. 43794

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Minutes from the meeting held on February, 20 1963 at the premises of the Council for Foreign Trade of the Federal Economic Chamber with the companies interested to work in Indonesia.

Asian section

11 no. 1525/1 DP/KK

Belgrade, February 25, 1963

Attending:

- | | |
|---|--------------------------------|
| 1. Ćosić Jovan | - ITV, Belgrade |
| 2. Ćirić Ilija, Stamenković
Velibor, Botica Katarina | - Invest-Import, Belgrade |
| 3. Kalica Petar | - Jugometal, Belgrade |
| 4. Zrnić Dušan | - Geozavod, Belgrade |
| 5. Ratković | - Geoistraživanja, Zagreb |
| 6. Bošković i Nedić | - Hempro, Belgrade |
| 7. Ljuština G. | - Jugoauto, Belgrade |
| 8. Rajak, Ing. Bajić | - Interexport, Belgrade |
| 9. Đonović M. | - Metalexport, Sarajevo |
| 10. Mirčić Radislav | - Centroprom, Belgrade |
| 11. Debossens Alex | - "ELKA", Zagreb |
| 12. Pantelić B. | - Feroelektro, Sarajevo |
| 13. Kitić Mir. | - Jugoslavija Film, Belgrade |
| 14. Andrejević M. | - Energoinvest, Sarajevo |
| 15. Milanović Vojin | - Fabrika kablova, Svetozarevo |

16. Janković i Ćirović	- Jugoelektro, Belgrade
17. Pejnović R.	- Progres-Invest, Belgrade
18. D. Roler i D. Popović	- D.S.I.P., Belgrade
19. M. Kapetanić i F. Đerđ	- D.S.S.T., Belgrade
20. Ing. Tomić Ivo	- KIZ, Zagreb
21. Živčić	- Pliva, Zagreb
22. Mali B. i Ković V.	- Jugoimport, Belgrade
23. Lenarčić	- Jugobanka, Belgrade
24. Lešnjarević Mil.	- Rudnap, Belgrade
25. Belinić Ante	- Centrotexil, Belgrade
26. Glumac Stevan	- Derma-Koteks, Zagreb
27. Ljubisavljević Radmila	- Jugolek, Belgrade
28. D.Vulović	- Jadroagent, Rijeka
29. Perić Dobrivoje i Ljubičić Mile	- Savet za spoljnu trgovinu

Agenda:

- 1) Implementation of the plan of exports and imports in 1963 for Indonesia;
- 2) Miscelineous

Comrade Perić reports on the last year's commodity exchange with Indonesia noting that, despite the fact that the volume of exports reached 10.9 billion, its structure is unsatisfactory since only a small portion accounts for mass-production and wide consumption goods. The largest share of exports was realized by JUGOIMPORT. The situation with imports is the same. Despite the fact that it reached the amount of 1.6 billion dinars, the product range is very poor, reduced to just three items: raw rubber, copra and tin.

After the exposure, he invites the attendees to reflect on the problems encountered in performance, placement of goods, transport, payment, etc. Particular attention should be paid to the problem of our network in Indonesia. At the same time, it is necessary to give a proposal for harmonization of the network with the current and future needs. Among other things, it is concluded that the presence of our companies in the international market is more of a campaign character and that our companies do not make long-term plans. This performance is necessary, given that the Indonesian market is very promising and that among other things, it requires the constant presence.

After this, they moved on to consider the plan of exports and imports according to individual products and product segments.

The Representative of Hempro, Belgrade, believes that for the placement of our products, primarily in chemical sector, it is necessary to predict the possibility of providing commercial loans and also to ensure the agreement of the companies in our country. During the last year, larger quantities of raw rubber and copra were purchased mainly by one importer, which means that the planned quantity was not realized. The question is whether there is a possibility that other importers could be involved in the procurement of these items because he believes that they would be able to achieve better results. He also states that the structure of the current network (branch) is not able to process and expand the range of both imported and exported products. The question is whether it would not be more useful to enable another company to establish its branch in addition to the already existing one.

Comrade Kapetanić from the Secretariat of Foreign Trade explained the role and importance of the company in improving the exchange. At the same time, he invited the present representatives of companies to focus on items that are hardtop place and where we did not show particular activity. Also, he emphasizes the need for closer co-operation between our companies in their appearance in the Indonesian market which should be manifested in the work of our network in Jakarta. He believes that today's network in Indonesia mainly deals with the problem of placing investments while other sectors are neglected since none of them is on the market there.

The representative of "Invest-Import" informs that the contract was concluded on the construction of shipyards in the amount of \$ 8 million, 90% of which accounts for the export of equipment, mechanical engineering and electrical engineering. During 1963 it will be partly realized while the entire facility will be completed in 1964/1965. During this year we should also export the spare parts worth about a million dollars. They predict reinforcement of the current representative office with one engineer and other staff.

The representative of RUDNAP, Belgrade informs that the contract regarding construction machinery (\$ 1.8 million) was partially realized in 1962 (\$ 223,000), while the largest part will be realized this year (\$ 1.5 million). There are prospects of new jobs in construction and other machinery and tractors.

The representative of "Jugoauto" notes that so far they have not been able to provide jobs just because the branch was unable to process mass-production items. It is believed that the branch should be set in a way to be able to respond to this task.

The representative of ITV states that they were late with the placement of motor vehicles in the Indonesian market, although in this country there are rather big possibilities. He agrees that the network is lacking.

The representative of "Energoinvest", Sarajevo, underlines that the loans, both long-term and short-term, are necessary for the placement of equipment and

mas products, so it is necessary to make a serious approach to solving the problem of commercial loans.

The representative of "Elka" Zagreb, tells about the difficulties they encountered regarding the placement of cables and conductors in the Indonesian market. He says that their company has not been able to establish the necessary cooperation with the branch in Jakarta, considering that this (Interexport) has a contract with another factory (cable). The largest share of exports was realized over the West German company in Hamburg, while a smaller part was realized directly. In a conclusion, he emphasises the need to organize branches in such a way that would permit that our exporters can operate under the same or similar conditions since the vast majority is unable to keep their permanent representatives.

The representative of the cable factory, Svetozarevo, says that during this year they will export cables worth about \$ 700,000. However, for the increased placement it is necessary to solve the problem of loan and the possibility of creating a consignment stock in Singapore. During this year, they will send a representative to Indonesia in order to make a more detailed market analysis, since it has been mainly conducted through the representatives of "Invest-Import".

The representative of KIZ, Zagreb, believes that our exports should focus on the products that are difficult to place on the Indonesian market.

The representative of Jugolek, Belgrade, reports that during the last year the company qualified for a larger amount of drugs and medical supplies via "Jugoimport", and hopes that this year it will be able to proceed with the placement. Among other things, they expect the delivery of polio vaccines in the amount of \$ 200,000.

The representative of Centrotekstil, Belgrade, says that they are negotiating the conclusion of fabric exports worth about \$ 4 million – mostly Indonesian cotton processing. The company is struggling with some difficulties, primarily due to the lack of the continuity in processing transactions and loans, as well as due to transport problems. The first difficulty is due to the fact that assignment depends on the administration, while in transport the deliveries are late due to irregular and long voyages of Jugolinija. He mentions the case when the goods were ready for boarding on November 28, 1962, and the ship sailed out on January 18, 1963, which led to the late arrival of the goods at the destination. This method of shipment significantly reduces our chances of getting jobs, and it is necessary to find a solution. This problem has existed until now, however, Jugolinija promised the introduction of express lanes for the countries of Southeast Asia, which, however, has not been achieved. We expect a new contract worth \$ 9 million.

The representative of Jugoslavija Film, Belgrade, declares that the Indonesian market achieved significant results in exports in 1960/1961. However, due to

the lack of foreign currency today, Indonesians is asking loans for movies with a 5-year term. Maybe we should grant a loan to 2-3 years, in which case the Jugoslavija-Film could count on exports worth 60-80000 dollars.

During the discussion it was noted that in offering investment equipment there is insufficient coordination between companies that perform there.

Comrade Kapetanić emphasizes that in this respect it is necessary to achieve cooperation primarily in the country and then unify the forces in the market there, organizing the branches both in Jakarta and in other economic centres in the form of Commercial-Technical Bureau.

Participants are familiar with the new system of foreign participation in investment construction, which has been lately practiced in Indonesia, the so-called "Production Sharing System", under which foreign investments are paid by the products of a plant or facility. We, from our side, will have to find the most appropriate form of participation and repayment. This could be realized through the delivery of equipment, and at the same time identifying ways and forms of repayment with Indonesian partners.

Regarding imports, all conditions are met for its successful realization, but it would be necessary to invest greater efforts to expand the range of products.

The representative of Centroprom, Belgrade, expects that this company, through joint engagement with Interexport, will be able to achieve turnover of 250,000 pounds in the first phase, to finally achieve the sales of 500,000 pounds. He thinks that Jakarta branches should be reinforced with more people and division of labour performed. It is also necessary to address the problem of transport in order to realize the planned activities.

The representative of Jugometal, Belgrade, says that this year his company expects to realize imports of tin in the amount of only 1,200 tons since Indonesians are not able to provide larger amounts. Indonesians are offered a long-term agreement for the supply of tin, as provided in the trade agreement, however, they did not agree. Instead, they have committed themselves to deliver only about 100 tons per month. Other products that are on the list of imports are already included in the plan, so that it will be able to realize imports.

In discussing the problem of our commercial network in Indonesia, most of those present agreed that it cannot fully respond to perspective exchange with Indonesia and that it should include representatives of other sectors (mechanical engineering, metal processing, chemical and others) and that the branches should be given general Yugoslav character. It is proposed that the branch should comprise the following sectors: investments, exports and imports. During the talks, they have stressed the necessity of coordination of all the companies that are interested in exchanges under the same conditions. This is necessary because Interexport operates mainly with the companies with which it has contractual relationships.

Based on the discussions the following conclusions have been made:

1. To examine the trade networks as well as the proposal to create a unique Yugoslav bureau that would have its offices not only in Jakarta but also in other economic centres: Sumatra and Sulawesi. This bureau should include the representatives of other fields and be able to handle market including wider range of products. Inter-export and Ingrom should be consulted therein.

2. For the purpose of better affirmation of the Indonesian market, it is necessary first of all our to make our production and export companies direct their performance more prosperously and in the long run, because the present performance is limited to temporary jobs where they cannot have longer-lasting benefits.

3. Given that, under the present circumstances, the company for the exchange promotion – Interexport – is not able to equally treat all interested parties, it is necessary to re-examine this issue, in order to enable other companies to perform under the same conditions. This issue should be addressed in cooperation with DSST, Jugobanka, etc.

4. As it has been re-emphasized in presentations and discussions, there is still a serious problem of transport. This problem should be addressed with Jugolinija, Splošna plovdba, and other competent authorities. The solution to this problem should be found in the higher shipping frequency, establishing express lines or letting our exporters engage foreign shipping companies in certain cases.

5. Jugobanka and other bodies should consider offering the mass-production goods through corresponding commercial and other loans and possibly some other benefits in order to make our companies competitive in the Indonesian market. Given the fact that a large part of the realization of commodity exchange with Indonesia is realized through parallel jobs which are the subject of special arrangements, it will be necessary to provide the assistance to Interexport company which is working on its realization.

Secretary of the Asian Section
R. Žugić, signed

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Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Bebler about President Sukarno's informal expression of friendship towards Yugoslavia

Jakarta
Number 176
February 28, 1963

At the reception on the occasion of Idul Fitri, Sukarno expressed his friendship towards Yugoslavia. While all the participants (members of the government, the General Staff, diplomatic corps) were standing, he was looking for my wife and me. He called adjutant, told him to bring three chairs, sat down with us, invited photographers to take pictures with us and stayed sitting during a long talk. Diplomatic corps were trying to guess the meaning of this. We are guessing, too...

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1963, F38, dos. 24, no. 47228

175

Note on the talks of the State Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Nikezić with Indonesian Ambassador Asmaoen, March 20, 1963.

Cabinet Undersecretary of State
Conf. no. 410027
March 23, 1963
Belgrade

He came to visit at his own request.

Talking about the Malaysia issue, he says that the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines have agreed to hold a conference therein and invite the government of Malaya. Depending on its position, the conference would be held in April. He presents a well-known position of Indonesia towards the projected Federation, referring to the ethnic composition of the territory in question. He also speaks of the potential dangers of such a creation for the safety of Indonesia, since Singapore is a great English base.

Indonesia does not ask North Borneo for itself. It has nothing against the Philippine's pretensions towards this territory – let it first be released from the

English, and then if they want to unite with somebody, let them do it as a free country, and not to be involved in the federation before independence.

When asked about the position of China in the case of the formation of the Federation, he replies that the presence of Chinese people, 50% of whom are in Malaysia, and majority in Singapore, represents a special danger for the whole area of SEA. Throughout history, Chinese people have tried to win Indonesia three times.

To my question, he says that China is not the buyer of their oil – almost anything goes to Americans and other neighbouring countries.

Answering the question what he thinks about the current phase of Indo-China conflict, Asmaoen says that the situation is quite complicated. The diversity of approaches on both sides and interpretation of the content of the proposal of Non-Aligned creates an atmosphere of uncertainty, and puts India in a particularly difficult position. This state is more complicated by the situation on Indo-Pakistan border, which is made even more difficult by the agreement between China and Pakistan.

He confirms that Japan is an important economic partner of Indonesia. He says that the Japanese want to do everything by themselves without employing Indonesians. (He speaks about them with no sympathy).

Asmaoen is interested in our views on the Common Market. In general terms, I informed him about our views and suggested the meeting with Vojin Guzina.

Finally, Asmaoen reports on the conversation with a group of our friends at lunch with the Minister-Advisor of the Indonesian Embassy – Darusman (Note no. 47876), which relates to their views on KPI press. He assures us that it is not the attitude of either the government or President Sukarno and that the Embassy repeatedly warned Jakarta about the harmful effects of an incorrect interpretation of the Yugoslav foreign policy. He will also do it in the future. He asks to be as soon as possible and as accurately informed about similar things.

M. Nikezić

Letter from the President Sukarno to President Tito

Jakarta, March 23, 1963

My dear friend Tito,

Thank you for your message which I was delivered by Ambassador Bessler. Before answering, I was waiting for certain events on the international scene to be clarified so that I could inform you about the latest developments.

I agree with you that the last year was critical. There were crisis all over the world, but fortunately they were overcome. In its own corner of the globe, Indonesia has finally crowned its efforts to return to the West Irian within its administrative jurisdiction, with no major military clashes with the Netherlands.

As you know, Indonesia has always been a consistent supporter of the peaceful ways of resolving international problems, both inside and outside the framework of the United Nations. This was the reason why we immediately agreed to the request of Mrs. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, to contribute and to help India and China in finding ways and means for a peaceful settlement of their long-standing border dispute, which is basically the remainder of the colonial past. The conference of six Afro-Asian non-aligned countries in Colombo in December last year, was able to formulate and put together the proposal for the conflicting parties. Both China and India were able to see the usefulness of these proposals and have shown a willingness to take them as a preliminary basis for discussions. After that, these proposals were published and I'm sure you've already seen them. Of course, there are points in the proposal which are interpreted differently depending on the side. In our opinion, that should be the subject of the talks. As soon as the representatives of both countries sat down together at the round negotiating table, the primary goal of Colombo participants would be reached. There are good prospects that soon the last obstacle to negotiations between China and India will be removed.

Recently, a new problem has emerged in this area, namely the deterioration in the relations between Indonesia and Malaya. As for Indonesia, I can assure you that we do not want this. This unfortunate development is only the result of Malaya inherent policy of hostility against Indonesia, whose supporter is its current Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, who serves as a weapon of neo-colonialism. This dates back to 1957, when the aforementioned Malayan policy coincided with anti-Indonesian politics of launching the rebellion inspired by foreign subversive activity. Responsible leaders of Malaya often stated that Sumatra should be annexed to Malaya. We have prevented it.

Malaya was actively helping the rebellion against the Indonesian government and created a base for the operations and a refuge for the rebels in its terri-

tory. With this respect, we only submitted a diplomatic complaint, which had no effect.

When planning to establish A.S.A. (Association of South East Asia), Malaya did not consider it necessary to consult Indonesia in advance, but when the association had already been created, Prime Minister Abdul Rahman arrogantly stated that if Indonesia did not join ASA they would continue without her.

When Malayan Prime Minister initiated discussions with the Dutch government and issued a joint Malayan-Dutch statement about the problem of West Irian, it was done without prior consultation with the Government of Indonesia on the desirability of such a joint statement.

However, a drop too much was Malaya's attempt to force the realization of the idea of the Federation of Malaysia, which should also include the territory of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah, which were under British rule in the north-western part of the island Kalimantan. The planned federation, if achieved, would have a very long common border with Indonesia on the island. For us it is very difficult to accept neo-colonialism on our borders which would cause unrest in the region.

The Government of Indonesia has repeatedly declared that the people in these territories, instead of being imposed the idea of Malaysia, should decide on their own about their future. In this regard, Indonesia has no territorial claims. However, as the things stand now, the people of North Kalimantan have never been consulted. The fact is that Cobolt Mission (British) contacted only a select group of 4,000 people and asked for their consent for the creation of Malaysia.

Meanwhile, towards the end of last year, the growing opposition manifested itself in the armed resistance towards the idea of Malaysia in the territory of Brunei, under the leadership of Mr Azhari, the leader of Brunei People's Party. This armed revolution having an alternative aim to create an independent Federation of North Kalimantan from the British dependent territories, is met with a broad support of the people in British Sabah and Sarawak. In line with our principles of anti-colonial struggle in all parts of the world, Indonesia is helping this movement for independence.

Certainly, in Indonesia there are strong forces that would like to immediately respond to this hostile and neo-colonialist attitude of Malaya. However, the Government of Indonesia has been tolerant in this regard, taking into account the wider interests of good neighbouring relations and Asian solidarity. We have believed that this attitude of Malaya is probably a result of the lack of experience in international affairs, and as such, a passing phase in our relations and that it will automatically disappear when Malaysian politics becomes natural. However, this belief has proved to be incorrect. Now we have undeniable evidence that this hostility is one of the basic principles of the Malayan policy towards Indonesia. This has clearly come to light in one of the official publication of the Malayan government which published the speech of the Assistant Minister for Information

of Malaya – g. Mohamed Ismail bin Yusuf, from February 1, 1963, in which it is said that the friendship between Indonesia and Malaya has always been difficult because of the internal and external policies of President Sukarno and due to changes made in the leadership of the Indonesian armed forces. Anti-Indonesian attitude of the Malayan government, its sympathy for Indonesian rebels and even encouraging our people to overthrow the current regime in Indonesia, would give us enough reason to say how much they are right. We know from our bitter past experience that the only effective remedy to such a hostile policy is the corresponding policy of active confrontation that we have now accepted. This policy has been imposed on us, but it seems that it will be necessary until Malayan Prime Minister understands that he cannot, under any pretext, dictate the policies of his ambition to his neighbours.

Regarding the situation in South Vietnam, we are following the events there and my impression is that the troubles of Vietnamese people will take some time. In my opinion, the most beneficial solution to these problems lies in a fair implementation of the Geneva Agreement.

As for Indonesia, we think that the countries and peoples of Southeast Asia need to work on active preservation of their security by themselves rather than to plan and to be imposed from outside. In particular, if every event in Asia is seen through the prism of the Cold War, solution cannot be achieved, especially not one that correspond to the interests of the people in this area, which includes good neighbourly relations, peace and active cooperation.

I very much appreciate your information on talks with Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. I intend to maintain regular contact with you in order to inform you about events and developments in our part of the world.

With best wishes and greetings to you and your wife.

Sukarno, m.p.

AJ, KPR I-1/432

Indonesian press on President Sukarno's leaving for vacation, May 2, 1963

May 2, 1963

/Tanjung/ Jakarta, May 2 – Indonesian press today gives an official announcement on front pages on President Sukarno's leaving for vacation to Japan, Austria, Yugoslavia and Italy. The newspapers write that the President will be accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Subandrio /but only to Tokyo/, the Deputy Prime Minister Dr Leimena and the Minister of Trade Dr Suharto.

The representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has underlined today that President Sukarno's decision to spend some time on vacation in Yugoslavia has been accepted with great pleasure. The President is delighted by the heartiness and hospitality showed by the Yugoslavs during his earlier visits and above all by their openness. President Sukarno will also use this opportunity to discuss the situation in the world with President Tito.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-21

178

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on the attacks to the Chinese in Java

Jakarta
Number 414
May 15, 1963

The conflict with the Chinese short before the arrival of Liu Shaoqi to Citarabon as well as in other places of the central and western Java especially in Bandung are treated as a serious problem. There are 18 possible casualties, while officially two casualties are confirmed. Material damage is huge. It is officially confirmed that there are 525 shops demolished and several hundreds of vehicles destroyed in Bandung. Wealthy Chinese panic-stricken merchants in fear of conflicts in Jakarta keep their shops closed and the valuables and vehicles are hidden at foreign diplomats and Indonesian friends. There are threats heard from the Chinese calling for revenge: "China will get revenge and Asia will belong to the Chinese." The police and army have intervened only after the conflict and these actions received numerous contradictory comments. The government intervention limited itself to introducing curfew in Bandung and to police reinforcements in Chinese centres of Jakarta and Western Java, the official apologies and moderate demand to the students and the youth not to repeat similar acts. Many-sided interpretations of these actions come down to mixed elements of nationalism, Islam and social and political character. The motive for the action which has been present from earlier, became more organized in Bandung with the help of the students of Technical Sciences because the Chinese relations and behaviour, protectionism, corruption, and the luxury have been opposed to Indonesian poverty. The actions started with destroying and demolishing the Chinese professors and students' vehicles; after that, even greater number of people joined. There were hundreds of participants and the loudest of all was the Islamic high school youth. It is speculated that a former Masyumi party had an influence here. This is con-

firmed by numerous actions lead against the communist influence, especially in education.

It cannot be said who is behind this action. Great number of our sources says that the actions point at orthodox Muslims principally and particularly at former Masyumi with nationalistic tendencies, intolerance, as well as racial reasons. Muslim youth was dissatisfied with Sukarno's recent speech where he tolerates "foreign status" of the Chinese, not insisting on their complete assimilation. Indonesian bourgeoisie also benefits from the demonstrations against China, due to economic interests, since China – as a private sector – holds key economy positions and has a greatest part of income and riches of this country and illegally exports them to China. The third, political element: the army does not wish to act as guards of order. They wish to prove why they exist as a key factor and thus they fight to prove the importance of their presence and role in the country. Communists and procommunist Chinese party Baperki are indirectly accusing the army of provoking the clash, which would serve them as a proof that the country situation is not stabilized and that the army should once more get the authority over internal safety, and attempts of –"provoking actions" of the army wanting to keep its position after abolishing the state of war, as pointed out in the communist press. Some high rank officers told our comrades that they – the army, do not approve of the act, but that deep down they are pleased for what happened to the Chinese, seeing it as a warning for the government that a similar thing can happen against the regime. One navy major claims that this was inevitable "because the Chinese are taking away our own thing" and if there is no other way, this has to be justified. He admires "the courage of the youth" that will in future be followed by the many, and adds that "this is a battle between us and the yellow race".

This action joins the interests of the nationalist groups and the army, as we were told by our sources from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. All demands of the authorities, parliamentary student groups and organizations point out the necessity of erasing social differences which can cause disasters in everyday life; it is also necessary for those social groups with "privileged stronger and better economic status" – especially foreigners – "to adjust to the aspirations of the Asian people".

There are attempts to blame the communists for the action, at least for trying to benefit from it. Although this comment comes from some Members of Parliament, it is not so viable regarding the internal situation, and especially regarding the attitude of KPI towards the Chinese minority. What KPI least wants is to cause the army intervention in any form. Some Western diplomats see this as a potential action of pro-Russian communists, which is also insubstantial.

This is based on the talks between the Indonesian administration, HIP, the Parliament, the army and diplomatic corps. Following various interpretations, the least number of comments are given by some anti – Chinese demonstrations on

SP or a bilateral plan of Indonesia-China. Most comments relate this to inter-political and economic state in the country, all this shortly before the second session of the National Congress (Medjelis) on 15th this month after which we can expect the guidelines for resolving political and economic situation in the country.

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1963, F-38, dos. 1, br. 416478

179

From the note on the talks between the Chief of Protocol of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Makiedo and the Ambassador of Indonesia Asmaoen (May 20, 1963) on possible new private visit of President Sukarno to Yugoslavia

He is informing me that Sukarno will arrive in Belgrade on the 10th and leave on the 13th of June this year. He is rather ill and is coming to Europe (Italy and Austria) for the health treatment. So, his visit to Belgrade will not have an official character but it should be considered as a friendly visit because of his rest and rehabilitation. He is not expecting any ceremonial gatherings and receptions, official talks, communiqués on the talks and so on. Sukarno would not like to leave Belgrade during his three day visit.

Sukarno will be followed by 33 persons on his trip, among whom are alternatively Dr Subandrio – Second Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or Chaerul Saleh – Deputy Prime Minister and the President of the National Congress.

Sukarno expressed the wish to stay at the Metropol Hotel, so the Embassy has already booked the apartments and rooms for him and his escort.

He is asking for our consent.

Belgrade May 21, 1963

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-21

180

Farewell visit of the Ambassador of Yugoslavia Bebler to President Sukarno and the announcement of Sukarno's private visit to Yugoslavia

Jakarta
No 430
May 22, 1963

The farewell visit at President Sukarno's residence. He is talking as usual without any political references, mostly about my lecture on their history. I am giving him a copy. He is shuffling through the papers, reading the conclusions and saying that this is a serious work.

