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Alliances and Neutrality/Non-Alignment before and after the Second World War: A Theoretical Framework

Alliances and Neutrality in Europe 1918-1941

To better understand the policies of alliances and neutrality of the first Yugoslav state, we shall address the issue in the European framework. The main reason for the limitation is that this outline was the broadest scope of the active engagement of the foreign policy and diplomatic activity of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Other continents were either completely neglected or the diplomatic-consular activities were limited to particular issues. It should be noted that almost the whole African continent and a number of Asian regions were integral parts of the British and French colonial empires. Therefore, in many cases Belgrade did not need to enhance activities besides the direct contacts with London and Paris. On the other hand, relations with the USA were mainly restricted by the isolationist policy pursued by Washington.

Collective security and old fashioned alliances

The entry of the United States into the Great War marked not only a change in the shifting of superiority to one of the belligerent blocs, but it was also an encounter of two distinctive concepts of international relations. Wilson's concepts of self-determination and collective security were in total opposition to the traditional European approach – the balance of power based on alliances.[1] The main difference in these two approaches was that traditional alliances "were directed against specific threats and defined specific obligations"; whereas the collective security

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1   Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: A Touchstone book, 1994), 221, 222.

did not define "specific threats" and was "designed to resist any threat to peace". Alliances always predicted a potential enemy and the *casus belli* is an attack on particular national interests of their member states. The collective security defended the international law and the *casus belli* was the violation of the peaceful settlement of disputes through arbitration and reconciliation.[2]

These conflicting views were reflected in the course of the discussion on the formation of the League of Nations, its tasks and goals. Wilson's idea was to form the body which would effectively pursue collective security through the power of the international community and world public opinion. His presumption was that the "equal rights among nations would provide preconditions for maintaining peace through collective security regardless" of the individual national power. For the British, the League was supposed to be an enlarged concert of the great powers. While the French were not enthusiastic with the Anglo-Saxon views on the future of international relations, they accepted the League as a peacetime alliance which could provide automatic sanctions and active military assistance.[3] Both France and Italy considered that the League of Nations was not providing sufficient guarantees for their post-war position.[4]

Forging collective security in Europe was impossible, since the drafted projects – such as the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1922 and the Protocol of Geneva of 1924 – were too excessive in obligations from the British point of view and, simultaneously, were not producing sufficiently strong guarantees from the French point of view.[5] Since Americans were reluctant to renounce their regional security based on the Monroe Doctrine, Article 21 of the League of Nations' Covenant provided opportunity for collective security at the regional level, through the preservation of existing agreements at the regional level. This stipulated an interpretation that the regional security structure – in addition to the general international law and the world peace organization – could be forged on

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2   *Ibid.*, 247.
3   F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 28, 36, 61-63; Zara Steiner, "Introductory essay", in: *The League of Nations in retrospect*: proceedings of the symposium, (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), 2; H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 227, 235; Adam Tuz, *Potop. Veliki rat i prekrajanje svetskog poretka, 1916–1931.*, (Beograd: Clio, 2019), 296, 297.
4   J. M. Robert, *Europe 1880–1945*, third edition, (London–New York: Routledge, 2001), 275.
5   F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 263-267, 275, 276; H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 254; A. Tuz, *Potop*, 525, 526.

particular agreements between the states and peoples of certain regions or continents.[6] The most famous case of regional security was the Locarno Pact of 1925. It promoted reconciliation among former belligerents and accommodated the relations between the European powers. The Locarno Pact also created two classes of frontiers in Europe,[7] thus dividing the continent into the eastern and the western region. Yet, it did not relinquish the balance of power politics, but was based on the same principle.[8] The agreement between the four great powers had stipulated the "Geneva spirit" and "pactomania" among European nations, each searching for guarantees of their particular interests.[9] Leaving the freehand of the Weimar Republic to pursue national interest in Eastern Europe meant forcing regional states to endeavor an agreement with two powers which could provide them real guarantees from the German threat – France and, later, the USSR.

The old-fashioned alliances ended through the failure of negotiations on the British-French Alliance in 1919–1922. The main obstacles were the opposite views on the protection of international order, militarism and policy toward defeated Germany.[10] However, the possibility of reviving the alliances' policy was unexpectedly encouraged by the cooperation of the two former great powers, Germany and the Soviet Russia,

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6   F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 55, 56; Constantin Svolopoulos, "La sécurité régionale et la Société des Nations", in: *The League of Nations in retrospect*: proceedings of the symposium, (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), 267.

7   H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 274-278.

8   B. J. C. McKercher, "Austen Chamberlain and the continental balance of power: strategy, stability and the League of Nations, 1924-29", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Volume 14, Number 2, (2003), 208, 212, 215-218; Sally Marks, *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933*, second edition, (Houndmills-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 85-87; Zara Steiner, *The Lights that failed: European international history 1919–1933*, (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 408, 409, 418, 419.

9   H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 276; J. Robert, *Europe 1880–1945*, 283; S. Marks, *The Illusion of Peace*, 94-97; Alan Cassels, "Locarno: Early Test of Fascist Intensions", in: *Locarno Revisited: European Diplomacy 1920–1929*, editor Gaynor Johnson, (London–New York: Routledge, 2004), 62; Z. Steiner, *The Lights that failed*, 405, 406.

10   G. H. Bennett, *British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-24*, (Houndmills-London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 12, 13, 16-18, 22-26, 31; Alan Sharp, "Anglo-French relations from Versailles to Locarno 1919-1925: The quest for security", in: *Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and cooperation*, edited by Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone, (London–New York: Routledge, 2000), 121-129; Id., "A Missed Opportunity?: Britain and the Negotiations for an Anglo-French Alliance in 1921-1922", *Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique*, Vol. XXVII, no. 1, 2022, 3, 4, 9-12.

from 1922, which was based on the common denominator in the political and military spheres.[11] Since the collective security was eluding from the hands of western powers, the French were resolved to form their own system of collective security. It was comprised of the East, Central and Southeast European countries and the main goal was to forge an anti-German bloc. Its design was based on the traditional alliances, but it was also adapted to the Covenant of the League of Nations.[12] This system was based on the *status quo* policy, as the guardian of international order and peace.[13] Thus, three tiers of international commitments were forged in Europe during the 1920s. The first was based on the traditional alliances. The second was based on special guarantees promoted by the Locarno Pact. And the third one was the League of Nations' pursuit for the collective security.[14]

