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THE SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES FOR/AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

THIS CHAPTER WILL focus on changes in the Yugoslav socialist republics and autonomous provinces brought about by the death of Josip Broz Tito. The timeline covered will be from Tito's death in Ljubljana on May 4, 1980 until November 29, 1991, when the Badinter Commission – on Yugoslav Republic Day – announced that “the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution”.²⁵¹ The editorial board of this book has given me the assignment to edit its third part. A separate article has been ordered for each former republic and province, which should be written by an author from the country he / she is writing about. The editor should write the author's problem-based text based on the submitted works, which will be published in full on the project portal. The editor was obliged to propose to the Editorial Board theses regarding the concept and content that the authors of the articles should have used as a guide in designing their own articles.²⁵²

Research on the period from 1980 to the present, in a historiographical sense, is heavily influenced by the history of the present (*l'histoire du temps présent*). Moreover, even when research encompasses longer durations that extend beyond the history of national origins, the research generally cannot escape becoming ethnocentric. “Others”

251 Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, *European Journal of International Law*, No 3, 1992., 178–185, quote on p. 183.

252 See “Prijedlog tema za obradu u svim republičkim/pokrajinskim priložima”.

are more often the subject of the history of relations, especially when it comes to ethnic neighbors within the same political boundaries or across those boundaries, and less often an occasion for asymmetric comparison.²⁵³ National historiographical research of the history of the present and even the recent past is everywhere, *nolens volens*, intertwined with current challenges of a political and social nature. Therefore, dialogic communication between interlocutors regularly assumes the least sociopolitical contexts. Since this book should contribute to the expansion of dialogue spaces in the post-Yugoslav “macrocosm” (so saturated with “surpluses” of the unconquered past (*die unbewältigte Vergangenheit!*)), the chosen approach to the whole of the third part seemed to us the most appropriate. It was not easy to agree with the collaborators, but it was made possible with the efforts of several members of the Editorial Board, i.e. associates in the project, to whom we owe gratitude, and even more to the authors of the articles.

The editorial is limited to some key topics pertaining to the crisis in Yugoslav society. They include, firstly, the legal, political and economic aspects of socialist self-government from the 1974 Constitution and the 1976 to 1990/1991 Law on Associated Labor. Secondly, the controversy regarding the status of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, i.e. the republican and provincial League of Communists during the same period. Thirdly, the controversy surrounding the state-level status of republics and provinces, their institutional development and their political priorities. Fourthly, the role of republics and

253 V. Vladimir Stipetić, *Dva stoljeća razvoja Hrvatskoga gospodarstva (1820 – 2005)*, Zagreb 2005. One of his concluding remarks is the following: “... going through the Scylla and Charybdis of aggression, faced with numerous challenges, Croatia has lost its former position among the more developed countries of the world. It exceeded the level reached in 1989 in 2005, but the public expects a faster return to the circle of the developed! This is not an easy task: we are in debt and most of the production and financial capital is in foreign hands. Under these conditions, only a new economic strategy can deliver the results the public expects”. (365) Also, see: Drago Roksanđić (ed.), *Uvod u komparativnu historiju*, Zagreb 2004.

provinces, i.e. , nations and nationalities as actors in the Yugoslav crisis and its war, and, fifthly, disputes and changes in attitudes towards Tito's legacy in light of the crisis and disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia. Its content is mostly derived by a subjective, editorial reading of the content of articles by colleagues and colleagues of historians, that is, experts in various social sciences., The editor is solely responsible for the content of this article.

When it comes to political relations, it should always be borne in mind that SFR Yugoslavia in 1974 was constitutionally defined by Article 1, which distinguishes between "government" and "self-government": "The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state as a state union of voluntarily united peoples and their socialist republics, as well as the socialist autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo which are part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, based on the government and self-government of the working class and all working people, and the socialist self-governing democratic community of working people and citizens and equal peoples and nationalities". The socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces are defined analogously (Art. 3 / "The socialist republic is a state based on the sovereignty of the people and on the government and self-government of the working class and all working people, and the socialist self-governing democratic community of working people and citizens and equal peoples and nationalities". / And Article 4. /" A socialist autonomous province is an autonomous socialist self-governing democratic socio-political community based on the government and self-government of the working class and all working people, in which working people and citizens, peoples and nationalities exercise their sovereign rights. it is in the common interest of working people and citizens, peoples and nationalities of the Republic as a whole established by the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia – and in the Republic". / What this distinction means, when it comes to political relations, requires both problematization and interpretation. I will stick to but one aspect.

Making the distinction between government and self-government in the context of political relations requires both problematization and interpretation.²⁵⁴ The Law on Associated Labor (1976) and other laws, bylaws and related acts have enabled the participation of literally millions of people in “self-government”, “governance” and government, all the way to republican and provincial assemblies, using the logic of “pluralism of self-government interests”.²⁵⁵ The vast majority of participants were not members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, nor, in most cases, of any other socio-political organization. In other words, a minimum of social mimicry at that time enabled the legalization of attitudes, interests, practices and aspirations within the system’s institutions— from the bottom up, but also from the top down – which were not required to have any connection to the normative value order of 1974 or 1976. (This does not make the question of political dissidents, that is, of political opposition on the fringes or beyond the fringes of the political system, meaningless, but it requires special elaboration).²⁵⁶ In other words, the Law on Associated Labor was a de facto act of legalization of a “pluralism of

254 Sociological and political science literature in this regard largely dates from the 1980s. After 1990, it was significantly thinned, and in historical science it is the exception rather than the rule. Particularly indicative was Vladimir Arzenšek’s research, *Structure and Movement* (Belgrade 1984), which investigated the distribution of power in labor organizations in Slovenia from 1969 to 1981 and proved the existence of a permanent hierarchical structure of power. The greatest is the power of management, and the least is the power of workers, with a tendency to increase the gap, as opposed to normative intentions. By the way, the theoretical subject of his study is the critique of the Leninist party in the system of socialist democracy.

255 Edvard Kardelj, *Pravci razvoja političkog sistema socijalističkog samoupravljanja*, Belgrade 1977.

256 Given the period that the author opted to cover, it would be worth delving into a topic that is beyond our scope at this time, i.e. to compare the key provisions of the Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia from 1974 with the verdicts of the Badinter Commission. The Commission’s task was not to write a new constitution for the disintegrating country, but the question remains how its verdicts corresponded

interests”, but not necessarily a “pluralism of self-governing interests”. The monopoly on power by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia over the republics and provinces, was not only political, but was also expressed as economic, state security and military power. Such power minimized the achievements of pluralistic practices and aspirations of very different provenances. From the perspective of the eighties the goal was to program and institutionalize power into a multi-party system by 1989/1990 at the latest. From 1976 to 1990, the aforementioned mono-party concentration of power was reconfigured to be polycentric during Tito’s life, and then manifested itself in another way after his death. This begs the question of what happened to self-government during the lives of Tito and Kardelj, especially with regards to the legislatively proclaimed goal of “workers mastering expanded reproduction”.

The history of Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s is dominated by the search for constitutional formulas that would guarantee the survival and progress of the state union after Tito’s death. Nevertheless, profound societal and economic changes inside the Yugoslav cultural space increasingly developed uniquely and independent of one another within the borders of the socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces. Thus, in the imaginary, or more precisely, phantom borders of the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia, several of these changes became nationalist obsessions in the wartime disintegration of the state union.²⁵⁷ In some cases, the borders coincided, and in other cases less so: In 1981, 97.2% of Slovenes lived in Slovenia, and 95.2% of Macedonians in Macedonia. 81.5% of Muslims lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 78% Croats in Croatia and 76.2% Serbs in Serbia. Compared to others, the least Montenegrins lived in Monte-

to the key provisions of the SFR Yugoslavia Constitution, regardless of the constitutional changes already voted on and approved in the (former) republics.

257 Hannes Grandits et al., “Fantomске granice: novo promišljanje prostora i aktera u vremenu”, in: *Vojna krajina u suvremenoj historiografiji. Zbornik radova s međunarodnim sudjelovanjem* (ed. Drago Roksandić and Vedran Muić), Zagreb 2021., 263–286.

negro – 69%. Similar to the Montenegrin case, 70.8% of Albanians lived in Kosovo and, conversely, 90.3% of Hungarians in Vojvodina.²⁵⁸

This was most noticeable in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although 81.5% of Muslims in SFR Yugoslavia lived in it, they made up 39.5% of the population of the Republic, with Serbs at 32%, Croats at 18.3%, and nationally undecided Yugoslavs at 7.9%. The spatial dispersion of each of these communities made relations even more complex.

Croatian-Serbian ethno-demographic relations in Croatia were also complex. The share of Serbs in the population of Croatia gradually decreased after 1941–1945, but ethno-demographic relations became increasingly complex. Both ethnicities left the areas of their traditional agrarian concentrations on a similar scale and migrated, above all, to urban centers, which then became more ethno-demographically complex communities due to the modernization changes in socialist Croatia. Thus, regardless of the gradually decreasing share of Serbs in the population of Croatia, the ethno-demographic picture of the Republic became even more complex. Similar situations can be found in Montenegro, Macedonia, etc.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Summarizing his assessment of the successes and failures in the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1980s, Dragan Markovina characterizes the ideology of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina (LC BH) (it is the only place in his article that refers to “self-government”): “All this with the ruling party, which stubbornly and more than any other republican party insists on political trials and self-governing Yugoslavia, and the idea of compromise in the name of the survival of the common state”. “Stubbornness” was pointless in a republic in which numerous workers’ mass “work

258 Paul Garde, *Život i smrt Jugoslavije*, Zagreb 1996., 109–120 (“Nacionalnosti”).

stoppages”, i.e. “strikes”, were transformed from social to ethno-confessional movements in an ever-shorter period of time.²⁵⁹

The disintegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) at its XIV Extraordinary Congress, held in January 1990, significantly accelerated the disintegration of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was otherwise significantly weakened by the “Agrokomerc affair” that erupted on January 25, 1987. The affair was a mastodon example of a business utilizing bills of exchange without having financial coverage, but instead relying on political coverage at the highest levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina and even Yugoslavia. The “Neum affair” of 1988 contributed even more to this, revealing the secret of 557 preferential loans to Bosnian politically powerful men of all nationalities for the construction of holiday homes in the only Bosnian town on the Adriatic coast, Neum. The scandals coincided with a worsening economic and political crisis in Yugoslavia, which in turn had an additional devastating effect on Bosnian society and its economy.