Subandrio is talking about his visit to Belgrade, which Sukarno confirms. He would arrive around 10th. More precisely, he would arrive through our embassy in Tokyo. He would stay three days in Belgrade in Metropol hotel. He asks for the visit to be treated completely private without agenda. He only requests a conversation with President Tito. He is pointing out that he does not wish to visit Brioni and that nature field trips would be unnecessary. He wants to live a "life of a human".

Bebler

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1963, F-38, No 417366

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**Note on the talks between President Tito and President Sukarno,
June, 1963**

Concept

Regarding President Tito's initiative for holding a conference that would include greater number of participants and topics than the Belgrade Conference, President Sukarno says that he fully agrees with such a suggestion and gives the authority to Comrade President Tito to suggest to the governments of South America countries which he will be visiting to take part at the conference and to count on Indonesia as one of the conveners of the conference.

F. Knebl

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-21

182

**Note on the conversation between President Tito and President Sukarno
on a matter of Malaysia, on a ship “Krajina”, June 12, 1963**

Regarding the situation in the East, President Sukarno said that his meeting with Rachman in Tokyo occurred upon Rachman’s initiative. They /Rachman and the English/ are forcing the creation of Malaysia because the next month is the deadline after which the English need to give freedom to Singapore. In Singapore, 70% of population is Chinese. They are under enormous influence of China. If, under such circumstances, Singapore was given freedom, there would be a danger that it might become a great stronghold of PR China. The Chinese have strong positions in other parts of Malaysia too.

The initiative for creating a confederation among the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia was given by Rachman, and supported by the English and Americans. Basically, Sukarno has agreed to the creation of such a union – provided that many provinces under English protectorate /Brunei, Saravak and S. Borneo/ are given freedom, that is the right to self-determination – before they start forming a new union.

President Sukarno asked if we could, in our country, enable the training for a couple of their security officers. President Tito gave his consent suggesting a greater number of officers /20 and more/.

F. Knebl

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-21

183

**A request from President Sukarno to President Tito to provide
the assistance to Indonesian Presidential Guard in Yugoslavia**

Jakarta, October 14, 1963

My dear friend Tito,

I am introducing to you Col. Sabur, commander of the Presidential Guard.

He has come here to know more about Presidential Security – Guards.

Please will you be so kind as to instruct one of your men to give Sabur the best possible assistance.

With many thanks and affectionate regards, also to Yovanka,

Your best friend
Sukarno

AJ, KPR I-1/433

**Note on the talks between the State Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia Nikezić and Ms Supeni, the Assistant Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Indonesia, October 22, 1963**

State Undersecretary's Office
Conf. No 435308
October 30th, 1963

The conversation mostly covered problems in South-East Asia. Speaking of the politics of the great powers and neighbouring countries in that area, Ms Supeni pointed out that favourable relations with them do not depend exclusively on Indonesia. There were times when some of these countries even helped the Indonesian rebels out. The USA have now realized that the integrated and unified Indonesia suits their interests. The period of fighting for W. Irian, where Indonesia had high military engagement, is now over. The Malaysia question requires primarily economic actions. Asked about the prospects of Mafilindo confederation, Ms Supeni answers that there are real possibilities for establishing Mafilindo confederation, giving reasons of racial similarities, language and other connections among the peoples of Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines.

In the area of economic cooperation with developed countries, Indonesia does not approve of new investments but it insists on making arrangements based on production sharing. They have already reached such an arrangement with an American oil company, and they are offering it to others as well. The only interested parties are those which have a need for specific raw materials; thus, for example, Japan wishes to engage into developing nickel, wood and other production. As with the countries not directly interested in their raw material and products they are ready to offer even more flexible forms of "production sharing", such as mutual sales on third party markets etc. They consider "production sharing" system as suitable for other undeveloped countries, so they are planning to present it at the World Economy Conference.

They move on to the conflict of the great powers in the Asian territories, Ms Supeni reflects on a negative politics of the USA: If, for instance, the USA interfered less in Vietnam, a suitable solution would be much easier to find. The USA will probably draw back only when it is too late, as it was the case earlier. The American obsession of "the communist danger" is a huge obstacle in Asia, which has become prominent in in South Korea and other places. Asked the question on a possible Chinese reaction, Ms Supeni answers that she does not see the danger of increased Chinese pressure if the USA draw back from Vietnam; on the contrary, she thinks that thus even better conditions can be created for an independent development of the countries in the region. She thinks that Chinese

politics is primarily influenced by isolation and unfamiliarity with international matters. If PR China was a member of the UN and if there was also an initiative of non-aligned countries, many things could change. The Chinese want a coexistence based on Bandung principles, which she was pointed out by Zhou Enai when she was in China.

I told her that we are also of the opinion that PR China should be a part of UN and participate in solving international matters.

During her visit to China, Ms Supeni had a chance to assure herself that the economic situation has improved. Food rationing, introduced during economic crisis has now been abolished. Zhou Enlai told her that this year they supplied grains from Canada and Australia only to develop the relations with those countries, and that comparing to their needs these supplies were actually negligible. He explained the perspectives of further development of Chinese economy based on its own means of developed agriculture and in that manner he pointed out the right direction of PDR Korea which initially developed agriculture, and only later on its basis developed industry.

Ms Supeni says, during her visit to DPR Korea, that this country has highly developed industry and food surplus, and that the economic country situation is very good. She speaks of Kim Ir Sen as a capable and pleasant statesman. She says that Korean politics is also highly influenced by the isolation from the outer world. She interprets Korean support to China in a dispute with USSR as a completely restrictive attitude of Koreans who wish to strictly stick to the resolutions adopted in 1957 and 1960.

Ms Supeni herself has not launched any question on our foreign policy or international relations, although she willingly responded to those I have mentioned. She seemed not to be particularly interested in our foreign policy attitudes and actions.

Marko Nikezić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1963, F-38, dos. 26, no. 435308

185

**Letter from President Sukarno to President Tito on GANEFO games
(games of newly-developed countries)**

November 2, 1963

“My dear president Tito,

I am reading about your trip to Latin America and the USA. I am sure the visit was successful. Yesterday I checked the final list of GANEFO participants, starting on November 10 in Jakarta. I am very pleased to find 45 participating countries, yet I am very surprised that Yugoslavia is sending only five participants. I am not familiar with the reasons for this. Referring to some possible disciplinary measures by the International Olympic Committee, I think this is not an obstacle, having in mind the last decision of the Baden Conference to invite Indonesia to participate in the following Olympic Games in Tokyo. I hope that you see a clear road ahead and that you will reconsider your decision to increase the number of Yugoslav participants.

Many thanks and looking forward to seeing you soon.

Sincerely yours, Sukarno”

AJ, KPR I-1/434, The translation of the telegraph from President Sukarno to President Tito unofficially handed by Mr Darusman to the chief of 5th Directorate.

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**Letter from President Tito to President Sukarno
on GANEFO games**

Brioni, November 12t, 1963

My dear president Sukarno,
Thank you for your message.

I have been already acquainted with the holding of GANEFO games. Since the very beginning we realized Indonesia’s wish and interest for Yugoslav sportsmen to participate in the games. Yugoslav association for physical education had that in mind while making a decision, so despite many objective difficulties, they decided to send the crew to this competition.

Even though the number of the crew is limited due to these difficulties, we found it important for Yugoslavia to participate in these games. In the answer to your message we decided to send a folklore troop "Branko Krsmanović", which will, hopefully contribute to the success of this international manifestation with their performance.

I hope that GANEFO will serve to develop friendly relations between the participating countries and that it will contribute to improve international cooperation in general.

Thank you for a friendly interest you have shown for my recent trip to the countries of Latin America and the USA. I will be very happy if there is a chance for us to continue the present practice and soon exchange opinions on recent world developments, especially those relating to peaceful forces, non-aligned and developing countries.

Sincerely Yours,

AJ, KPR 1-1/434

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Letter from President Tito to President Sukarno with an insight into global political circumstances

Brioni, December 11, 1963

Dear friend,

Within our friendly exchange of views, I would like to inform you on our opinion regarding the latest world events and also to convey my impressions of the visit to some Latin American countries.

Observing the developments all over the world, I am convinced that, besides many obstacles and problems still present, there is a new positive trends in international relations, offering better perspectives. A highly significant fact is that world statesmen of today are mostly aware of the inevitability to resolve international issues through agreement which has already given first positive results.

During the conversation with Prime Minister Khrushchev and recently deceased president Kennedy I was assured in their readiness to put efforts into strengthening the politics of agreement and also to give importance to viewpoints and roles of non-aligned and other peaceful countries.

A sudden death of President Kennedy, which we sincerely grieve, has set in a kind of uncertainty in the international atmosphere. Simultaneously, I feel

that for now, the new USA President intends to continue the practice of negotiation policy and finding peaceful solutions to active problems. However, regarding the forthcoming elections, not much can be expected, and what follows is naturally still uncertain.

My recent visits to Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Mexico have given me an opportunity to exchange various points of view with honourable statesmen of these countries. During these conversations we easily came to identical viewpoints on contemporary key problems, which can be seen from mutual declarations. I had an impression that these countries, regardless of their present political and economic issues and other turmoil, tend to break from an isolation that existed in the past, because they see peaceful cooperation as the only chance for their fast and many-sided development. Although they do not use the exact term "non-alignment" when talking about their foreign policy their wish to become more engaged in resolving international issues of vital in which they are interested and about which they have similar or identical viewpoints to the non-aligned countries. During my trip I was thinking whether this very term "non-alignment" is in some way too narrow and inadequate to express the substance of our goals and endeavours and whether it can enable equal participation to all supporters of this goal. I strongly believe that many Latin American countries, trying to expand international relations, are expecting support and cooperation from non-aligned countries, and that peaceful politics has an even stronger support in this significant continent.

Nowadays, indeed, a greater number of states and people are actively engaged into pertaining peace, accepting the principles of active and peaceful coexistence. At the African conference of the heads of state and government, all participating countries basically declared for the non-aligned politics. This obviously means that the non-aligned politics is now becoming familiar and acceptable to a greater number of the countries worldwide. Thus, the circle of countries gathered in Belgrade in 1961 and in Cairo in 1962 has broadened. Such kind of development indicates new conditions for this peaceful politics to show its performance and activity towards strengthening and widening positive tendencies in international relations. Anyhow, a fact is that the present phase of non-alignment is quickly growing into a large and wide peace movement and peaceful cooperation. At the same time, it shows the need for non-alignment to be set on a wider platform. It should include all true supporters of the peaceful politics who accept key resolutions of the Belgrade Conference and who apply the principles of peaceful coexistence in relation to other countries and foreign-policy activities. Naturally, it is unacceptable to include those who only talk about coexistence and peace and practice the contrary.

We are pleased to be able to say that our politics with goals and principles set at the Belgrade Conference has contributed to positive actions in the world, which already bringing visible results, such as the conclusion of Moscow agree-

ment on partial ban of nuclear tests, declaration on non-launching nuclear weapons into space and the fact that contacts and negotiations continue.

In my opinion, the current stage of the world developments is featured by a more intensive process of polarization to peace forces and cold war forces, peace forces having the advantage. The fact that the polarization is widespread throughout many countries and almost all world regions is very significant. Not even military-political groups or ideologies are immune to this process – not even religious communities, nor social systems. Simultaneously, the conditions for weakening the negative forces are improved in many places, which cannot be neglected and which have until recently hindered understanding and easing the international tension.

In such an atmosphere the initiative for holding a new conference of non-aligned countries, coming from many sides, is relevant as a later contribution to mutual agreement and resolving international issues. It could serve well in efforts for disarmament and resolving conflicts, for resolving critical issues of economic development, for the final eradication of colonialism and similar. Shortly, such conference should help in further progress towards general use of the principle of peaceful coexistence.

Dear President and friend,

I believe that you share the opinion that such conference could be useful and there is a huge responsibility ahead of us in preparation of such a significant meeting. It seems that the most useful thing at this stage would be to organize consultations among those countries which are ready to actively participate in holding a new wider conference. Besides, I think that it is very important to clearly see the goals of the conference and make thorough preparations.

During the meetings with some ambassadors of the participating countries at the Belgrade Conference, I have already presented my opinion that the criteria should be based on the principal decisions and declarations of the Belgrade Conference. I have also expressed the opinion on the need for wide mutual consultancy regarding the conference preparations so as to resolve all its other practical issues in most acceptable way.

Since the date of holding the UN conference on trade and development is near, it seems to me that its success now particularly relies on the opinion exchange and a better coordination between non-aligned and other developing countries. We hope that the Conference will be held under more favourable political circumstances, and that the influence of non-aligned and newly-liberated countries will bring the first significant results in resolving the international economic problems of our times, and take measures to improve the position of the developing countries. It is encouraging that highly developed countries are ready to take part in this conference proving that entire international community is starting to realize the importance of solving such issues.

Regarding the following meeting of non-aligned countries and the forthcoming Trade and development UN conference, I am also planning to send messages to many Heads of friendly countries and Governments.

I am using this opportunity to say how pleased I am about the settling of Moroccan- Algerian conflict. With its intervention in resolving the conflict, the African Unity Organization has shown in practice its crucial role in resolving the issue in that continent and in strengthening the African unity.

Dear President and friend,

I wish to express my own opinion on some events in the area of Southeast Asia which draw our attention – yet, you must be more well-informed on such issues. In addition, I am aware of numerous events such as non-ceasing crisis in South Vietnam, the problems Cambodia is facing in its efforts to maintain its independence and integrity as well as an event caused by creation of Federation of Malaysia, of which I am certain that caused reasonable worries.

I trust that you share an opinion that attempts which neo-colonial and other reactionary forces to weaken current success of newly liberated and peaceful countries and peoples and to regain or preserve their positions are doomed to failure, owing to the resoluteness and unity of peaceful forces.

I am sure that the non-aligned countries will be able to contribute, as they used to before, to the resolving of all the problems mentioned.

Dear friend,

I would like to use this occasion to say that I highly appreciate our exchange of views and would like to hear your opinion on the issues I presented.

Last week I had a pleasure of hosting your honourable associate – the Minister of National Defence and Safety, Army Chief of Staff of the Republic of Indonesia – General A.H. Nasution, whose mission, I am assured, is successfully performed in our country, in the spirit of traditional friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia.

My dear friend and President, please accept my warmest greetings and wishes for good health with expressions of deep respect,

(J. B. Tito)

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Note of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on some aspects of Indonesian foreign policy, political relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia and the attitude of the Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta on these issues

Number 441478
December 26, 1963

/on Comrade Vujović's report/

There are some elements in Indonesian foreign policy, present from earlier, that have become more obvious and which in a certain way are in contrast with its politics of non-alignment and somehow narrow the frames of Indonesian foreign policy activities and besides that make constant pressure on our political relations with Indonesia.

– directing basic foreign political tendencies of Indonesia towards taking regional Asian-African actions together with and often under key influence of China;

– concerning this, the inclination for further affirmation of the concept of “new emerging forces”, and a certain confrontation of such politics to the non-aligned politics /Indonesians more and more often speak about “ideological divergence” with us/;

– further decrease of interest for the non-aligned actions, particularly for the new conference and weakening of political connections with other non-aligned countries, even from the Asian regions;

– tolerating actions of KPI against the non-aligned politics, especially against Yugoslavia;

– the consequences caused by deepening the confrontation with Malaysia /we have already mentioned the “destruction” of Malaysia/ regarding foreign policy actions of Indonesia, and the relations with us; especially the constant pressure for obtaining an absolute support for all their attitudes and actions that reflect the closeness of our relations /similar to the West Irian issue/.

Along with the growing manifestation of all elements, we have noticed low interest in establishing our Embassy in Jakarta, the reason why the Embassy Minister-Counsellor Vujović was invited to report to DSIP.

Delivering the report to the 5th political administration and service for investigation and documentation, and the conversation with Assistant State Secretary – comrade Zec, the above mentioned questions were reconsidered and the following was pointed out so as to serve for the orientation and more active establishment of our Embassy in Jakarta:

1. Main evaluation of the Indonesian foreign policy, its non-aligned orientation and our interest in full cooperation and support to Indonesia, and the evaluation of the contradiction in a swift change in Indonesian politics still remains within evaluation and conclusions made by DSIP, dated July 3 this year. A more detailed track of certain aspects of this politics is vital, particularly of the ones affecting Indonesia relation towards the politics and actions of the non-aligned, as well as towards our relations and consideration of our best attitude tactics towards them.

2. Our Embassy should put more initiative into conversation with Indonesia at all levels, should set and explain our viewpoints related to non-aligned politics, put more effort to include Indonesia into non-aligned actions and contribute to considering their problems /i.e. Malaysia/ from the perspective of non-aligned politics. Besides, Indonesia should be treated as a significant factor of non-aligned politics, particularly in the Asian area since its contribution, initiative and ideas have great importance for further development and affirmation of non-aligned politics.

It is also important to have a more active approach to Indonesia's ideas and actions on "new emerging forces" particularly regarding "Conefo"; wherein we have been too passive till now. Therefore, a starting point must be an equal attitude towards goals of peace and coexistence, without opposing outer forms and paroles /non-aligned formula is nothing specific or comprising, the core of the politics is what matters/. Indonesia's persisting to impose "new forces" formula on us, should be answered by initiating the talks on the ideas of the current tasks in the international relations as well as by suggesting Indonesia to test their formulas during the contact with a wide range of potentially interested countries. Under no condition discussions to be lead on the Bandung alternative, that is "CONEFO" non-aligned conference; we have always supported AA solidarity actions and particularly the efforts put into improving this solidarity, which is naturally the concern of all interested countries; on the other hand, we are convinced that Indonesia will fully take on a significant role in all non-aligned actions.

3. Not letting Malaysia become the main subject of our friendly relations which should be based primarily on development of broad political, economic, military and other cooperation.

After surpassing a certain delay in defining our principal attitude, our support should be appropriately estimated /which was publicly appraised by the Indonesians/, as an expression of our principled politics not to be in a position to be exposed to new pressures for further concession. On the other hand in favourable circumstances and in a convenient way the Indonesians should be incited to realize the issue of Malaysia and support of the others in the light of non-aligned politics /with their politics they also contributed but gained such little support from the other non-aligned especially in Asia/. Our support can also be significant only within non-aligned politics in general.

4. Our endeavours to stop the attacks of KPI and China which occasionally spread around Indonesian press as a constant factor of bad atmosphere in mutual relations should be pointed towards avoiding confrontations as much as possible. Constant campaign protests and possible nervous reactions from our side can have a counter effect and for sure are less efficient than a serious political engagement about that problem on the entire level of our relations in a certain place and on a convenient occasion. The seeming effect of the last intervention with Subandrio should endure if supported by the development of atmosphere of trust expressing the belief that the Indonesians will not allow any disruption of the atmosphere, obliging them in this way to stick to the guarantees given. Certain polemic attacks of CP will be impossible to avoid in future, but it should be carefully estimated if and when a possible new intervention should be made. In addition, strict attention should be paid not to be involved in the relations between CP and the government /that is the army/ which tendencies can be perceived within some Indonesian circles.

V. Šestan

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1963, F-38, dos. 24, br. 441478

189

The Embassy in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the issue on Kalimantan (Borneo) and suggestion for the coalition between Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines

Jakarta
Number 18
January 17, 1964

Mahdi – Vujović

Malaysian problem. Mahdi says that Sukarno's visit to Philippines, Cambodia and Japan is the attempt to mobilize neighbouring countries to exert diplomatic pressure on the British in Malaysia. This step, he says, is made possible by strong confrontation of Indonesia in economic and military terms against the British in Malaysia. As the result of a conflict, Mahdi pointed out economic difficulties of Malaysia and fast and successful growth of guerrilla on the North Kalimantan (I know that hospitals in Surabaya are admitting casualties from North Borneo, so it is for sure that there is guerrillas activity).

The important moment from Manila talks according to press release: Makapagal and Sukarno want to reintroduce Mafilindo and bring Malaysia back to

their lines. Their requirement for this is that direct decision-making of the British in Malaysia should at least be reduced, especially in terms of safety. They seem to have the USA support for this (Nasution's statement that Johnson agrees that Asian countries resolve Asian issues, which will probably be confirmed at Sukarno – R. Kennedy meeting in Tokyo). Britain complies on this matter too – the statement of the Ambassador of Great Britain in Manila is that they hold nothing against Mafilindo if it is based on Manila documents. The newspaper and press release indicate the intention of Mafilindo to expand to other SEA countries (firstly Thailand, Burma, Cambodia and Laos).

Malaysia (Razak's reaction) as a precondition of its re-entry to Mafilindo, for now sets its recognition and withdrawal of the troops from the borders of North Kalimantan.

On the initiative of Macapagal, there will be a meeting between Makapagal and Tunku.

The aim of Sukarno's visit to Philippines was primarily to keep the Philippines on his side at least for a little while by confirming officially – for the first time, his support to the Philippines about the rights in the territory of Sabah, the promise of economic benefits (the transit of Indonesian goods through some Philippines ports), the invitation to Romulus to get the honourable doctorate in Jakarta, simultaneously sending a huge cultural group to the Philippines and so on. The continuation of the tour in Cambodia and Japan besides analysing the possibility and attempts to recruit Malifindo for his own plans about Malaysia has a more important task of promoting the second AA Conference, the promotion of bilateral cooperation, the problem of the Seventh Fleet and so on. Regarding these issues Sukarno's meeting with Kennedy is of high importance since his presence at the meeting with Sukarno shows that the USA counts on an emotional effect with Sukarno, especially because R. Kennedy, at the times of resolving the Irian issue, had one successful mission in Indonesia.

Knebl

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1964, F-64, br. 42507

190

**Letter of President Sukarno to President Tito concerning the appointment
of a new Indonesian Ambassador in Belgrade Subyakto**

Bogor, 20. March 1964

My dear friend Tito,

This letter is being brought to you by ambassador Subyakto, who replaces ambassador Asmaoen at Beograd. Subyakto was my ambassador at Ankara, and before that, he was chief of staff of the Indonesian Navy. He is a good patriot, and an ardent believer in a close cooperation between Yugoslavia and Indonesia.

So I hope you will give him all assistance in his very important work at your side.

He brings to you also my most brotherly greetings, to you, and to Yovanka.

Affectionately yours
Soekarno

Note: The letter was hand-written.

Added at the margin!

„My love to you and Yovanka. Y. Soekarno.“

AJ, KPR I-1/436 (transcript)

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**Note about some questions of bilateral relations between Yugoslavia
and Indonesia regarding Ambassador Asmaoen farewell visits**

March 20, 1964

Relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia have been characterized by a high level of friendship and understanding which is based on the identity or similarity of the viewpoints on most of the major international issues. The biggest contribution to such relation is made by the two countries' presidents who maintain close and often frank contacts.

Recently, however, certain decrease in intensity in political relation is noticeable between our two countries, mainly because of Indonesian endeavor to hold the second Asian-African Conference at all cause, which is why Indonesia has distanced itself from the activities of other non-aligned countries involved in

convening the second conference of non-aligned countries. But, as expected, both due to a general position and a foreign policy which were non-aligned, Indonesia decided to participate at the new non-aligned conference and to send their representative to ambassadors' preparatory meeting in Colombo. Nevertheless, Indonesia has continued preparing the second Asian-African Conference, by convening the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of some Asian-African countries for April 10th. For all those reasons it is not clear what the Indonesian attitude at the conference of ambassadors will be, because it is suspected, and not without grounds, that Indonesia will try to use it for imposing the priorities of the second Asian-African Conference, although there are no objective conditions for it.

Yugoslavia continues to support Indonesia regarding its attitude towards Malaysia and it is ready to meet Indonesia's needs emerged as a result of confrontation, to the extent possible. Also, we are still of the opinion that Yugoslavia should not recognize the federation of Malaysia nor to establish diplomatic relations with it, which however does not exclude changing that attitude later on, under new circumstances (solving the problem or at least softening the current conflict). Furthermore, economic relation with Malaysia should maintain on the current level (which is very restricted) and no action should be taken for their improvement, but any kind of direct trade with North Borneo territories which were a part of Malaysia should be eliminated.

On the whole, economic relations are constantly improving, so at this point by their intensity they represent the most active form of cooperation and are ahead of political relations. It is very positive that they are getting a brand new form – cooperation between industrial enterprises.

The total commodity exchange in 1963 amounted to 10.749 million dinars, 6.624 million dinars accounted for exports and 4.123 million dinars for imports. The total trade volume was 2,6% million dinars lower than in 1962, and the main reason is that our export to Indonesia in 1963 was 39% lower comparing to last year. The main weakness of our exports to Indonesia is the fact that two-thirds are still special deliveries (weapons and equipment).

The focus of our activities in recent years was on industrial cooperation which allows planning of the exchange in the long term. So far, we have contracted the construction of shipyard in Jakarta and two power plants, and our offer to build the factory of rolls, motor vehicles and diesel engines, and one mill, with a total value of about \$ 78 million are taken into consideration. There are discussions about the construction of the electrical network in Java, two hydro plants, two cement factories, explosives and color factories, tannin factory, and truck deliveries and further deliveries of military material.

In the area of technical assistance, satisfactory results are not yet achieved despite the fact that there is a significant number of Indonesian staff on schooling and specialization in Yugoslavia.

The most important problem of economic relations between the two countries at this time is the request of Indonesia to delay payment of the overdue instalments of military loans in the amount of 50 million dollars, and by that the unilateral breach of obligations by the Indonesian Bank concerning payment of already overdue instalments (about 6 million dollars).

The Indonesian government is repeatedly delaying the arrival of the announced government delegation who should discuss this issue, as well as the issues on further industrial cooperation and the increase of commodity exchange. According to the latest information the arrival is allegedly to be expected in mid-April.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-23

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Note on the reception of the Ambassador of Indonesia Asmaoen reception with the Vice President of Yugoslavia Aleksandar Ranković, March 23, 1964

The Ambassador of Indonesia is thankful for the medal which Deputy President Ranković gave him on behalf of the president of the Republic.