The reaffirmation of collective security was attempted at the global level through the Briand-Kellogg pact of 1928 for renunciation of aggressive war, and got its double at the regional level in the Litvinov protocol of 1929. This provided the false impression that the USA and the USSR were prepared to restore their role in European affairs on the agreed principles of international relations. This aroused new hopes for collective security not only at the continental, but also at the global level.[15] The pursuit of regional collective security in Eastern Europe was revitalized through an active approach of the Soviet foreign policy, in 1933–1935, and the Soviet-French cooperation.[16]

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11   J. Robert, *Europe 1880–1945*, 273, 274; Z. Steiner, *The Lights that failed*, 165-169.
12   Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno*, (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1962), 21, 211, 216, 217, 294, 295, 300; A. Tuz, *Potop*, 314, 321.
13   Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 23, 63, 64.
14   H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 277, 278.
15   J. Robert, *Europe 1880–1945*, 283, 284; S. Marks, *The Illusion of Peace*, 107-109.
16   Matthieu Boisdron, "Le projet de Pacte oriental (février 1934 – mai 1935)", *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, no. 220, De la Première à la Seconde Guerre en Europe. Accords stratégiques et opérations. Intrigues et débats intérieurs, 2005, 25-27; Сабин Дюллен, *Сталин и его дипломаты: Советский Союз и Европа 1930–1939 гг.*, (Москва: РОССПЭН–Фонд Первого Президента России Б. Н. Ельцина, 2009), 101-108; Ирина Александровна Хормач, *Возвращение в мировое сообщество: борьба и сотрудничество Советского государства с Лигой наций в 1919–1934 гг.*, (Москва: Институт российской истории РАН, 2011), 533, 548, 549, 555-558, 561; Александр Олегович Пеганов, «Советско-французские отношения в контексте проектов реорганизации Средней Европы, 1931-1934», *Росийкие и славянские исследования*, выписк 9, 2015, 184-187.

Contrary to the general tendencies in international relations, dictated by the great powers, the situation in the eastern region of Europe and the Near East was different. National movements were inspired by the Wilson's principle of the self-determination and the promised opportunity for autonomous development.[17] The eruption of military conflicts and revolutions on the territories of former land empires from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, in 1917–1923,[18] was a significant factor behind a prudent attitude toward new tendencies in international relations. The apprehension about the fragile security structure in this part of the continent gave momentum for pursuing the old-fashioned alliances, based on the political and military cooperation, in order to enhance national security. This was not only the case with forging the alliance with one of the protectors among the great powers (France),[19] but also in the cases of alliances between states in the region, such as the Little Entente.[20] Although it fit in both categories, Czechoslovakia was probably the only state in the eastern region of Europe which had successfully reconciled the principles of collective security and the alliance policy, and was one of the most active members of the League of Nations.[21] Nevertheless, the Locarno Pact and the Briand-Kellogg pact were challenging *raison d'être* not only of alliances with France, but also of those in the region.[22]

Although the Locarno Pact was seen by Britain as a renewal of the Concert of Europe,[23] the more open approach to reestablishment of

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17 Robert Gerwarth, Erez Manela, "The Great War as a Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911-1923", *Diplomatic History*, Volume 38, Number 4 (September 2014), 792-794.

18 Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923*, (London-New York: Routledge, 2001), 156, 157, 196, 197; Роберт Герварт, *Поражени. Крваво наслеђе Првог светског рата 1917–1923.*, (Београд: Службени гласник, 2017), 18, 19.

19 P. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925*, 216, 217, 300.

20 Zdeněk Sládek, *Malá dohoda 1919–1938: Její hospodářské, politické a vojenské komponenty*, (Praha: Karolinum, 2000), 21, 22, 24, 25.

21 Christopher Seton-Watson, "The Nationalist Challenge to Stability in Eastern and Central Europe: 1918–1945–1989", in: *Three Postwar Eras in Comparison: Western Europe 1918–1945–1989*, edited by Carl Levy and Mark Roseman, (Houndmills-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 87, 88.

22 Z. Steiner, *The Lights that failed*, 403, 404; Srđan Mićić, „The influence of France and Italy's (Central)European projects on Yugoslavia's re-evaluation of regional pacts (1927–1933)", *Istorija 20. veka*, 1/2020, 45, 46.

23 Jon Jacobson, "Locarno, Britain and the Security of Europe", in: *Locarno Revisited: European Diplomacy 1920–1929*, editor Gaynor Johnson, (London–New York: Routledge, 2004), 17; Patric O. Cohrs, "The Quest for a New Concert of Europe: British Pursuits of German Rehabilitation and European Stability in the 1920s", in: *Locarno Re-*

the balance of power through the concert was in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The most notorious was Mussolini's project for the Four Powers Pact in 1933, which planned the restitution of the XIX century concept and the great powers' dictate for the European affairs in total.[24] The alliance policy was reintroduced in the relations between the Great Powers in the late 1930s. The abandonment of the Locarno in 1936 triggered a pursuit for the balance of power, at least in the western region of Europe.[25] Britain and France converged their positions towards a new alliance, only after Germany, Italy and Japan had forged an alliance for the revision of the international order at the global level and after the Czechoslovakian fate had refuted the value of the French-Soviet pact for the preservation of international order in the eastern region of Europe.[26] Since the Anglo-French alliance included mutual obligations towards the East, Central and Southeast European states, the balance of power politics through military alliances was revived at the continental level.[27]

The deterioration of international order and the forging of the great powers' alliances were the omens of the forthcoming continental war. This gave new momentum to the importance of the policy of neutrality in different European regions.[28] Even before the Armistice in November 1918, the international position, rights and duties of neutral states was one of the most important issues for the advocates of international law and reorganization of the post-war international order.[29] Since the international role of the neutrals in the total war was diminished, and for some authors it was the start of decrement of the policy of neutrality, the Great War spurred mobilisation of the neutral states.[30] The importance of the neutrality policy coincided on the moral grounds with Wilson's views

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visited: *European Diplomacy 1920–1929*, editor Gaynor Johnson, (London–New York: Routledge, 2004), 24.

24   Giancarlo Giordano, *Storia diplomatica del patto a quattro*, (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2000), 11, 12.

25   H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 306.

26   Talbot Imlay, "Britain, France and the Making of the Anglo-French Alliance", in: *Anglo-French Defense Relations between the Wars*, edited by Martin S. Alexander, William J. Philpott, (Houndmills-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 93-113.