The inevitable dismissal of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the X Congress held in Sarajevo in December 1990, did not bring about necessary changes to the political ideology or program orientation. Above all, it failed to provide a sustainable vision of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the chaotic disintegration of the Yugoslav federal community. This inability to move forward left all the left-wing renewal movements, regardless of their backgrounds, fragmented. Like the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they had shared the ideal of a transnational state of equal constituent peoples, but found they had to distance themselves from the “corrupt” “red bourgeoisie” in power.

After the dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Communists, like their Croatian counterparts, wanted

259 Jake Lowinger, *Economic Reform and the ‘Double Movement’ in Yugoslavia: An Analysis of Labor Unrest and Ethno-Nationalism in 1980s. A Dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy*, Baltimore, Maryland, October 2009.

to maintain their elevated status in society and ensure the continuance of the advantages they had created for themselves through decades as the party in power. They attempted this by announcing the progress they had achieved from 1945 to 1990 in advancing Bosnia and Herzegovina as it had never been before in modern history, and so on. They failed at that. As the socio-economic crisis steadily worsened, the Communists' attempts to de-ethnicize / deconfessionalize a political culture in transition failed due to the 12 June 1990 decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The decision legalized the right to form political parties with national and religious attributes, and set a new date for multi-party democratic elections to be held on December 18, 1990. These elections were overwhelmingly won by ethno-confessionally formed parties (SDA, SDS and HDZ), which each "won" "their" electorate, by avoiding mutual conflicts and, in all three cases, by labeling the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a party that it was necessary to delegitimize politically and historically.

Table 1. Election results of the parties successors of Republican Communist Alliances in 1990.²⁶⁰

	Party	% of votes	No. of seats in parliament won	% of seats	Election date
Bosnia and Herzegovina	SK BiH-SDP	12,4	19/240	7,8	18.11.1990.
Slovenia	ZKS-SDP	17,5	14/80	17,5	8.4.1990.
Croatia	SKH-SDP	25,2	73/356	20,5	23.4.1990.
Macedonia	SKM-PDP	21,8	31 /120	25,8	11.11.1990.
Montenegro	SKCG	56,1	83/125	66,4	9.12.1990.
Serbia	SPS	46,0	194/250	77,6	9.12.1990.

260 Alfredo Sasso, "Legacy of the past, dilemmas of the present and the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina between multi-party reform and elections", *Social Democracy in BiH – Historical Review and Considerations for the Future*, ed. Nermin Kujović and Alfredo Sasso (Sarajevo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2020.), 130.

The League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina has significantly weakened the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia. Both of them were oriented towards the same electoral body and competed with each other. The Alliance was constituted at a large rally in Kozara on July 29, 1990, and brought new energy to the reform-oriented part of the electorate. However, the Alliance was too weak to have a more decisive effect on stopping the process of ethno-confessionalization of BiH politics and society *in toto*.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the type of transition policy that played out was first modeled in Poland, albeit, under different circumstances. Alfredo Sasso writes about this: "In the transition to a multi-party system, especially if it takes place in a multiethnic country, a careful institutional plan and time schedule and the order of the founding elections are equally necessary and crucial. Unlike other Central and Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia as a whole did not have any 'roundtable negotiations' between the ruling party and the opposition forces on basic conditions for a multi-party system: a law on political association, mechanisms of separation of powers, electoral system, etc. Pluralism in Yugoslavia emerged from a chaotic sub-state competition between the republican branches of the LCY, which intensified in the late 1980s over a conflict in which the leaders of Serbia and Slovenia were the main participants. From 1989 to 1990, each branch of the LCY established its own conditions and schedule for elections to be held at the sub-state level. The branches used the transition to a multi-party system to bolster the democratic legitimacy of the republican sphere and increase popular support for their rule. In contrast, the Yugoslav State elections, envisaged by the federal government, were constantly postponed, and in the end were never held. However, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the LC BH approached the multi-party process with significant reservations and slowness. In the initial phase, until February 1990, this can be attributed to ideological rigidity, and in the later phase, until June 1990, to strategic indecision.

During the Congress in December 1989, the LC BH guidelines on pluralism remained essentially conservative”.²⁶¹

MONTENEGRO

In the Montenegrin case, according to Radenko Šćekić, self-governing socialism developed in a society whose culture of memory reached back to the Montenegrin tribal tradition at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. “Although under the communist regime, in which self-governing socialism developed, the memory of the tribal system from the beginning of the century, which intertwined with the post-war socio-political engineering of the Communist Party, was essentially preserved”. Montenegro, in the final phase of the Yugoslav crisis, became the scene of an “anti-bureaucratic revolution” in August and September 1988. Self-governing slogans became instruments used to negate the fundamental values of the same socialist self-government and above all to retraditionalize the Montenegrin society: “From the very beginning of the gatherings, their characteristic was demagogic populism. The propaganda claimed that these were spontaneous movements and gatherings of the people, however, it was still an organized movement. For the sake of better and more efficient propaganda, this movement skillfully used the dissatisfaction of the people due to the events in Kosmet, as well as the difficult economic situation and presented itself as a movement aimed at overcoming the crisis, i.e. as a movement with primarily social demands. There were many slogans at the rallies about self-government, the fight against bureaucracy, and against ‘reborn’ officials”.

According to the same author, “the economic inefficiency of the political system in SR Montenegro in the 1980s initially seemed like a transient economic crisis, as another in a series of previous ones. The general illiquidity of the economy, huge costs, inefficient, expensive

261 Alfredo Sasso, “Hipoteke prošlosti, dileme sadašnjosti i Savez komunista Bosne i Hercegovine između višestranačke reforme i izbora”, in: *Socijalna demokratija u BiH – Historijski pregled i razmatranja za budućnost* (ed. Nermin Kujović and Alfredo Sasso; Sarajevo, 2020., p. 70–90).

and cumbersome administration, negligible investment and the introduction of new technologies made Montenegrin export products often uncompetitive on the world market. The return of a large number of guest workers to the country after the global economic crisis of the 1970s also resulted in a drastically reduced inflow of foreign currency. Inflation and unemployment rose with rising economic losses, while output and living standards declined. The growing economic crisis was inevitably increasingly accompanied by a growing crisis in all other areas of life – especially in interethnic relations. Along with the growing crisis and the increasingly obvious manifestation of the inability of leading political elites to find a way out of it, the dissatisfaction of the people with the situation in the country grew, the reputation and influence of the LCY and political leadership weakened and distrust grew in a system unable to find a way out from the crisis”. Since in the eyes of the Montenegrin public the most responsible for the long-lasting crisis of Montenegrin society were those who in the period after 1966 were at the same time key agents of the Montenegrin national self-awareness process, the wave of “anti-bureaucratic revolution” was actually directed towards the Montenegrin national elite. A “trigger” was a group of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, led by Miroslav Šolević, “secretary of the Committee for Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins to go to protest rallies outside the province”. The group played a role in conducting a series of “truth rallies” throughout Serbia and its provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. These rallies enabled Slobodan Milošević to secure power in Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina through a series of populist coups. They also helped him to wield control over personnel working in federal agencies and organizations, originating from Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina. The same group was given the task from Milošević’s associates to “ensure rallies of truth” and to launch the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” in Montenegro in order to secure a “fourth” vote of a total of eight in (con)federalized Yugoslav bodies and organizations. The group and its Montenegrin supporters would not have done too much if there were not many people in Montenegro who needed her appearance so that they could announce themselves.

Although the 16th session of the LCY Central Committee in July 1988 declared itself against the “export” of the “truth rally” from Serbia, a mass rally was organized in Titograd on Milošević’s birthday, August 20, using the same pattern. “Anti-bureaucratic” rhetoric was intertwined with militant Serbian nationalist rhetoric. The rally succeeded in inciting the most mundane impulses in the Montenegrin public. Similar rallies followed in other parts of Montenegro. Although the Montenegrin leadership managed to prevent attempted personnel changes in 1988, Yugoslav and Montenegrin initiatives to prevent the next wave of “anti-bureaucratic” campaigns failed. The situation culminated in a conflict near Žuta Greda in which the police were called to intervene and three months later at a rally in Titograd on January 10, 1989, which forced the collective resignation of the Montenegrin leadership the next day: “The two-day protest rally of over one hundred thousand workers, students, youth and citizens ended at around 2 pm on January 11, 1989, after all their demands were accepted. The then Vice President of the Parliament of SR Montenegro, B. Tadić, announced that in accordance with the demands of the rally participants, the following personnel would resign: the Presidency of SR Montenegro, the Presidency of the Central Committee of LC Montenegro and its executive secretaries, the Presidency of the Republic Commission of the Socialist League of the Working People, and members of the Presidency of the SFRY and the Central Committee of the SKJ from Montenegro: V. Đuranović, V. Žarković and M. Orlandić, and the Executive Secretary of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY, M. Filipović. ‘All demands have been met, the people have won’, Momir Bulatović said, among other things, congratulating on the victory to the raging crowd. He further emphasized: ‘The Montenegrin leadership lost a lawsuit with the people. One wrong policy crashed, in which attitudes were fabricated, adorned with rhetorical flowers, and the results of the actions were disproportionately little behind it. What happened was due to the justified dissatisfaction of working people, citizens, young people and students, The political earthquake from October 7 to 10 last year, was not enough to

break with such a policy. Because of all this, the people had to gather again'.²⁶² Exclamations, songs, chanting and inscriptions on the banners reflected the diversity of demands and attitudes of those present at the rally. They moved from social demands for the improvement of economic conditions, to nationalist slogans, and finally to attacks on the then Montenegrin leaders...”.

Although numerous actors of different political orientations and aspirations took part in the “happening of the people” in Montenegro, and although some key persons among them – depending on the changes in the “power relations” in Montenegro and outside Montenegro – changed their national political and other priorities even the goals until the state independence of Montenegro in 2006, in 1989 the winner was Slobodan Milošević. The consequences of his “crossing” the borders of Serbia with the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina in SFR Yugoslavia, largely in a state of disintegration, were catastrophic. Serbia could no longer be re-elected in federal bodies and organizations, and the Yugoslav People’s Army was potentially, as it would soon become, its ally.