During the conversation, the Ambassador pointed out that his stay in Yugoslavia fell in the time of significant activities concerning international relations, and especially the relation between our two countries. He says that he is pleased that during his ambassador mandate very friendly relations were built between Indonesia and Yugoslavia, and that president Sukarno visited Yugoslavia four times and that considerable progress was made in every domain of mutual relations.

In addition, he says that he actively monitored the internal development of Yugoslavia, with specific interest in the Constitutional Court as an institution that is supposed to keep the legality and socialist way of its development, while Comrade Ranković explains the importance and the role of the Constitutional Court in our terms. Indonesian ambassador then points out that he thinks Indonesia needs such kind of an institution, especially because of its numerous islands and thus assists both internal and external factors to affect against socialistic development which they want to provide in Indonesia. He also underlines that other Yugoslav experiences have also been very useful, since they wish to implement similar measures in their country.

Regarding the forthcoming conferences in Bandung and new Non-Aligned conference, Indonesian Ambassador also expresses the opinion that they have the same goals. However, the one in Bandung is more nationalistic whi-

le the other has an international characteristic. He says that both conferences should contribute to further strengthening forces which are fighting for new relations and further positive development in the world and concerning this the goals of two conferences are not opposed.

Emphasizing great importance of two conferences, he specially highlights moral obligations of two presidents – Tito and Sukarno – to collaborate even more closely in order to ensure the success of both countries so as not to allow the imperialist forces to confront our two countries and divide us. He is mentioning the activities of western diplomats in Belgrade who are confronting these two conferences which only confirms his opinion that imperialistic forces are taking actions to split us apart.

Vice President Comrade Ranković agrees these two conferences should not be confronted and points out that has been our attitude from the start. He talks about the importance and contribution in solving international issues occurred during the Belgrade conference. He expresses his opinion that new Non-Aligned conference in these terms and with greater number of participants can have even higher importance and contribution in solving world problems, which does not mean that new Bandung won't have similar importance. However, tactical and political reasons would require the new Non-Aligned Conference to be held first.

Vice President Ranković points out that in the present situation, most important is a mutual confrontation to all those who wish to implicate intrigues in our relations. He highlights that mutual relations between our two countries are so well-built that we are open to exchange experiences and to communicate.

At the end of the conversation the Ambassador says there were earlier indications about the meeting between the two presidents and that regarding the meeting, April was mentioned as a term. He thinks that it will be hard for President Sukarno to realize this meeting in April due to the problems they have – he mentions Malaysia issue. So, the visit is still under consideration.

Vice President Ranković emphasizes that President Sukarno is a dear guest always welcome to Yugoslavia, that previous meetings of the two presidents have been important and given positive contribution in solving international issues and that their meeting would give very significant results without a doubt. Afterwards Vice President asked the Ambassador to convey his and President Tito's greetings to President Sukarno.

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Letter of President Sukarno to President Tito on extending economic and financial cooperation between Indonesia and Yugoslavia

Jakarta, May 7, 1964

My dear friend Tito,

Cooperation between Yugoslavia and Indonesia is developing in every aspect and is becoming better and wider every day.

In order to give specific form to financial and economic relations between our two countries I found it necessary to send a delegation operated by Mr Jusuf Muda Dalam, Minister of Banking and the Governor of the Central bank of Indonesia, a close associate of mine, to Belgrade.

Since the economies of Yugoslavia and Indonesia are complementary, I am convinced that our economic and financial relations can be further expanded. It would not only be beneficial for the people of Yugoslavia and Indonesia but will also strengthen the economy of socialist and newly independent countries, so that they could constitute some kind of a front against the forces of capitalist countries.

I was very pleased when Indonesian delegation informed me about favourable cooperation with Yugoslav delegation during the Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva.

I am convinced that Indonesian delegation will have your support so that we can achieve best results.

I am sending my warmest greetings to you and your family.

Your friend,
Sukarno, m.p.*AJ, KPR I-1/437*

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Visit of Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesian Suwito to President Tito on Brioni Island, September 26, 1964

The reception was attended by the members of Mr Suwito's entourage and on behalf of Yugoslavia: the secretary of the President of the Republic General Bogdan Crnobrnja, Assistant State Secretary Mišo Pavićević and Ambassador of SFRY Franjo Knebl.

Suwito conveyed the greetings of President Sukarno who is now in Vienna for treatment to Comrade President.

Then he referred to the question of Malaysia and a debate on this issue at the United Nations Security Council. He underlined that Indonesia accepted the suggestion from the president of Philippines, Macapagalo that the Malaysian issue should be reviewed by a Commission for reconciliation of Afro-Asian countries. President Sukarno declared in Tokyo that Indonesia would accept any decision made by such Commission.

President Tito has declared that he is looking forward to meeting with President Sukarno. He intends to meet him before the Cairo Conference in order to discuss how to best define the problems at the Conference. Regarding the specific issues it cannot be concealed but more efforts should be invested to achieve the solution.

Suwito has declared that he has been informed in Colombo that the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mrs Bandaranaike will try to mediate the Malaysia dispute outside the Conference.

Manoeuvres of the British ships in the waters around Indonesia are causing concerns. On August 28, a British plane carrier and two fire ships passed between islands Sumatra and Java. Naturally, such actions cause tension. On August 31, two Australian war ships passed through – as Indonesians think – territorial waters of that country. On September 3, Indonesian aviation noticed seven war ships near the coast but was unable to identify them. Those were neither British nor Australian ships but by all chances those were ships which belonged to the USA Seventh Fleet. It has not been established whose ships they were. The American Government has declared that those were not American ships.

Suwito has asked the question what the purpose of such demonstrations is.

As a result of those actions Indonesia was forced to declare the state of readiness. Especially as there are riots in Sulawesi caused by a rebel colonel. During his last inspection Subandrio found that there were large quantities of British weapons on the island.

Regarding Malaysia, Indonesia is facing the British force.

President Tito then noticed that imperialists tend to retain their positions.

Suwito underlined that British dominance is confronted with Indonesian revolution in Malaysia.

Comrade Tito asked why Indonesia publicly confirmed before the Security Council that it sent paratroopers to Malaya.

Suwito answered that it was a fact that cannot be concealed. There are more than a million of volunteer soldiers in Indonesia and their morale is very high.

Indonesia has explained that it knows exactly where the source of the British subversion is. Those are Singapore and Malaya. Now when Indonesia has consolidated the issue in the country, it is able to strike straight to the centres of subversions. Indonesian volunteers are impatient and it is very difficult to restrain them.

President Tito has declared that this is not only about British demonstration and intimidation. It is about serious intentions. This is not only the matter of the British but of Americans as well, because in that part of the world their interests match. It seems there is an intention to connect all that with the situation in South Vietnam and Laos. For all those reasons, and with great interest, he expects conversation with President Sukarno as well as with prince Sihanuk, who has significant problems in Cambodia. It is important to prevent escalation of the situation and to restrain tendencies of imperialistic forces. At the Cairo Conference it will be necessary to state the facts, inform the world about it and to indicate that attempts of colonialists to retain their positions in some other way could cause very drastic consequences on the whole world and not only in that part where they are happening. It is not Indonesia that is endangered but peace which is in the interest of huge part of mankind is endangered as well.

Suwito pointed out to at certain coordination between British and American strategy.

President Tito then noticed that British and American interests are somehow in contradiction but it seems that for now they are similar in terms of South-East Asia territory. The future is hard to tell.

Suwito was interested in our point of view on Presidents De Gaulle's opinion about South-East Asia.

President Tito declared that we have a positive attitude towards the role De Gaulle plays in weakening the Atlantic Treaty. Even the recent visit of French President to some Latin America countries does not please the Americans. The attitude which General De Gaulle has regarding South-East Asia pleases neither the Brits nor Americans. De Gaulle has another view on decolonization process. Despite him being a reactionist, his politics is flexible and realistic. By being against escalation of the situation in that part of the world, President De Gaulle intends to gain benefit for France, of course. He has realized the course of events. France paid the price for its experience in Vietnam.

President Tito then referred to our relations with France. Those relations were very bad during the liberation war in Algeria.

However, De Gaulle has recently sent one of his closest allies Lois Joxe to Yugoslavia, where as we know he talked with representatives of Algeria in Evian.

President Tito said that Lois Joxe left a good impression on him. French Minister said that neo-colonialist politics is harmful and that France does not plan

to go that way. France wants to cooperate both with its former colonies which have not gained freedom, as well as with other countries in Africa and Asia. France intends to cooperate economically, though there should not be any illusions that it will not try to get all the profit; anyhow, France has a different viewpoint on the issue of cooperation with developing countries. French minister has also agreed with our view on the manner in which the assistance should be given to developing countries. The goal of that assistance should help these countries become equal partners in international trade.

Suwito declared that relations between Indonesia and France were bad because of Algeria. Now relations are a bit improved. French delegate did not take part in the debate about Malaysia in Security Council and it was believed that France would abstain during the voting on the Norwegian resolution plan. Nevertheless, France voted for that plan.

Suwito repeated that relations between Indonesia and France are improving and that President Sukarno has the intention to possibly visit President De Gaulle after the Cairo Conference.

President Tito said it is very important to take into consideration all elements at the Cairo Conference. There is no need to frontally and indiscriminately attack all the forces, but to differentiate between them. Facts should be determined and thus not put France, Great Britain and the USA together. It would not be desirable to cause unnecessary antagonism. Regarding the principle of active and peaceful coexistence, Suwito noticed that Southeast Asia is a bad example of such coexistence.

President Tito underlined that despite different situations we cannot give up the principle of coexistence. On the contrary it is necessary to put even greater effort to put these principles into practice. They are our strongest weapon in the struggle against colonialism and attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Now in Mexico there is a meeting of special committee of the United Nations for the codification of the principles of coexistence. It is obvious who is bothered by these principles. Americans are giving strong resistance to some clauses, and not just Americans.

The acceptance of these principles will make it difficult for foreign forces to have intervention and will reduce their chances to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries under various excuses.

President Tito added that last statement he gave about the situation in Vietnam caused resentment among the ruling circles in America. It was said that even Khrushchev did not attack American politics so sharply. However, President Tito only pointed out the facts and underlined that such methods should not be used in solving such disputable problems in the world.

Suwito underlined that problems of Southeast Asia could be solved more easily if there was no intervention by USA and Great Britain. Indonesia, Malaya,

Philippines, Cambodia and Thailand could easily find mutual interest. The culmination of the situation has been caused by foreign interference.

Suwito then said that it would be appropriate for the Non-Aligned Conference to take a strong stand against interventions and subversions. He added that those problems will be mentioned by President Sukarno in his speech in Cairo.

President Tito underlined that it was very important that the meeting of Heads and Governments of the Non-Aligned countries in Cairo would be successful and promote even higher degree of unity. Every serious conflict should be avoided because it would go in favour of the imperialists and opponents of non-aligned policy. Some less important questions should be left for later. That depends on the time and the situation. The most important thing is the unity. It would be wrong if the Conference would be used for debating about bilateral relations and conflicts. Only basic principles should be mentioned at the Conference and bilateral questions certainly are included in those principles.

Suwito said that is Sukarno's intention as well. The main thing is to find mutual approach to basic problems and not to fall for details; it is relevant not to cause any discordance among non-aligned countries.

Comrade President underlined that attitude about Cairo Conference is more heterogenic than the case was in Belgrade. Many newly liberated countries will participate there. Therefore, it is important to achieve unity in all basic issues. If the Conference was to look towards internal and not paying attention to external issues which are very important, such as decolonization, saving peace and active coexistence, then it would be beneficial only to imperialists.

Comrade Tito underlines that he has high hopes concerning the Cairo Confidence and that it will bring good solutions, more useful than the one in Belgrade. Of course, resolutions made at the Belgrade Conference were very helpful.

The Belgrade Conference had many friends and supporters. But the Cairo Conference is much wider and has greater number of friends. All socialist countries had a certain reserve regarding the Belgrade Conference. They waited to see the outcome of conference. On the other hand, Western forces were against the Conference.

Today, all Eastern European as well as all developing countries are looking with sympathy at the Cairo Conference. And countries from the West are looking differently at it. During his visit to Yugoslavia, Lois Joxe said that France thinks that the Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo would be very useful. Accordingly, a non-aligned politics group is much wider today than it was during the Conference in Belgrade. It is up to us to justify the trust which radical people have in Conference.

In the end one member of the Suwitos' entourage conveyed personal greetings from President Sukarno to President Tito. President Sukarno was sorry for not being able to arrange appropriate date for a meeting with President Tito in

Yugoslavia. He said that President was looking forward to the meeting with President Tito in Cairo. In the end, he invited Comrade President to visit President Sukarno in Indonesia.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-27

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Note about the conversation between President Tito and President Sukarno, at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo, October 5, 1964

Attending: Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio and other members of Indonesian delegacy; Koča Popović, Bogdan Crnobrnja i Mišo Pavićević.

/President Tito visited Sukarno at the Hilton hotel/

Comrade President informed President Sukarno about the action taken against Chombe's arrival.

President Sukarno said that he would leave the Conference if Chombe attended it. President Sukarno then said that the struggle against imperialism and colonialism should be the priority of Cairo Conference in. That is the only way Asian and African countries can be related to it. Otherwise they could not understand it. In Belgrade, he had a slight argument with the late Nehru who put the accent on peace. This idea was accepted in Belgrade declaration.

Comrade President said that it was not about the sequence but about the way the struggle against imperialism and colonialism should be presented. Urgent issues can be resolved peacefully and not in the war. We have to fight for peace and against colonialism, for economic growth of developing countries. All that should be underlined. Economic growth is equally important. Developed countries should be compelled to contribute to the economic development of underdeveloped countries. If we succeed in our struggle for providing aid to undeveloped countries we will reduce colonial tendencies. Neo-colonialist tendencies should be stopped and giving help should be set on a new basis. Giving help should not be subordinated by any political or other condition.

In Conference documents we should energetically ask for eradication of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Request is the one thing but process by which it should be achieved is another.

Comrade President then mentioned that all Western countries should not be treated the same way. Neo-colonialism should be accurately defined. There are still remnants of the past. Some underdeveloped countries relate to metropolis economically and in other ways. They are looking for help. However, if no external interference and no tendencies for new conquest of old positions are shown,

then it is not possible to say that it is another form of neo-colonialism. Many African countries, especially those French-speaking countries are very interested on how those things will be set.

If we win the fight for giving economical help to undeveloped countries this will contribute to the liquidation of economical stagnancy.

President Sukarno underlined that help is not so important for Asian-African countries, especially for Indonesia which doesn't even need it. Help is not the main thing that Asian-African countries are interested in. This conference will be interesting for Asian-African countries only if item one on the agenda is a condemnation and struggle against imperialism, colonialism and its new form – neo-colonialism.

Subandrio underlined that the matter of security is number one problem for Indonesia. He also underlined as a necessity for the Cairo Conference to put an accent on the struggle against colonialism.

Comrade President accentuated that all problems should be put as a priority. To achieve eradication of colonialism and neocolonialism it is necessary to lead everyday struggle on all fields.

Subandrio mentions the Philippines as an example. That country is dependent on the USA to a great extent. However, now it wants to be emancipated. First large demonstration of the Philippines youth against USA was held few days ago.

President Tito mentions that countries of Latin America are under the USA domination. They want to be emancipated to unite with somebody and to rely on somebody. They can only rely on non-aligned countries. Several Latin American countries were presented through observer at the Cairo Conference. Some would surely become full members if there wasn't a coup in Brazil and other external pressures.

We have an obligation towards the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and other countries which suffer under external domination.

President Sukarno added that those countries can rely not only on non-aligned countries but on the Asian-African Conference as well, which gives priority to anti-colonialism. They can rely on the AAA Conference /AAA = Africa, Asia, America Latin/ and on the CONEFO / Conference of The New Emerging Forces/. He spoke also about his visit to Latin America, that he was familiar with the condition there and that the countries of Latin America were adopting "his ideas".

Latin American countries are fighting against American domination and neocolonialism. Let us make this Conference appeals to the Asian, African and Latin American countries.

Comrade President stated that countries of Latin America are in a very difficult situation. Goulart wanted to lead policy independent from USA, but he was

crushed. The country is led by those who are correspondent to USA. Paz – Estensoro is one of the most progressive statesmen in Latin America. He wants to lead an independent policy but the situation in the country is increasingly difficult. Associated with the communists, Chilean socialist were 100 percent sure of their victory, but they suffered defeat; the external factors interfered.

He agreed with President Sukarno that local wars should also be discussed at the Conference. It is necessary to point out to them and fight against the causes of these wars.

Of course non-aligned countries cannot indicate an armed conflict to the great forces, but they have to take specific actions and make unified decisions.

Regarding armed conflicts in North Vietnam President Tito mentioned that at one time he gave a very sharp remark. The Americans complain that no one had such reaction. It is necessary for all the non-aligned countries to present unity on these issues. It is necessary to support Cambodia as well.

President Sukarno underlined the necessity of non-aligned countries united struggle.

He mentioned Pakistan as an example. In that country he was asked a question: Since there has been improvement in relation between the Soviet Union and the United States, why do we need the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries? He answered that it is necessary for fighting against the domination, imperialism and neocolonialism. They replied: “Sukarno, you have our blessing”. And that is what they told him in Pakistan.

Comrade President says that he himself has been fighting against colonialism for 44 years. He changed neither his voice nor terminology.

Since President Sukarno said that he likes the word “assistance”, President Tito replied that it is not some kind of a mercy. Developed countries are obliged to give assistance, not in a form of a gift, but in different ways /non-discrimination, fair assessment, etc/.

President Sukarno noticed that he would use words “take back” rather than the word “duty”.

They also talked about Sukarno’s visit to Yugoslavia. He said that he would come “but under the condition to stay at the Metropol hotel and not in Dedinje”.

AJ, KPR I-4-a/5

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**Amendment to the note on the meeting of President Tito
and President Sukarno in Cairo**

At one moment Comrade President noted that President Sukarno's view on current events is too simplistic.

Sukarno overheard the remark, or pretended that he did not hear it.

AJ, KPR I-4-a/5

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**The visit of President Sukarno to President Tito at the Second Conference
of Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo, October 10, 1964**

Attending: Koča Popović, Vladimir Popović and Bogdan Crnobrnja.

President Sukarno agreed with Comrade President that the final document should be clear and concise, and that the details should be included in an annex. "The shorter, the better" said Sukarno.

He agreed with Comrade President's suggestion that final editing, without any changes to the existing text, should be done by smaller editorial board of Foreign Affairs Ministers which would include representatives of the following countries: Indonesia, India, Ceylon, South Africa, Ghana, Guinea, Algeria and Yugoslavia.

Being asked by Comrade President, President Sukarno replied that in his opinion, the Cairo Conference was even more successful than the Belgrade Conference.

President Tito pointed out to the fact that many differences in opinions between Indonesia and Yugoslavia were manifested at this Conference.

President Sukarno said that there are often differences between brothers, even quarrels, but that it did not mean they would split.

President Tito agreed with Indonesian President and added that we were not well understood by Indonesian when they confronted us regarding the coexistence. We do not take coexistence literary as a further maintaining of the existing situation. Coexistence should enable us to solve issues in peaceful way and not by war. It doesn't imply the coexistence with colonialism. That would be impossible. That is why we are struggling for the final eradication of colonialism. We consider the coexistence to be the alternative to public war.

President Sukarno noticed that without the war, Algeria wouldn't be liberated, nor would Yugoslavia in the Second World War.

President Tito replied that those were liberation wars and that is another thing. We were the first to help the Algerians.

President Sukarno interrupted and said that Indonesia was the first to help Algerians. He gave 5 million dollars' worth weapons to the Algerians.

President Tito pointed out that it was necessary to continue helping liberation movements. In the morning he talked to the representatives of Portuguese colonies and promised to help them.

Concerning Malaysia, President Tito said that one day the relation between Indonesia and Malaysia would normalize, when the latter "changes".

President Sukarno agreed that it would be possible "when Malaysia changes". The coexistence between current Malaysia and Indonesia is not possible. Malaysia is established (and the document about it is in his hands) to be: 1. Against China and 2. Counterbalance to Indonesia.

At the end President Tito said that he would speak in detail about all those issues with Indonesian President once he came to Yugoslavia.

AJ, KPR I-4-a/5

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Note about the talks of Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia Nikezić with the Ambassador of Indonesia Subyaktó, January 13, 1965

DSIP

Charter No. 410101

Belgrade, January 13, 1965

He came at his own request. He gives me Aide-memoire about Indonesia resigning from the UN. He emphasizes that selecting Malaysia, which is not recognized by Indonesia, to the Security Council is an insult to Indonesia. Being out of UN Indonesia will solve its issues more easily, and it will keep cooperation with all friends, including Yugoslavia.

I say that we have been surprised by Indonesia's decision, even though we knew the difficulties with Malaysia regarding which, I remind him, Indonesia always had our support. However, we think that the UN is the place where international problems can and should be fought for and be solved.

In further conversation Ambassador gives explanations which contradict to the basic thesis that the admission of Malaysia is the cause of the withdrawal.

He says they want peaceful solution with Malaysia based on Manila agreement. On the remark of a potential reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia, where Indonesia would still stay out of the UN, the Ambassador says that Malaysia is not the only reason, but the inability of the UN to lead the struggle against imperialism. He takes Congo as an example and says that Indonesia wouldn't be able to solve the Western Irian issue through UN, and that the USA helped.

I note that in case of Western Irian they were supported by Yugoslavia and the UN, as well as other friends of Indonesia.

Being asked about his opinion what will improve the position between Indonesia and Malaysia – no explanations were given. He confirms that infiltration of Indonesian guerrillas on Borneo and in Malaya continues, and since the English are sending troops and they are now “on the same sea and in the same sky” this can lead to a war, although Indonesia does not want it.

Concerning Malaysia he expects the support of friends, including us. I am reminding him that Yugoslavia so far has given decisive support to Indonesia by not establishing relations with Malaysia and with the whole attitude, and wondering about a large number of their friends who have diplomatic and other relations with Malaysia. Ambassador confirms that those relations are making them sad, he praises Yugoslav attitude and wants to have closer bilateral cooperation.

Since coexistence and non-aligned countries are mentioned neither in Ambassador's speech nor in the Aide-Memoire I am closing the conversation with our wish to continue friendly bilateral relations, but that we also hope it will be possible to extend the cooperation concerning non-aligned policy according to Cairo Convention. I believe that the cooperation will be very necessary to Yugoslavia as well as to Indonesia.

Note:

There is an impression that Indonesian Government wants to keep political and economic cooperation with us, aware of the fact that resigning from UN can make serious damage to that cooperation. The arguments for leaving the UN are weak and contradictory and reflect hard position of Indonesia. Obviously, they are afraid of a conflict with Malaysia, in other words with Great Britain; on the other hand they have a political need – internal and external – to be offensive which is often adventurous.

AJ, KPRI-5-b/40-6

**President Sukarno's letter to President Tito regarding the decision
of Indonesia to resign from the United Nations**

Jakarta, January 19, 1965

Dear Comrade Tito,

As I have done so many times before, I am writing to inform you about significant progress in development of Indonesian revolution. This time I would like to explain reasons and motives which led us to the decision to withdraw from the membership in the United Nations. I am doing this based on my strong belief that bonds of solidarity between our two countries and nations are strong and indestructible in our common struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their aspects.

Essentially, the Indonesian and the Yugoslav revolution are similar by character and both have strong basis that is to build a world through different paths based on freedom, social justice, prosperity and peace.

Of course, there are differences in relation to past times, when we had to deal with the world of imperialism, the world of exploitation, the world full of poverty and the world which was dominated by the war threats.

Under your leadership, the revolution of the Yugoslav people gave its illustrious and heroic share in the remodelling of the old world with all those achievements which we are witnessing today.

Our ideals are partially realized in terms that most of the world has now reached a level of national freedom, that is to say, that most countries in the world now have their own national government. Solid foundations of socialism are established by our comrades in the socialist camps and these achievements are now spreading across four continents.

Technical and economic achievements that are shown by socialist countries, without doubt, gave the progressive revolutionary forces in the world a real proof that socialism has specific capabilities, previously monopolized only for the capitalist system.

All these achievements can be seen as a great victory in which the Yugoslav revolution and the Yugoslav people took part in the forefront.

Now we are confronting the future. The remnants of imperialism and colonialism are still strong in political terms and especially in terms of economy and army. These remnants can clearly be seen in Asia, Africa and Latin America while the socialist camps are mentally and physically cleared of those remnants of imperialism and colonialism, with possible exceptions here and there.

How to confront the future effectively in order to achieve victory as soon as possible?

As in the past, first we must hold firmly to our solidarity and prevent contradictions that arise between us due to the diversity of situations and existing conditions that lead to tension, misunderstanding and confrontation among us. Indeed, dialectically speaking, the achievements of our struggle sometimes bear the contradictions in our own body, but let us stop all that in order not to undermine our common ground in front of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Secondly, Yugoslavia and some other friends of Indonesia are managing to use peaceful coexistence as a tool in a struggle, I repeat, as a tool in a struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. As far as I am concerned, I don't think that peaceful coexistence means involving the enemy, but confronting the enemy by implementing new tools. On the other hand, Asian, African and countries of Latin America where colonialism and neo-colonialism are still present in terms of politics, economics and military we obviously cannot achieve victory by using peaceful coexistence as a basis, because peaceful coexistence would prolong or make imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism even stronger.

If we can keep the understanding among friends in that aspect, then our mutual solidarity will be preserved and strengthened. We support the tactics used by Yugoslavia and other comrades who in return also support our struggle.