27   H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 314, 317.

28   *European neutrals and non-belligerents during the Second World War*, edited by Neville Wylie, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

29   F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 4, 10.

30   Rebecka Lettevall, Geert Somsen and Sven Widmalm, "Introdution", in: *Neutrality in Twentieth-Century Europe: Intersections of Science, Culture, and Politics after the First World War*, edited by Rebecka Lettevall, Geert Somsen and Svem Widmalm, (New York–London: Routledge, 2012), 6-8.

on the reorganization of international relations. Therefore, this policy was fully emphasized in the ranks of the League of Nations. During discussions about the seat of the organization – contrary to the French and Belgian proposal – the view prevailed that Geneva was the most suitable location due to the Swiss neutrality in the Great War. Also, thirteen neutral states were invited to participate along with the Allies as original members of the League of Nations.[31] Switzerland, for its part, accepted membership in the organization on condition that it was allowed to maintain the policy of neutrality in the event of the League's military intervention against an aggressor member state.[32] The neutrals on their side were using their moral grounds to pursue a fair treatment of the vanquished.[33] After the number of the Council's seats was increased for the first time, in 1922, the Assembly sent a clear-cut message that the majority of member states wanted an increased role and influence of the neutral states in the League of Nations business.[34] This notion was realized only during the new enlargement of the Council in 1926.[35]

Policy of neutrality in the first phase of the Second World War

As the policy of neutrality did not help to preserve the independence of a number of European countries during the Second World War, it was neglected and even denounced. The greatest objection in the assessments of this policy was shifted to the moral grounds, even though this policy had its basis in international law. Contrary to appraisals of their role in the First World War, when the morality of neutral states was emphasized as their virtue,[36] their role in the Second World War was esti-

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31   F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 36, 37, 112.
32   *Ibid,* 92.
33   Maurice Hankey, *Diplomacy by Conference: Studies in Public Affairs 1920-1946*, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1946), 32; F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 68, 73, 90; Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 258.
34   Charles Howard-Ellis, *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, (London 1928), 140; F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 137, 238.
35   C. Howard-Ellis, *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, 142; F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 335; *Historical Dictionary of the League of the Nations*, ed. Anique H. M. van Ginneken, (Lanham–Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), 65.
36   Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919*, second edition, (London–New York: Routledge, 2013), 140, 141.

mated as they attempted to benefit from the belligerent's calamity.[37] This was partially the consequence of the ideal and policy of collective security, which was based on the presumption that peace was indivisible and security against an aggression war necessitated the support of the entire international community. Therefore, the policy of neutrality in the case of a military conflict for the preservation of international peace and order seemed "inappropriate" and "positively immoral".[38] The policy of strict neutrality of smaller states was seriously compromised by Mussolini's definition of the non-belligerent status in September 1939, which was based on the balance of power policy among the principal belligerents.[39] Another important feature which differentiated the neutral states in the Second World War, on the one side, from the neutral states in the First World War and non-aligned states in the Cold War, on the other side, was the fact that the former contrasting to the latter have failed to assembly in order to accumulate their numerical strength in pursuit of armed neutrality.[40] Contrary to the small states, the middle powers were able to use their international role and neutral status to balance between the belligerent sides as long as they were geographically distant from the conflict zone.[41] Their maneuver ability was narrowed in cases when they were under pressure of the both blocs.[42] Therefore, the sustainability of the policy of neutrality during the Second World War was based on the strategic and/or political insignificance, and on the consent of the great powers (through the balance of power policy or individual acceptance).[43]

Neutrality/Non-Alignment and the Cold War Bloc System

To better comprehend Yugoslavia's specific historical experience with the great power alliances and neutrality/non-alignment inside the

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37   M. Hankey, *Diplomacy by Conference*, 127; Neville Wylie, "Introduction: Victims or actors? European neutrals and non-belligerents 1939–1945", in: *European neutrals and non-belligerents during the Second World War*, edited by Neville Wylie, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1-3, 11.

38   N. Wylie, "Introduction", 8.

39   *Ibid*, 4.

40   *Ibid*, 9.

41   Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, (London: MacMillan Press, 1984), 168, 169.

42   *Ibid*, 189, 190.

43   H. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 133; A. Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, 112; Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 32-37.

Cold War context, which will be dealt with in more detail in different chapters included in this volume, one initially needs to seriously address certain theoretical issues pertaining to the essence, origins, rationale, motivations, role and aspirations of these distinctive political phenomena in world affairs after 1945. It was the emergence of the Cold War bipolar bloc system and the concurrent downfall of European colonial empires, both ushering sweeping geopolitical and socio-economic changes into the international landscape, that eventually opened doors to the emergence of a distinctive "third force" in international relations, one that actively pursued non-bloc policies, while its fundamental national interest was embedded in the notions of independence and sovereignty preservation from any encroachments sought by the great powers.[44] These phenomena would gradually arise on different continents independently from each other, under completely different historical, political, cultural, social, economic and other conditions, but soon enough each of these nations would find some common denominators that would bring them closer together in their joint struggle to change the world they all lived in.[45]

However, both in the case of Yugoslavia, as well as with respect to other leading non-aligned nations, their insistence on political and economic independence, within the framework of comprehensive modernization of their societies, was the direct response to the dominant bloc politics of the post-Second World War era, thus constituting an increasingly influential, and in time the most numerous strategic alternative to the alliance system of the Cold War, all its evident weaknesses and not always successful results notwithstanding. This non-aligned option, in general, proved to be a much more dynamic and quite a prolific alternative to the classical notion of neutrality characteristic for some European states in the past, and it was primarily characterized by the active pursuit, outside the great power arrangements, of an independent position and freedom of action in the interest of reducing international tensions and promoting overall peace and stability, thus directly contributing to the growing relevance of these non-bloc factors in international relations.[46] In fact, with time non-alignment evolved into "an independent, impartial and positive

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44   Bojana Tadić, *Nesvrstanost u teoriji i praksi međunarodnih odnosa* (Beograd: IMPP, 1976), 50-70.

45   Mark Atwood Lawrence, "The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment" in Robert J. McMahon (ed.), *The Cold War in the Third World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 141-142.

46   National Archives of India (NAI), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), HI/121(1)/72, The evolution of the concept of non-alignment, October 8 1971.

force that did not believe that alliances were inevitable and indispensable for national security", meaning that the respective national interests of states, as well as the general goals, could be also achieved outside the immediate mandate of the great powers, sometimes in cooperation with them, sometimes despite them, depending on individual preferences and corresponding abilities.[47] Non-alignment eventually proved to be a continuous struggle for a fundamental change of the very fabric of the existing international system largely dominated by the great powers and rich nations, a political struggle for a more just and equitable world order, one attuned to the needs of its most deprived and smallest members, and not just the most powerful ones.

Neutrality, neutralism and non-alignment

When tackling the wide body of international theoretical literature on international relations, it is often observed that notions of "neutrality", "neutralization", "neutralism" and "non-alignment" are interchangeably used during the Cold War decades, frequently without profoundly addressing many distinctive nuances existing between them, often confusing them as mere synonyms or even giving preference to one term over the others in all other instances, although that one notion could not either truthfully or accurately address the essence it would like to convey in this respect.