Since the epicenter of change in Montenegro was in the University Committee of LCM, and the public bearers of change were mostly younger people, the joint session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCM and the Presidency of the University Committee of LCM, held on December 10, 1988, could create the impression of a “generational turn” in the Montenegrin Party as it faced the challenge of a multi-party system: “After the changes in Montenegro in January 1989, relying on the mechanisms and infrastructure, norms and rules of the previous regime, a certain division of functions was made to reconcile and satisfy the aspirations and wishes of the participants in the coup and part of the government administration, which needed for the system and institutions to function normally. It can be said that there was a certain mood among the main political leaders resulting from the January coup. The League of Communists

262 Pobjeda, 12. januar 1989., str. 5.

of Montenegro was already discussing, at least declaratively, political pluralism at its Tenth Extraordinary Congress in April 1989. (...) Although at their last congress (X Extraordinary, held in April 1989) the Communists of Montenegro discussed political pluralism, i.e. the need and possibilities of introducing a multi-party system, the assessment prevailed that ‘more parties do not mean more democracy’, so it could be interpreted that democracy can be achieved without a multi-party system and thus enter the transition”. Nevertheless, the political pluralism of the mass movement that legitimized changes in the Montenegrin establishment obliged the new leadership of the Montenegrin Communists to agree to the constitution of the Democratic Forum, which consisted of representatives of all political movements emerging out of January and post-January changes, and should have made the conditions for an open discussion of all key questions about the future of Montenegro and Yugoslavia certain, which made the situation in Montenegro different from that in Serbia.

However, in the first multi-party elections in Montenegro, in December 1990, the League of Communists of Montenegro won convincingly without a reformist addition to its name. Their program insisted – paradoxically – on continuity with the “old order” rather than on discontinuity, but in the second part of the XI Congress (June 22, 1991 – again, a symbolic date) they opted for a new name, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). In the second multi-party elections in 1992, the party, under its new name, won an absolute majority in the Montenegrin parliament: “... the supremacy of the DPS was still enough to win an absolute majority in Parliament (46 out of a total of 85 seats). It is interesting that the parliamentary list of this party attracted more voters in the December republican elections of 1992, as well as in the first multi-party elections in 1990, than the lists of all other parties represented in the Montenegrin parliament. Comparatively speaking, the DPS is the only party in the post-communist countries of Central and Southeast Europe that, having won an absolute majority in Parliament in the first multi-party elections managed to preserve that majority in the second

multi-party elections”.²⁶³ Regardless of everything that could be said about that absolute majority, it was obviously reconstituted amidst the horrors of the wars that caused the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which included the active participation of Montenegro in the alliance with Serbia to conquer Croatia.

CROATIA

Tomislav Badovinac, the tireless president of the Association of Societies “Josip Broz Tito” of Croatia, edited two books dedicated to Zagreb and Croatia in the “Tito era”, These books included some 80 testimonies and scientific contributions about Croatia as it was from 1945 to 1990 in the eyes of people who believe that Croatia’s historical heritage must be thought about critically.²⁶⁴ While writing my article about Croatia for this edition, I used many other works, but these two books especially intrigued me because they contained writings by people who were in different ways identified with “Tito’s Croatia” or “Tito’s Yugoslavia”. Their observations often expressed critical, and even very critical point of view (Milan Kangrga, Predrag Matvejević, etc.).²⁶⁵

Since Tito’s name is symbolically linked to the concept of socialist self-government, I checked what could be read about it in relation to him. Socialist self-government is mentioned relatively often in relation to Tito, but generally quite briefly and with the sense that it is not worth in-depth examination nor should it be glorified any longer.²⁶⁶

263 Vladimir Goati, *Izbori u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori od 1990. do 2013. i u SRJ od 1992. do 2003. godine*, Beograd 2013., 38.

264 Tomislav Badovinac, *Zagreb i Hrvatska u Titovo doba*, Zagreb 2004., 476 p.; Ibid, *Titovo doba. Hrvatska prije, za vrijeme i poslije*, Zagreb 2008., 570 p.

265 By far the most prolific Croatian historian on the history of Croats in Yugoslavia is Ivo Goldstein. For the purposes of this paper, I singled out Zdenko Radelić’s study *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji od 1945. do 1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza* (Zagreb 2006. i 2008. godine, 701 p.), which, by its plentifulness of themes and exact nature of insights, becomes ineluctable material.

266 Another such “silent” topic, with two explicit exceptions (Ivan Perić and Dejan Jović) are Serbs in Croatia.

The closest to glorification can be found in Adolf Dragičević's writings, and he, regardless of his reputation, was not a favorite of the "system": "The choice of the new and the better fell to the workers' self-government, but only in three of its important functions: decision-making by majority democratic overvoting, control of the execution of the decisions, and disposal of the realized income. The fourth and most important function – the function of preparing decisions – was retained by the party and state bureaucracy, using educated experts".²⁶⁷ Dragičević also considered the fundamental intentions of the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY and the 1976 Law on Associated Labor to be justified: "The novelty was the possibility and need of networking of economic entities, even of the basic organizations of joint work of different companies. It corresponded with a world turn in which traditionally fragmented community is replaced by – as its eminent theorist, Manuel Castels, calls it – a postmodern networked society. Along the way, however, the Croatian managerial elite imposed itself: by successfully penetrating world markets, establishing and developing internal scientific institutes, monitoring and adopting technological innovations, and changing the structure of production by training and hiring specialized experts".²⁶⁸ In contrast, Tomislav Badovinac himself, in the "Preface" to the same book, despite his belief that the path towards the development of self-governing socialism was historically justified, still rates it as lacking. I single out a few key criticisms: "The development of self-government and its success have increasingly lost their efficiency, and the much-needed solutions to contradictory difficulties and adequate further direction have been lacking. (...) The most important cause and the most responsible player is the League of Communists".²⁶⁹ According to Badovinac, it was not possible to transform the League of Communists from a "state

267 Adolf Dragičević, "Pogovor", in: *Titovo doba. Hrvatska prije, za vrijeme i poslije* (ed. Tomislav Badovinac), Zagreb 2008., 549–570, quote on p. 556.

268 Ibid.

269 Tomislav Badovinac, "Predgovor", in: Ibid, *Titovo doba. Hrvatska prije, za vrijeme i poslije*, Zagreb 2008., 7–18, quote on p. 16–17.

governing organization into a leading ideological and political force”, so the inevitable consequence was “the strengthening of bureaucratic tendencies and identifying with the role of self-management, imposing their own solutions, which were not always fully in agreement with self-management and further development of self-management. ... Legal frameworks were created but these were not the best solution, because there was no material basis for the for the achieved attainments of consciousness of self-managers. The Law on Associated Labor (ZUR, 1976) caused disunity instead of connecting the basic organizations of associated labor (OOUR). The technological units of companies are fragmented. (...) As a result, production stagnated and public consumption flourished, so companies had less and less income and accumulation at their disposal from year to year”.²⁷⁰ Badovinac also emphasized the effects of the republican-provincial *liberum veto* in federal bodies and organizations: “The desire for all decisions in the federation to be made by consensus has diminished its efficiency and reduced the possibility of resolving significant difficulties. (...) The 1974 Constitution enabled the republics to become independent as self-governing socialist republics, and they, unfortunately, became independent as nationalist-chauvinist republics, opposed to each other”.²⁷¹

Systematic research by many scientists about the Croatian experience of socialist self-government from 1980 to 1990, warned that the system suffered from unresolved issues that contributed to a variety of problems in Croatian and Yugoslav society. These scientists included: the sociologists Rudi Supek, Josip Županov, and Srđan Vrcan; the economists Vladimir Stipetić, Dragomir Vojnić and Marijan Korošić; the lawyers Eugen Pusić and Nikola Visković, and the political scientist Jovan Mirić. Warnings were also issued by people like Stipe Šušvar and Dušan Bilandžić, who enjoyed a special status among the political elite and the scientific community.

270 Ibid.

271 Ibid.

Table 2. Croats and Population of Yugoslavia and Croatia²⁷²

Year	Population of Yugoslavia	Croats in Yugoslavia		Population of Croatia	Croats in Croatia	
		number of	%		number of	%
1948.	15.772.098	3.784.353	24,0	3.779.858	2.975.399	78,7
1953.	16.396.573	3.975.550	23,5	3.936.022	3.128.661	79,5
1961.	18.549.291	4.239.809	23,1	4.159.696	3.339.890	80,3
1971.	20.522.972	4.526.782	22,1	4.426.221	3.513.647	79,4
1981.	22.424.711	4.428.043	19,8	4.601.496	3.454.661	75,1
1991.	23.472.000	4.664.292	19,8	4.784.265	3.736.356	78,1

I will dwell on Županov's critique: "... in constructing a self-governing project, the political elite started from a sociologically erroneous theory of social change:

- 1) Social change represents a sharp break with the existing reality – change means only discontinuity;
- 2) Change does not spring from the existing reality – it is revealed, imposed from above by the revolutionary avant-garde;
- 3) Change is imposed through new institutions, which means that the process of change is highly institutionalized;
- 4) Since new institutions are defined in legal norms, they are the main mechanism of social change. In other words, the process of change takes a characteristic form: project – realization".²⁷³

When it comes to the organizational level of self-government, Županov has long warned of the importance of his missing starting point: "In choosing the organizational level, the Yugoslav 'project' completely neglects the level of the working group. Self-management is centered at the level of the work organization with a tendency for self-management to be centered at the global level (delegate system). This is quite contrary to the sociological criteria that self-management is centered at the level where information and motivation are strongest".²⁷⁴ Since self-

272 Zdenko Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji od 1945. do 1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006. i 2008.), 538.