Third, we are now witnessing the phenomenon that nations everywhere – both nations and combat groups – are taking over the torch that was originally lit by our brothers in the socialist countries, who have made the world a great favour by starting the fight against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. It is our duty now to take care that the lines of progressive revolutionary forces as the new torch-bearers in this fight outdo each other in their mutual effort and that these lines grow stronger.

I am saying this to you, Comrade Tito, not as a leader of Indonesian government to a leader of Yugoslav government but as a comrade-in-arms, since I am convinced, as I really am, that Yugoslav people and Government will continue following ideals which were originally formulated by Marx to eradicate imperialism and colonialism from the face of the earth.

Based on the above, I will explain you the reasons why Indonesia has decided to withdraw from the United Nations.

Honestly speaking, before we reached the final decision, that issue was the subject of a comprehensive review on all aspects and all possible consequences, both in the national and international context. Honestly speaking again, there are many reasons that do not support the withdrawal from the United Nations. On the other hand, there are strong and fundamental reasons which in the final analysis forced our government to withdraw from the United Nations.

First: for a long time it is considered by everyone, except the imperialists and colonialists, that the United Nations can no longer adequately reflect today's world, both mentally and structurally. Not once we have pointed this out; howe-

ver, the imperialists and colonialists do not care about these requirements of ours. I will mention just one example, the fact that one seat in the Security Council has to be shared by two countries, which is really absurd. Financial problems of the United Nations have become chaotic to the extent that they have caused the tensions inside the United Nations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which is also the result of manipulation of the imperialists and colonialists. I can mention other examples regarding this.

We hope that the withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations will make the imperialist and colonialist leave their indifferent attitude and understand that mental and structural changes in the United Nations as the matter of utmost urgency. Our friends from the newly emerging powers in the United Nations can now use the action of Indonesia to strengthen their demands. You will agree that we have made a wise decision. We have not insisted on an open voting in the General Assembly, not to put some of our friends in an awkward position concerning the issue of financial contribution.

Secondly, while looking for a solution to the Malaysian problem, our withdrawal from the United Nations may also provide a beneficial interest, because in this way the British and their puppet Malaysia can finally understand that question can actually become explosive. This way they may feel forced to accept negotiations based on the agreements reached in Manila and Tokyo. As an additional observation regarding this I may also mention that Malaysia has not even met the objective prerequisites required by the Charter of the United Nations for the election to membership of the Security Council; however manoeuvring and manipulation of imperialists managed to squeeze Malaysia into it.

There is a rumour that Indonesia would move towards an open and a real war while seeking the solution. I can assure you that this is not true and that it cannot be true. On the other hand, the opposite is possible and moreover likely. The imperialist powers are spreading such rumours in order to conceal their real intentions. Therefore, we must conclude that the concentration of so many British forces around Indonesia, unprecedented during peacetime can easily become threat of an open attack on Indonesia.

I hope that it wouldn't happen because it could have affect entire Asia, and it could even be signal for the Third World War.

Finally, regarding the overall confrontation between the general progressive revolutionary camp in the United Nations and the reactionary imperialists, Indonesian action could be beneficial. The precedent made by Indonesia will make the imperialists think twice before persisting in keeping their high attitude towards the progressive revolutionary camp.

My conclusion is that the activities of our comrades within the United Nations and the Indonesian activities outside of the United Nations do not necessarily have to be contradictory. Conflicts should not be created among them; on the

contrary they should strengthen their struggle against imperialism, against colonialism and against neo-colonialism, based on solidarity and deep understanding. As division of labour is based on peaceful coexistence and active confrontation, complemented by force if necessary, both being tools in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, so are our responsibilities concerning the struggle inside and outside of the United Nations.

I admit that the action of Indonesia will add to multiple burdens which we already have to bear as a struggling and growing nation. However, Yugoslavia and other comrades have given clear evidence that the fencing and locks just give another additional stimulation to do whatever possible in order to stand on one's own feet. Regarding this there are many examples, as there are also other examples that clearly show how nations like Asia, Africa and Latin America, which would rather live on the remnants of imperialism and colonialism, can easily fail at any time.

I am being thus comprehensive on purpose, because I want to ensure that our consultations are done thoroughly and based on solid foundations. I do not have any doubt that the Yugoslav government and Yugoslav people will understand the decision and action of Indonesia, just as we always follow the policy of the Yugoslav government and Yugoslav people with full understanding. I am still convinced that the policy of mutual assistance in any circumstances, as in the past time, will remain our guiding principle.

With warmest greetings,

Sincerely Yours,
Sukarno, m.p.

AJ, KPR I-1/438

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The note about the talks between President Tito and Indonesian Ambassador Subiyakto about the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, February 25, 1965

Belgrade, February 26, 1965

The reception was attended by the Secretary General of the President of the Republic Bogdan Crnobrnja.

Ambassador Subiyakto conveyed to the President of the Republic a personal message from President Sukarno. Having established that the message is rather lengthy, Comrade President observed that he would examine its content later.

Asked by President Tito on the situation regarding Malaysia, Ambassador replied that the situation was rather “exciting”. However, Japanese mediation should contribute to creating good atmosphere and he believed that the relations between Indonesia and Malaysia shall calm down.

Comrade President was interested to know on which basis the discussions would be held in order to reach the solution.

Ambassador said that President Sukarno was ready to negotiate on the basis of the proposal of the President of the Philippines Macapagal. President Sukarno said he would accept the decision of the Asian Reconciliation Commission. Japan, Cambodia, Pakistan and Thailand shall try to establish the Committee. The Philippines cannot be a part of it because they are a party to the dispute, given the fact that they claim the Sabah. The idea is, therefore, to return to the Manila Accord.

President of the Republic said that it was a good thing. He added that the situation in the South Vietnam was worrying and that the so-called “young generals”, who came in power, wanted to expand the conflict to the North Vietnam, which was absurd.

Regarding this, Ambassador observed that “young people are always ambitious”.

The President of the Republic was then interested to hear about the marking of the tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference, as well as whether Heads of State would participate.

Ambassador said that the Conference would be attended, in addition to some Heads of State, by the Heads of Government as well. A special invitation for participation was sent to President Nasser.

President Tito then asked a question regarding the forthcoming Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria. He also wanted to know if there was going to be a preparatory meeting.

Ambassador said that it was proposed that the conference be postponed for June 29. Indonesia would agree with such proposal. Regarding preparatory meeting, there will be a Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs three days before the main Conference.

President Tito was interested in the participation of USSR at the Conference. The Ambassador said that a decision would be made by the Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. A matter of dispute was the participation of Malaysia, which was objected by Indonesia.

Comrade President then asked about the position of Indonesia regarding the participation of USSR. Ambassador said that Indonesia would accept the decision of the Preparatory Conference.

President of the Republic noticed that, given the size of its territory, USSR is the largest Asian state.

Ambassador then asked if the President of the Republic intended to visit Indonesia, as he had promised. He added that President Sukarno had already visited Yugoslavia several times.

President Tito said that that year he was too busy. He had to visit Norway, Czechoslovakia, GDR, and Algeria, and Yugoslavia was going to be visited by Tunisian President Bourguiba, Moroccan King Hassan II /probably in June/, and possibly the Shah of Iran.

After visiting Indonesia, the President of the Republic would also have to visit Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, i.e. countries where he had been officially invited. He added jokingly that he would certainly not visit China.

Ambassador noticed that both Ceylon and India were on that route. After that, he mentioned the possibility of President Sukarno's visit to Yugoslavia during his visit to Algeria regarding the Afro-Asian Conference. He would ask to arrange for that visit. Ambassador also said that President Sukarno had given up the intent to go to Vienna for the purpose of medical treatment in the near future.

President of the Republic said that he would be pleased with the visit of President Sukarno.

When asked by Ambassador whether the President of the Republic was going to be in Yugoslavia at that time, Comrade President answered affirmatively.

President of the Republic wanted to hear about economic relations between the two countries. Ambassador answered that the relations were very good.

When asked if they were better than political ones, Ambassador answered that political relations were also good.

In that respect, President Tito made a few remarks about the position of the leader of the Communist Party of Indonesia regarding Yugoslavia.

Ambassador answered that it was the position of the Communist Party. However, Indonesian Government and President Sukarno wanted to further improve relations with Yugoslavia.

President of the Republic said that it was necessary to advance the relations.

Ambassador then added that President of the Republic would read in the President Sukarno's personal message that his country wanted to advance relations with SFRY. He underlined again that economic relations were developing well. The agreement was concluded. Yugoslav economic delegation paid a visit to Indonesia. "Both political and economic relations are good" – repeated the Ambassador.

President of the Republic said that he would be very pleased if President Sukarno could come by to Yugoslavia, when visiting Algeria.

Ambassador promised that he would do everything in his power to make it happen. He wanted to know when Comrade President was going to visit Algeria.

President Tito answered that he had been invited to visit Algeria two years before, but due to his busy schedule had not been able to visit it earlier. He would visit Algeria in April. At the end, President of the Republic asked Ambassador to convey his warmest regards to President Sukarno.

AJ, KPR I-3-3/39-28

201

The note about the reception of the Indonesian Ambassador Subyacto with President Tito, May 31, 1965

Belgrade, June 2, 1965

The meeting was attended by the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Marko Nikezić.

Ambassador said to the President of the Republic that President Sukarno invited him to visit his country and to attend the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of Indonesia's liberation on August 17, 1965.

President of the Republic thanked for the invitation but also stated that it would not be possible since at that time i.e. in August, he expected the visits of President Nasser and Prime Minister Shastri.

President Tito was interested in the situation regarding Malaysia.

Ambassador answered that the situation was still difficult. President of the Japanese Government tried to mediate the dispute. A meeting was arranged to take place in Tokyo. However, the meeting was not convened given the fact that Prime Minister of Malaysia actually travelled to Tokyo to the meeting of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, not for the discussions on Malaysia.

Indonesia wants to settle the dispute with Malaysia peacefully. However, this cannot be addressed in any way until the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria, since too little time remained.

Asked by President of the Republic, Ambassador answered that there was still a huge concentration of British forces in Malaysia. In that part of the world the British had a large number of war ships, as well as air and ground forces. Australia and New Zealand had also sent their troops, while Canada had sent transport planes.

However, the situation was not that tense as was six months ago. President Tito wanted to know the number of participants in the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria.

Ambassador answered that the Conference, according to the estimates of the Algerian Government, would be attended by between 50 and 60 countries.

Comrade President noted that it seemed that the Conference was not going to be attended by some members of the group of Francophone countries. As far as Tshombe was concerned, it was certain that he would not have access to the Conference.

Ambassador reiterated President Sukarno's wish that President Tito visit Indonesia since a lot of time had passed since his last visit to that country /end of 1958 and beginning of 1959/.

President of the Republic said he hoped that President Sukarno would be able to spare several days in Yugoslavia after the Conference in Algeria or at any other time, in the second half of the year. He had already invited him while in Cairo. He was interested whether after Algeria President Sukarno was going to visit any other country.

Ambassador answered that he had raised this issue with President Sukarno. He was not in the position to give a concrete answer. After Algeria, he was going to visit some European countries, and possibly some Latin American countries. However, his time was very limited.

Asked by the Ambassador about the possibility to visit Indonesia, President Tito said that he would gladly visit Indonesia. He might be able to do so the following year. He was having three more visits in June, including USSR, in August visits by President Nasser and Prime Minister Shastri, and in September visit to Bulgaria.

Ambassador then stated that President Sukarno appreciated very much Ambassador of SFRY in Indonesia, Comrade Knebl. He would welcome if Ambassador Knebl could remain in Indonesia for some time more. President Sukarno was making use, *inter alia*, of his advice on forestry.

President of the Republic answered that he was to consider that matter.

Ambassador wanted to hear about the position of Ambassador Knebl after his return to SFRY. Comrade Nikezić mentioned that it was planned for him to take over certain functions in Croatia.

President of the Republic thanked once again for the invitation to visit Indonesia. He was pleased to hear that Indonesian President was in good health.

Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Knebl to State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia on Sukarno's statement that Indonesia was preparing A-bomb

Jakarta, no. 342

August 6, 1965

Sukarno's statement on recent explosion of I. A-bomb, as well as recent statements by Subandrio and General Yani, we consider characteristic in the context of current and foreign policy.

I. representatives (official, who talked to us) as well as foreign representatives are of the opinion that there isn't any possibility that I. will make an A-bomb, particularly in a time-framed period, except regarding China. It is more believed to be a propaganda statement for foreign use –for A-A developing countries.

Subandrio's statement that "the more countries possess an A-bomb, the stronger the guarantee that the A-bomb will not be used", is deemed by the East as a justification of Chinese positions and a "political" explanation of the Sukarno's statement regarding the A-bomb.

Yani's statement received attention, since according to it I. is seeking, in the military naval sense, to take the role of the Seventh Fleet, thus ensuring the security of SEA, not on the basis of technical overcoming of USA but "based on social and political armament focused on physical and technical weapons".

Given the fact that we already have information that recent I. delegation in Africa purposefully expressed their views "in the capacity of a power", the said statements may be seen as propaganda elaboration of that I. "capacity of a power".

Knebl

MSP RS, DA, PA 1965, F-55, no. 427707

203

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia on the attempt of coup d'état and Muslims' requests
for the work of the Communist Party of Indonesia to be banned**

Jakarta
No. 464
October 7, 1965

(Tanjug). Jakarta, October 8

The press assess that the armed resistance has been dealt with. The situation in the Middle Java, where the forces of "September 30" were concentrated, is fully under control of regular forces. The press have given a prominent position to the statement of the Army Chief of the Information Service, Brigadier General Ibnu Subroto, that "September 30" is not an internal army issue, but a national one. It cannot be denied that there was an attempt to take power, dissolve government and create RS. They point to the necessity of finding a political solution as soon as possible.

The majority of the press today assess the murder of the general as a "Gestapo action". They repeat accusations of the participation of PKI in the coup. Army's *Berita Yudha* and *Angkatan Bersenjata* ask again for the PKI to be dissolved, pointing out that request to Sukarno was made by Nahdatul Ulama.

This has marked the beginning of the campaign against PKI, politically led by Muslim organisations. This morning Muslim youth gathered in downtown Jakarta with the request to abolish PKI. The participants have tried to set fire on the CC building. It is indicative that neither papers nor leaders mention Nasakom, although both Lukman and Njoto attended the Dwikora meeting.

Although the conference against foreign military bases is to begin in two days, there aren't any official statements that the conference will take place. Muslim *Suara Islam* in its editorial asks for the meeting to be postponed, considering that in the current situation the requirements are not met for the meeting to be fruitful.

There are rumours that some foreign delegations are already on their way to here.

Savić
Vujović

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign
Affairs of Yugoslavia about anti-communist protects and actions**

Jakarta,
No. 465,
October 8, 1965

At several places in Jakarta and in the countryside Muslim youth groups are gathering together under anti-PKI slogans requiring ban on PKI and arrest of Aidit.

A wider anti-PKI rally was held here, the Army being tolerant and the police present, from where the mass of the youth headed towards the PKI CC building demolishing it to some degree and trying to set fire to it. Police prevented.

Under excuse that weapons were distributed by "30 September", the Army and police maintain "the police hour". Following press leads and conducting raids, the weapons were found with members of PKI. Army press mobilise the public against PKI.

Muslim groups – the youth in particular, and reactive elements accept this under the slogan of anti-communism. However, the slogans focus on banning PKI and accusations against Aidit as the organiser of the slaughter of generals.

We are of the opinion that the Army doses the spirit of the masses given the fact that they are in power and that too radical incidents would stand in their way rather than assist them.

Certainly, this is a kind of orchestrated pressure on Sukarno regarding political concessions against PKI – but publicly not against S.

Masyumi elements will try to make use of the political climate and legal possibilities via N.U. and other Muslim organisations, particularly among the youth and students' organisations (HMI) for which PKI asked their abolishment and for open anti-communist campaign, which is currently only in sight.

Similarly, the banned Murba and PSI (socialists), who are currently giving their full support to the Army, will come to life.

It is without doubt that Basyuni would opt for more open actions. It depends on the Army interests, as they are actually in power.

Vujović

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in London to the State Secretariat for Foreign
Affairs of Yugoslavia about British and Soviet views on the rebellion
in Indonesia**

London,
No. 578
October 8, 1965

Indonesia. According to the interpretation of the Indonesian chargé d'affaires here (this was conveyed by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires Vasyev), the West had for some time prepared an action against Sukarno. In this context, the Indonesian is inclined to attribute the victory to the action of the West, which is however, given the failure, forced to retreat. The West felt that a threat emerged from PKI's control over a series of islands, because of which it stood behind Sukarno again, hoping that using its name it will be able to strengthen its positions in the newly emerged situation.

According to Vasyev's opinion, who talked to the British as well, the root of the event is still unclear, especially since PKI did not visibly take side (this fact was pointed to us by Peck, our ref. 574, making a conclusion that PKI does not want to expose itself publicly before the perspective of the rebellion is reviewed). Vasyev and more-less all other observers here these days are of the opinion that, irrespective of the origin of the rebellion and final outcome of the event, Sukarno's personal position is weakened and the West is obtaining more space for manoeuvring in the fight for its influence in Indonesia.

In our contacts with the British we come across restraint and avoidance to declare them and thus opt for one or the other force in the conflict, with the excuse that all reports to date have been insufficient and contradictory. There is satisfaction in the air because Sukarno's position is questioned at all, since it weakens Indonesia's unity which is seen as a threat to Malaysia, although it is still early to make any conclusions regarding its possible impact on the Indonesian future policy towards Malaysia. The press particularly underline the news on strengthening right-wing pressures in Indonesia in respect of measures against PKI.

Demajo

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1965, F-53, no. 435623

**Embassy Yugoslavia in London to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia about British views on the rebellion in Indonesia**

London,
No. 580
October 8, 1965

Indonesia. The situation is still fluid, and many questions require further clarifications. What the British had expected as inevitable with Sukarno's leave actually happened, namely, the beginning of the fight over power of different factions in Indonesia – although no one could expect that at this moment.

According to their assessment, that was a coup attempt by “colonels” (the majority of them being left-wing and under PKI influence) against “generals” (the majority of them being conservative). Whether and to what extent “colonels” coup was inspired by PKI is hard to tell. They note that immediately after the coup there was a statement by PKI supporting the coup, although after that PKI did not make any steps that would be indicative of its position.

Sukarno's role in the entire matter remains unknown. There are even opinions (although they are only speculative) that the “colonel” coup may have been inspired by Sukarno himself, in order to deal with the group of “generals”.

In counter-attack the generals liquidated the colonel coup, however, there remains to be seen whether and to what extent they will be able to make a step forward, i.e. to consolidate this victory of theirs. In all probability, it is not going to be an easy thing to do since among them there are not any strong personalities (“generals do have force, but don't have any brains”). Nasution is the only one who could do something.

For now it seems that status quo will be maintained, which is suggested by Sukarno's talk with journalists. Sukarno was in “great form”, and he will probably manage to calm the situation down using his personal charm and skill to balance and maintain equilibrium between different tendencies.

They notice that the Chinese are cautious in their comments, as well as many others, including the British, without any wish to jump the gun, until it is ascertained which force will prevail.

Demajo

207

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in New Delhi to the State Secretariat for Foreign
Affairs of Yugoslavia about Indian view on the rebellion in Indonesia**

Delhi,
No. 930
October 9, 1965

KPI is concerned about the developments in Indonesia. There is a danger that the right-wing generals may obtain full dominance in the country thus disturbing the balance of powers in the SEA. Their vindictiveness and anti-communist slogans indicate a turn in favour of imperialist powers. Undoubtedly, CP of Indonesia is responsible for such state of affairs due to its adventurous positions. Now, the question is whether it will have time to free itself from Chinese tutelage, and find its own path as a national party before its possible destruction in a conflict prepared by the right wing. Sukarno has lost its prestige even if he remained in power. It is questionable whether he will manage not to become an instrument in generals' hands. There are indications thereof.

Kljun

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1965, F-53, no. 435666

208

**Embassy of Yugoslavia in Washington to the State Secretariat for Foreign
Affairs of Yugoslavia about American view on the rebellion in Indonesia**

Washington D.C.
No. 1742
October 9, 1965

The coup attempt in Indonesia was committed by the left wing elements that had wrongly assessed that the conditions had matured for such enterprise. It is not quite clear yet what the role was of personal interests, and who the shadow initiator was, but it is the fact that "the Revolutionary Council" included a large number of communists and that "Harian Rakyat", the main KPI body, supported the conspiracy on the front page the very first day. Conspirators' claim that action was taken in order to prevent the coup plotted in conspiracy with US intelligence service is not grounded. The idea was to create an argument to justify the conspiracy and ensure as wide support as possible.

USA does not want to interfere with Indonesia's internal matters, although they are not indifferent in respect of the increase of Chinese influence. Although ten years ago they had been interested in affirmation of the right wing in this country and its joining the South Asian Defence Pact, USA has since sought to adapt to the realities of Indonesia development.

Non-engagement on the part of Jakarta would nowadays fully suit American politics in that part of the world and only due to Sukarno's shift towards China and refusal to cooperation with USA, full stalemate occurred in the relations between America and Indonesia. For America, the most unfavourable option would be if today's developments gave rise to the civil war in this country, since it would open the third major crisis in the SEA area, which would be beneficial only to Chinese political and strategic conceptions.

USA is convinced that the threat of such development is significantly reduced, since the forces loyal to Sukarno have dispersed the main strongholds of the conspirators, and regained control in Jakarta and other major points in the country. Despite that, further course of internal movements is uncertain, and complications are possible. Although KPI did not openly lead the rebellion, it exposed itself to such degree and manner that may give rise to counter-actions by the Army and serious confrontations. The hardest moment is brutal slaughter of the generals and, in connection with that, an ever increasing pressure in the Army to implement adequate sanctions. It was the reason due to which none of KPI members attended the reception at the Chinese Embassy on October 1, being afraid of arrest and retribution. Many leading communists have changed their place of residence and their whereabouts are unknown.

Sukarno turned out to be utterly indecisive, waiting to see which side is going to outweigh, ready to give it its support in order to preserve gained position and privileges. His tactics is now being maintained by the endeavour to minimise the depth of the schism and regain the disturbed balance. Despite all his flaws, for Indonesian masses Sukarno is a figure of authority and there are not any groups that at the present moment would not count on him. However, the coup attempt is a proof of failure of his political doctrine, and it is questionable whether he is going to maintain the same degree of control. In any case, KPI standings will be weakened due to this. They are very pleased over the prompt suppression of the rebellion, since it could have thrown the country into the chaos of the civil war. Although the situation is now seemingly stabilised, there is concern over possible provocation against USA. In Indonesia there are approximately 1,600 American citizens (diplomatic staff, experts and oil industry employees) against whom physical attacks are possible. It is not excluded that left wing radical elements, who in the defeat of conspiracy see a threat of strengthening the right wing and shifting foreign policy, may upon Chinese instigation take a terrorist act against Americans, in particular the diplomatic missions, being aware of the consequences for the relations between the two countries. Such an attack would

inevitably give rise to the Congress and American public response and DoS is not sure whether that would ultimately lead towards breaking the relations, which would not suit them in any way.

(F. Underhill, Deputy Head for the South West Pacific at the US – to Brzić).

Mićunović

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1965, F-53, no. 435967

209

The letter of President Tito to President Sukarno regarding the rebellion in Indonesia

October 15, 1965

Dear friend,

I would like to tell you that I, personally, as well as the Yugoslav public, have been following the events that have taken place these days in your country with utmost attention. We have learnt with regret about the tragic deaths of your officers and of bloodsheds, and we have with pleasure received the news that the attempts at causing disorder and disturbance of normal development of Indonesia were thwarted promptly. I am convinced that your further efforts at handling the situation, with the support of the people of Indonesia, will lead to overcoming current difficulties very soon, and that the people of Indonesia, under your leadership, will successfully continue its work towards the country's development and progress, maintenance of its independence and legacy of Indonesian revolution, for which we, here in Yugoslavia, have always had sincere affection, and offered full support.

I would like to use this opportunity to extend to you my warmest regards and sincere wishes for good health.

Sincerely yours Josip Broz Tito

AJ, KPR I-1/439

Interpretation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia that Army action is not anti-communist but targeted against the rebels from the Communist Party of Indonesia

October 19, 1965

Surjotjondro, Chief of Staff of the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Indonesia is in the process of its revolutionary development. In this process many things can be anticipated, while many happen all of a sudden. Indonesian revolution is open in finding the path for Indonesia, under the condition of preserving basic principles. It is oriented towards fight against colonialism, since this country in the course of its historical development felt serious consequences of colonial exploitation. Apart from that, the position of Indonesia is unique in the world, by its position and as a nation occupying a large archipelago, whose unity should be preserved.

He repeated the official thesis of MFA that examining and fact-finding on who is responsible for the bloodshed is still under way. The Army is holding power in its hands, it is difficult to obtain from it all the evidence collected so far, except from the Army-controlled press.

So far, there have been only suspicions that PKI is responsible, but it has not been established yet whether only certain elements, whose responsibility has already been proved, or the party as a whole. The silence of the East cannot be deemed as approval, but it is strange that PKI has not condemned the crime perpetrators so far. Because of PKI, China is also under suspicion that the sensitive line dividing cooperation and intervention has been crossed /the understanding of the principle of Pantjasila/.

All the events took place only in Djakarta. In other parts of the country the situation is completely normal. The state of war has been declared only in Djakarta. In the course of such state the military commander has extraordinary powers. He has used these powers to issue the order on temporary ban on PKI and related organisations. It does not mean that PKI is banned country-wide. Arrests of PKI members in the countryside are individual arrests on the basis of established responsibility and links with what had been happening in Djakarta.

Aidit's whereabouts are unknown.