As for "neutrality" and "neutralization", these two terms carry a specific historical and judicial connotation that is directly related to the central issue of war and peace in international relations, with "neutrality" clearly implying certain abiding rights and duties a country has to respect under the norms of international law, and there is no room for its loose legal interpretation or arbitrary political implementation, as it is often the case with "neutralism" and "non-alignment", both of which having neither a legally binding nor historically well-defined character.[48] In fact, "neutrality" and "neutralization" serve the purpose of conflict termination or conflict moderation and, if a state is not facing an imminent danger of war, then their role is directly related to the issue of conflict avoidance. However, any kind of "neutrality" or implementation of "neutralization"

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47   Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MMFA), Research Division (RD), Non-Alignment Movement, 1978.

48   Peter Lyon, "Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism", *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1960), 257.

could be either self-proclaimed or negotiated with other relevant factors inside the international system, particularly with the great powers, thus becoming a matter of a wider consensus in the international community, requiring from the neutral state to refrain itself from the use of force, except in self-defense, avoid joining any military-political alliances or subjecting its territory to any military purposes, while other interested parties, in response, respected the status, sovereignty and integrity of the neutralized state.[49] The most successful cases of neutrality and neutralization in history are Switzerland (1815) and Austria (1955), which were the direct product of a great power compromise and consensus, an outcome of the stability of the regional and global balance of power then put into a legally binding form for all members of the international community to firmly adhere to. Nevertheless, in all these cases, as well as among non-aligned states, "neutrality" or "non-alignment" were both used, each in its own distinctive way, to ultimately raise the international profile of a state, address its internal and external challenges, and bridge any domestic divergences while creating a stronger national consensus.[50]

In fact, unlike in the case of "neutralism" and "non-alignment", a neutral state is isolationist in its essence, and it will do anything to stay out of any armed conflicts by nurturing an even-handed and impartial stance towards all conflicting parties, professing certain rights and duties along the way, while, on the other hand, a non-aligned state would try to prevent armed conflicts from erupting altogether, presenting that as the best way of remaining aloof and, as a result, significantly devaluating the relevance of war as a means of solving inter-state problems in general.[51] Therefore, "neutrality" is rather static and generally passive, while "neutralism" or "non-alignment" is very proactive and more shifting and evolving in its nature, subjected to sudden changes inside the Cold War system. As "neutrality" primarily depends on the overall balance of power which is guaranteed either by the general consensus or relative dominance of certain members of international order, practitioners of "neutralism" or

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49   Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, Oran R. Young, *Neutralization and World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 4-6; Leos Müller, *Neutrality in World History* (London: Routledge, 2019), 4-6.

50   Johanna Rainio-Niemi, "Neutrality as an Instrument for Small States Manoeuvring and the Globalisation of Neutrality in the Cold War" in Laurien Crump, Susanna Erlandsson (eds.), *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers* (London: Routledge, 2020), 169-173.

51   Michael Brecher, "Neutralism: An Analysis", *International Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1962), 226-227.

"non-alignment" observe the relative balance of power as a continuously changing phenomenon, not as something guaranteed by either the stipulations of the international law or the general understanding reached between the great powers. Unlike neutral states, the non-aligned strive to essentially negate the global balance of power, insisting on the undividable and bloc-free collective security, as well as on equal rights and duties for all international actors, while subsequently stimulating the fundamental overhaul of that same world order customarily resting on the privileged position of the great powers and developed nations.[52]

However, when we discuss "neutralism" and "non-alignment", different opinions also tend to emerge in theoretical literature. Nevertheless, the majority of authors still observe these two notions as largely synonyms, which is also the stance of this author, although in some instances certain nuances might be also defined.[53] In fact, some authors made a clear distinction between these two notions claiming that non-alignment was just the "passive first stage of neutralism", they both shared "an expressed desire to remain aloof from bloc conflict", but neutralism also "involves a positive attitude towards bloc conflicts". Therefore, according to them, "non-alignment is the policy guide of the neutralist state, but neutralism represents an attitude and a policy which are much more activist than non-alignment as such".[54] The opinion that "non-alignment" was something existing only inside the wider neutralist discourse, closely related to it but not something equal or distinct in its own way, was still very much present among both political theoreticians and practitioners in the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, some of them even defined different versions of "neutralism", ranging from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's "positive neutralism" to non-alignment being specified as "negative neutralism". This understanding primarily rested on the relationship a neutralist state developed with the Cold War world order in general, clearly depending on the causes and motivations for such a relationship to function, thus being largely observed from an angle of whether such state was

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52   Ranko Petković, *Teorijski pojmovi neutralnosti* (Beograd: Rad, 1982), 273-297.
53   Marco Wyss, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Sandra Bott, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, "Introduction: a tightrope walk – neutrality and neutralism in the global Cold War" in Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Marco Wyss, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl (eds.), *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?* (London: Routledge, 2016), 2-6.
54   Michael Brecher, "Neutralism: An Analysis", 225.

trying to stay aloof from the bipolar confrontation or aspired to merge it-self into it by manipulating the system to its own benefit.[55]

Nevertheless, what largely contributed to the disappearance of the term "neutralism" from the general discourse was its apprehension as be-ing something negative, passive, and opportunistic that clearly presented the non-bloc foreign policy in an unfavorable light. The moral and ethi-cal plain of action was quite an important part of the non-aligned world-view, especially with respect to the issues of world peace and avoidance of war, while neutralism, conversely, partially implied that these coun-tries were only using existing contradictions of the Cold War to their own advantage, largely sitting on the fence, and conscientiously avoiding re-sponsibilities for further ensuring overall stability. In addition, for many of these non-aligned nations themselves this term "neutralism" was of-ten associated with something that implied being less lofty and often too compromising and deceitful, something that, therefore, had to be sup-planted by a far more accurate and rewarding term, such as "non-align-ment", one that generally implied a positive and morally uncorrupted stance.[56] In many of their speeches, non-aligned leaders frequently em-phasized this positive, uncompromising and independent streak, togeth-er with an equally relevant active, pragmatic and non-isolationist feature that all distinctively separated non-alignment from any similar or oppos-ing theoretical notions.[57]

Nevertheless, it was the Joint Statement of the Yugoslav Presi-dent Josip Broz Tito and the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, is-sued on the occasion of Tito's first official visit to India on December 22nd 1954, which, for the very first time, made a clear distinction between the notions of "neutrality", "neutralism" and "non-alignment", thus giving preference to the latter term, concurrently also formally setting down the doctrinal foundations of a non-bloc foreign policy in a comprehensive manner: "The policy of non-alignment adopted and pursued by their re-

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55 Fayez A. Sayegh, "Anatomy of Neutralism – A Typological Analysis" in Fayez A. Sayegh (ed.), *The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World* (San Francisco: Chandler Publish-ing Company, 1964), 10-11, 28-43, 64-76.