273 Josip Županov, *Poslije potopa*, Zagreb 1995., 15.

274 Josip Županov, *Poslije potopa*, Zagreb 1995., 17.

management was organized opposite to how it should have been, the failures in its development were, according to Županov, exponentially greater: “Transferring self-management, i.e. its focus, to the global level (“mastering extended reproduction” and similar slogans) has even less chance of success than self-management at the enterprise level. This is reflected in the complete failure of the delegate system, i.e. in the failure of delegations to direct the work of elected delegates. The delegate system has acquired a regressive character, as it replaces democracy in society, blocks the development of a democratic political system and protects the political elite from democratic political control”.²⁷⁵ Županov’s critique, at least in some of its aspects, coincides with Badovinac’s, which is undoubtedly directed differently: “some essential elements of ‘dogmatic Marxism’ remained unchanged. These are: an absolutely negative attitude towards private property, which is incompatible with socialism and even self-governing socialism, and therefore a negative attitude towards the private economy and entrepreneurship, an ambivalent attitude towards the market economy; a hostile attitude towards the peasantry; theory of class struggle and the working class; acceptance of the one-party system and the Party’s monopoly (avant-garde theory); acceptance of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat; firm representation of democratic centralism in the Party, etc”.²⁷⁶

The “Avant-Garde”, the League of Communists of Croatia, as well as everyone else in the republics and provinces and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia – in which the middle classes prevailed everywhere, people who for the most part no longer cared too much about “experiments” – clearly did not see their future in the labyrinths of self-management communication and social bargaining, the delegate system, etc. The reconstruction of the nation-state and civil society was already at their fingertips after all the crisis shocks of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, so that every League of Communists, republican and

275 Josip Županov, *Poslije potopa*, Zagreb 1995., 18.

276 Josip Županov, *Poslije potopa*, Zagreb 1995., 24.

provincial, was fragmented into smaller ones, political parties that emerged from the decision to hold democratic, multi-party elections.

In Croatia, this decision, in the best party manner, was made in December 1989 by the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCC, and then by the XI Congress of the LCC, on 13 December. Next up was the Republic Secretariat for Administration and Justice, which on February 5, 1990 issued registration decisions to representatives of eight political parties, and finally the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, which on February 15 adopted the necessary constitutional amendments and the Election and Revocation Act for councilors and representatives.

The first round of voting was scheduled for April 22 and 23, and the second for May 6 and 7, 1990: “1705 candidates, 33 political parties and 16 various associations took part in the race for 351 seats. With 42 percent of the vote, the HDZ won 205 (58 percent) seats. The second-best result was obtained by LCH-SDP with 26% of votes and 107 seats (30 percent). It was followed by the KNS People’s Agreement coalition with 15 percent of the vote and 21 seats (5.9 percent). The last party to pass the election threshold was the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), which won 5 seats (1.4 percent of the seats) with 1.6 percent of the vote. The rest of the mandate went to independent candidates and national minorities. Based on the election results, on May 30 of the same year, the first multi-party Parliament was constituted – a day that was celebrated until 2001 as Statehood Day. This Parliament passed many historically important decisions, including the Croatian Constitution on December 22, 1990, the Constitutional Decision on Independence and Autonomy on June 25, 1991, and the Decision on the Termination of State Legal Relations with the Former SFRY on October 8, 1991, by which Croatia de facto became an autonomous and independent state”.²⁷⁷

277 See https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrvatski_parlamentarni_izbori_1990. /accessed: 1.11.2021./ In the second parliamentary elections, held on April 9, 1992, the Social Democratic Party of Croatia fell from second to fifth place, with 5.52% of the vote and 11 seats (7.97%). See https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrvatski_parlamentarni_izbori_1992. /accessed: 1.11.2021./

MACEDONIA

Jasmina Trajkoska Navomoska – in addressing problems inherent in the economic system and, especially, in the business environment in Macedonia in the eighties – puts the blame first on the “distorted” operation of the market; second, on the inefficiency and even futility of planning; and third on the general market closure within the Republic administrative distribution of loans and foreign exchange. Federal guarantees for repayment of loans, annuities and business losses, inevitable and unrealistic prices, interest rates and exchange rates, which were administratively regulated, and, in addition to all the above, “non-compliance with self-governing agreements” regarding anomalies in income acquisition and distribution, a general overload of the economy and, finally, low work discipline and an irresponsible attitude towards mistakes in work and business.

Economic policy measures in Macedonia taken to address specific problems, according to the author, were ineffective because they failed to take into account that, without a global approach, partial attempts at problem solving, would reduce some problems but increase others. In addition, their propensity for in-depth analysis and searching for causes from the 1960s and 1970s, etc., led to the examination of causes that were older than the issues on the agenda, which further complicated decision-making and ultimately had a paralytic effect. This increasingly raised the question of the notion of self-government in relation to “objective economic laws”, the state as an agent of economic policy, the meaning and implications of replacing domestic accumulation with inflation and foreign loans, miscalculations of factors of production and, ultimately, the undeveloped economic system. In other words, ideological and political limits prevented the development of self-governing relations in a market-oriented economy, so that in the late 1980s it was officially concluded that the self-governing “socialist-based economic system did not provide a way out of the crisis”.

The focus of the search for a way out of the crisis shifted towards technological innovations. In 1989, a “Draft program for the implementation

of the strategy of technological development of SFR Yugoslavia in FR Macedonia” was prepared, with a focus on informatics, biotechnology, flexible production systems, industrial equipment, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, electrical machinery and appliances, vehicles, agricultural machinery, tools, tourism and food products. However, the key decision-makers in the normative socialist self-governing political and economic system in Macedonia remained the Party and the State. They held a monopoly on power and thus decisions on development policy.

The monopoly of power was only somewhat modified by the Trade Unions in the late 1980s, which sought to express and represent the interests of the working classes in decision-making processes. From 1986 to 1989, “bottom-up” pressures on real wages, but also on working and business conditions, intensified. They were increasingly related to decision-making methods in works councils and other self-governing and governing bodies, which expressed a loss of confidence in those responsible and, ultimately, in the political and economic system. Increasingly frequent strikes were gradually gaining more pronounced political characteristics: “The demands refer to: changing factory managements, quick implementation of reforms in the political and economic system, stopping social stratification and enrichment that is not the result of work, taking policies to stop inflation, etc”.

At the same time, the development of self-governing socio-economic relations in Macedonia was inevitably neglected, and the processes of combining work and resources on a Yugoslav scale were slowing down. The mentioned “Draft” therefore only normatively proclaimed development goals by which joint work was to fully master social reproduction by the year 2000, developing socialist self-governing socio-economic relations with a focus on building an “integral and creative personality”, with the aim of accelerating reduction and the difference in the level of development of FR Macedonia in relation to the Yugoslav averages, etc.

When it comes to the self-governing experiences and political culture of Macedonian citizens, research has confirmed that the experience of directly shaping the attitudes of individuals produced a

relatively high level of articulated public commitment. The actions of individuals, of course, correlated with various sociopsychological factors. According to public opinion polls from 1981, 75.9% of the citizens of FR Macedonia were of the opinion that nationalism was the greatest danger to the future of the Yugoslav socialist self-governing federation. When, in 1990, an amendment to the Constitution of FR Macedonia legalized political pluralism, lifted restrictions on the acquisition of private property, liberalized markets, etc., the value orientations of Macedonian citizens were after a decade of increasingly dramatic crises of Yugoslav society and the Yugoslav state union substantially changed.

Trajskoska Novomoska's very comprehensive account of the changes in Macedonia from 1980 to 1990 deals with the politically active League of Communists of Macedonia. Data from Macedonian public opinion surveys conducted in 1979 and 1981 are cited, which, among other things, check the perception of the communist figure among respondents. For many, communists were still supposed to be "people of a special kind" at the time, but those whom the respondents knew in one way or another were clearly not: "This is a period in which the League of Communists needs to reconsider its position among citizens and working people ... It is an interesting fact from the data that indicate that, although some schools of opinion said that "the time of communists has passed, and at this stage they should not be different from other citizens". Citizens and working people in FR Macedonia did not think so. Their common attitude was that a communist is a person who, out of personal conviction and without personal benefit, exemplifies the values of honesty and modesty, responsibility in performing work tasks, selflessness, willingness to fight for justice, having a Marxist view of the world, etc. In a previous survey in 1979, when asked: "In your opinion, should the criteria for admission to the League of Communists be stricter than the current ones?";

61.8% of the total number of respondents and 68.6% of the surveyed members of the League of Communists gave an affirmative answer.²⁷⁸

Such orientations of public opinion to some extent correspond to workers' behavior in strikes, which were an important phenomenon in Macedonian society in the period 1980–1990. Although the strikes were a new phenomenon of political participation in which workers publicly expressed themselves in new ways and even expressed resistance to the political system, they were “still under the great influence of the LCY”.

However, in the first multi-party elections in Macedonia in 1990, the League of Communists of Macedonia – the Party for Democratic Transformation won 25.83% of the vote and 31 seats, and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), 63% of the vote and 38 seats. Despite Macedonia leaving Yugoslavia without war, the reformed communists no longer had a future in the eyes of the Macedonian electorate.²⁷⁹

SLOVENIA

According to Božo Repe, the Slovenian decision to “dissociate” from Yugoslavia was decisively influenced by a variety of differences. The first concerned Yugoslavia as an alliance of independent states or a unitary state with Yugoslav national integration in perspective. The second, difference was over the development of a democratic,

278 It is necessary to warn Zagorka Golubović's remark from 1985 regarding the public opinion poll in the countries of “real socialism”: “... In the countries of ‘existing socialism’, which includes Yugoslavia, there is a great influence of ideology on the formation of attitudes, and the question cannot be avoided: what are the obtained attitudes – whether the real opinion of the respondents, or what they think is expected of them (especially if they are members of the LC)”. (Zagorka Golubović, *How to inform the Yugoslav public about writing about Yugoslav self-government*).

279 Etem Aziri, “Izborni sistemi i izbori u Republici Makedoniji. Prošlost, sadašnjost i izazovi za budućnost”, *Političke perspektive*, 7–21. Quote from p. 12.

multi-party parliamentary systems as opposed to the maintenance of mono-partisanship and the constitutionally guaranteed privileges of the ruling party that came with it. The third difference centered on the introduction of market laws and pluralism of ownership or a formally self-governing but truly state-run economy with dubious social ownership integration during a time when the fear of German and Italian historical “enemies” disappeared, which justified the Slavic commitment to Yugoslavia while the fear of Serbs and their political goals grew.