What is happening should not be interpreted as anti-communism but as anti-PKI, given the firm concept of Nasakom, with the focus on Indonesian Nasakom, Marxist doctrine of socialism as an integral part of the political system /philosophy, norms/ of Indonesia.

When the Government – Sukarno announce the facts, it would mean that the state of affairs has been established which does not necessarily have to correspond to press reports and informal talks.

Regarding the preparations for II AA Conference, the Chinese position why to postpone it is explained by the belief that a large number of participants are not firmly against the participation of the USSR. It became apparent through communiqués of numerous visits to Moscow. As known, Indonesia has not taken a firm position in this matter. That is the reason why Indonesia, as many other countries that had officially committed themselves, is in favour of the conference taking place, irrespective of the current relations in Asia and Africa.

China is of the view expressed in the statement of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Conference should take place under the condition that it clearly and specifically commits itself against USA imperialism. China does not believe that USSR would accept that now.

Indonesia is of the opinion that it is important to develop and advance the fight against imperialism and colonialism and that the Conference should imply mobilisation in that direction. In that respect, in the fight against Neocolim it is necessary to hold onto a realistic position.

He expressed the belief that Indonesian-Yugoslav relations will develop positively, since they are based on solid grounds of non-interference and independence. In this context, we mentioned the message of President Tito to Sukarno.

M. Bulajić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1965, F-55, no. 411164

211

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Tokyo to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the coup attempt in Jakarta and Indonesian politics

Tokyo
No. 328
October 20, 1965

Sukarno on the coup and Indonesian politics

The local press reports that on October 19 Sukarno received Japanese journalists accredited to Jakarta and, among other things, told them the following:

1. KPI has been involved in the rebellion but some members of the Army, Aviation and the Guard also took part in it. These participants will be punished

once the facts are revealed. The coup was a huge mistake. It is a phenomenon that occurs in any major revolution. Similar events were present in the French and Russian revolutions. The events of September 30 are a part of a huge Indonesian revolution.

2. My current task is to strengthen the Indonesian revolution. Indonesia does not intend to leave the Nasakom politics which is based on the unity of nationalists, believers and communists. Communism does not equal PKI only, but all those who support communism. Ideology of communism and socialism has to be applied in order to improve lives and advance the nation.

3. Sukarno stated that he required USSR to give up the participation in the AAC, adding that if Russians accept that, then the Conference will take place as scheduled. If they insist on their participation, then the Conference will find itself in a difficult position and a schism may occur within the AA group.

4. Regardless of the outcome of the AAC, Sukarno underlined that he would do his utmost for the CONEFO conference to take place as scheduled in August '66.

Rolović

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1965, F-53, no. 437610

212

Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Lončar to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about situation in Indonesia

Jakarta
No. 500
October 29, 1965

The current situation (on the basis of the publicly known facts and numerous talks with Indonesians, primarily during courtesy visits):

1. The situation is still critical and uncertain in respect of the final outcome. The duality of governance is the reason for such situation.

The state of war is still in force in Jakarta, which is being used by the Army effectively to achieve its goals. There is a latent threat that the activity of extreme elements may give rise to the prevalence of the anti-communist and anti-Chinese racist course, which would lead to further escalation of the crisis. Arrests and rallies are still on-going. There are armed conflicts in Central Java, where the state of war has also been declared. The Day of the Armed Forces, which has

been delayed for November 10 due to this crisis, is being delayed again because the Army units are deployed all the time. New slaughters of the coup plotters are being discovered, which intensifies the spirit of vengeance.

PKI still does not show public organised activity, while the Army is compromising PKI using propaganda and destroying it physically and organisationally. The entire PKI leadership is operating underground.

The relations with China, which are an integral part of the crisis from the very beginning, have grown tense to the point of the necessity of a new unfolding. Foreign activity of Indonesia is almost fully paralysed.

Sukarno cannot leave the country even if AAC takes place. The economic situation in the country, which has been the main cause of instability, is further worsening.

2. The current political crisis is exacerbating the plethora of contradictions in the social and political development of the country. Although it is clear that the crisis of the entire politics, both domestic and foreign, is deep, its resolution cannot be achieved without a decisive Sukarno's contribution, the implementer and creator of the very same politics. Likewise, the Army that has successfully led action against the coup plotters and absolute dominance of PKI in the political life, which has, at the moment at least, real power, is not able to finalise the matter without other forces. In fact, the most important characteristic of the current situation is the duality of governance, the duality of the titular power with Sukarno, who with the authority of his personality wants to preserve power and continuity, and the real power of the Army with Nasution, which controls the activity of political parties, the press, and entire public life. The fact that N. does not appear does not mean that his role is secondary; on the contrary, it shows the ultimate character of his views that are shared via the Army and Muslim organisations. Opposite views come into the light through the following key questions:

a. Sukarno is persistent in requesting the maintenance of the political concept of Nasakom with PKI (with changed leadership or reorganised party). On the other hand, the Army used prompt action to make PKI go underground. Although formally still legal, following the decisions of military leaders the entire PKI and mass organisations under its control were banned in the entire country; PKI headquarters are being set on fire, and their property disposed of; PKI activists are being arrested and dismissed from key positions; certain PKI organisations and committees have started to make decisions on their dissolution.

b. Sukarno openly defends the authority of Subandrio, O. Dani and others. On the other hand, the Army is leading an open campaign through rallies and the press against Subandrio, they ask for his removal as well as overall government reshuffle. They managed to remove Dani, to have their favourite Suharto appointed as Minister in place of Pranot. According to some information, the Army sup-

ports Subandrio's deputy Suwito, who advocates the course of peaceful co-existence and from these positions cooperation with China;

c. Sukarno is in favour of maintaining relations with China, since he believes it is necessary for the implementation of his foreign policy conceptions; points out that this is just one of the crises in I-Ch. relations, that there have been more serious ones, but nevertheless their common cooperation interests prevailed. On the other hand, over the press and the public, there are more and more attacks on Ch. the most formal reasons being used to the maximum; anti-Chinese demonstrations and slogans are being supported, as well as breaking and entering into the premises of Ch. trade representations – the creation of such relations that have caused not only serious protests on both sides, public conflicts (KIAPMA), but also the leave of a number of Ch. from I, and even suspension of trade relations, which had never happened even after more serious incidents with other countries (Great Britain, USA).

3. The true balance of political forces in the country is indicative of the necessity to make compromises. It is not clear what the compromises will be. It is certain that neither side is harmonious enough to take full control in their hands. Although S's reputation has been shaken, it is very difficult to imagine any solution to the crisis without him. He is still, despite obvious mistakes and unreal conceptions, the symbol of country's unity and integrity, a compromise against extreme tendencies.

The "30 September Movement" was finally characterised by Sukarno as counter-revolutionary; the earlier version that it is Army's internal matter has been fully discarded, but at the same time he is pointing out that it is one of the usual deviations in the development of the I. revolution the correction of which has to be sought through political solutions.

It is inevitable that the compromise can be reached at the expense of PKI, but based on the modified S's conception of Nasakom as a general political platform. In all probability, PKI will not be declared illegal, although it is requested by the Army and five out of seven political parties, but in that case its reorganisation and complete change of leadership would have to take place, along with a political explanation of the necessity to have a national Indonesian C.P. or Marxist party, as it is preferably called nowadays. This would trigger new turmoil and regrouping of I's progressive forces. A kind of national political front might also be created, which would not take over the prerogatives of a single-party system, but would be a framework for the activities of these political parties, which is an old wish of Sukarno's and which would be acceptable for the Army.

A result of the compromise may be the removal of Subandrio from the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but it is difficult to assume that Sukarno would allow his full political liquidation. Other changes in the government may gradually take place in line with the Army policy of removing "counter-revolutionary elements".

Although these compromises seem rather realistic, other solutions are not ruled out. If the situation is not resolved for certain period of time, and new conflicts and clashes occur, further Army measure should not be ruled out which would make Sukarno only formal president.

4. The politics of China has had a major failure not only in respect of Indonesia but in a more general context. Ch. has prejudiced its relations with I. to a large extent both by the character of the coup and wrong and rigid position after the alleged (frontal attack against the Army). If we add the current position of PKI, then the weakening of Ch. positions are understandable.

For a closer approximation with USSR and other socialist countries an obstacle may to a certain degree be fear and reserve towards I's Army, which has been manifested by these countries during the crisis.

Western countries have positioned themselves rather cautiously. The present anti-PKI and anti-China wave suits them. Wishing further development in that direction, they seek not to make the position of the Army more difficult. Although the possibility of an attempt to use the hardships, particularly economic needs, cannot be ruled out, it is difficult to assume that faster changes in relationship with the West may take place.

It may be assumed that I's foreign policy will have to experience certain corrections in its substance, although a fast dramatic development should not be expected.

5. In this context our possibilities are expanding. In addition to good positions in the Army, owing to present good cooperation, even those factors in MFA that had belittled cooperation with us in recent years, are showing greater attention and interest (as much as can be estimated in the current situation). It could have been felt in the first meetings and talks during courtesy visits.

The current press which is under the Army control, unlike earlier times, is publishing positive news about Yugoslavia: high publicity has been given to the President's message; for the first time after a long period Tito's photograph appeared in the press; publicity has been given even to the interview on the French television where the Indonesian politics was criticised.

Lončar

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Lončar to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about better media image of Yugoslavia
in Indonesia after the removal of the supporters of the Communist Party
of Indonesia from the public broadcaster**

Jakarta
No. 509
November 4, 1965

UPIN. A positive change of the position regarding Y. has occurred in the Indonesian press. This is most noticeable in Antara, from where 36 journalists were dismissed together with almost entire team of editors – PKI members and supporters – who were the implementers of the anti-Yugoslav campaign.

A positive position was confirmed in the yesterday's talks between Lonpar and Director of Antara Nahara, and the team of editors, who accepted the comments on the report of their correspondent in Belgrade about our positions on the events in I. (implies that we establish our positions according to the position of USSR). N. pointed out that now, first of all, it is necessary to show common interest for improving bilateral relations and suggested that the information be published on the development of economic relations in particular between the two countries.

He believes that even a casual statement of a functionary of ours would be useful (maybe a state secretary), which would confirm the friendship between the two countries and in the present moment point to the possibilities of the development of friendly cooperation in all fields.

In our opinion, positive attitude in the press towards Yugoslavia could be affected to a certain degree by the position of our press towards the events in I. (e.g. comments by "Rad"). We understand the necessity of using foreign sources, as our correspondent in Jakarta sends reports regularly; however, the practice of using K. Lumpur as the most cited source should be abandoned, since it creates mistrust and objections here.

On the occasion of the Day of the Republic a better possibility is being offered to publish more material on Y. in I. press. We kindly ask you to arrange with SINF and Tanjung to start providing us immediately not only with features but also with brief information from all fields, and to start using the programme for I. even more for information about the development and positions of our country.

Lončar

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A letter-telegram from President Sukarno to President Tito

Received: November 7, 1965

His Excellency
 Josip Broz Tito
 President of the Federal Peoples Republic of Jougoslavia
 Beograd

I would like to express my sincere thanks and deep appreciation for your kind message and best wishes. May I take this opportunity to convey my best wishes for your personal health and happiness.

President of the Republic of Indonesia Soekarno

AJ, KPR I-1/439

215

Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about dualism in Indonesian foreign policy

November 17, 1965

The latest statement of the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Suwito indicates the presence of dualism in the modern Indonesian foreign policy. Information from different parties confirms our earlier conclusion that Suwito enjoys the trust of the Army. We recall that at the reception at the Chinese Embassy on October 1 in the afternoon he stated before the present foreign diplomats that the Army was keeping the situation under control. In this manner from the very beginning of the crisis he promoted himself on the side of the Army. In the next few days the Army sharpened its attacks on Minister Subandrio, requesting openly his removal. Subandrio was accused of having known about the action of the "30 September" and that he deliberately departed to Sumatra in the expectation of the outcome. The one who went to the meeting of ministers in Algeria was Suwito, not Subandrio (they say that Dr Asmaun directs himself towards the Army).

On his way from Algeria Suwito held a series of consultations with Indonesian diplomats in Europe (The Hague), Middle East and East Africa (Beirut),

and Asia (Bangkok) and gave several interesting statements which received full publicity in the Army-controlled press:

- Speaking about the postponement of II AAC, he pointed out strengthening of the spirit of Bandung against all the attempts at distortion or attack;

- The tension in Chinese-Indonesian relations is nothing unusual in the relations between two countries. Relations with China were placed at the same level of difficulty as with other two superpowers – G. Britain and USA. At the same time, he underlined the necessity to maintain normal relations with China; and that possible measures against PKI should not be a matter of foreign interference, since as in case of “Masyumi”, PSI and “Murba”, it is an internal issue of Indonesia. It is in the interest of Indonesia to make sure it would not shift to the Right.

- US wants to improve relations with Indonesia, so the Government will do its best for the improvement to take place, stressing the necessity of mutual understanding, in particular on the part of USA.

The second line is represented by the latest Sukarno’s accusation against American Ambassador that he had tried to bribe some Indonesians with 150m rupis in order to promote the ideology of the “free world”.

M. Bulajić

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1965, F-55, no. 411164

216

**Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Lončar to the State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about political liquidation
of the Communist Party of Indonesia**

Secret

Jakarta
No. 538
December 8, 1965

From the talks between Jovanović and Bratanata, Government Minister:

He believes that PS will make important political decisions this month. It is a complex issue since for the last several years problems have accumulated both internally and externally that are not easy to resolve. The Subandrio issue is still under discussion; he has been responsible to a large extent for the development of the Indonesian policy in the last years although he was not its creator.

Striving to preserve the position of the First Deputy, he lacked background support of political forces, so he started relying on PKI assessing that I. policy would increasingly depend on the role of the left-wing. PKI accepted him readily as a lever to increase their political influence. As a chief of the intelligence service, he presented fake reports to PS that African countries, LA, and other progressive movements support their policy, thus deceiving PS. This contributed to the full movement of I. to Chinese waters, which was the PKI foreign policy line, and internally it used it to strengthen its positions. Therefore, consciously or unconsciously, Subandrio was an instrument in the hands of PKI, so by its leave from the political scene, he must leave as well. Now he is distancing himself from everything, and as the Speaker of Sessions in Bogor, he is striving to give an extra focus to the criticism against PKI, to show himself as a friend of the Army which does not accept him. PS does not want to remove him completely and will probably keep him as a special ambassador.

The Army is seeking the intelligence service to be reorganised and to have influence in the service in order not to allow it to get into the hands of one man and become a weapons of deception.

PKI is practically liquidated. The darkest figure was Sudisman, as a pillar of the organisation, while Aidit was only “selling” political positions and advice. The rumours that Njoto is nationally oriented and that he may reorganise PKI are without any grounds, since he is the same as others and unacceptable. He believes that the situation with Nasakom will not change with the disappearance of PKI since Nasakom is not a front of political parties but an ethical principle that needs be obeyed by any individual irrespective of his/her political affiliation. PKI has let down the principle, thus stepping out from Nasakom.

No fear that I. policy will shift to the right, which is guaranteed by the existing forces:

– The Army has grown through the fight for liberation and the army leaders come from all layers of the people.

– PNI is a progressive political power. In the last couple of years it has been weakening due to the policy of Ali Sastroamidjojo and his wing, which was constantly emphasised by PKI in the fight for dominance. Now internal disputes are being addressed, and the forthcoming PNI congress should achieve unity and strengthen it. One of the factors in addressing the situation in PNI is the Police Minister, General Sutjipto, who was allegedly told by Suharto that as soon as they settled internal issues and ensured unity, the Army would wholeheartedly support them.

– The program of NU Party is reactionary to some degree. However, practical moves are often progressive and to the benefit of the people. They advocate agrarian reform, and have had a positive attitude in a series of economic problems.

– Further progressive left wing forces are also embodied in former members of the banned parties MURBE and MASYUMI, that PKI, through PS, managed to liquidate as its competition.

He says that recent appearance of Hatta in the public is irrelevant. He is definitely a major revolutionary fighter but does not have political power anymore. He remains a symbol of the construction of the country by paying full attention to the development of agriculture.

Regarding economic reforms, he says that a firm course was taken to heal the economic situation in the country. Finally economy was granted a proper place in the state politics, but there are many problems that are not easy to solve. The meaning of the Indonesian revolution should be cleared. For some, revolution means armed fight, living day by day, etc.; such atmosphere does not contribute to constructive views and does not give the necessary strength for building the country.

Ministers of economy-related fields and finance managers are preparing analyses and proposals for the reconstruction of the economic system and the principle of further development.

He believes that they do not have a man who is respectable and strong enough to openly say to PS that economy is chaotic and to try to tell him the truth about other illusions, such as that PS and I. are the lighthouse in global revolution, fight against NEKOLIM, etc.

I. foreign policy was badly led in recent years, which has brought large damage to I. at international level. Something needs to change definitively. They will try to normalise relations with China but will not go back to the previous state.

Lončar

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1965, F-53, no. 443273

217

The report of the Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Lončar about the talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Malik

May 18, 1966

1. He thanks for the information and expresses full consent that it is necessary to intensify cooperation of non-engaged countries in the manner that was agreed upon in Alexandria. From his Ambassador in Cairo, he received a telegram several hours before notifying him that two presidents had decided to send

an emissary to Djakarta, who would inform PS on the results of the talks. Egyptians seek opinion on this, which is unclear to Malik. After my explanation that two presidents decided to inform some heads of the non-engaged countries about the talks, including Sukarno, without prejudice to the form and that in relation to them the intention, above all, was to assist further evolution of Indonesian policy, which I had already discussed with him, M. expressed his thoughts aloud saying that he was more against than in favour of it. He believes that in the present situation when they are trying to influence PS towards his evolution, the arrival of the emissary may create with him a feeling of pressure from abroad in coordination with M. or, to the contrary, he may get an impression that great importance is attached to him abroad, which would even more strengthen his personal belief that he is irreplaceable and that therefore there is no reason for him to loosen his views. He repeated his opinion several times that it seemed to him that the time was not appropriate and concluded that he would consult more with Suharto. However, he believes that in any case I should visit PS and inform him about the content of the talk as well as about the message from President Tito.

2. Continuing the discussion about non-alignment policy of the forthcoming meeting Tito-Nasser-Indira, and about perspectives of Indonesian foreign policy, M. expressed his opinion that the possibility of PS participation in the summit should not be excluded. If the situation stabilises here, and PS further evolves his views and strengthens trust and cooperation with the Army and the new government, i.e. if the meeting of MPRS concludes successfully, Sukarno's participation in the meeting would be of immense importance for the rehabilitation of Indonesia at global level, and PS in particular. He agrees that in that case Sukarno's evolution is needed even more, in relation to the OUN and co-existence for understanding with the partners in that meeting.

3. At the last meeting of Kogam full agreement was reached about further policy towards Malaysia; were pleasantly surprised with the evolution Sukarno expressed regarding co-existence. He accepted that the conference should be an organised pressure towards peaceful solution of the dispute with Malaysia, in the spirit of the Manila Accord. It is important for general understanding with the new Government and the leading faction of OS.

It is also important that Kogam was attended by Nasution who established contact and reasonable dialogue with PS, which showed that preconceived pressure that Suharto, Buwono and Malik made on Nasution was fruitful. M. as a Sumatran establishes contact with Nasution easily and openly shows the need for bigger tactics and carefulness towards Sukarno, in the interest of common goals. He got the impression that Nasution is ready to submit himself to the interests of the new conception, which has confirmed his characteristic to sacrifice personal prestige in critical moments.

4. MPRS will probably be in session at the beginning of June. Until then a favourable atmosphere needs to be created, closer cooperation between relevant

factors established (Sukarno-Army-Parliament-Government) and along that line certain results achieved. M. estimates that for the success of the meeting the decisive factor will be to fill the vacant posts with positive persons and for the new Government to achieve certain successes, which would at the same time confirm the correction of earlier policy and the validity of the new direction. In such circumstances the application of the 1945 Constitution would be possible; PS would not only be re-elected, but rehabilitated as well, which would mark a new phase in the life of Indonesia. However, for that purpose full cooperation by PS is needed i.e. open correction of certain positions.

5. Successful outcome of the new policy of confrontation and return to the OUN, as assessed by M, would be significant results which would strengthen the position of the Government and show that PS supports the new policy. Although M. decided to put aside the UN issue for some time, and not to escalate the issue with PS, he assesses that MPRS meeting is an appropriate event to raise it again in the above mentioned sense. He will try to have a few talks with PS and to convince him that it is his personal interest to make a decision on his own about the return to the OUN.

6. He officially accepted the invitation to come to Yugoslavia and expressed his thanks. On his way to USSR he will stop by at New Delhi, where he has also been invited. After USSR he would visit Yugoslavia, and on his way back he would go to Pakistan. Relations with USSR are going in the good direction. Based on the last talk with Soviet Ambassador he got the impression that he would find understanding in Moscow, which he sees as a important moment for his personal position and consolidation of progressive forces in Indonesia in general.

Lončar

AJ, KPR, I-5-b/40-7

218

The report of the Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Lončar about the talk with President Sukarno

May 21, 1966

1. He received me immediately after I asked for a meeting. As usual, there were a few more persons at the breakfast (Minister for Atomic Energy Prof. Siwabessy, Minister for Sports Maladi and several unimportant ones). I stayed two and a half hours out of which 45 minutes tête-à-tête. In the first part of the talk, in the presence of others, confrontation with Malaysia, Chinese A-bomb, OUN and CONEFO were touched upon.

2. PS is ready to meet Tunku without third party mediation. If Tunku accepts the Manila Accord as a basis, there may be some results. The time and venue have not been decided yet; they are waiting for the proposal by Kuala Lumpur. He confirmed that confrontation means seeking a peaceful way, which is contrary to his earlier statements.

He agreed with me that all explosions should be condemned, and use of atomic weapons in general, in particular because it is at disposal of all major forces, with different political views (USA, USSR, China, and France). However, he had to be frank and said that as an Asian, he was proud of the Chinese success.

Upon Siwabessy's proposal for Indonesia to participate in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, PS asks whether that implies return to the OUN – if yes, he is against participation, if no, he is for it. Siwabessy concludes that PS agrees with the participation, given the fact that it does not imply automatic return to the OUN.

Afterwards PS asked for my opinion on CONEFO. My opinion is that CONEFO could have its meaning and success only in complementarity with the OUN and on the basis of awareness of unity and global inter-dependence, PS answers that CONEFO does not confront the OUN, and that he does not want to be involved in inter-dependent relations with American imperialism. I observed that unfortunately both he and we are in inter-dependent relations with all that determines USA policy, including imperialism; otherwise, we would not have to worry about its existence. PS tried to round off the matter with a joke, and concluded addressing everyone: "Here, you can see that not all communists are that aggressive as they are presented in Indonesia".

3. He listened very carefully to the message of President Tito that I conveyed tête-à-tête, asking several times that I repeat certain wordings. He commented on the message item by item.

He agrees with the assessment of the global situation, in particular the observation that imperialistic forces are aggressive, but that general anti-imperialistic and progressive front is not weakening. The position in the communiqué about Vietnam was a good one. However, to the framework of Geneva agreements, the necessity of withdrawal of American troops should also be added.

He fully shares the opinion that cooperation and coordination of the non-engaged countries should be intensified bilaterally and multilaterally, as well as the opinion that the time is not appropriate to convene a new conference. The initiative for a trilateral meeting is interesting and may be useful, just asks whether Indira is strong enough partner. After being told that through such meeting her personality should strengthen, PS added that Indira was a positive personality, however, the politics of India is affected by many negative factors, due to which it is rather conformist. They seek to fix the relations and cooperation with India.

He is pleased with the opinion that Pakistan, Japan, Iran and France are in the process of a positive evolution. PS is less of an optimist in respect of Japan given their too deep relations with Americans, although Indonesia has friendly relations with that country.

When he heard the opinion on the OUN, PS paused for a moment and asked whether we thought that Indonesia should return to this global organisation. I said that the two presidents did not speak about that matter directly, but that my free interpretation was that it would be useful for Indonesia. He believes that the initiative for greater activity towards further development of the organisation is useful; Indonesia will cooperate with specialised agencies, but still cannot return to the OUN. He also agreed to get involved in the preparation and work of the Second Conference on Trade and Development, and with the assessment of the need for enhanced cooperation in economic matters.

4. Regarding internal situation, he reiterated his earlier assessment that those were counter-revolutionary actions, that progressive forces were broken down and on the defensive, and his belief that gradually they would overcome the existing difficulties. He particularly emphasized the need to stabilise the peace and later start the organisation of progressive forces. He also said that he cared very much that President Tito be well informed about the situation, and expressed that hope that I did that conscientiously and successfully. When I asked him if he had any specific message for President Tito in that respect, he reiterated that I surely sent impartial and accurate reports, so there was no need for him to convey anything in that respect. He avoided speaking more specifically about the present situation.

5. I informed him about the invitation to Malik to visit Yugoslavia (which was previously agreed with M.). He believes that it would be good for the visit to take place, but thinks that the programme should be as short as possible, since he needs Malik in the country at the moment.

6. He asks about the health of President Tito and his further international activity.

The meeting with President would be both pleasing and useful. He will endeavour to visit Yugoslavia as soon as the circumstances allow. He reiterates the invitation for President to visit Indonesia and it seems to him that it may take place along with the visit to Japan. He said that he was sending not only regards but "also love to President Tito".

7. PS was obviously satisfied with being informed about the Alexandria meeting. Although he reiterated some old views, in general there seems to be an evolution taking place with him. I was able to notice that he was more determined in defending his earlier views in front of his associates than tête-à-tête. It was obvious in respect of the OUN issue. He almost did not oppose at all the observation of the two presidents that the OUN is an irreplaceable and useful form of

gathering progressive forces, unlike the discussion about this topic in front of his associates.