56 NAI, MEA, HI/102 (12)/80, Difference between neutrality and non-alignment, May 20 1980; The National Archives (TNA), Foreign Office (FO) 371/161211, Neutralism: the role of uncommitted nations in the Cold War, January 30 1961.

57 *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949- 1953* (New Delhi: GOI, 1954), 221; Josip Broz Tito, *Govori i članci*, Vol. 10 (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1959), 99; *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September, 1-6, 1961* (Belgrade: Jugo-slavija, 1961), 27.

spective countries is not 'neutrality' or 'neutralism' as sometimes alleged; but it is an active, positive, and constructive policy seeking to lead to a collective peace on which alone collective security can really rest".[58] However, what really made "non-alignment" distinct from both "neutrality" and "alignment" was its evident feature to judge any international issues independently by its own merits, while based on that assuming a stance, without proclaiming in advance its strict adherence to certain views or an outright opposition to any of them. This generally implied that both bloc and non-bloc nations had to seek compromises so as to reach certain arrangements, but without either side being compelled to give up on its fundamental principles.[59]

What was non-alignment?

If we observe from a historical hindsight, non-alignment could be analyzed from three different perspectives: it was a practical foreign policy orientation, one directly dedicated to the preservation of a country's independence and its alliance-free position in international relations, satisfying its needs of maintaining internal and external security while providing suitable conditions for unhindered socio-economic development; it was also a specific world view, built up from a position of small, weak and underdeveloped nations, initially marked with a set of loosely-based guiding principles that gradually evolved into a well-defined and rules-based political doctrine; and finally it was also an international movement, at first a loose group and a proper international organization afterwards (the Non-Aligned Movement - NAM), one encompassing the majority of non-bloc countries coming from four different continents and it boasted different operational mechanisms created for forging closer mutual cooperation in an effort to launch a concerted international action of all these diverse factors.[60] Since from the standpoint of non-aligned countries any alignment was tantamount to losing their hardly-won independence, it was eventually non-alignment that "enabled the powerless to hold a dialogue with the powerful and to try to hold them accountable", irrespec-

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58 Archives of Yugoslavia (AJ), 837, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (KPR), I-2, Joint Statement by the FPRY President and the Prime Minister of India, December 22 1954.

59 'Kautilya', "The Philosophy of Non-Alignment" in *India 1962: Annual Review* (London: Information Service of India, 1962), 7; Ranko Petković, *Teorijski pojmovi neutralnosti*, 72-75.

60 Ranko Petković, *Teorijski pojmovi nesvrstanosti* (Beograd: Rad, 1974), 18-23.

tive of their individual motivations or immediate results produced by their joint actions.[61]

Nevertheless, it was especially this dimension of independence preservation and gaining freedom of action, crucial preconditions of any aspirations harbored by small countries escaping colonial or bloc domination, which eventually became the cornerstone of any deliberations about the character, origins, evolution and results of the non-alignment's concrete performance within the Cold War system. In this way, non-alignment never became a dogma, clearly remaining a pragmatic and practical concept at its essence that was always open to different views, interpretations and suggestions but, nonetheless, still remaining free from any ideological rigidity characteristic for the two blocs.[62] In the words of one author, this liberty in making a free and bold choice of adopting a non-bloc foreign policy orientation became the non-alignment's distinctive feature as related to the existing world order, one clearly separating it from the vertically imposed discipline of the blocs, thus gradually transforming itself into a dynamic and strenuous "quest for distinctive, intellectual expression of independence".[63]

Therefore, non-alignment was a policy that perfectly suited the needs and aspirations of small and weak non-bloc nations, a realistic estimate of a rapidly changing world within which they could still discover means and opportunities of setting up leverages for forging wider cooperation against a bloc-dominated order. In addition, non-alignment could also be seen as an authentic rebellion against the centuries-old domination of the powerful and rich over large swathes of the world, an outright aversion expressed by small nations to any outside political and economic subjugation or ideological indoctrination, thus bringing forward a new tendency into world affairs of a stratified power dispersion between different world actors, well beyond just the two blocs and irrespective of their size and strength, but still inside this comprehensive Cold War framework. This eventually provided the non-aligned states with opportunities to exercise a certain amount of influence over the actions of great powers, with the great power rivalry often raising the level of effectiveness these nations possessed vis-à-vis major world developments.[64] In short,

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61   Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press, 2007), xv-xix.

62   Leo Mates, *Nesvrstanost: teorija i savremena praksa* (Beograd: IMPP, 1970), 78-80.

63   Peter Lyon, *Neutralism* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963), 72-73.

64   Cecil V. Crabb Jr., *The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 10-13, 80; S.B. Jain, *India's Foreign Policy and Non-Alignment* (New

non-alignment was very much affected by the overall dynamics of the balance of power system, its functioning was directly related to it, but it also exercised a considerable amount of influence over the system's sensitive operations, thus making it even more relevant under specific conditions. This generally went against the basic ideas provided by the dominant international relations theories that small and weak states could only survive by joining the great powers or remaining generally passive, without ever trying to seriously challenge great power policies.[65]

However, despite many critics claiming that non-alignment was purely an idealistic concept, shorn of any accurate assessments of the world situation, nonetheless, it was a realist, pragmatic and practical policy primarily driven by aspirations for realizing a country's national interests, while concurrently guaranteeing its mere survival on the international stage either through dedication to conflict prevention or inclination towards conflict manipulation. What sometimes differed between numerous non-aligned nations was the nature of their individual national interests and the character of their immediate foreign policy goals, as well as their respective relationships with the central Cold War actors, which all clearly depended on the geography, history, capabilities and motivations characteristic for each and every of these nations.[66] One author colorfully addressed this realist essence of non-alignment, stressing that "this was a policy, not a creed, a tactic, even a weapon, but not a gospel, for whatever else gospel may do, they do not establish or preserve independent status", thus limiting the moralizing impact on non-alignment's practical implementation.[67]

In this light, we can clearly see that non-alignment was not an isolationist or opportunistic policy, in spite of its pragmatic character, nor did it ever aspire to assume a position of preaching moral infallibility, even though many critics of non-alignment unjustifiably labeled it as being outright immoral. Nevertheless, it was still the most difficult path a small country could undertake in order to strengthen its independence, safeguard its sovereignty and achieve some of its national interests, thus putting difficult choices in front of each non-bloc nation while

Delhi: Anamika Publishers, 2000), 8-14.