In such a problem grid, it is difficult to single out specifically self-governing issues, whether they are experiences that should have been given up or those that would happen in the future. However, regardless of how anyone outside Slovenia in the 1980s or even looking back today, would accept such exclusively formulated alternatives, it is an unquestionable fact that the system of socialist self-government in Slovenia before the 1980s resulted in a much more pluralized political culture than anywhere else in Yugoslavia and, perhaps more importantly, legitimized institutional actors who in various ways crossed the mono-party permitted limits of “pluralism of self-governing interests”. The author cites the political “jumps” of the Alliance of Socialist Youth of Slovenia, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Slovenia, the Marxist Center of the Central Committee of the Alliance of Communists of Slovenia and professional societies of writers, political scientists, sociologists, etc. In various ways in the first half of the 1980s, they influenced profound internal changes within the League of Communists of Slovenia and created the necessary preconditions for its reform transformation on the basis of a radical departure from “Titoist” ideology.

In addition to internal changes, no less important were the successive failures of key Yugoslav actors, centered in the Presidency of the LCY Central Committee and the SFRY Presidency, who were already functionally paralyzed by a system of annual rotations at the helm, to agree on anything that was constitutionally within the competence of

the federal state in situations of permanent crises that affected Yugoslavia as a whole and each of its citizens as individuals.

Until the beginning of 1989, the official leadership of the Slovene Communists tried not to radicalize their attitudes towards others in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia who were reform-oriented: "In January 1989, the LCS Central Committee Presidency still advocated that the LCS's vision was to develop non-partisan pluralism, in which the Socialist League of the Working People would permit the political parliament to be 'a space for democratic expression, confrontation and competition of initiatives and programs and control of their implementers'; socialism and self-government remained the foundation of the social order. The Socialist League of the Working People would be reshaped, together with the emerging alliances, while the competition for projects and programs would be taken over from the classical parliamentary system and the political responsibility of their holders and implementers would be affirmed".

Internally, the "innermost circle" already had a significantly different political orientation, which radically exceeded the limits of socialist self-governing constitutionalism: "At the same time, the closest leadership of the LCS concluded that it was necessary to organize the LC as a modern party, as well as to prepare for the party game, and the quiet abandonment of the idea of non-party pluralism before membership was justified by the fact that the situation changed, that Slovenian society had become pluralistic, that the transition to a democratic order required a legitimate government based on a 'time-limited, divided and democratically controlled structure of government institutions', which should 'allow political actors to decide for themselves what type of political organization (movement, alliance, party etc.) they prefer'. Given that in 1986, public opinion polls showed that 60% of Slovenian citizens – in contrast to numerous oppositional distances from institutional political actors – "had confidence in the system of socialist self-government", the question arises as to what delegitimized socialist self-government in Slovenia itself, regardless of Yugoslav disputes over it. In other words, why, could not at least some

important aspects of socialist self-government have survived the end of communist monopolism? Does the answer lie partly in the anti-communist mobilization of public opinion in the summer of 1991, which was not only Serbophobic and Yugoslav-phobic, but required a shift to new German and Italian “strategic partners, essentially discarding everything that bound Slovenes to Yugoslav socialist heritage? The historical paradox, however, is that nowhere in Yugoslavia was socialist self-government as productive as in Slovenia.

In his article on Slovenia in the period from 1980 to 1990, Božo Repe paid /much attention to the changes in the League of Communists of Slovenia. Starting from the claim that the position of President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCS in Slovenia was the most important position in the political system, his interpretation of the changes is largely personalized, with the focus remaining on that systemically most influential person. From 1982 to 1986, the top leader of the Party in Slovenia was Andrej Marinc, who secured a place at the apex of the Slovenian political hierarchy by participating in a showdown with the “liberal” Stan Kavčič, succeeding him as president of the Slovenian Executive Council (1972–1978). Marinc continued his political career in Belgrade as Vice President of the Federal Executive Council (1978–1979) and then as a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the SKY (1979–1982). After gaining the necessary federal experience, he returned to Ljubljana and replaced France Popit as President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party, where he remained for the next four years (1982–1986). From the perspective of the changes that took place in the second half of the 1980s, Marinc embodied a policy of continuity (e.g., support for heavy industry in crisis years); controlled discontinuity, e.g., limiting the use of repression in disputed cases; changing of attitudes towards the “dark” sides of the communist past (research of the so-called Dachau processes); opening opportunities for dialogue within the media, while also negotiating control of opposition media (“Mladina”); launching the “New Review”, etc. The members of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCS were in the “field”

practically every day, “sector” issues were openly discussed, etc. The inner being of the League of Communists of Slovenia was gradually changing, but the leadership lacked a clear longer-term orientation.

Marinc had a decisive influence in reconciling the “old” and the “young”, which paved the way for Milan Kučan to take the lead in the League of Communists of Slovenia at its 10th Congress in April 1986. Although congressional rhetoric was still traditionally revolutionary, reforms were legalized that would open the door to non-partisan pluralism only two years later in 1988. Soon after, came the announcement of a possible “change of government”, culminating in the Decision of the XI (extraordinary) Congress of the League of Communists of Slovenia in December 1989, to go in a social democratic direction. In that sense, Kučan’s status in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was radically different from that of previous leaders. The Slovenian delegates elected for the XIV extraordinary Congress of the LCY received clear instructions on how to defend the new party identity, even at the cost of withdrawing from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and this time all under the leadership of Kučan’s successor at the helm, Ciril Ribičič.

Kučan’s understanding of social, economic, and political reforms encompassed neither the “letter” nor the “spirit” of the 1974 Constitution and the 1976 Labor Law other than recognizing the state’s right to self-determination, including the right to secede; hence, federalism as defined by said Constitution. The focus of the reforms was on pluralism, dialogical democratization, a creative attitude towards open issues in society, technological development corresponding to world trends and, in particular, an orientation towards European integration (“Europe now!”). He sought ways to use Yugoslav formulas to achieve the fundamental goals of reforming Slovenian politics. Nothing more than that.

Table 3. Relationship between League of Communists of Yugoslavia membership and population of Yugoslavia in 1978 (in%)²⁸⁰

REPUBLIC / PROVINCE	Population in Yugoslavia	Membership in LCY	Members of LCY in population	Difference: Members of LCY - population in SFRY	
B&H	TOTAL	18,7	16,3	6,5	-2,4
	Croats	/	/	4,1	-8,7
	Muslims	/	/	6,0	- 5,7
	Serbs	/	/	9,0	+9,8
MONTENEGRO	2,6	3,6	10,3	+1,0	
CROATIA	20,9	17,0	6,2	-3,9	
MACEDONIA	8,3	6,7	6,1	-1,6	
SLOVENIA	8,3	6,2	5,6	-2,1	
SERBIA	Inner Serbia	25,1	33,4	9,9	+8,3
	Kosovo	6,8	4,5	4,9	-2,3
	Vojvodina	9,2	11,2	9,1	-2,0
YUGOSLAVIA	100 %	100 %	7,5 %	/	

By the way, “LCY at the time of Tito’s death, as the only and leading political party, had 2,117,083 members, which is 9.5 percent of the population. In the first three years after Tito’s death, the number of members increased, but in the second half of the eighties it began to decline, especially drastically in Slovenia, where the membership had traditionally been smaller, about 6 percent of the population. The LCS also entered the post-Tito period as a monolithic party (it had the most members, 126,737 in 1983), with its own newspaper (The Communist), the Marxist Center, the Political School, the municipal and inter-municipal network and basic organizations in every company and institution. For a long time, however, it was not a workers’ party, but a party of the middle class: comprised of officials, teachers and others who associated membership with career advancement”.

In articulating his reform program, Kučan was receptive to alternative culture, civil society, various organizations and the media. After

280 Zdenko Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji od 1945. do 1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006. i 2008.), 520.

1988, he was even prepared to dialogue with the nuclei of emerging political parties. This secured him a respectable international status, but also provoked a deeply divided, largely reluctant reaction within the party establishments of the republican League of Communists and, in particular, the Yugoslav People's Army, which was increasingly the subject of fierce criticism in Slovenian public opinion at the time.

With the rise of Slobodan Milošević as the head of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1987 and the launch of the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" in Serbia which aimed to expand throughout the whole of Yugoslavia, battles began on both sides to support others in Yugoslavia. Deep stratifications had begun even earlier, after Tito's death, when the document "Baseline of the long-term program of economic stabilization" was agreed with a lot of hesitation and with partial agreement in the Federal Assembly, along with the later document on the reform of the political system of socialist self-government as well. All of this was insufficient, so the Slovenian delegation at the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia prepared proposals for a series of democratic reforms for the whole of Yugoslavia: "They referred to guaranteeing human rights, a multi-party system, abolishing verbal offenses and suspending political trials, settling the situation in Kosovo in compliance with the Yugoslav constitution, direct elections and reform of the federation and the LCY as an alliance of independent entities. All of the Central Committee proposals were rejected in a very hostile atmosphere, which is why the delegates decided to leave, which they did very thoughtfully, because they wanted to show Yugoslavia and the world that they were truly fighting for reforms and not just using tactics".

Although Ante Marković, president of the Federal Executive Council, was convinced that his reform policy would maintain and stabilize the Yugoslav state union, this was no longer feasible in the fundamentally changed realities of Yugoslavia in 1990.

On the other hand, "in (internal) processes in Slovenia, the influence of the League of Communists became weaker in the mid-1980s,

and the number of members began to decrease. There were several reasons for this. With the democratization of society, the importance of membership diminished, and leading positions in society (except in politics and some other spheres) could be reached without a party card. Leaving the party was also without any consequences, which especially affected a large part of the passive and politically disinterested membership. The inability to seek an answer to the economic and social crisis has eroded the reputation of the hitherto leading political organization. (...) The loss of membership was also influenced by reforms in the party, as well as the possibility of political engagement outside the SK, in various civil society organizations and emerging alliances”.