In conclusion it should be said that his views lag behind the needs deriving from the situation, and that they aggravate to a high degree the consolidation and quick affirmation of positive tendencies and forces.

Lončar

AJ, KPR, I-5-b/40-7

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The report on Indonesia by the representatives of the Yugoslav group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union

Brdo near Kranj, May 31, 1966

On their way back from Australia the representatives of the Yugoslav Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, P. Dapčević, and J. Vilfan, paid an unofficial visit to Indonesia, where they had a series of meetings with the current Indonesian leaders. The text below gives an overview of the talks and impressions about the situation presented by Comrade P. Dapčević in his report.

1. Talks with President Sukarno. He received us in a kind and friendly manner. We tried to impose a political conversation in order to obtain at least some of his assessments of the situation, but he refused such conversation. He only said that on May 12 he would appear as a “guilty man” before the Provisional People’s Consultative Council of the Congress. Based on this, we concluded that to some extent he was aware of the fact that he would have to start explaining his actions. However, based on his attitude in general, it seems that he wants to postpone the solutions which might get the red light by the Congress, and despite the criticism addressed against his autocracy, megalomania, “orchestrated democracy” etc, to ensure for himself a similar position and to prevent going back to the 1945 Constitution and control of the Congress over him.

Only after half an hour did we find the possibility to convey President Tito’s regards, when he inquired about President’s health and asked us to convey the invitation for President Tito to visit Indonesia, where he would organise tiger hunting by helicopters.

In front of us, and probably due to the presence of Vice-President Buwono and Provisional Chairman of the Congress Puspojudo, he defended his megalomania plans, and issued orders related to the organisation of the Congress for

May 12 (probably to make it clear for them that he was not afraid of standing before the Congress and that as before he would manage the affairs in the Congress as well). He is aware that everybody needs him as a personification of unity, due to his war and revolution merits, and that for the time being he is difficult to be replaced; he will do anything to keep as many prerogatives of power as possible, and to remain “the father” of the nation in the new circumstances as well. It is one of the main reasons why he cannot, or better said, does not want to open the door for any compromises that would, to say the least, dethrone him (He spoke of the attempts to dethrone his personality and his not giving in). The impression is that only organised and much more energetic political pressure might force him to make concessions, which would be beneficial even for him.

2. Talks with General Suharto. He informed us about the situation briefly and in general terms. During the entire statement he insisted on a progressive aspect of the creation of their Army, and that he did not and does not want to introduce dictatorship. He immediately said that they responded to the coup which meant betrayal of national interests in favour of a foreign force (he did not directly mention China). He says that the Army, as a national force, had to act that way and defend national interests, and it was also under terrorist attack.

He underlined that he would not allow anyone externally to interfere with country's internal matters. He deems the situation difficult, but transitional, so on his part he will assist and do his best for the consolidation of circumstances to take place as soon as possible. He deems Sukarno the leader of the nation and legitimate President of the Republic.

He underlined, as a good example, our inter-army cooperation and that general cooperation should follow suit. He pointed to the similarities of the creation and goals of the two armies.

He thanked for Yugoslav understanding of the emerged situation, assuring us that they were aware that the resolution of the situation may be only along the line of progressive solutions. At the end, he reiterated that he would not allow anyone, following our example, to interfere with their internal matters.

It should be mentioned that he did not express any regret for the events that had occurred, not to mention the regret for the victims of the conflict.

3. Talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs Malik. He stated that their foreign policy should assume the earlier course, i.e. the policy of active non-alignment and that the policy should be even more active.

He deems that it is necessary to return to international organisations, so they will soon take some measures to that end (he did not make reference to the OUN).

He says he is aware that they need to move to normal political life as soon as possible, and seek consolidation that way. Some measures are already being taken to that end (together with a group of associates he is working on establis-

hing a new, broad political party whose pillar would be his former socialist party Murba – banned by Sukarno and founded on the principles of Marxism, and in favour of socialism. The party would gather those forces of CP of Indonesia that are in favour of independence and way to socialism). He is aware that they must not rush into that due to psychological consequences of the events, but that they must not be in delay. He appreciates our foreign policy. He thanked for our readiness to assist them in their economic difficulties, within the limits of our capabilities. He believes that contacts will be needed regarding our further arrangements and development of relations in general.

He also pointed out that Sukarno would remain President. He did not say a word about the victims and consequences of the slaughter of communists.

We got the impression that only Malik, and to some extent but with a flare of opportunism, Abdulgani, have elaborated at least some general political conception of pulling the country out of the difficult situation. It cannot be applied to others (we do not know about Nasution) since they think that practical solutions are sufficient.

4. Talks with Vice-President of the Government Buwono (Sultan of Yogyakarta). He is aware of the country's general difficulties and in particular economic ones. He knows that without economic consolidation there is no political stability, so they are already taking measures to pull out the country from such difficult situation. In that respect they are preparing short-term and long-term economic plans. They will immediately take actions to increase the production of rice, tea, and cotton. Industrial production and all that would ensure higher export will find its place in those plans. They will address foreign countries to assist them to that end. They will immediately take action at both national and international levels. They will prevent prodigality (which is difficult to believe) and do their best to increase export (The plan for export in 1965 was \$450m but the actual export was much below this figure, according to our trade representatives).

At the end, he reiterated all that as a requirement for political stabilisation, which the country needs as soon as possible. He deems Sukarno legitimate head of state.

He says that they count on Yugoslavia as a serious factor. He thanked, as Malik did, for our understanding of their economic situation.

He did not say a word about the events and their victims.

5. Talks with Vice Prime Minister Abdulgani (one of the main theorists of the Indonesian revolution).

He spoke at large about the opposites and changed conditions of today's world, pointing to the necessity of certain reconciliation of the opposites of national independence and international obligations of any country, on which, he says, stability, world peace and international understanding depend to a high degree.

(It seems to us that this was an allusion with a touch of criticism of President Sukarno and his policy in this area in recent years.)

While elaborating this thought, he notes that this was one of the reasons of the failure of KPI, which from dogmatic and extreme positions had subordinated nationalism to the fight for power, in the service of a foreign force – in this particular case, China. Speaking of most recent events, he says that three negative factions emerged in Indonesian political life, which although opposing each other, converged to a common dogmatic and opportunistic position and were beneficial to each other thus preventing normal political and general development of the country. Those are, first of all, CP of Indonesia, followed by remains of the former aristocracy (extreme right wing), and economic adventurers. Not coincidentally, among the imprisoned ministers are precisely the representatives of these formations.

It is encouraging, Abdulgani says, that the forces which prevailed in recent events have noticed their harmfulness for the development of the country and taken measures against them all.

He pointed out that, as soon as possible, the country needed to go back to constitutionality which must be observed even by President Sukarno, whom Abdulgani respects.

Speaking of the position of Indonesia, he stressed that it had to fill the vacancy in international politics as soon as possible, and give its positive contribution there. He expects that in this context cooperation with Yugoslavia will revive and produce even greater results.

He was interested in the development of our country, workers' self-management, showing great interest in our system (he has visited our country twice).

Even he mentioned, more in passing and without going to the essence, some concern regarding the events and confrontations therein.

6. Talks with other Indonesian functionaries. In the talks with the representatives of the Indonesian Parliament, all groups accepted as normal and useful to continue our cooperation in the future as well.

Talks with Vice-President Leimena and Provisional Chairman of the Consultative Congress General Puspojudo were general and courteous.

The talks with Nasution were arranged, but a day before the meeting he proposed to our Ambassador Lončar not to have the meeting explaining that he had tactical reasons. We assume that Nasution avoided the talk because he was afraid to speak of his conflict with President Sukarno. Otherwise, we know that Nasution assessed our visit and talks as useful, emphasising in particular at our insistence in all talks that matters should be addressed along the line of further progress and relying on the legacy of the revolution.

7. A few general impressions about the situation. The state of affairs in Indonesia is a consequence of the attempt of KPI to seize power using heterogeneous political formations, with the assistance of China, and of the brutal settling of

accounts not only with the coup plotters but with the communists as well (It is estimated that in the direct conflicts after the coup in the chaos facilitated by the Army between 100,000 and 300,000 citizens were massacred, the majority being members of KPI. It should be noted that the Government has not provided any official figures yet).

One of the reasons for such line-up was the dogmatism of KPI, which was not aware of the significance of the national moment and its too close connections with China. Due to the rapid increase in its numbers, observing the situation only from one point of view (KPI has become a strong political formation in the last 5-6 years), KPI was not able to wait for the process of seizing power to mature nor to revise to a certain degree its dogmatism, to achieve more influence in the Army through such slogans that would in the eyes of the Army present it as a national force and thus seize power in a relatively peaceful way, but it opted for the coup, also encouraged by China.

Another reason is the fact that the dogmatism had connected with the remains of former aristocracy which represents the extreme right wing, adventurers like Subandrio and economic adventurers of the "the worse, the better" type. They did not mind even Sukarno's autocracy. That's why it is no coincidence that KPI Secretary General Aidit, who was in the Council of the Republic, did not criticise Sukarno's autocracy. It is also characteristic that KPI attacked our Party incessantly, and helped Sukarno attack the non-alignment policy, while being silent about his megalomania plans. It seems to us that it was done because Sukarno's politics was favourable for its plans.

The worst of all was the fact that the leadership of KPI established closest relations with CP of China and became its instrument, which has inevitably created a gap between KPI and nationalist elements, which were not in favour of stepping back but were against unilateral power of KPI. The main pillar of those forces has been and still is the Army led by the generals Nasution and Suharto.

All talks pointed out the betrayal of the revolution and of the country's national interests to China by KPI. They think logical that the army had to swiftly and energetically intervene in order to preserve independence, save the nation and country's unity. It is interesting that in the talks China was not always referred to; instead the expression "a foreign power" was used.

Although apolitical to some degree, using the coup that was welcomed, the Army stepped onto the political scene and began the counter-attack as a defender of national interests. And for the reason that it did not appreciate the situation from the political point of view, it did not stop at settling accounts with the coup leaders, but it moved on to the mass massacre of communists, where settling personal accounts was present.

In such situation Generals Nasution and Suharto stepped on the political scene, as well as Malik, Buwono and Abdulgani as political figures (the last one

rather cautiously) with a view to channelling the course of events and consolidating the situation as soon as possible. It seems that the Army accepted them fully aware of the possibility that the massacre might turn against them, and lead the country into the complete chaos. A political solution was needed, but under the condition that the Army be the main catalyst of the event. That's why the Army continued "cleansing" the country from communists, in particular communist leaders, with the explanation that the threat was still present.

Seeing the situation from a rather narrow perspective, KPI did not expect such counter-attack, so it found itself in the situation that its leadership was swiftly liquidated, party members and supporters massacred, while it was retreating from all fronts beaten as non-national force serving a foreign power. Such passive attitude of KPI gave strength to military circles which then moved on to brutal settling of accounts with KPI and its members. This is the only possible explanation of such slaughter of communists (There are rumours that KPI has gone underground and is being reorganised).

The impression is that Army leaders, Generals Nasution and Suharto, and particularly Malik and Buwono are aware of severe wounds and that as a consequence a connection was created in order to find political solutions, although they are not fully aware of the entire problem (there is not any declaration or programme yet).

The impression is that the Army (its leaders) woke up, and found a common language with progressive politicians such as Malik, Buwono and Abdulgani, which has encouraged some progressive forces and pushes the Army itself to find solutions along a progressive line. General Suharto was convincing us that the Army is in favour of progressive solutions to the situation, without intention to introduce dictatorship, pointing out even that it has been and will remain in favour of the revolution, progress and political solution, which would guarantee national interests and integrity of the country. In this context, the Army shall not oppose the establishment of a normal political life and return to the 1945 Constitution.

It is interesting that this position was particularly expressed by General Suharto with obvious intention to justify all what has been done, i.e. in order to come across understanding in our country, which they particularly want to achieve.

Further encouraging is the fact that Army leaders, Generals Suharto and Nasution, as well as Malik and Buwono, are fighting a joint battle against Sukarno's autocracy, against "guided democracy", and for the reinstatement of constitutional governance and the 1945 Constitution. It should be added that General Nasution, who is operating from the background, is turning into the leader of the fight for independence and normal functioning of a constitutional republic, which is, it seems, not opposed by anyone.

Nasution is keeping his background position and does not want to escalate relations with President Sukarno, since he believes that for the time being Sukar-

no should remain President, subject to the condition that the country reinstates the 1945 Constitution. He is a true action leader, and no one is questioning that at the moment. He is tactful and aware of the complexity of the task, the question is only how long the Army will support him in that, and whether he will be forced to go for concessions because of Sukarno's authority and certain fluctuations in the Army (Sukarno is delaying solutions because of that as well as his appearance before the Congress).

The arrest of Subandrio (a right-winger who turned into Sukarno's footman; there are also rumours that Subandrio was a Chinese agent), to whom police and intelligence service were handed over /Subandrio delivered everything to KPI and China's service/ was not made only as a threat to Sukarno /the trial may turn into heavy accusations against Sukarno/, but as a confrontation of the Army and politics /the police has been broken down and dissolved and its role was taken over by the Army/.

It is difficult to say that the normalisation of political life will be easy, since there are groupings in the Army, although the strongest one is advocating a constitutional solution. There is concern that extreme right wing groups in the Army may connect with the West, which would complicate the situation even more and postpone solutions, and any delay is beneficial to the right wing. It should be added that foreign interference is facilitated by the difficult economic situation in the country although about 80 per cent of the population relies on subsistence economy. It is encouraging that the country is rich (English, Dutch and other Western traders have already rushed there!).

If a democratic and constitutional solution to the crisis was ensured, it would be a significant victory for Indonesia and at the same time an attack against dogmatic views, in particular Chinese dogmatism which in this case has shown all its aspirations, as a major power, to solve international issues by expansionism. China actually wanted to fix its political losses in Africa and Asia, and strengthen its positions in Vietnam and Asia as a whole. But also due to the geo-political position of Indonesia there may be further difficulties and complications.

What was typical for these talks, except the one with Abdulgani, is that no one expressed regrets for the victims of the confrontation (it is even more characteristic that this matter is little discussed in the country, and even less observed in the streets or among the people). There is no impression that people are intimidated! In private talks, no one said a word about it, which surprised us a lot.

The fact that the Army so violently confronted with the members of KPI carries an element which will be fraught with conflicts in the future. That is why there is concern that the Army may request too much for itself in the political life being afraid of vengeance.

It is discouraging that Sukarno's attitude is rather strict so that he would maintain his position and that he does not show any understanding for what is happening in the country.

Sukarno could help a lot with positive solutions if he were capable of understanding the situation and his position. For the time being it is difficult to say that he is aware of the situation and ready to concessions which would imply going back to the normal functioning of the Republic.

8. Attitude towards Yugoslavia. Our impressions are that Yugoslavia is very present in that country: in the press, among the people, via our traders (they dedicated 15 minutes to our visit on TV), they do care about our country, they speak openly with us, etc. Such situation gives us certain advantages, so it seems that we might have influence on finding more positive solutions. It is also necessary to solidify our presence. The arrival of Minister of Foreign Affairs Malik may be a good opportunity to learn more about the situation and clarify certain views to some extent.

They did not ask for delay of loan payment, or for economic assistance, which does not mean they will not do so very soon. We think it is short-sighted that our banks refrain from doing business normally, since it can and will inevitably influence the exchange, in particular its prospects (this was said by our traders).

It should be said that our Embassy is in the position to follow the events since Ambassador Lončar has permanent connections with all figures that nowadays make decisions on the faith of Indonesia.

All persons we talked to (except Sukarno), and in particular Suharto, Malik and Buwono, leave the impression that they are serious and responsible people, but regarding their awareness of the difficulty of the situation and responsibility that they have taken over, there are certain differences which may and will inevitably have a role in the further course of events in Indonesia.

In all talks we supported the view underlined by all that only building on the legacy of the revolution, further progress and consolidation of political life of the country, and reliance on all national and progressive forces in the country, may offer a perspective solution for Indonesia. We supported the defence of national independence against external interference, but subject to the condition that the Army be the implementer of a progressive solution, without allowing any external interference by anyone. We told them clearly and without any doubt that they will find understanding with us only if they remain on the positions of national independence, revolution and progress.

With General Suharto we also underlined the importance of friendly relations between our two Armies, which he deemed positive both in the past and in the future and an example to be followed in respect of our overall relations.

It is our impression, almost an observation, that such views of ours were accepted by our Indonesian collocutors.

A note about the talks between President Tito and Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Malik, September 16, 1966

Malik: conveyed personal regards from President Sukarno to President Tito and added that President was well.

Comrade Tito: was interested about the situation in Indonesia and Asia.

Malik: answered that the situation in Asia was worrying, particularly the events regarding Vietnam. He pointed out that they exchanged views with Ms Gandhi, Bumedi, and other leaders with whom they had contacts recently. All of them agree that the situation is such that words are not enough, but it is necessary to take concrete measures and actions in order to resolve it.

Comrade Tito: said that bilateral talks in that respect are most useful and desirable. Then he talked about the forthcoming meeting in New Delhi and added that the issue of holding this meeting was raised in Alexandria for the first time, and later in the talks with Ms Gandhi during her stay in Yugoslavia. The October meeting of the three heads does not aim or intend to be a preparatory meeting for a high-level meeting. We are meeting in New Delhi in order to exchange views, to agree on how to proceed and what to do.

He expressed opinion that bilateral contacts and exchange of opinions among the countries and state representatives are necessary. He expressed belief that the time would come to clearly review the need to convene a broader meeting, where we, i.e. the non-engaged countries, would not be only the initiators of convening such a meeting. Nowadays there are many countries in the world, not only the non-engaged ones, which have clearly reviewed the threat of using force. Countries in the world, not only in Europe, are afraid of further escalation of the situation and threats of war. Then he added that it would be necessary to hold a broader meeting of all those who are interested in global peace, all those who are against the use of force in international relations.

The world is changing nowadays. Opinions and views of many leaders are changing. Even in America there is a rising resistance towards the US politics. The Atlantic Pact is no longer what it used to be. The countries that joined it hoping that the Atlantic Pact will serve their security have now realised that it could draw them in a dangerous adventure and new war.

Comrade Tito underlined that in respect of many issues we had views on global problems similar to de Gaulle's, it has been particularly prominent during recent visit of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Couve de Murville.

There are reactionary circles in some countries – particularly in USA – which want and strive to escalate the situation. The world is threatened not only by USA but China as well; policies of both countries lead towards increased dan-

ger of the outbreak of war. China has not said a word against the war; on the contrary, it claims it has nothing to lose in such war. The threat comes from two sides – USA and China.

Malik – said that Indonesia intended to return to the OUN.

Comrade Tito – Indonesia's joining the OUN is a major act. It means strengthening the policy of peaceful co-existence which has been proclaimed in Bandung, Belgrade and Cairo.

Malik – We got the impression that our position gave rise to some confusion among our friends. We thought it was necessary to explain our position personally, particularly to our friends in India, Yugoslavia and UAR.

We believe that today the situation is such that it requires greater engagement. We need to move from the ideas to concrete actions. In our opinion, there was enough talking. We are aware that China represents a threat, we feel such threat. We agree that USA and China together represent a threat.

– The talks were continued between Comrade Tito and Malik, in the presence of Comrade Nikezić.

AJ, KPR, I-3-a/39-31

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Second note on the talks between President Tito and Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Malik, September 16, 1966

In a separate talks with the President of the Republic, without the presence of other members of the Indonesian delegation, Minister Malik informed President Tito about the position of Sukarno and his relations with the Government of Indonesia, highlighting that President Sukarno is unwilling to give up cooperation with China, and in particular his ideas on CONEFO. Malik stated that Sukarno, responding to the arguments of Minister of Foreign Affairs and others in the Government that Indonesia should return to the OUN because it cannot remain isolated, said: "Convene CONEFO, even it's only ten countries". Members of the Government explained to him that today not even one country would come and that all probes turned out to be negative.

Regarding return to the United Nations, Malik says that President Sukarno also had an unrealistic idea about the possibilities of Indonesia, and that he agreed to send a mission in the capacity of observer, subject to adoption of the resolution by Asian and African countries that would welcome the return of Indonesia and provide support to its requests for conducting the necessary changes in UN, and only then would Indonesia consider its return to full membership. Malik

said to President Tito that the Government knew it was impossible and that they intended to return to membership during this session, irrespective of the opinion of President Sukarno.

At international level, he explained the steps they undertook to normalise the relations with Malaysia and informed President Tito about the talks he had had in Delhi, Algeria and Cairo. President Nasser particularly emphasised that he deemed Sukarno a fighter credited with the liberation of Asia and Africa and that it would be very important to reach an agreement with him. At the same time Nasser said that such an agreement, naturally, had to be reached on the basis of the politics of the current Government.

Speaking of the internal situation, Malik stated that it was not stabilised yet and that the main problem was decline of Indonesian economy. Industrial production has almost stopped, while agricultural production declined due to natural disasters and in particular due to the conflicts and murders in villages. Indonesian export will be around \$400m this year (our note: four years ago it amounted to 700m, and it was much higher before that), and only payment of debts that are due this year amount to \$450m. That is why Indonesia had to ask for delay of payments from a number of states, which their delegation is going to negotiate with us as well.

In order to handle the economic situation, the new Government intends, *inter alia*, to decrease the army personnel, which is over 500,000 soldiers at the moment, more precisely to transfer a part of the army to production facilities. Those people, Malik says, cannot be simply discharged, since they have rifles. Malik confirms that Gen. Suharto accepted this view. He mentions that to this end they are considering to invite an American mission, the so-called civilian mission, which would advise them regarding the transfer of military units to production operations.

During the talks about the internal situation in Indonesia, President Tito said, after Malik's explanation that the killing of the generals caused huge outrage among Indonesian people, that we could understand why the conflict and murders took place immediately after the failure of the coup, but that we believe that it is highly detrimental to Indonesia that these things keep on happening; that now the most important thing seems to be to reach peace and stability in the country and apart from that we believe that it is impossible to eliminate such a large part of Indonesian people from the political life, such as the left wing and all other progressive forces. Communists and other progressive forces cannot be destroyed; a way should be found for them to become active in the political life.

Malik says that he fully agrees, since 90 per cent of Indonesian people are proletarians, that the bourgeoisie had actually never existed, and that therefore it is a natural progressive orientation of the majority.

President Tito said that he believed that it was very important to rely, in the renewal of the progressive movement, about which Malik expressed their intentions, first of all on organised working class. In reply to President's question about the trade union situation, Malik says that they are torn now; each party has its own. President says that the fight for the unity of trade unions should be one of the first tasks, since the workers who are members of different parties' trade unions do not have diverse interests; interests of all workers are the same. Malik confirms that they share this opinion and that they want the future progressive movement to be based in the first place on the workers' support – since the support of exclusively intellectuals could produce a club only. After that he specifies that they believe that they need to create a movement, not a party. When asked about the forces they count on, he says that the nationalistic party left wing, and a large majority of Muslim organisation membership, which is, in his opinion, progressively oriented, would support the new movement. When it was observed that such movement would offer the possibility to activate former members of CP of Indonesia as well, Malik agreed. Regarding the parties, when asked about the Congress, he spoke of its composition, stating that landowners and the rich are not in the Congress, but teachers, clerks, officers and workers, still he mentions that the atmosphere present since the coup was such that known decision could have been made. When President observed that there is no sense in banning Marxism, since it is impossible to kill such an idea, the idea of progress, Malik agreed and said that they (the Government) shared this opinion.

Speaking of certain individuals, following President Tito's explanation that he is under impression that Nasution has significantly shifted to the right, Malik confirms that he fell under the influence of the right wing. He explains that with the murder of his daughter and attempted assassination of him during the coup attempt, and in addition to that he says that politics-wise Nasution has always been blank – he knows him very well since they are cousins too. On the other hand, he says that Nasution is a very honest man, that he is not corrupted, while the situation in respect of Suharto is different. When asked whether this refers to Suharto in person, he says no, but that in a close circle around Suharto there are people who are prone to corruption. Then he says that those are the things these people have learnt from President Sukarno.

When talking about the trilateral meeting, Malik says that there is interest in their country for that meeting, they want it to be as successful as possible, but he is of the opinion that, under present circumstances, this meeting will be better off this way, without President Sukarno, than with his participation.

Regarding the invitation that President Sukarno has repeated several times regarding President Tito's visit to Indonesia, Malik agrees that it is too early, that the situation is still not stable enough. Regarding President Tito's earlier invitation for Sukarno to come to Yugoslavia next time he visits Europe, which he ex-

tends on this occasion again, sending his regards to Sukarno, Suharto, and Nasution, Malik says that he will convey the regards and invitation. He thinks that it would be a good thing, but mentions in passing that the Government has suggested Sukarno several times lately to travel abroad, but he keeps delaying it being afraid of Nkrumah's fate.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-31

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Embassy of Yugoslavia in Jakarta to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia about the Communist Party of Indonesia a year after the coup attempt

Top secret

Djakarta
No. 263
October 5, 1966

The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), our reference 100, 141 and 171

1. There are not any serious signs of PKI organised activity. In the Army surge after October 1, 1965, it was physically broken down to a large extent, without any perspective of its full recovery in the long run. It is already being accepted as real the fantastic figure of the 500,000 killed, although no one has the exact number. The public prosecutor Sugih Arto has recently stated that 120,000 communists have been imprisoned. Such concentration of PKI members represents an economic and political problem. The position of the imprisoned is very difficult and entirely inhuman. The terror is not moving to its end at all, new mass arrests are under way, even liquidations.