65   Hanna Samir Kasab, *Weak States in International Relations Theory: The Cases of Armenia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Lebanon, and Cambodia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 32-39.

66   David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), 22-23.

67   G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Nonalignment* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), 402.

making life-changing decisions that often triggered in return the wrath of the great powers. Besides, non-alignment was not a mere policy of equidistance towards both blocs, but an active and flexible response to them, one that even more contributed to the dynamic performance of the non-aligned with respect to major world issues.[68] Therefore, this was a clear-cut choice for one country when taking destiny firmly in its own hands, thus denying the great powers of the mandate to make decisions on their behalf, in the face of any external pressures or inherent weaknesses. In essence, the fate of the world should not be determined by the great powers alone, since the non-aligned nations were also competent enough to present their own perspective and offer constructive solutions for the significant lessening of tensions based on the common interests and duties of all members of the international community.[69]

Taking all this into consideration, we can conclude that non-alignment was essentially a defensive foreign policy strategy permeated with strong nationalist feelings, both in its principles, as well as its practice, primarily dedicated to the struggle for the world of equal nations, one where power politics would not reign high any more, great power alliances would not decisively dominate the international landscape, thus fundamentally transforming the ancient paradigm of relations between big and small countries, while also advocating for the disappearance of colonialism and ensuring worldwide peace through stimulating comprehensive cooperation and understanding by mutual accomodation.[70] This was clearly a "strategy for maximizing one's security in a bipolar world; foreign policy expression of domestic political, cultural and psychological needs; policy of newly independent countries for securing their regional interests".[71] In fact, non-alignment was a foreign policy strategy driven by a strong impulse of self-preservation, firmly directed at the realization of concrete national goals, primarily acting as an instinctive response of small powers to the objective circumstances, possibilities and limitations of the Cold War bipolar world order.

Therefore, based on this, we can determine a number of immediate goals of non-alignment that remained current for decades and they were high on the agenda of all major non-aligned leaders when facing the

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68   M.S. Rajan, *Nonalignment and Nonaligned Movement: Retrospect and Prospect* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1990), 10-11.
69   Bojana Tadić, *Nesvrstanost u teoriji i praksi međunarodnih odnosa*, 20-21.
70   Leo Mates, *Nesvrstanost*, 113-114.
71   Rami Ginat, *Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism: From Independence to Dependence* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 3.

world dominated by the superpowers: "non-alignment insures political freedom and independence and contributes to national self-respect and moral integrity; in contrast to alliance membership, non-alignment permits freedom of expression and action; non-alignment keeps a small nation from getting involved in larger conflicts of no concern to it; alignment would make local problems more difficult to solve; alliances involve military obligations that divert scarce resources from the urgent necessities of economic development; non-aligned nations are in a position to accept and to bid for economic aid from both sides in the Cold War".[72]

Furthermore, the best definition of non-alignment was provided by the Political Declaration passed at the 1970 Lusaka summit: "The policy of non-alignment has emerged from the determination of independent countries to safeguard their national independence and the legitimate rights of their peoples. The growth of non-alignment into a broad international movement cutting across racial, regional and other barriers, is an integral part of significant changes in the structure of the entire international community. It is the result of the world anti-colonial revolution and the emergence of a large number of newly liberated countries, which, opting for an independent political orientation and development, have refused to accept the replacement of centuries-old forms of subordination by new ones. At the root of these changes lies the ever more clearly expressed aspiration of member-nations for freedom, independence and equality, and their determination to resist all forms of oppression and exploitation. This has been the substance and meaning of our strivings and actions".[73]

However, criteria clearly determining what one country made non-aligned in its international orientation were internally defined during the Preparatory Meeting in Cairo in June 1961, when the preparations for the first non-aligned summit in Belgrade were already underway. Then it became the responsibility of participating countries to set down definitive principles that clearly separated non-bloc countries from the bloc ones, since such a shady division was causing a lot of confusion among different Third World countries. Therefore, these criteria were then defined as follows: adherence to the policy of independence based on the principles

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72   Ernest V. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism" in Laurence W. Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs* (New York: Praeger, 1962), 95, 116.

73   *Documents of the Gatherings of the Non-Aligned Countries*, Vol. 1 (Beograd: IMPP, 1989), 44.

of active peaceful co-existence between different social or political systems; active support for the national liberation struggle; not becoming a party to multilateral military-political alliances created in the context of the East-West conflict; not becoming a party to any bilateral military alliances created in the context of the East-West conflict; non-compliance with the establishment of military bases of great powers on the national territory.[74] Such criteria had not essentially changed throughout the Cold War period, with only minor clarifications coming later on, despite their somewhat vague character and occasional openness to nuanced interpretations.

On the other hand, it was India, Yugoslavia and Egypt that displayed a formative influence on the emergence and evolution of non-alignment in world affairs, with their leaders Nehru, Tito and Nasser acting as a "big three" of the non-aligned world. It was through their direct interactions and frequent deliberations that non-alignment had assumed the shape that had become customary for the Cold War era.[75] India was the obvious philosophical and practical cradle of this concept, the very first post-colonial nation that officially adopted a non-bloc foreign policy minutely defined by Nehru in many of his speeches, then also closely followed in this respect by some other Asian countries (Burma, Indonesia), with the role of non-aligned countries as responsible mediators coming high on the agenda of the Indian prime minister. Nehru's non-alignment was evidently Asian in its essence, as Nasser's was Middle Eastern one, actively pursuing Arab liberation from any externally imposed control.[76]

However, since India was a giant country in both its size and demographics, it was very hard for other nations to emulate New Delhi's policies, especially its strictly regional focus, therefore, Tito instead started advocating the non-alignment's universalist and inter-regional character as the central one, one that was primarily dedicated to pursuing authentically independent and non-bloc policies on an intercontinental basis, while ac-

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74 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a, Final Report of the Cairo Preparatory Meeting, June 1961.
75 Mohamed Heikal, *The Cairo Documents* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1973), 251-299; Momir Stojković, *Tito, Nehru, Naser: nastanak i razvoj politike i Pokreta nesvrstanosti* (Zaječar: RO Zaječar, 1983), 49-72.
76 B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1976), 180-183; Jovan Čavoški, "Constructing Nasser's Neutralism: Egypt and the Rise of Nonalignment in the Middle East" in Lorenz Lüthi (ed.), *The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East: Crucial Periods and Turning Points* (Washington, DC, Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Stanford University Press, 2015), 89-90.