The finale: “In the elections, LCY-SDP found itself in an unusual situation. Although it was the winning party individually, it practically went bankrupt financially (inflation already had eaten a lot of money planned for the new building in the middle of the eighties), and its management did not listen to the advice of its economists to establish companies and thus ensure stable financial elections. The political school was closed earlier, the magazine *The Communist*, which was little read at the end of the eighties, despite it being quite a solid magazine which even opposition authors wrote about, also failed (it was succeeded by the magazine *Evropa*, which did not have a long life). All employees, including officials, had to go to the Employment Bureau (at the beginning of the 1990s, this was the second layoff in Slovenia, previously it had happened only to Iskra workers)”.

SERBIA

According to Dušan Janjić, the author of an extremely comprehensive and extensive study of Serbia in this period, one of the fundamental characteristics of political change in Serbia in the 1980s was “giving up building a society on the ideals of socialism, self-government, decentralization, national equality, ‘brotherhood and unity’ and peaceful conflict resolution”. It is understood that all these “givings up” did not take place in Serbia at the same time, nor in a linear

manner, and were by no means limited to Serbia. The greater the crisis of Serbian and Yugoslav society, the more “external” and “internal enemies” there were. The criteria for identifying “enemies” were still determined, as in Tito’s time, by an arbitrary attitude towards “the development of a self-governing socialist system” etc. The identification of “enemies” was the monopoly of key actors at the top of the League of Communists of Serbia in cooperation with key actors in the civilian and military security and intelligence communities. Situational variability of the criteria was regularly related to assessments of the “balance of power” between Serbia and the provinces, Yugoslavia and the world. The purpose of assessing the “balance of power” was to maintain a monopoly of power and authority. Hence, policy changes – however verbally and / or normatively legitimized by the “general line” of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia – were far from consistent in this crisis-saturated society: “This resulted in the collapse of the ‘socialist self-governing system’ and Yugoslavia, when the League of Communists itself ended its existence, and thus its rule”.

The political priority for the 1980s was the constitution of Serbia as a republic equal to others in Yugoslavia or, more precisely, the constitution of Serbia as a state. The intentions of the 1974 SFRY Constitution were obscure not only in state law but no less in self-government. They were seen as “endangering the existing division of power and a great risk for the then powerful”. The declarative call for socialist self-government, which was common to all political actors, regardless of mutual relations, nevertheless ranged from dogmatically expressed orthodoxy to critical affirmation with a focus on the need to “sacrifice significant forms of self-government in the interest of effective governance and political discipline”.

I have to add something independent of Dušan Janjić. Josip Broz Tito chose to be buried in Belgrade, in the “House of Flowers”, where his grave is still part of the Museum of Yugoslavia. It was his own decision. Although, it seems he was not optimistic about the future of socialist Yugoslavia, that is, any Yugoslavia, it could not be said that he wanted his grave to be in the capital of the independent Republic of

Serbia. How many times in Belgrade, as in many other places in Yugoslavia, did he say: “We have shed a sea of blood for the brotherhood and unity of our peoples. Well, we will not allow anyone to touch us or to ruin us from within, to destroy that brotherhood and unity”. He obviously wanted Belgrade to be and remain a symbol of such Yugoslav “brotherhood and unity”.

However, the way in which he treated his most reliable collaborator, Aleksandar Ranković, in Brioni in 1966, was a blow to conservative Serbia, which knew very well what “court coups” were. Likewise, the way in which Tito dealt with the party in 1972 – with the “liberal” Serbia of Marko Nikezić, Mirko Tepavac and Latinka Perović, along with a whole constellation of other equally young, educated, open to the world liberals, hit that other Serbia, the one facing the future, incomparably harder. The Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia from 1974, which was written for a Yugoslavia after Tito, contained many utopian projections that did not need (and did not have) direct practical implications. The result was that in the (con)federalized state union it petrified the status of Serbia and its provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, in a way that could / should have had the effect of a *Zeitbomb*. He entrusted the implementation of the constitutive provisions to his old war cadres, Draža Marković and Petar Stambolić, who did not receive flattering epithets neither in Serbia, nor outside of Serbia, when it came to their understandings of the equality of peoples and nationalities.

When Tito died, not only Belgrade, together with Serbia and Yugoslavia, paid him respects” but also a large part of the world did so as well in a way that became and remained paradigmatic. However, it did not take long for various Belgrades and various Serbias to start, often without consideration, to settle their accounts with the “locksmith”. There were those who wanted it on various sides of Yugoslavia, yet the priority lied with Belgrade, and everywhere in Yugoslavia it was understood as the beginning of the battle for a different Yugoslavia. In addition, the eruption of Albanian nationalism in the spring of 1981 – regardless of why and how it occurred – set back Serbian-Albanian / Albanian-Serbian relations for decades and disrupted the already

complicated relations between and within republics and provinces with a domino effect.

From then on, everything that happened in Belgrade was subjected to suspicion from various sides. The paradox was that in a prolonged crisis which manifested itself in more and more ways, solutions were nowhere sought by the logic of constitutional principles. Although everyone referred to the Constitution and the Law on Associated Labor, every attempt on the part of Serbia to harmonize attitudes between the republics and provinces that would not call into question the fundamental constitutional provisions, and that would regulate relations between Serbia as a republic and Kosovo and Vojvodina as provinces in a legally meaningful and sustainable manner, was essentially rejected. Federal harmonization of positions was often reduced to “someone’s” *liberum veto*, because the constitutional problems of relations between Serbia and the provinces were constantly given different contexts.

In his text, Dušan Janjić pointed out that in ten years, from 1980 to 1990, Serbia found itself in probably the most difficult situation in its modern history, primarily due to the irresponsibility of its own party-state nomenclature, which was definitively formed at the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia.

The populist stampede orchestrated by Serbia’s new strong man, Slobodan Milošević, in its various permeations (“anti-bureaucratic revolution”, “truth rallies”, “people’s events”) and *Wild West* operations (embargo on Slovenian products, incursion into the Yugoslav monetary system, etc.), repulsed every Yugoslav state union, inflamed Serbophobic nationalisms on all sides, and, in turn, initiated horrific wars that were to expand Serbia’s borders and gather all Serbs into one state.²⁸¹

281 “Milošević, who spoke about the importance of the unified Yugoslav market at all party gatherings, will in the end be remembered for the imposition of the economic embargo to Slovenia in December 1989. A principled recentralist would not dare introduce such an embargo after a simple political disagreement with the Slovenian leadership”. Or: “The probably most pronounced example of Milošević’s destruction of the institutions of the common state is the barging into the monetary system of the SFRY and the primary

The unfinished, but largely failed socialist modernization of Serbia from 1945 to 1980, could have been, as in the case of some other republics and Kosovo, the starting point for different development strategies and socio-political systems more appropriate to its reality and potentials within a Yugoslav, European and global environment. Why it did not become so, might have been best guessed at by Josip Broz Tito in a “Bolshevik” fashion at the VIII Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1964): “Just as in the conditions of bourgeois society nationalism is, in fact, only one form of manifestation of bourgeois class interests. So in the conditions of our society nationalism is predominantly a form of manifestation of bureaucracy and various hegemonic aspirations. However, once it emerges, even with this new feature, it spontaneously seeks to ‘connect’ with ‘classical’ bourgeois nationalism and to use its ideological arsenal. The bureaucratic character of this nationalism is best seen in the fact that it, in fact, most often seeks to mask the mentioned resistance to the development of social self-government, strengthening the role of direct producers and poses the greatest threat to nationalism and hegemony of any kind”.²⁸²

However, in the excellent article by Milan Gavrović “The Cold War after the Cold War” in Badovinac’s *Tito’s time*, it says: “Sometime near the end of Tito’s life, someone (probably some intelligence agency) submitted to the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia the text of a lecture given by National Security Adviser to US President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Stockholm or Amsterdam... Mr Brzezinski said that the communist regime in

emission of the National Bank of Yugoslavia in December 1990 – January 1991. On this occasion, the Republic of Serbia illegally ‘borrowed’ the dinar amount in the equivalent of 1.4 billion dollars at the time for the needs of budget payments”. (Aleksandar Miletić, “Generacije srpskih (re)centralista, 1968–1990: Oправдани zahtevi ili put u raspad Jugoslavije?”, p. 29 i 30).

282 “Izveštaj J. B. Tita na VIII kongresu SKJ”, in: Branko Petranović – Momčilo Zečević, *Yugoslavski federalizam. Ideje i stvarnost. Tematska zbirka dokumenata. Drugi tom 1943 – 1986*, Beograd 1987., p. 372.

Yugoslavia can be overthrown so that loans encourage its leadership's propensity to invest and spend. (...) In Mr. Brzezinski's words, the communist elites in all the Yugoslav republics could easily be recognized. (After the 1965 reform, the federation did not invest anything more) (...) Only a few years later, after Tito's death, Western financiers, exactly according to Mr. Brzezinski's prescription, suspended loans to Yugoslavia, leaving the country with large unfinished investments and without enough foreign exchange to import raw materials, intermediate goods and oil (...).²⁸³

KOSOVO

In his contribution, Memli Krasniqi pointed out the difficulties in the practical constitution of the delegate system, both from an organizational and functional point of view. The biggest problem was the passivity of the elected delegates, "who were not ready to open a discussion on various social and economic problems". It was different with the self-governing consensual connection of Kosovo's basic organizations of associated labor into one complex organization of associated labor. Thus, for example, "Kosovo Trade" was created with 10,000 employees and an annual turnover of 12 billion dinars, or over six hundred million US dollars at the current exchange rate. These were agreements that were supported and even encouraged by the provincial authorities.

By the way, using various provisions of the Law on Associated Labor, "many" organizations of associated labor, "even though they

283 Milan Gavrović, "Hladni rat poslije hladnoga rata", in: *Titovo doba. Hrvatska prije, za vrijeme i poslije* (ed. Tomislav Badovinac), Zagreb 2008., 187–188. Since this is an unverifiable diary entry, I will register that Kiro Gligorov, in a note to Dušan Bilandžić on 28 September 1980 spoke of how the foreign debt grew from one and a half billion dollars in 1972 to "16 to 18" billion in 1980: "It started when the Minister of Finance of Serbia, Petar Kostić, without the consent of the federation, took out a loan of one billion dollars for the Smederevo ironworks." (Dušan Bilandžić, *Povijest izbliza. Memoarski zapisi 1945–2005.*, Zagreb 2006., p. 206).

worked at a loss”, increased the salaries of employees, paid unearned benefits, etc.