Military forces systematically maintain the state of psychological tension by constantly pointing out the threat of communism by the "political guerrilla" (the news that out of 86 members of PKI CC only 31 were captured, etc). The appearance of certain PKI fliers recently has been well used in that sense. This explains the decision made by KOTI on the ban on spreading and developing Marxism-Leninism via commanders of military regions. Since Suharto stands behind this decision, there is no doubt that the long-term course of the present Government is extreme anti-communism.

Representatives of socialist countries (USSR, Poland, GDR) with whom we exchange information from time to time, do not have a shared opinion about the situation in PKI.

Among PKI, according to Polish sources, there are voices that Aidit is largely responsible for the loss of a large number of the Party membership, since after October 1, 1965 he took the position that for the Party it was most important to keep its legality. A directive was given against the use of force and all party members were peacefully waiting at their homes to be beheaded. Instructions were given later to go underground, but the Party was not prepared for that. The policy of developing the Party only on Java and less on other islands boomeranged on PKI.

East Germany is developing the thesis that Sukarno is most responsible for the loss of the party membership, who promised that he would not ban PKI and guaranteed personal safety for Njoto and others. The tactics of provocations caused the opposite effect and prevented consolidation of the left wing forces.

According to Polish sources, PKI was finally engaged on systematic development of a new party programme, which is based on thorough analysis of the past: it starts with accusations of Aidit for class cooperation instead of class fight; the attitude towards Sukarno is being reviewed, since that cooperation was costly; attacks are made not only against militarism, but also against Muslim fanaticism; a more positive attitude is being taken in respect of socialist countries.

It is estimated that Utopia, the main obstacle in reviewing earlier mistakes, was forced to withdraw, while pressure was exerted on Sudisman to side with realistic politics and self-criticism. According to unconfirmed information, a new unified Politburo was composed: Sudisman, Sugiono (Bandung), Sakirman, Anwar Sanusi and Revan. If this turns to be true, the above composition does not promise more radical changes in PKI politics.

According to East German sources, positions of PKI have not changed. At the beginning certain degree of self-criticism was observed, not because they realised their mistakes but to calm down the dissatisfied. Therefore, the leadership is basically still pro-Chinese. In East Java, allegedly, there were attempts to persuade Sudisman in the necessity to revise PKI politics, but he refused it in order to prevent further schism in the party. Based on the visits of Java and Bali, they reached the conclusion that there is no organised activity by PKI.

Korean and Vietnamese sources tell about some PKI activity, but not country-wide, still mostly in Djakarta, Central and East Java.

Hungarian sources support our old information that there are two party groupings, "two central committees", without any prospects for a new single politics that would be based on the analysis of past experiences and mistakes.

Bulajić

**The report of Ambassador of Yugoslavia in Jakarta Lončar on the talks
with President Sukarno about the situation in Indonesia**

Djakarta

No. 218

November 7, 1966

I visited PS at my own request. In a lengthy, open talk, Sukarno said the following in reply to my direct questions about the situation, relations with the Army, politics of the new Government, political solutions and position of the left wing:

1. The situation is still complex, although the balance of forces is clearer. Reactionary and right wing elements are still on the offensive, but it is obvious that they are in minority. He is maintaining contacts with leaders of major parties and trying to develop cooperation. It is particularly significant for him that those parties have publicly supported him.

2. Polarisation is also clear in the Army. The majority, in particular younger officers, are on his side. In East and Central Java the senior command staff is sided with him. There are also reactionary groups linked with Masyumi as well as those influenced by American agency. Out of 300 officers educated in USA, more than a hundred have been recruited. Among them, the most prominent are: General Major Panggabean, Suharto's assistant, General Major Darsono, new commander of Siliwangi Division, while Edy Sarwo, commander of paratroopers, is a narrow-minded religious fanatic and a reactionary.

He established certain understanding and cooperation with Suharto. He is convinced that he is loyal to him. However, Suharto is politically undeveloped and subject to various influences. The right wing is exerting systematic pressure on him; it is dangerous that several pro-American officers surround him. PS still hopes that his influence on Suharto will be even greater.

3. He will cooperate with and support the new government, although he disagrees with parts of its programme. First of all, the need to satisfy the masses is too much underlined, which is unrealistic and can only give rise to renewed dissatisfaction. He also disagrees with the orientation to obtain large assistance from the West.

He cannot find a common language with Malik whom he earlier considered his closest associate. Regarding the issue of ending confrontations, Malik directly disappointed him, by skipping the fundamental problems set by the GB imperialistic policy in this part of the world, and he was not fair towards him personally. Despite this, PS thinks that Malik's visit to Yugoslavia, Algeria and UAR will be useful and can positively influence Malik. He is of the opinion that along

this line it would good that Yugoslav leaders point to Malik the essence of imperialism and interests of progressive forces in the current international situation.

4. As a Marxist and revolutionary, he will continue the fight against anti-communist accusations. He deems that in a few months already he will be able to organise a direct action against the MPRS decision on the ban of communism, due to which the debate on that was postponed.

Members of PKI are massively infiltrating into other political organisations. The solution is to establish a new left-wing party.

5. PS raised again the question of President Tito's visit. I said that I was not familiar with the obligations and possibilities of President Tito, but in my personal opinion the situation in Indonesia was still not mature for the visit to take place. He agrees that at the moment the conditions are not that favourable, however, he expects they will significantly improve by the end of this or beginning of the next year, when the visit might take place.

At the end he asked me to send most cordial regards to President Tito and he said that he wants me to visit him as soon as I get back.

This time PS was unusually open and specific in the talks. He often pointed out that he was telling me things in most strict confidentiality, as to the ambassador of his best friend.

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-7

MSP RS, DA, PA, 1966, F-60, no. 432625

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A note on the talks between President Tito and Indonesian Ambassador Suhadi on the occasion of presenting credentials at Beli Dvor, November 8, 1966

Present: State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Marko Nikezić, and Secretary General of the President of the Republic, Bogdan Crnobrnja, and on the Indonesian side Minister-Councillor, S. Darusman

On the occasion of presenting credentials, Indonesian Ambassador held a short speech /attached/. President Tito answered that it was with great pleasure that he received letters of credence by which President Sukarno accredited Mr Suhadi as Indonesian Ambassador to Yugoslavia. He expressed belief that his work would be as much useful as the work of his predecessors and that he would contribute to further solidification of friendly relations between two countries. He is very happy that President Sukarno nominated precisely Suhadi as Ambassador to Yugoslavia, which demonstrates his full confidence in him. The Ambassador

will be able to work with us on further development of relations between Indonesia and Yugoslavia. Comrade President wished Ambassador much success in his work.

After the reception of the credentials, President Tito had a short friendly talk with Ambassador. Comrade President was interested to hear whether President Sukarno intended to travel abroad.

Ambassador answered that President Sukarno intended to visit Europe. Comrade President expressed his wish to see him again, as they had not met since the Cairo Conference.

Ambassador Suhadi noted that President Sukarno invited President Tito to visit Indonesia. During the travel to Japan President Tito might stay for a few days in Indonesia.

Comrade President replied that he had been invited to visit a number of countries. Six years before he received an invitation to visit Afghanistan. In addition, he had been invited to Mongolia, Pakistan, Cambodia, etc. Only after these obligations, he may visit Indonesia. However, if President Sukarno visited Europe, then it would be easy for him to visit Yugoslavia, since Europe is not large. If he was going to Austria, he had to fly over Yugoslavia in any case.

Comrade President was then interested in the situation in Indonesia and asked whether it was calming down. Ambassador replied that the situation was stabilising.

Comrade President then noted that large numbers of the Chinese are leaving Indonesia. He added, jokingly: "Mao Tse Tung needs Red Guards". He also said that he was familiar with the fact that the Chinese in Indonesia are mostly merchants and noted that Mao might think that they would be able to transfer their wealth to China.

Ambassador Suhadi replied that around 1 million Chinese would move to China. They are present in Central and East Java and in Sumatra, particularly in the vicinity of Medan City. Only in Sumatra there are about half a million of the Chinese. They will be allowed to bring along their personal belongings only.

Comrade Marko Nikezić was interested to hear whose initiative such large emigration of the Chinese was. Ambassador replied that it happened upon the initiative of the Indonesian Government. The Chinese agreed and took over the responsibility to provide necessary ships. However, this was developing slowly since the Chinese were not in a hurry.

Comrade President then asked whether Indonesia would have to pay China any damages for the immovable property of the Chinese in Indonesia. Ambassador replied that Indonesia was not obliged to pay any damages since, pursuant to Indonesian law, the Chinese do not have the right to possession of immovable property.

Comrade President expressed his opinion that it is better to have more monolithic population since others might use various elements for their own purposes. In this context he mentioned Yugoslav experience before the war, when in our country there were 450,000 Germans who were Hitler's Fifth Column. During the war all of them were for Hitler and fought with arms in their hands against our people. At the end of the war about 96 per cent of Germans were expelled from Yugoslavia.

Comrade President then expressed his belief that the relations between Yugoslavia and Indonesia would develop positively in any respect. He said that we would want for Indonesia to overcome all the challenges it was fighting with as soon as possible, which had arisen from recent events. He believed that President Sukarno might contribute a lot to that. Comrade President repeated that he would gladly meet President Sukarno and discuss international problems with him. Indonesia played a major role in international relations. Different imperialistic powers would find more suitable that Indonesia be preoccupied with its internal problems and not to play a peaceful role in the international arena as before. The non-aligned countries miss more active engagement of Indonesia in international relations, in particular in the present situation. Imperialistic and reactionary powers in the world object the non-alignment policy and they would like to prevent it.

Comrade President said that regarding non-alignment there had been a series of positive developments lately. For example, the High-level Conference in Africa made certain positive decisions and successfully prevented different imperialistic manoeuvres. Even the difficulties that may seem insurmountable may be overcome, irrespective of the difficulties, if a number of countries have shared standpoints. However, the power of the non-aligned countries must not be overestimated, but it should not be underestimated either. Those are the issues that he would gladly discuss with President Sukarno.

Ambassador promised he would pass that on to President Sukarno.

AJ,KPR I-3-a/39-32

**A letter by President Tito to President Sukarno on the trilateral meeting
between Yugoslavia, United Arab Republic and India in New Delhi**

Belgrade, November 14, 1966

Dear friend,

The usefulness of our past exchanges of opinions about international issues, as well as the wish for further strengthening of our friendly cooperation, have encouraged me this time as well to write to you and inform you about the talks I had during the recent Trilateral Meeting in New Delhi with UAR President Nasser, and Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi.

The world has witnessed, recently in particular, many changes and in some areas critical deterioration of the situation, which is overall not a good one, despite certain positive tendencies. From various sides on several occasions some concern has been expressed and the view has been underlined that it is necessary to invest constant efforts in preventing such development globally. During the meetings I had this year with President Nasser and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, we came up with the idea to hold a trilateral meeting again, so that we can, in addition to considering further improvement of mutual cooperation, exchange detailed opinions about the current global situation and the possibilities to contribute to peace and equal international cooperation. We also had in mind that under current conditions it would be difficult to arrange or have meaningful broader consultations of the non-aligned countries, especially because such action would need the initiative and support from all non-aligned countries. We certainly did not deem the trilateral meeting as a substitute for a broader gathering of the non-aligned countries, nor did we want to deprive other non-aligned countries of their freedom to propose initiatives and actions, which was pointed out on the eve of and during our meeting. On the contrary, we would nowadays, as before, only welcome such and similar activities of the non-aligned countries.

At our meeting in New Delhi we openly and thoroughly indeed examined current situation in the world. We reached agreement on the state of affairs and causes of the current international tension, which has occurred, first of all, due to enhanced pressure of imperialist and neo-colonialist powers on newly liberated and developing countries, including of course the non-aligned ones, although there are other hegemonic and non-peaceful tendencies. Imperialism cannot come to terms with the wish of the growing number of countries to become fully independent and to politically and economically solidify their independence. Likewise, no one wants to accept the fact that military alliances are nowadays becoming less and less effective political tool, and a poor foundation of global security.

We paid particular attention to the situation in Africa, where the pressure of imperialism and neo-colonialism is rather strong and where independent countries rightly expect more support in their fight.

Dear friend,

At our meeting, as you may have already learnt, we pointed out our belief that the basic principles enshrined in the documents of the Belgrade and Cairo Conferences of the non-aligned countries – are still topical. Since peaceful co-existence is the only alternative to the politics of force and pressure, I am convinced that it is realistic and necessary, as has been to date, to advocate its realisation. In our opinion, the principles of co-existence are more broadly accepted nowadays than several years ago by many countries and powers within and outside the Blocks. We are of the opinion that one of the important goals of the non-alignment policy is to support such efforts, all the more so since these principles have not come to the fore yet due to the politics of force and pressure by reactionary forces. Joint actions by the non-aligned countries which aspired to the universal implementation of the principle of co-existence have had a positive impact on the international situation. We believe that nowadays the non-aligned and other peaceful countries and forces represent an even stronger potential power in the world.

At the trilateral meeting we particularly focused on the state of affairs in economic relations and the position of the developing countries, considering the opinion that the acceleration of their development is a main precondition for their political and economic independence. In this respect, we noted that significant progress had been achieved in defining a new international development policy, but that in practice there have not been any steps ahead due to which the position of the developing countries has deteriorated on many specific issues. Although they are making huge efforts to mobilise resources and to use their natural wealth to a larger extent, the developing countries cannot accelerate significantly their development without appropriate broader cooperation and changes in the existing relations towards them by highly developed countries. We are of the opinion that in these matters there are major common interests among all developing countries, irrespective of the differences among them. We also believe that there are many of those who wish and seek to continue and expand joint and other actions in order to address the said matters which deserve our fullest attention. In this sense we expressed hope that the second UNCTAD Conference would achieve better progress and that it is necessary to influence developed countries to that end through intensified activities and unified approach of the so-called Group of 77.

Likewise, we reached a conclusion in our meeting that it was necessary to expand joint efforts of our three countries regarding economic cooperation and to further strengthen economic cooperation with other friendly countries. It has been agreed to convene a meeting of the Ministers responsible for economic matters of the three countries as soon as possible in order to explore the possibilities of enhan-

cing mutual cooperation and giving larger contribution to the efforts of the developing countries to improve global conditions for their economic development.

Since the war in Vietnam is burdening international relations to a high degree and is threatening global peace, we also thoroughly exchanged our views on this problem as well. It was fully clear to us that ensuring peace in this particular case depends on USA, first of all, which is the implementer of intervention and aggression, which has not expressed any readiness so far to take specific measures to terminate the war. It is our belief that all peaceful forces should exert further pressure in order to find political solution and to achieve the conditions in which Vietnamese people could live in peace and freedom and to decide on their own about their fate without external interference. Based on that, we expressed our views about the need to terminate bombing of DR Vietnam and equal participation of NLF as one the main sides in all efforts to withdraw foreign forces and engage in negotiations. Certainly, we could not give any specific proposal for addressing the issue, since it would be inopportune in the situation where there are not any adequate preconditions.

Finally, I would like to say that our trilateral meeting showed again that basic approaches of India, UAR and Yugoslavia are very close both regarding the assessment of the international situation and regarding the usefulness of larger activation of all non-aligned countries and peaceful forces in general. We agreed that more frequent exchange of opinions between two, three or more countries, and between the non-aligned countries in general, would be useful and would positively influence strengthening the fight for peace and further affirmation of the policy of non-alignment. We are convinced that the trilateral meeting in New Delhi was useful not only for our three countries but also for the cause of peace and international cooperation, and that it will be of use for the efforts and aspirations of the non-aligned countries and all those who are fighting today for independence and peace.

I understand, dear President, that you are busy at this moment with handling many other problems. I believe, however, that you share the opinion that it would be useful to exchange in person our opinions on current global issues, when an opportune moment comes. I am also deeply convinced that, with mutual readiness, our relations and cooperation will further develop and improve on the basis of the traditional friendship and common interests of our two countries.

I would highly appreciate, Mr President and my dear friend, your opinions on these and other issues in international relations and on the possibilities for increased contribution by our and other interested countries in order to solidify the role of the non-aligned countries in current international circumstances.

With friendly regards.

Sincerely yours,
T.

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**New instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia
on cooperation with Yugoslavia**

Information from Jakarta

November 16, 1966

After the Subandrio-Lončar talks, the President's Office ordered MFA to explore and propose common contact points with Yugoslavia where Indonesia may, internationally and bilaterally, share positions and where it could cooperate with a view to improving our relations. The MFA office handling this matter will propose stronger emphasis on already shared positions /Vietnam, etc/ as a starting point for going back to non-engagement.

AJ, KPR I-5-b/40-7

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**A note about the talks between President Tito and Muhammad Jusuf,
special envoy of the new President of Indonesia Suharto,
October 7, 1967**

The talks were attended by: on the Yugoslav side comrades Vladimir Popović and Budimir Lončar, and on the Indonesian side –Ambassador of Indonesia in Yugoslavia

Jusuf expressed his gratitude for being received by the President of the Republic. He conveyed warm regards from President Suharto to Comrade Tito and to the peoples of Yugoslavia. He added that President Suharto regretted the fact that obligations in his country did not allow him to come to Yugoslavia in person and exchange views on a series of issues with Comrade President. Therefore he decided to send to our country, as his personal representative, Minister Jusuf. Conveying the message to Comrade President, Jusuf underlined that, in the first place, it related to expanding economic and financial relations between the two countries and to strengthening cooperation on all matters of interest for Indonesia and Yugoslavia.

Comrade President was informed about the content of the personal message. He asked Jusuf to express gratitude to General Suharto.

He will gladly talk about economic and political relations between our two countries. He is of the opinion that the relations need to be further developed.

Comrade President then underlined that he was very pleased with the fact that the standpoints of Indonesia and Yugoslavia in respect of foreign policy, and particularly the Near East crisis, fully matched. It is particularly important now when the prospects of settling the Near East crisis are poor, irrespective of the fact that Arabs agreed to political solution following the visit of Comrade President to UAR, Syria and Iraq. The situation is becoming more and more complicated. Certain major forces, specifically USA, are withdrawing and taking more rigid approach. It is a matter of concern for us. It is comforting, however, that France has taken progressive approach in respect of the resolution of the conflict. It wants to assist Arabic countries to solve the problem. Great Britain has also changed its position to some degree and become more flexible. Now the main responsibility is on USA. All the more so since USSR from the very beginning took a decisive approach regarding the Near East conflict. We are surprised by the fact that the three major powers which are in favour of urgent resolution of the crisis in amicable way failed to persuade USA to take such course.

The non-aligned countries can play a major role in this respect. It is necessary for them to take even more unified approach regarding both the Near East and colonialism, etc. Apart from that, the balance of powers is changing in the world. A number of countries that are neither non-aligned nor socialist are also changing their approach in comparison with the original approach which was in favour of Israel. Now all these countries are more and more supporting urgent and amicable resolution of the crisis.

There is still some hope that the current session of the UN General Assembly might bring along some positive results. However, we should not rule out the possibility that this session might end in disagreement without bringing any solution for the Near East. If this happened, then it should be considered what further action the non-aligned and peaceful countries should take in order to prevent the aggression from ending to the detriment of the Arabs, i.e. not to force Arabs to capitulation because they would not concede to it. The purpose of the action should be to ensure peace.

On the other hand, it is the fact that Israel is a state. We were explaining this to Arabs who are now aware of the fact. Certainly, the idea of Israel that seeks to expand its territories at the expense of Arab countries cannot be accepted. In addition, the issue of Palestinian refugees cannot be allowed to keep hanging in the air. This issue needs to be resolved.

Arab leaders have agreed with our proposals in general, about which President Suharto has been informed. There was not a plan involved, but a basis which would allow for further talks and specifically formulation of positions. Our proposal brought the Arabs to the position of political rather than military resolution of the crisis in the Near East. With all Arabs there was a tendency to address the crisis by military means. However, they do not have real possibilities for that. This may change after some time, but it could certainly lead to various undesira-

ble situations. We exchanged views with many heads of state and government of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The majority of statesmen were in favour of seeking a political resolution, a solution that would not degrade Arabs and force them to capitulate.

Now there is a battle in the Near East at the moment about not solving conflicts by military means. If the advocates of aggression won this battle, it would pose a threat for other regions in the world. Local wars might break out in other places as well. Such wars cannot be allowed to take place. USA has now seen that it is possible to solve certain problems by using force. Earlier there was a thesis that any war, even a local one, would inevitably lead towards nuclear warfare. However, the situation is not set that way. The nuclear powers – USSR and USA – are balanced. Both powers are fully aware that an attempt to trigger nuclear warfare would equal self-destruction. All non-aligned and peaceful countries should do their best so that local wars do not pay off. The use of force in resolving international disputes should be prevented.

Reactionary imperialistic forces show the tendency to liquidate progressive regimes in the Near East, and in all other places where they can do that. Europe is no exception to that, as seen in the example of Greece. In order to achieve their goals, imperialists bring to power the most reactionary regimes, i.e. the regimes that will follow their politics. This is a threat to all countries, particularly small ones. It may cause the expansion of warfare, which does not necessarily have to be nuclear. World War II was rather devastating while today conventional weaponry is much more advanced than in WW II. This matter should be given full attention.

Jusuf underlined that President Suharto and Indonesian Government appreciated very much the efforts by Comrade President and our Government for peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Near East. Indonesian Government is of the opinion that the crisis should be resolved as soon as possible, since it is a threat to global peace. In this respect Indonesia and Yugoslavia have identical views.

Indonesian Government is now rather occupied with internal problems, in particular in the field of economy. Economic development should be ensured and living standard of the population should be improved. There are possibilities for cooperation between the two countries in the economic field. This matter was discussed during his stay in our country. Indonesia is particularly interested in industrial development. Yugoslavia has helped Indonesia re-establish its economy. He would be grateful if Comrade President could give some advice in that respect.

Comrade President said that he fully understood the economic situation in Indonesia. From the very beginning we have done our best in the field of cooperation with developing countries, so as to contribute to the development of those countries. Regarding concrete questions, he would not talk about them since he had been occupied lately with foreign policy issues as well as issues regarding

our economic reform. This one should be finalised in order to advance even faster. He will have discussions with the bodies in charge of these matters and tell what Yugoslavia should and could do in the area of economic cooperation with Indonesia.

We are aware that Indonesia is a big country. It is very important that it keeps its independence, and it will be independent only if its economy is independent. Indonesia can play and is already playing a major role in the world. It is particularly important that progressive countries that are in the position to help – some more and some less – fully understand the needs of Indonesia. It is also one of the ways to prevent the implementation of imperialistic plans.

This shall be discussed in the forthcoming conference of 86 developing countries /earlier there were 77 of them/, that will take place in Algeria. This Conference is a preparation for the Second Session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, which will take place in New Delhi at the beginning of the next year.

Jusuf underlined that Indonesia still abode by its original policy of “panchashila”. Indonesia leads independent and active politics and wants to take part in the activities of the non-aligned countries.

He thanked for the assistance that Yugoslavia provided to Indonesia. He stressed the spirit of cooperation and friendship in the relations between the two countries. He particularly appreciates the affability with which he was received during his stay in our country.

Comrade President said that he would like to use that opportunity to invite President Suharto, through his special envoy, to visit Yugoslavia the following year.

Jusuf thanked for that.

AJ, KPR I-3-a/39-33

**INDONESIA ON THE PAGES OF BELGRADE DAILY
NEWSPAPER POLITIKA FROM 1945 TO 1947**
Selected texts

1

Conflicts in Indonesia

(This article is taken from the first issue of “Thirty days” magazine):

Immediately after the unconditional surrender of Japan, the Supreme Allied commander for South East Asia, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, as quoted by Reuters agency, warned Japanese troops in the Dutch colonies in Indonesia not to surrender power to any Indonesian organization. “Occupation of the Dutch East Indies”, says Reuters, “must be executed by command troops in Southeast Asia since the Dutch due to transport difficulties cannot move their troops from the Netherlands to the Far East.” English troops under the command of Mountbatten began in September to disembark with great urgency on the islands of Indonesia, the land of vast natural wealth with 70,000,000 inhabitants, which was before the war in a colonial possession of the Netherlands.

Meanwhile, the Indonesians, who were engaged in partisan battles against the Japanese on the islands during the war, took power in their own country and managed to disarm a number of Japanese garrisons and take over wide areas on the islands of Java, Sumatra and Borneo. When the Japanese and English troops began to seize that power, the Indonesians rose in arms. Subsequent developments in Indonesia and the role of certain major powers in these events are understandable in the light of the economic importance of Indonesia.

Much of Indonesia, including the islands of Java, Borneo, Sumatra, Celebes, etc., was before the war a part of the Dutch colonial empire. These islands are among the most densely populated parts of the world: on the territory of nearly two million square kilometers there are 70 million people, mostly Malays, who make up 50 different nationalities and tribes. The largest island is Java, home to 40 million inhabitants. As well as on the other islands, almost all the inhabitants are poor peasants, with very little or no land.

Almost all the land belongs to the Dutch government, which rents it to large American, Dutch, English and Japanese trusts. American trusts US Rubber Tires, Goodyear, Hawaii-Sumatra Rubber, own vast areas of land on the island of Sumatra, where rubber trees are grown or could be grown. Rockefeller oil trust, Standard Oil of New Jersey, owns huge plots of land in Indonesia, where oil can be produced. The Dutch company Handelsvereniging of Amsterdam, whose president was until recently former Dutch Prime Minister Dr Colijn, had almost half

of the island of Sumatra. Feudal princes are also in possession of very large pieces of land in Indonesia.