tively scrutinizing all major international issues, like peace, development, disarmament and similar, from the perspective of all nations of the world, irrespective of the region they came from, their size, strength and any individual historical differences they had.[77] In this way, primarily through Tito's continuous efforts, non-alignment really became a global phenomenon, one without any regionalist inclinations and with evident international aspirations. This line of thinking also produced considerable effect on Nasser's individual views, as well as on the corresponding strengthening of tripartite cooperation between these nations in pushing forward the concrete non-aligned agenda onto the center stage of world politics.[78]

Non-alignment and the Cold War system

Generally speaking, non-alignment was a foreign policy strategy fully tailored for small powers in times of a Cold War when these nations largely found themselves being treated as the outright objects of great power competition but still not the immediate victims of war or any other overt military confrontation. Under such conditions, they had to choose either to fully subordinate their interests to the blocs by clearly limiting their freedom of choice or to opt for an independent stand that often implied making painful compromises along the way. The majority of non-aligned countries readily chose the latter option.[79] Psychologically this proved to be quite attractive since it reflected deeper desires of newly-liberated states of avoiding any formal commitments to their former masters or new aspiring ones, while still experiencing a certain amount of influence over the emergence and realization of bloc policies. Therefore, non-alignment was quite an appealing policy for many due to the fact that it provided importance and status to those countries that were traditionally denied that inside the customary hierarchical world order, which was even truer for the bipolar one that even more stressed the potential role of non-bloc actors inside the rigid East-West global division. Such specific structural conditions often limited possibilities for the blocs to further

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77 Jovan Čavoški, "Between Great Powers and Third World Neutralists: Yugoslavia and the Belgrade Conference of the Nonaligned Movement 1961" in Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tine, Nada Boškovska (eds.), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War*, 187-188.

78 M.S. Rajan, *Nonalignment and Nonaligned Movement*, 17-21.

79 Robert L. Rothstein, "Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers: 1945-1965", *International Organization* Vol. 20, No. 3 (1966), 404-405; Ernest V. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism", 117.

expand without triggering mutual confrontation and worldwide confla-
gration, thus consequently opening an even wider maneuvering space for
these lesser powers to resolutely act in their own interest and in the in-
terest of world peace and stability.[80]

In fact, non-alignment was primarily characterized by an overt
opposition to any alignment, to any alliances or blocs promoted by the
great powers, to any historical conditions that facilitated the emergence
of these blocs and eventually bred great power conflicts as their logical re-
sult. This was a distinctive feature of the Cold War system in general and
it largely went against the basic tenets of freedom and independence of
small countries. Such specific circumstances frequently undermined sov-
ereign rights of these newly-liberated nations in favor of external domi-
nation, and they consequentially also produced an immediate impact on
their aspirations for achieving socio-economic emancipation and modern-
ization.[81] With this almost static feature of the Cold War, a "zone of auton-
omy" gradually emerged, one where non-aligned actors could still remain
outside the immediate control of the bloc structures, thus subsequently
reducing superpower effect on these nations and regions they came from,
while concurrently creating structural preconditions for these lesser pow-
ers to project their influences in a manner and scale unfathomable during
previous decades or even centuries. This ultimately opened clear ways
for these nations, depending on specific crisis situations, to either tem-
porarily defect to one side of the Cold War or continue to hold onto mid-
dle ground steadfastly.[82]

It was this specific feature of non-alignment that gave rise to the in-
fluence or the perception of influence the non-aligned could project within
the Cold War system, sometimes directly affecting the global correlation
of forces, thus often creating a strained relationship between non-align-
ment and the main Cold War protagonists. In this respect, democratiza-
tion of the existing international relations became one of the main goals
of non-alignment, clearly directed at mitigating the extremes represent-

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80   Charles Burton Marshall, "On Understanding the Unaligned" in Laurence W. Martin
      (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, 28.
81   MMFA, RD, Non-Alignment Movement, 1978; Edvard Kardelj, *Istorijski koreni nes-
      vrstavanja* (Beograd: Komunist, 1975), 37.
82   John Lewis Gaddis, "On Starting All over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the
      Cold War" in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpreta-
      tions, Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 31-32.

ed by the two blocs.[83] This, in return, triggered growing frustrations of the blocs with these non-bloc nations, since their individual and collective activities on different levels – local, regional and global – could have not only induced disturbances into the sensitive balance of power but also freedom and flexibility under which they acted could have opened a potential window of opportunity for bloc allies to also grasp possibilities to defect into the ranks of the non-aligned.[84] This kind of a newly-discovered self-confidence eventually stirred an even greater level of mistrust the superpowers frequently demonstrated towards the non-aligned.

Furthermore, it was the general character of the Cold War, almost constant balancing on the brink of war throughout many crisis situations arising both in Europe and around the Third World, which was immediately assessed by different non-aligned leaders as a sign of great irresponsibility demonstrated on behalf of the blocs. This tendency gradually provided the boost for non-bloc nations to utilize this reasonable fear of an impending world disaster to their own advantage when launching subsequent political initiatives, since that also implied that in this respect one third of humanity could have sided with either bloc in forwarding the general cause of peace, stability and prosperity. Surprisingly, it was the time of crisis that largely expanded the space for non-aligned mediation to really take place, while also strengthening the hand of these nations when influencing respective superpower policies as unbiased actors. This kind of an astute approach largely earned these nations even greater respect and understanding from both sides of the Cold War spectrum, concurrently facilitating moderating influences and the balanced effect these nations produced on the general lessening of tensions in the world.[85]

Therefore, a confrontationist stand towards one or both Cold War blocs on the side of the non-aligned was always out of the question, since that could have only derailed their efforts and undermined their independence and stability. Cooperation and understanding with the blocs, depending on a concrete situation or issue, was the most constructive way of achieving certain goals without ever reconciling themselves with

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83   Aleš Bebler, "Non-Alignment and the Theory of Equidistance", *Review of International Affairs*, No. 12 (1961), 1-2; Josip Broz Tito, *Govori i članci*, Vol. 10, 23-33.

84   Samir N. Anabtawi, "Neutralists and Neutralism", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1965), 358-359.