The demonstrations in Kosovo in the spring of 1981, on March 11 and 26, and on April 1, 2, and 3, were characterized at the federal, republican, and provincial levels as “counterrevolutionary”. The reasoning was that they attacked the socialist self-government system and endangered the territorial integrity and independence of SFR Yugoslavia, ie because they were “directed against the constitutional order, socialist self-governing system, policy of brotherhood and unity, as well as against freedom, independence and the territorial integrity of SFR Yugoslavia”. The Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo, trying with all its might and arguments to calm the agitated masses, simultaneously had to oppose “any attempt by Serbian and Montenegrin nationalists to take advantage of the situation created after the student demonstrations”. However, recognition that the economic crisis was a major contributing factor to the mass expression of dissatisfaction came from the federal level (Stane Dolanc, member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY).

Student protests in Pristina, a city of 40,000 students (7,000 in Tirana at the same time), erupted on March 11 and 26, 1981 due to poor nutrition and housing conditions. , They immediately caused alarm at all levels of government in Kosovo, in Serbia and everywhere in Yugoslavia. The protests turned into mass demonstrations in Kosovo on April 1st, 2nd and 3rd with many different slogans, the most prominent of which was “Kosovo-Republic”. Bearing in mind that the population of Kosovo was on average the youngest in Yugoslavia and that, according to Krasniqi, of the 88,000 members of the League of Communists of Kosovo, 42% were under 27 and Albanians made up 65% of its membership, a mass protest mobilization of youth had far-reaching consequences in itself. In addition, these were the first mass protests “from below” in a country that was still experiencing the profound socio-psychological effects of Tito’s death, but also in which was potentially “boiling” on all sides. It was important for the provincial leaders to protect the constitutional position of the province, so

they themselves drastically sharpened their assessments of events and took adequate measures of repression. According to Krasniqi, “classification of the student demonstrations in 1981 as counter-revolutionary, despite the fact that there was no call for the overthrow of socialism as a socio-political order, and as nationalists and irredentists, directed against the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the SFRY, were the basis of the official policy of the LC of Yugoslavia, the LC of Serbia and the LC of Kosovo, which only deepened the gap between Albanians and Serbs. As the beginning of the creation of an anti-Albanian mood in FR Serbia and SFR Yugoslavia, it marked not only the brutal use of force by police units that came to Kosovo, but also the use of these events as triggers to attack and change the political elite in SAP Kosovo”.

Mass demands for the proclamation of Kosovo as a republic stemmed in part from the belief that fulfilling that demand would more easily address Kosovo’s fundamental development problems in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Dušan Dragosavac (Secretary of the LCY Central Committee Presidency) unequivocally ruled out such a possibility on April 15, 1981, citing constitutional impediments. Many Albanians in Kosovo saw this as an expression of intensified confrontation between themselves and the state leadership.

In the following years, until 1985, the key actor in the development of institutions and the application of socialist self-government norms was the League of Communists of Kosovo. During this period, the LC of Kosovo was experiencing bilateral pressure – on the one hand from the League of Communists of Serbia and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and on the other hand from the passive resistance of the majority of Kosovo Albanians. Their objections included corruption, abuse of office, delays in self-governing procedures, etc. – Despite the pressure, the LC of Kosovo acted in a way that brought results that were limited in scope.

The results were even smaller in 1986 when initiatives for socio-economic reform and constitutional change were intertwined at the federal level. A significant factor was that the Presidency of the SFRY

“demanded that during the constitutional changes not only some principles be respected but also changed, such as: the policy of brotherhood and unity and equality of all peoples and nationalities; the socialist self-government system; federal regulations and the constitutional position of republics and provinces, etc”.

Despite the shortcomings of both the organization and the functioning of the system of socialist self-government in Kosovo, the Kosovo economy recorded a 16.4% increase in industrial production in 1985, and for the first time achieved a positive foreign trade balance of \$11.9 million US dollars. Although 110 self-governing agreements on pooling financial resources and labor were signed at the time between various joint labor organizations from Kosovo and the Yugoslav republics, few were implemented. Numerous delays included funds from the Federal Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped along with incentive measures.

The development of Kosovo's autonomy in the period from 1966 to 1974 and in the years following the death of Josip Broz Tito, in the minds of many Kosovo Albanians along with undoubtedly many others in Serbia and Yugoslavia in the Yugoslav party nomenclature, was primarily related to Tito himself. Memli Krasniqi also testifies to this: “The process of national affirmation of Albanians and the new status of Kosovo was evidenced not only by two visits of J. B. Tito to Kosovo (1975 and 1979), but also by the fact that the Youth Relay, organized as part of the birthday (May 25) of the President of SFR Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito was last handed over on May 25, 1979, by the representative of the Socialist Youth Alliance of Kosovo, Sanija Hyseni. ... Kosovo and its representatives were supported by the President of SFR Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, especially from the 1970s until the end of his life. This was also seen in the case when the new composition of the Presidency of the SFRY was announced at the joint session of both chambers of the Yugoslav Assembly on May 15, 1979, with J. B. Tito expressing special gratitude to Fadil Hoxha for his contribution to the successful work of the Presidency of the SFRY”.

Many people, including non-Serbs, considered Tito to have an obsession with “weak Serbia in a strong Yugoslavia”, although one could agree, on the contrary, with Stipe Šušar: “He wanted peace and prosperity, and equality of people and nations in not just the country he headed, but in the whole wide world. And most of all, it remains in the historical memory of the people, and belongs to the future”.²⁸⁴ Contrary to indicators pointing to Kosovo’s growing lag behind the more developed Yugoslav republics and the province of Vojvodina, other undeniable signs coupled with and even more experience of epochal changes in Kosovo’s reality in socialist Yugoslavia, especially in Tito’s time.

However, when it comes to the constitutional status of Kosovo, as well as many other key issues affecting the survival of socialist self-governing Yugoslavia, the diagnosis made 40 years ago by Jure Bilić to Dušan Bilandžić on January 22, 1981 is still valid today: “... the whole system has been built for years around the danger of disintegration after Tito. Fear of the future”.²⁸⁵ The 1974 Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia, with its hypernormativism, in which a socialist self-governing utopia was densely intertwined with reflections of a realpolitik “balance of power” within a multinational state union, could not have needed the reliable constitutional support of Yugoslav society in facing inevitable, far-reaching reforms. The Constitution’s questionability was all the greater because its self-governing component, which, along with the Law on Associated Labor (1976), was supposed to guarantee the sustainability of the (con)federal construction, turned into an interpretive chaos that created more new problems than it solved.

The Presidency of the Provincial Committee of the LC Kosovo and the Presidency of SAP Kosovo – therefore, in party-state symbiosis,

284 Stipe Šušar, *Hrvatski karusel. Prilozi političkoj sociologiji Hrvatskog društva*, Zagreb 20042, 216 (“Riječ u Kumrovcu, 4. April 1999”).

285 Dušan Bilandžić, *Povijest izbliza. Memoarski zapisi 1945–2005.*, Zagreb 2006., 218. Frano Barbieri, also towards Dušan Bilandžić, was even more cynical: “... the actual problem that Yugoslavia faces is the shift from Tito’s monarchy to a republic” (Ibid, p. 206).

initiated in 1980 and 1981 a collection of socio-economic changes in collaboration with leaders from within the Province, from Serbia, from the other republics, and from the Federation. These changes aimed to provide longer-term solutions to the fundamental development problems of this lesser-developed Province. The effects of these changes were extremely limited and the situation in the Province became increasingly tense. Tensions were exacerbated by the situation in Serbia, where the economic crisis was taking an especially hard toll on its industrial giants (metallurgy, automotive industry, etc.), thus causing constitutional issues in post-Tito conditions to come into the limelight.

From 1981 onwards, , Serb-Albanian / Albanian-Serb relations in Kosovo intensified in a series of nationalist or chauvinistic paroxysms. Without delving into the interpretations offered here by Memli Krasniqi, Slobodan Bjelica and Dušan Janjić, it is important to point out that the unilateral de facto and legislative abolition of the 1974 Constitution by the Serbian Constitution in 1988 and 1989 multilaterally guaranteed that provincial autonomies, would experience violence of unprecedented proportions in socialist Yugoslavia. It also ensured both local and worldwide support for the Kosovo Albanian resistance, thus creating all the necessary preconditions for the establishment of an internationally recognized independent state of Kosovo.. In fact, on 23 December 1989, the Democratic League of Kosovo was formed, headed by Ibrahim Rugovawith a core of largely former members of the League of Communists of Kosovo, and it succeeded in developing a parallel government in Kosovo.

VOJVODINA

Discussing the problems of socialist self-government in Vojvodina in the early 1980s, Slobodan Bjelica emphasizes the legitimation principle towards the socialist autonomous provinces found in the policy of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. Thus, in January 1982, the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party interpreted “problems in achieving unity” in the Republic

primarily as “an expression of stagnation in the development of self-governing socialist relations and inconsistencies in achieving constitutionally established relations and responsibilities”. “Unity and togetherness” in the Republic were again the subject of a dispute at the session of the Central Committee of the LCS in November 1984. The argument took place during a discussion about the tasks of the Party in the “further development of the political system of socialist self-government”. On that occasion, the introductory speaker Bogdan Trifunović pointed out that “certain results” had been attained in achieving “unity and togetherness”, primarily in “self-governing association of work and resources on the entire territory of SR Serbia”, but that “essential” differences in understanding relations between the Republic and the provinces remained. The session ended with the adoption of positions to which “development of the political system of socialist self-government” remained as the common framework, while the dissonant tones about what was most controversial remained.

Regardless of the great and even huge differences between Vojvodina and Kosovo, the events in Vojvodina and the relations between Vojvodina and Serbia from 1980 to 1990 were largely conditioned by the relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The main reason for this is that both provinces had the same status in the SFRY Constitution and related constitutional acts. In the discussions on the constitutional status of the provinces, Kosovo issues were much more often on the agenda than Vojvodina, and the way of resolving some of them inevitably influenced the way of resolving others. This was due to the fact that the state-level legal aspects of the issue and their spillover to other areas would overshadow other problems. While the everyday life of Vojvodina and Serbia made additional demands, various open issues were more difficult to resolve due to the burden of the aforementioned aspects.