These islands are among the richest colonial possessions in the world. Before the war Netherlands drew more than 6 billion dollars from these islands annually. Fertile land and tropical climate allow abundant production of various food and industrial plants. Before the war Indonesia provided 98% of the world production of quinine, 37% of rubber, 44% of palm oil, 16% of tea and 9% of sugar. Indonesia is also very rich in minerals, in particular tin, iron and gold. Before the war 20% of world production of tin came from Indonesia. The main branches of the economy of Indonesia are in the hands of big bankers and industrialists from the Netherlands, the United States and Great Britain. According to some data, until the beginning of 1940, out of 4.6 billion Dutch guildens of foreign capital invested in Indonesia, 2.5 billion belonged to the Dutch companies, about 760 million to English, about 400 million to American and 175 million to Japanese companies. Indonesian capital was just a very small part of the economy of Indonesia.

So far it is not known who manages the military and political operations of Indonesians in the fights against the British, Dutch and Japanese troops. Some US and British media say that the movement is managed by Dr Sukarno. These newspapers reported that Dr Sukarno appealed to the US government for help on several occasions. US Secretary of State, Burns, announced on October 25th that "the British and Dutch forces in the Far East used weapons for political purposes. These weapons were obtained on the basis of the Lend-lease Act and the US opposed it." Burns added that the British and the Dutch governments were asked to remove the US signs from the weapons used in Indonesia. British Prime Minister Attlee said in Parliament that Great Britain sends reinforcements to Indonesia in order to keep the word given its Dutch allies. British and American newspapers have reported that after negotiations with the Dutch and the English commanders Dr Sukarno called the Indonesians to lay down their arms and stop fighting. The Indonesians continued the battle and after negotiations Dr Sukarno had to condemn the "extremists" who are still fighting. The day after signing an agreement with the British commander, Reuters agency reports, the Indonesians killed Dr Sukarno.*

On November 4th a radio station in Surabaya, according to Reuters, invited the Indonesians not to pay attention to Sukarno's call for suspension of fighting. "Radio Surabaya invited the Indonesians to continue their fight for independence by all means, and against all the enemies of the Indonesian republic."

* This is, of course, the western propaganda. Sukarno was the President of Indonesia from 1945 to 1967.

This movement of the Indonesians for freedom aroused sympathy among other colonial nations, and among the inhabitants of Southeast Asia.

Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the leaders of the Indian National Congress, welcomed the fight of the Indonesians and requested help of the global public for India, Indonesia and other colonial countries to get freedom. According to the English newspaper, the dockers in Australia and New Zealand have suspended the loading of all British and Dutch ships that were supposed to take reinforcements to Indonesia. In Australia and New Zealand Federation of Trade Unions unanimously approved this decision of longshoremen.

Politika, November 15th, 1945

2

The Struggle of the Indonesian People for Freedom and Independence

A Soviet Union representative presented to the Security Council of the United Nations the question of Greece and a representative of Ukraine the question of Indonesia, the two countries where the British troops were used in order to suppress people's democratic movement.

The situation in Greece is quite well known. In contrast, very little is known about the details of the Indonesian movement. Even the British press complains that because of the censorship there are almost no information from Indonesia and that they are forced to gather scarce details from a small number of telegrams of American journalists in the Far East.

Indonesia, or how its former masters the Dutch call it, Dutch Indies, is not some small and insignificant colonial country, sparsely populated by scattered natives. This is one of the richest and most densely populated parts of the globe.

Indonesia is part of the Malay Archipelago, a series of large and small islands that separate the Indian from the Pacific Ocean. It is located almost on the equator and is therefore a land of eternal summer. The most important Indonesian islands are Java, Sumatra, New Guinea, Borneo and Celebes, in addition to a very large number of smaller ones.

Indonesia has 70,000,000 inhabitants, and only a quarter of a million of those are Europeans. The island of Java is more densely populated than Belgium, the most densely populated part of Europe.

Regarding population the whole colony is almost eight times bigger than the Netherlands, the country which wants to rule so many people, and regarding territory it is fifty-eight times bigger than the Netherlands. Only the island of Borneo is as big as the entire France.

There are six cities on Java with over 100,000 inhabitants. The largest, Batavia, has half a million people, and Surabaya, the second largest city, has a population of 350,000, about the same as Belgrade.

Indonesians are one of the oldest and most cultured nations of the Far East. In the past they were Buddhists, and now the vast majority are Muslims. They speak one of the oldest and most elegant world languages. They have a very rich and ancient literature. The oldest preserved literary works date from the XII and XIII century. From the same era are also hundreds of magnificent Buddhist temples on Java. The most famous of these is the temple of Borobudur, which is considered one of the greatest wonders of the world. If the outstanding medieval sculptures and bas-reliefs of this temple were lined up side by side, the line would be nearly five kilometers long. This interesting fact alone shows the enormous scale of this work of art, one of the greatest architectural creations of mankind. Indonesian music, which has reached a very high artistic level, is very famous as well. Crafts and applied arts are also outstanding.

The Dutch first disembarked in Indonesia in 1595 and have remained in the country until now, not because they were captivated by the magnificence of its temples and extraordinary music, but because they were immediately drawn to its natural resources, which are huge.

Indonesia alone provides 92% of total world production of quina, from which quinine and other medications are made. It also gives 80% of kapok, a special kind of cotton, and 70% of the total amount of pepper produced in the world. Regarding production of rubber Indonesia is ranked second in the world, regarding production of sugar, tea and tin the third, in production of rice and coffee it is fourth, and fifth in production of tobacco.

Moreover, Indonesia provides annually 3,400 kilograms of gold and 4.5 million tons of gasoline. Petrol is exploited by the English-Dutch society "Royal Dutch" and that is one of the biggest problems in the current political situation.

The Dutch established their own markets in Indonesia first, and then seized all the power and enslaved the entire nation. This process was initially led by the famous East India Company and later the Dutch state itself. Fertile land was seized from the natives and they were forced to produce coffee, tobacco, sugar, cinnamon, indigo, tea, pepper and other products that the Dutch distributed around the world with their ships and sold for big money. This regime caused frequent famines of which hundreds of thousands died, but the Dutch capital grew more and more.

Therefore, uprisings against the Dutch often erupted on Java. One of the biggest lasted from 1825 to 1830. It was led by Javanese folk hero Dipanegara. Despite their great technical superiority in this war the Netherlands lost over 15,000 people. Dipanegara was eventually overpowered and killed, but people still say that he is alive and will one day appear to lead his people in the libera-

tion war again. Javanese people have unsuccessfully rebelled in 1849, 1865, 1870 and 1883. During the uprising of 1849, which was one of the most serious, half a million Javanese died just of starvation.

National consciousness, however, increasingly developed and the liberation movement strengthened. Indonesians continued their struggle for independence and liberation from the Dutch oppressors and exploiters. The leaders of these battles were largely young people, trained in Western universities. During the last decades industrial workers became more and more aware of their role and their rights.

Dutch invaders, however, did not want to allow democratic methods of government and the requirements of Indonesian patriots, who asked for participation in the government of their country. Every movement for independence was ruthlessly suppressed. The policy of the few Dutchmen who proposed compromise and placability was called "ethical folly" by the colonials which demanded the application of brute force.

In this state Indonesia found itself in World War II and the Japanese attack on allies. Shortly after the raid at Pearl Harbor on December 7 1941, the Japanese managed to occupy Indonesia and seize its natural resources, in particular sources of natural rubber. This was a harsh blow for the allies.

Under the Japanese occupation of Indonesia the nation's struggle for independence extended and they stood up against the new occupiers. Trusting the promises of the Atlantic Charter and numerous statements of Allied statesmen, the Indonesians expected that after the victory over the Japanese fascist invaders they will finally gain freedom for which they fought so long and sacrificed so much. Fighting against the Japanese they have greatly contributed to the Allied victory, separating the Japanese troops from other fronts and aggravating the exploitation of Indonesian products for the purposes of Japanese imperialism.

After Germany's defeat, when Japan began to give way, they liberated almost all the land, arming themselves with weapons looted from the occupying forces and began creating their national authorities, independent from the Dutch.

In contrast, the Dutch colonialists in Indonesia felt that a popular movement of Indonesians was a greater enemy than the Japanese themselves. Many of them collaborated with the Japanese and helped them to take rubber, necessary for motorized troops, gasoline for the aviation and other raw materials from Indonesia. All this, of course, for personal profit.

During the war, the Dutch government in exile gave some vague promises to the Indonesians. In this sense, Queen Wilhelmina gave a speech in 1942. But when Japan capitulated and when the war ended, the Netherlands has completely forgotten those promises and asked Indonesians to immediately lay down their arms and return under the authority of the Dutch colonists, who, in large numbers collaborated with the Japanese occupiers.

The Netherlands, however, was not able to ensure the fulfillment of these demands, because it had no army, which it could send to Indonesia, nor enough ships to transport troops. That is why it turned to the UK which sent troops to Java to disarm the Indonesians and re-establish the Dutch government. So a new war started in Java.

The British, of course, do not present the whole thing like this. They claim that they needed to send in the troops in order to disarm the Japanese and to rescue those Europeans who were kept in Japanese camps as prisoners of war and internees.

However, it quickly proved to be just an excuse. Seeing that they cannot cope with the people, which did not want to disarm, they, quite contrary to their claims, armed the remaining Japanese and turned them against the liberation movement of the Indonesian people. Now this action and the bombing of Indonesian villages and towns justified itself with the necessity of imposing order and security.

This British and Dutch policy has met with considerable resistance. In India, there were protests and strikes due to the use of Indian troops in battles against the Indonesians. Longshoremen in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa refused to load war materiel for Indonesia on several occasions. There have been cases that British sailors refused to transport Dutch troops to Indonesia, and recently there was a strike by British aviation personnel in the Far East, for the same reasons. In the UK very sharp protests were held as well.

It is difficult to give an accurate report of what is now happening in Indonesia, since the Dutch and the British reports claim that these are "police operations" against a small number of "extremists, bandits and robbers." For this reason it is argued that in Indonesia there can not be a true national movement "because of the racial reasons" and that the Indonesians are unable to govern themselves.

The actual situation looks like this:

There is a very strong national movement for the complete liberation of Indonesia from the Dutch colonists and the British occupation. It has its own political and military organization and is well armed with weapons looted from the Japanese.

A number of Indonesian politicians such as Syahrir and Syarifuddin, are trying to weaken the people's movement, hoping to propitiate the Dutch and the British and finagle a settlement with them, by which Indonesia would get some sort of self-government.

Some Dutchmen, such as Van Mook and Van der Plas, are prepared to talk to them.

However, most of the Dutch colonists want to use force and refuse to compromise, even accusing the British that they are not sufficiently energetic.

The Dutch government proposes the establishment of “Volksraad”, a kind of assembly in which the Indonesians would have a majority, but members would be appointed by the Dutch government, and the assembly itself would have no real power. Syahrir and Syarifuddin, however, do not agree to this.

As it is officially claimed Great Britain supports the politics of compromise together with a group close to these two.

In the meantime, the fights continue. Quite contrary to what is claimed by most of the British press, it is not a “police operation” against “extremists” and “bandits”. According to reliable reports, battles on Java and other Indonesian Isles could last for years and are, in fact, a real war of the Liberation Movement of a nation of 70 million. The so called negotiations, if there are any, are led with a small number of traitors, who are trying to organize units to fight against the real national movement.

Mih. S. Petrović

Politika, February 10th, 1946

3

Conflicts Between Dutch Troops and Indonesians in Java and Sumatra Continue

The Hague, 10th January

TASS reports:

According to the latest news from Indonesia in various parts of Java and Sumatra armed clashes between the Dutch troops and Indonesians continue. The city of Palembang and oil wells in the vicinity are in the hands of the Dutch. As reported by the agency ANP, the Dutch air force bombed Indonesian positions on Celebes. A Dutch aircraft was shot down.

After the capitulation of Japan English and Dutch troops landed on the main island of Indonesia where they found a republic proclaimed by the people. Its creators were progressive and patriotic elements who led a ruthless struggle against the Japanese invaders during the war.

Immediately after disembarking the English and the Dutch solemnly declared that the purpose of their arrival is disarmament of the rest of the Japanese garrisons and the release of Allied prisoners of war and civilians who fell into Japanese captivity in 1942. However, Indonesians realized very quickly that these troops appeared only in order to establish the old colonial regime, destroy the In-

donesian Republic and all those democratic achievements of the people on these islands. In clashes with Indonesian patriots the British and the Dutch, to the general disgust of public opinion in the whole world, used the Japanese units whose number was estimated by the foreign press to about 50,000 troops.

Facing the concentrated attacks by the English, Dutch and Japanese, Indonesians were forced to withdraw from certain places: Batavia and Surabaya on the island of Java; Palembang, Medan and Palang in Sumatra; Balikpapan in Borneo, but, in the interior of the country, the people spontaneously formed new and numerous units which put themselves at the service of Indonesian government and continued to fight against the colonizers.

It has been over 15 months since the collapse of the Japanese militarism, but the fights in Indonesia continue. The Indonesian government of President Sharir decided to continue the resistance until the Dutch recognize Indonesia's right to be the master in its own country.

The real intentions of the Dutch government towards the Indonesians were fully disclosed by the Flemish liberal "New Gazette" published in Antwerp, when it recently pointed out that the Indonesia's Affairs Commission, established by the decision of the Dutch Parliament, has to take care of the problem of "the mission of Dutch troops in Indonesia in order to establish and respect the legality" in the country.

It is clear, wrote "Novoye Vremya" on this occasion, that forming of the Commission proves that the leaders of the Netherlands and their London masters do not intend to recognize the independence of the Indonesian Republic.

In recent days foreign newspapers and news agencies report that on all major islands of Indonesia new fights are flaring. The Dutch constantly receive reinforcement, despite the protests of progressive elements in the Netherlands, which realize that the Dutch want to impose their will on the Indonesian people by force of arms. They began a major offensive against almost defenceless Indonesians. The Dutch commanders use air force and tanks which lead to massive destruction of the civilian population.

The Indonesians mobilized all available forces and provide heroic resistance, attacking the Dutch units in the interior of the country and the Dutch military bases on the shores.

"In the name of the Indonesian people," the Minister of War in Indonesian government recently said, "I warn the Dutch imperialists, who dream of an instant victory, that they will not achieve their goal. The Dutch army will not destroy the independence of Indonesia."

Politika, January 11th, 1947

SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF MAJOR PERSONS

1. **Soekarno**, from Java, born on June 6, 1901 in Surabaya, died on June 21, 1970 in Jakarta.

President of Indonesia from August 18, 1945 to March 12, 1967.

He graduated from Architecture at the Institute of Technology in Bandung (1926).

He was the founder and leader of the National Party of Indonesia (1927), which advocated the liberation of Indonesia. He was arrested by the Dutch colonial authorities in December 1929 and released in December 1931. Due to his engagement in the liberation of the Dutch colonial government Sukarno was arrested again in August 1933. Together with his family, he was interned first to Flores, and then to Sumatra. During the World War II Japanese occupation forces set him at liberty (1942).

After the capitulation of Japan, on August 17, 1945 Sukarno declared the independence of Indonesia.

He was a wartime leader in the national revolution i.e. the war for independence (August 17, 1945 – December 27, 1949) in which Indonesians defeated the Dutch and the British.

He advocated decolonization; organizer of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (1955) and founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961).

He was a personal friend of President Tito of Yugoslavia and a frequent guest in formal and informal occasions.

2. **Mohammad Hatta**, from Sumatra, born on August 12, 1902 in Bukittinggi, died on March 14, 1980 in Jakarta.

He was a Vice President of Indonesia from August 18, 1945 to December 1, 1956. At the same time, he was the prime Minister of Indonesia, from January 29, 1948 to September 5, 1950. While he was Vice President of Indonesia, Mohamed Hata was the Minister of Defence (1948-1949) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1949-1950).

He graduated from the Business School in Rotterdam, where during the studies he advocated the independence of Indonesia. That is why he was arrested in the Netherlands in 1927 and released in 1929.

In 1932 he received a status of a doctoral candidate at the Business School in Rotterdam but did not defend his doctoral thesis because he returned to Indonesia to fight against the Dutch colonial government.

He joined Sukarno in the National Party of Indonesia. He was arrested in 1934 and then interned in 1935 in Papua and then in Maluku. During the World War II Japanese occupation forces set him at liberty (1942).

During the national revolution i.e. the war for independence (August 17, 1945 – December 27, 1949) in which Indonesians defeated the Dutch and the British, Mohamed Hatta was in charge of diplomatic activity in the country and outside Indonesia to negotiate international recognition of independence.

In the mid-fifties of the 20th century Mohamed Hatta increasingly dissipated with Sukarno whom he accused of autocracy. He resigned from the position of Vice-President of Indonesia in 1956 and later became a critic of the government.

3. **Sutan Syahrir** from Sumatra was born on March 5, 1909 in Padang Panjang and died on April 9, 1966 in Zürich.

He was a Prime Minister of Indonesia from November 14, 1945 to July 3, 1947. During that tenure, he was Minister of the Interior Affairs (1945-1946) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1945-1947).

He completed his law studies in the Netherlands, studied in Amsterdam and Leiden. During his studies he met Mohammad Hatta with whom he worked closely on the ideas of the Indonesian national independence. He returned to Indonesia in 1931. He was arrested, interned and released with Mohammad Hatta.

In 1945 Syahrir founded the Socialist People's Party – Paras, and in 1948 he founded the Socialist Party of Indonesia (PSI). Because of the alleged conspiracy against Sukarno's government, Syahrir was arrested in 1962, and then because of poor health in prison he was sent to Switzerland where he died in 1966.

4. **Amir Sjarifoeddin** from Sumatra was born on April 27, 1907 in Medan, and killed on December 19, 1948 in Surakarta.

Prime Minister of Indonesia from July 3, 1947 to January 29, 1948. He was also the Minister of Defence (1945-1948) and Minister of Communication and Information (1945-1946).

In the Netherlands, he studied philosophy, and in Batavia (Indonesia) he received a law degree.

He was one of the founders of the Indonesian National Movement – Gerinda (1937) which was of Marxist orientation. During the occupation of Indonesia in the World War II, Sjarifoeddin and Syahrir, due to leftist beliefs, led a resistance movement against Japan, while Sukarno and Hatta believed that cooperation with the Japanese occupiers could bring faster independence to Indonesia.

He founded the Socialist Party of Indonesia – Parsi (1945) which was united with Syahrir's Socialist People's Party – Paras into a single Socialist Party from 1948, which set aside the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI).

In 1948 Sjarifoeddin admitted being a member of the illegal Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) since 1935 with whose members he tried to overthrow the Sukarno's government (1948). He was liquidated by the Indonesian army.

5. **Soeripno** was an official of the Communist Party of Indonesia since 1948 and deputy special envoy for Central and Eastern Europe based in Prague.

In January 1948, he submitted a proposal to Yugoslavia for establishing diplomatic relations with Indonesia.

6. **Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro** from Java, born 23 May 1904 in Surakarta, died on June 8, 1957 in Jakarta.

He was Minister of National Education of Indonesia (1949-1950), then Deputy Minister of National Education and in that capacity he visited Yugoslavia in 1953.

7. **Sukarjo Wiryopranoto** from Java, was born on June 5, 1903 in Kesugihan, and died on October 23, 1962 in New York.

As an Indonesian envoy in Rome, he visited Yugoslavia in 1953 together with Mangunsarkoro. Later, he was a Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations.

8. **Soenario** from Java, was born on August 28, 1902 in Madiun, died on May 18, 1997 in Jakarta.

He studied at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands.

He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia in 1953, and in 1955 he spoke about the exchange of the Yugoslav and Indonesian missions.

He had an important role in the organization of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (1955) and in establishing the Non-Aligned Movement. In the period from 1956 to 1961 he was Ambassador of Indonesia in the UK.

9. **Soedarsono**, the Socialist Party of Indonesia, was in frequent and friendly contact with the Yugoslav mission in Jakarta.

He was Ambassador of Indonesia in Belgrade from 1956 to 1959. Previously, he was the Ambassador of Indonesia in New Delhi.

10. **Ali Sastroamidjojo** from Java, born on May 21, 1903 in Grabag, died on March 13, 1976 in Jakarta.

He was Prime Minister of Indonesia from July 30, 1953 to August 11, 1955 and from March 20, 1956 to April 9, 1957.

He chaired the African-Asian Conference in Bandung (1955).

From 1957 to 1960 he was a Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations. He was also Ambassador of Indonesia to the United States, Canada and Mexico.

From 1960 to 1966 he headed the National Party of Indonesia.

11. **Dipa Nusantara Aidit** from Sumatra, was born on July 30, 1923 in Tanjung Pandan, and was killed on November 22, 1965 in Boyolali.

He was the leader and General Secretary of the Communist Party of Indonesia, which was the third largest in the world, after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and China. He was a critic of Yugoslav socialism.

The Indonesian army killed Aidit after the coup attempted on September 30, 1965.

12. **Subandrio** from Java, was born on September 15, 1914 in Kepanjen, died on July 3, 2004 in Jakarta.

He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia from April 9, 1957 to March 28, 1966. He visited Yugoslavia on several occasions.

Suharto government accused him of having participated in a communist coup attempt in 1965 and sentenced him to death. The sentence was commuted to life, and Subandrio due to ill health was released from prison in 1995.

13. **Djuanda Kartawidjaja** from Java, was born on January 14, 1911 in Tasikmalaya, died on November 7, 1963 in Jakarta.

Prime Minister of Indonesia from April 9, 1957 to July 9, 1959. He was the Minister in several departments from 1946 to in 1962.

He used to visit Yugoslavia.

14. **Ruslan Abdulgani** from Java, was born on November 24, 1914 in Surabaya, and died on June 29, 2005 in Jakarta.

He was Secretary General of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (1955). The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia from March 24, 1956 to April 9, 1957.

Abdulgani enjoyed Sukarno's high confidence. He came to visit Yugoslavia.

15. **R. A. Asmaoen**, Ambassador of Indonesia in Belgrade from 1959 to 1964. Previously, he was the ambassador of Indonesia in Tokyo.

16. **Raden Subyakto**, Ambassador of Indonesia in Belgrade from 1964 to 1966. He was a Vice-Admiral of the Indonesian Navy.

17. **Suharto** from Java, was born on June 8, 1921 in Kemusuk, died on January 27, 2008 in Jakarta.

President of Indonesia from March 12, 1967 to May 21, 1998.

He received the rank of a Brigadier General of the Indonesian army in 1960. He was promoted to the rank of Major General in 1962, and then to the rank of Lieutenant General in 1966 and later in the same year to the rank of General.

He was a Commander of the strategic reserves of the Indonesian Army (1961-1965), Commander of the Indonesian Army (1965-1967) and Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces (1969-1973).

Secretary General of the Non-Aligned Movement from 1992 to 1995.

18. **Abdul Haris Nasution** from Sumatra, born 3 December 1918 in Kotanopan, died on September 5, 2000 in Jakarta.

He was the Commander of the Indonesian Army (1950-1952 and 1955-1959); The Minister of Defence of Indonesia from 1959 to 1966; Acting President of the National Advisory Assembly (Parliament of Indonesia) from 1966 to 1972.

19. **Adam Malik** from Sumatra, born on July 22, 1917 in Pematangsiantar, died on September 5, 1984 in Bandung.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia from 1966 to 1978. Previously, he was Ambassador of Indonesia in the Soviet Union and Poland, and later head of the delegation of Indonesia for talks on the West Irian.

He was the Chairman of the UN General Assembly from 1971 to 1972; President of the Council of National Representatives (House of the Parliament of Indonesia) from 1977 to 1978; Vice President of Indonesia was from 1978 to 1983.

20. **Raden Soehadi**, Ambassador of Indonesia from 1966 to 1968. He was a major general of the Indonesian army. He was awarded the Order of the Yugoslav Flag (1968).

*

1. **Josip Broz Tito** was born in Kumrovec on May 7, 1892, died in Ljubljana on May 4, 1980.

Prime Minister of the FPR Yugoslavia (1945-1953) and President of FPR Yugoslavia and SFR Yugoslavia (1953-1980).

He was the leader of the revolution and the commander of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia during the World War II. He was the head of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia from 1936 to 1980. He was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of FPR Yugoslavia and SFR Yugoslavia.

The founder and first Secretary General of Non-Aligned Movement (1961-1964).

2. **Konstantin Koča Popović** was born on March 14, 1908 in Belgrade, died on October 20, 1992 in Belgrade.

State Secretary (Minister) of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia (1953-1965).

He was a Lieutenant General of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army (1948-1953).

Vice President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1966 to 1967.

3. **Radoslav Brzić**, the first diplomatic representative of Yugoslavia in Jakarta with the title of Charge d'Affaires (1955-1957) since the first Yugoslav candidate for ambassador to Indonesia Mihailo Javorski was not accredited (from July 1950 to January 1951) and the exchange of diplomatic representatives temporarily paused.

4. **Stane Pavlič** was born on October 7, 1914 in Ljubljana, died in 1996.

He received his PhD in law at the University of Ljubljana (1939).

The first Yugoslav Ambassador to Indonesia (1957-1961) and then the Yugoslav Ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg (1963-1967)

5. **Aleš Bebler Primož** was born on June 8, 1907 in Idrija, died on August 12, 1981 in Ljubljana.

His received his PhD in law at the Sorbonne (1930).

He was the second Yugoslav Ambassador to Indonesia (1961-1963), Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations (1950-1951), and then from 1955 Yugoslav Ambassador to France.

6. **Franjo Knebl** was born on July 25, 1915 in Vilsnice (Czech Republic), died on February 6, 2006 in Zagreb.

He graduated from the Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry, University of Zagreb (1940).

He was the third Yugoslav Ambassador to Indonesia (1963-1965), Major General of the Yugoslav People's Army, and during the fifties Yugoslav Military Attache in the United States.

7. **Budimir Lončar** was born on April 1, 1924 in the village Preko near Zadar.

He was the fourth Yugoslav Ambassador to Indonesia (1965-1969). Then Yugoslav Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (1973-1977) and the United States (1979-1983).

He was the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of SFR Yugoslavia (1987-1991).

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