85   Bimla Prasad, "Opšte iskustvo i perspektive nesvrstanosti" in Ljubivoje Aćimović (ed.), *Politika nesvrstanosti u savremenom svetu* (Beograd: IMPP, 1969), 109-111.

the existence or negative role these blocs exercised in the world.[86] This kind of specific weight gained within the Cold War system was also used by the non-aligned as a leverage of acquiring much needed economic aid from either side, primarily without any strings attached, in order to dampen the effect of socio-economic backwardness and trigger a corresponding process of modernization. This tendency would also become one of the main motives for embracing a non-aligned foreign policy course by taking hold of the Cold War fissures and then directing them against the system's main stakeholders through diversifying economic dependence of different non-bloc factors.[87]

In fact, when it touches upon the ideological relationship between non-alignment and the Cold War, non-alignment did not observe this system as the decisive battle between good and evil but a far more nuanced and diverse phenomenon than it was simplistically perceived from either bloc's perspective. Therefore, motivations for using the outstanding features of the Cold War to their own advantage were another proof of a realistic and pragmatic character of non-alignment, one dedicated both to the self-improvement and world betterment, which was evidently blossoming due to the specific character of the existing world order.[88] In time, the non-aligned would become something like moral arbiters of the Cold War, a "consciousness of the mankind" as Tito colorfully dubbed them, having the power of the critical world public opinion behind them, thus gradually becoming the strongest weapon they could wield inside the UN, while creating another principled bond for establishing wider and more active cooperation among themselves.[89]

Since the non-aligned countries represented a more or less organized political force, almost a disciplined voting bloc in the UN that caused great pain to the superpowers, the debate about non-alignment becoming a "third bloc" was often raised in the literature, a notion that was frequently used to discredit the entire strategy by putting it on the same level of power politics embodied by the two blocs rather than give it a measured and justified assessment that should have implied something com-

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86   Ali A. Mazrui, *On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship: Essays on Independent Africa* (London: Longmans, 1974), 203.

87   Margaret Legum, "Africa and Nonalignment" in J.W. Burton (ed.), *Nonalignment* (New York: James H. Heineman Inc., 1966), 57-58; Leo Mates, *Nesvrstanost*, 178-180.

88   J. W. Burton, "Introduction to Nonalignment" in J.W. Burton (ed.), *Nonalignment*, 16-17.

89   Leo Mates, *Nesvrstanost*, 236-237.

pletely different.[90] However, none of the major non-aligned leaders ever contemplated setting up a "third bloc", since that seemed as a futile endeavor altogether, primarily due to the economic and military feebleness inherent to all these nations, their evident diversity in many fields of existence, lack of a bloc-like discipline, and no clear leadership structure, even though, as we saw it, these nations, both individually and collectively, did hold certain structural cards in their hands to use them against the interests of the blocs.[91] These cards were, nonetheless, personified in the creation of specific mechanisms for forging closer cooperation and collective coordination that seemed to the great powers as something much more globally managed than it really was, but the non-aligned were well aware of the kind of dangers and constraints any emulation of a bloc-like unity could have eventually meant for them. Therefore, they never sought a bloc-like organization, which the NAM never really was, opting for more democratic and loose forms of institutional cooperation.[92]

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The emergence of global non-alignment was an outright response to the perils and limitations of the superpower bloc system of the Cold War, one where the newly-liberated nations of Asia and Africa, as well as some bloc defectors from other continents, like Europe or Latin America, sought to strengthen their independence and sovereignty respectively, expand their unalienable right to make free choices, while strenuously protecting their national interests outside the realm of the great powers and their strategic alliances, but without ever remaining neutral vis-à-vis any relevant international issues or situations.[93] This proved to be both the initial and ultimate motivation for all these diverse actors to finally opt for such a bold foreign policy choice as remaining unaligned to any of the blocs or great powers dominating the international landscape at the time. This kind of response initially arose as a rather individual one, becoming increasingly organized over the years, both in the form of looser means

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90   Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance* (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1978), 96-98, 102-109; A.W. Singham, Shirley Hume, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (London: Zed Books, 1986), 27-30.
91   TNA, FO 371/161211, Neutralism: the role of uncommitted nations in the Cold War, January 30 1961.
92   Ranko Petković, *Teorijski pojmovi nesvrstanosti*, 79-83.
93   Michael Handel, *Weak States in the International System* (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 187-195.

of mutual cooperation and eventually through setting up a proper inter-
national organization, the NAM. In time, by building upon the structural
benefits and weaknesses of the Cold War system, often skillfully manip-
ulating their many nuances, these nations had become not only catalysts
in reducing international tensions, but also a serious collective force to
cope with, particularly inside the UN, thus granting all these nations, un-
der specific historical conditions, with a previously unseen level of pres-
ence and influence uncharacteristic for countries of their modest status
and potential in any other time in history.[94]

  However, what made non-alignment far more successful within
the Cold War framework, especially when compared to any other region-
al or neutral competitors of those years, was primarily its "universalist",
intercontinental and non-discriminatory character, except in the field of
non-bloc orientation and pursuance of independent policies outside great
power arrangements as its two distinctive features. This specific charac-
ter, therefore, was clearly reflected in the generally relevant issues that
dominated the non-alignment's agenda (freedom, peace, equality, secu-
rity, stability, development), there were no regional limitations to par-
ticipation in any joint endeavors, with non-alignment encompassing the
entire world, while any individual differences between these non-bloc na-
tions never became an obstacle to launching any joint initiatives or forg-
ing even closer institutional ties.[95] All this made non-alignment a potent
political force for the post-colonial world, increasingly directed towards
satisfying the pressing needs of socio-economic modernization through
a struggle for a more just and egalitarian world, thus providing these na-
tions with both concrete means and new ways to persevere in the sur-
roundings often dictated by the continuous competition of great powers.

  Irrespective of the non-alignment's relative successes or failures
during the Cold War, what has remained as a long-term consequence of
its dynamic presence in world politics, now often seen in the form of mul-
ti-vector policies or strategic autonomy of certain nations, is the conscious-
ness and strength it has instilled into many developing nations that be-
ing free, equal and respected, not uncritically toeing the line of any great
powers, having its own interests and goals as paramount, expressing
strong solidarity with others, while nurturing the spirit of multilateral-

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94 Richard L. Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers* (New York: Praeger,
  1983), 103-105.
95 NAI, MEA, HI/102(28)/76, Role of non-alignment in the changing contours of inter-
  national politics, April 22 1976.

ism and joint action was something that has become their true right and their duty to continue to advocate and pursue even after the Cold War era ended.[96] Therefore, in some specific form, both on an individual level, as well as in some collective emanation, non-alignment has essentially not outlived its purpose and relevance in today's world, adapting itself to new circumstances, also regardless of many troubles it has faced in the past 30 years, particularly since the political, security, economic, social, environmental and other challenges of the past have remained as present and as perilous as it used to be the case, perhaps becoming even graver today, thus forcing the hand of many small and developing nations to seek new mechanisms of wider cooperation and coordination for protecting their independence and propelling their national interests in an increasingly multipolar world, though still without directly succumbing to the will or dictate of the great powers.

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