As early as the spring of 1981, “hostile and counter-revolutionary action” in Kosovo was used in Serbia as an argument to reconsider the constitutional status of the provinces. Such an approach was very

quickly rejected by Vojvodina at the highest level of the party and provincial presidency, but the issue remained open in the media. However, it was impossible to avoid a threefold questioning of normative and practical-political aspects, among which the national defense and social planning stood out. On that occasion, after lengthy discussions, it was possible to agree on at least some positions (for example, regarding the Law on Citizenship in SR Serbia). In 1982, the focus shifted to relations within the League of Communists of Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina, which was an integral part of the issue of change within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. This again became a topic of discussion in 1985. The procedure for the adoption of the Law on Internal Affairs and the Law on National Defense lasted until the beginning of 1984. The issue of further development of the system of socialist self-government came on the agenda at the end of the same year. Legislative activity continued in 1985 when the regulations regarding spatial and social planning were harmonized. The working group of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, led by Milan Kučan, joined the discussions taking place among the leaders of Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina, ultimately supporting the positions of the republican leadership. In May 1986, the party's statutory solutions were harmonized, which, in Ivan Stambolić's opinion, paved the way for constitutional changes. The political atmosphere in Serbia then changed with the retirement of Petar Stambolić and Draža Marković, and the new "duet" consisted of Ivan Stambolić and Slobodan Milošević. However, in the 1986 and 1987 talks, positions regarding constitutional changes were not agreed upon, which did not prevent the Assembly of SR Serbia from initiating them in September 1987. In the same month, on September 24, at the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, the "duet" Stambolić – Milošević broke up dramatically, and the issue of relations between Serbia and Kosovo came to the fore again. Stambolić was convinced that he had agreed with Kosovo's leaders on constitutional changes. Vojvodina members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, like Kosovo,

silently facilitated Milošević's confrontation with Stambolić, apparently in the belief that they would be able to more easily defend their understanding of Vojvodina's interests in negotiations with Milošević. However, Milošević's general purge of unsuitable cadres in Serbia and the strained attitude towards Kosovo did not herald better days in Belgrade-*Novi Sad* relations either. However, Milošević obviously could not support the rally in *Novi Sad*, because it added a new dimension to his policy towards Yugoslavia, which he was not yet ready for. However, on July 9, a well-known group from Kosovo arrived in *Novi Sad* and, refusing to talk in the provincial Socialist League of the Working People of Vojvodina, began a public gathering, which disrupted *Novi Sad*'s urban usages with its repertoire of slogans and manner of communication. At the session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia on July 14, the Vojvodina leadership was already on the "dock". In a dramatic sequence of events from July to October in *Novi Sad* and throughout Vojvodina, a "street democracy" and a multitude of political coups and counterattacks, with ambivalent reactions from federal centers, gradually created a situation in which provincial leaders had to resign on October 6, 1988. In parallel with the pressures in Kosovo, preconditions were created for the amendments to the Constitution of SR Serbia to be adopted on March 28 in the Assembly of SR Serbia. At the same time, the "purge" in Vojvodina removed several thousand "autonomists", and the Vojvodina political landscape took on a completely new look.

CONCLUSION

“The Communist Party of Yugoslavia will continue to fight for a fraternal, free and equal community of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. It will fight equally against the Greater Serbia hegemonists, who seek to re-oppress the other peoples of Yugoslavia, as they will fight against those who would try to sow discord and disturb the fraternal unity of the peoples of Yugoslavia for the interests of any imperialist power”.²⁸⁶ Josip Broz Tito announced this fighting commitment as the leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the commander of the Supreme Staff of the People’s Liberation Army and partisan detachments of Yugoslavia after visiting Bihać, on November 27. In 1942, the “Resolution on the Establishment of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia” was announced.²⁸⁷ He did so at a time when it was highly questionable whether it would be possible to create any Yugoslavia at all “after the war”. He spoke at a time when the restoration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was more likely on the side of the Anti-Fascist Coalition. Therefore, his unequivocal declaration for the “fraternal, free and equal community of all the peoples of Yugoslavia” gave the “anti-fascist” attribution of the People’s Liberation Movement and the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia a much more substantial and obligatory program and even assumed historically far-reaching consequences.

More specifically, what the “fraternal, free and equal community of all the peoples of Yugoslavia” meant, can be seen in the “Declaration of the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia”, “on the day of November 29, 1943 in Jajce”, under article 4: “to build Yugoslavia on a democratic federal principle

286 [Josip Broz] Tito, “Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji u svjetlosti narodno-oslobodilačke borbe”, *Proleter*, year XVII, vol. 16, December 1942. (See Branko Petranović – Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslavski federalizam. Ideje i stvarnost. Tematska zbirka dokumenata. Prvi tom. 1914 – 1943.*, Prosveta, Beograd 1987., 741–747. (quote on p. 747).

287 See Branko Petranović – Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslavski federalizam. Ideje i stvarnost. Tematska zbirka dokumenata. Prvi tom. 1914 – 1943.*, Prosveta, Belgrade 1987, 725–738.

as a state union of equal peoples”.²⁸⁸ The decision of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia to build Yugoslavia on a federal principle, adopted on the same day, says in the preamble: “Based on the right of every people to self-determination, including the right to secede or unite with other peoples, of all the peoples of Yugoslavia ... The Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia makes the following DECISION: (...) 2. In order to achieve the principle of sovereignty of the peoples of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia to be the true homeland of all its peoples and never again will Yugoslavia be built on a federal principle, which will ensure full equality of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins, ie the people of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Article 4 was of crucial importance as well: “National minorities in Yugoslavia will be provided with all national rights”.²⁸⁹

With the death of Josip Broz Tito, the direct loser was the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, as it was basically defined by the Program and the Statute, which were adopted on VII Congress (April 22–26, 1958). The program preamble explains the meaning of the document that was to guide it in its “leading political role”: “It is not a code of dogmas and ultimate truths. Our future social practice and scientific thought as a whole will overcome, correct, and perhaps to deny certain concrete attitudes, views and formulations, and thus affirm the revolutionary spirit and creative conception of the Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. That will be done by the social practice and scientific thought of the modern socialist forces in the

288 Ibid, p. 796.

289 This decision implies in principle the right to full equality of members of all peoples of Yugoslavia throughout the country as well as to full equality of peoples, obviously in terms of citizens of federal states, in their federal state. The guarantee of equality of people is expressed in both ways. The formulation of article 4, point 3, is also very important, because it concerns the national rights of national minorities and not the minority rights of members of national minorities.

whole world”.²⁹⁰ In just a few years, the primacy of “social practice” made most of this document pointless, and the changes that followed in the face of the inevitable contradictory “reforms” from the 1960s to the 1980s have called into question not only “immediate socialist democracy” but also socialism as a world process, as the Program understood it at the time. The only thing that would come on the agenda long before any other achievement of socialism in Yugoslavia was the League of Communists of Yugoslavia itself.

Its “disappearance” was programmatically conceived in a significantly different way. In the part of the Program called “Leading role and constant conscious action of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia”, among other things, it says: “The leading political role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia will gradually disappear in conjunction with the development and strengthening of more comprehensive forms of direct socialist democracy. This disappearance will go hand in hand with the objective process of the extinction of social antagonisms and all forms of coercion that have historically grown out of those antagonisms. But in order to achieve these goals, a constant conscious action of the communists is needed, through all forms of socialist democracy and the organization of the working people. The antagonistic forces have not yet been weakened to such an extent that they would cease to be a danger to the survival of socialism”.²⁹¹ It is a kind of historical sarcasm that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia disintegrated in a way that excluded not only the possibility for the development of any socialism, but also excluded the survival of any form of Yugoslavia.

Thus, everything that was created after 1945 as a more permanent and even lasting humanistic value became meaningless. The price of victory (“real losses”) in the national liberation war with goals proclaimed in such a way was 1,014,000 human lives, according to

290 Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije usvojen na Sedmom kongresu Saveza komunista Jugoslavije 22. – 26. April 1958., Belgrade 1980., 7–8.

291 *Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije usvojen na Sedmom kongresu Saveza komunista Jugoslavije 22. – 26. aprila 1958.*, Belgrade 1980., 233.

Bogoljub Kočović, and 947,000, according to Vladimir Žerjavić.²⁹² Such an appallingly high price obliged the Yugoslav communists – if nothing else – not to allow the horrors of World War II to be repeated in the event of the consumation of the right to self-determination and secession. That is the least they had to secure ten years after the death of Josip Broz Tito. However, less than ten years had passed when Slobodan Milošević in Gazimestan, on June 28, 1989, in front of allegedly two million people, in front of the entire Presidency of the SFRY, led by Janez Drnovšek, in front of the President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the SKJ Milan Pančevski, etc. stated, “We are again before battles and in battles. They are not armed, although arming ourselves is not excluded”. What could be expected from those who were already convinced at that time that the annulment of the fundamental values created in federal and socialist Yugoslavia *conditio sine qua non* was some kind of improvement for their people, free from any Yugoslav references.

We will not be able to verify the truth of Daniel Vernet and Jean-Marc Gonin’s allegations about the content of a private conversation between a French diplomat and Slovenian Prime Minister Lojze Peterle in early 1991, who tried to persuade him to postpone independence so as not to force Croatia to do the same.. Peterle, I repeat – *allegedly* replied: “ Cela fait des décennies qu’ils en rêvent: laissez-les donc se battre!”.²⁹³

Many other quotes from various parts of the disintegrating federal state from those years could be cited, and some of them have already become part of grand narratives in various performances and for various needs. The disintegration of the Yugoslav state union has not yet been put *ad acta*, although probably no one, regardless of nostalgia, cared about its restoration.

292 Bogoljub Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji*, London 1985., 124–125; Vladimir Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, Zagreb 1989., 116–117.

293 Daniel Vernet – Jean-Marc Gonin, *Le rêve sacrifié. Chronique des guerres yougoslaves*, Paris 1994., str. 131.