

•  
ANALELE ȘTIINȚIFICE  
ALE  
UNIVERSITĂȚII „ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA”  
DIN IAȘI  
(SERIE NOUĂ)

# ISTORIE

TOM LXVIII  
2022

Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași

## COLEGIUL DE REDACȚIE:

Nelu Zugravu (Iași), Neculai Bolohan (Iași), Alexandru-Florin Platon (Iași), Petronel Zahariuc (Iași), Ștefan S. Gorovei (Iași), Maria Magdalena Székely (Iași), Cristian Ploscaru (Iași), Claudiu Topor (Iași), Gabriel Leanca (Iași), Gheorghe Iacob (Iași), Ovidiu Buruiană (Iași), Victor Spinei, membru al Academiei Române (Iași), Ioan Aurel Pop, președintele Academiei Române (Cluj-Napoca), Ovidiu Cristea (București), Antal Lukács (București), Ion Eremia (Chișinău), Ion Varta (Chișinău), Dennis Deletant (Londra), Carol Iancu (Montpellier), Hans-Christian Maner (Mainz).

## COMITETUL DE REDACȚIE:

Laurențiu Rădvan (redactor șef),  
Lucrețiu Mihailescu-Bîrliba, Ionuț Nistor, Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu,  
Adrian Vițalariu (secretar de redacție),  
Mihai-Bogdan Atanasiu (secretar de redacție).

Responsabilitatea pentru opiniile exprimate în textele publicate revine în exclusivitate autorilor.

Manuscrisele, cărțile și revistele propuse pentru schimb,  
ca și orice corespondență se vor trimite redacției:

**Laurențiu Rădvan**

Facultatea de Istorie  
Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași  
B-dul Carol I 11,  
700506, Iași, România  
Tel.: 40-(0)232-20.12.74  
e-mail: radvan@uaic.ro

ISSN 1221-843X  
eISSN 2821-4617  
Printed in Romania



## CUPRINS

### Romanian-Serbian relations in the 20<sup>th</sup> century

Zoran Janjetović, <i>Romanian national minority in the Yugoslav Banat 1918-1948</i> .....	11
Adrian Vițalaru, <i>In the capital of the allied state. Romanian diplomats in Belgrade (1919-1941)</i> .....	25
Alexandru D. Aioanei, <i>Yugoslavia and Britain's clandestine actions in Romania during the Second World War</i> .....	39
Olivera Dragišić, <i>Italian precedent for the armistice negotiations with Romania in 1944</i> ..	51
Vladimir Lj. Cvetković, <i>Yugoslavia and the crisis of Petru Groza government (August 1945 – January 1946)</i> .....	65
Ionuț Nistor, <i>A marriage of convenience. The Romanian Workers' Party and the Yugoslav emigration in the early 1950s</i> .....	79
Petar Dragišić, <i>Serbian press and Romanian Revolution in 1989</i> .....	89

\*\*\*

Iulia Dumitrache, <i>Despre potențialul halieutic pontic la Ovidius</i> .....	101
Ionuț Acrudoae, <i>Cohortes I-VIII Breucorum în secolul I p.Chr. Locuri și oameni</i> .....	119
Nelu Zugravu, <i>Vasile Pârvan e Marco Aurelio</i> .....	145
Claudiu-Costel Luca, <i>Ciclurile monarhiei imperiale în Liber de Caesaribus – o abordare istoriografică</i> .....	159

\*\*\*

Alexandru Ștefan, <i>Tentația falsului diplomatic. Cazul lui Ștefan de Sânger, notarul conventului benedictin de la Cluj-Mănăștur</i> .....	169
Ștefan S. Gorovei, <i>Falsuri și falsificatori pentru istoria românească</i> .....	185
Radu Cărciumaru, <i>Greci la Târgoviște în veacul al XVII-lea. Interferențe istorico-arheologice</i> .....	197
Celestin Ignat, <i>Logofeția Țării Moldovei în cea de-a treia domnie a lui Gheorghe Duca (1678-1683)</i> .....	211
Mihai-Bogdan Atanasiu, <i>Documente inedite ale familiei Goia (I). Ramura lui Sandu Goia</i> .....	225
Gheorghe Lazăr, <i>Ajutoarele românești în favoarea așezămintelor athonite Karacalu și Marea Lavră. Noi mărturii documentare (sec. al XVIII-lea)</i> .....	261
Mihai Anatolii Ciobanu, <i>Două planuri rusești ale ansamblului Episcopiei Buzăului</i> ..	287
Laurențiu Rădvan, Mihai Anatolii Ciobanu, <i>Planul satului Lăzăreni (Iași) și surprizele sale: reședința lui Rumeanțev și schitul de la Stânca Jijiei</i> .....	303
Georgiana Mădălina Mihai, <i>Ținutul Romanului în cadrul organizării administrative a Moldovei în secolul XVIII – prima jumătate a secolului XIX</i> .....	321

## Cuprins

---

\*\*\*

Laurențiu Rădvan, <i>Noi contribuții privitoare la originea și activitatea arhitectului Johann Freywald</i> .....	337
Alexandru-Florin Platon, „ <i>La Révolution de la Grèce n'est qu'accidentelle...</i> ”: o versiune inedită a relației prințului Gheorghe Cantacuzino despre acțiunea Eteriei în Principatele Române la 1821 .....	355
Cristian Ploscaru, <i>O piesă de teatru și afacerea „idarelelor calpe”. Secvențe din istoria domniilor pământene</i> .....	413
Maria Rados, <i>Întâia reformă a școlilor din Moldova?</i> .....	429
Simion Câlția, <i>Decorațiile, instrument de guvernare în timpul domniei lui Carol I</i> .....	457
Claudiu-Lucian Topor, <i>Romania's Royal Legation in Germany before 1914</i> .....	473
Mihai Tudosă, <i>Orthodoxy and Orthopraxy Among Romanians During the Great War</i> ..	497
Ovidiu Buruiană, <i>The German military occupation in Romania (1916-1918) and its representation</i> .....	515
Liviu Brătescu, <i>Centenarul nașterii lui I. C. Brătianu (1921). Memorie socială și legitimare politică</i> .....	543

\*\*\*

<i>In memoriam: Ion Toderășcu</i> .....	559	
<i>Recenzii și note bibliografice</i> .....	561	
Sextus Aurelius Victor, <i>Liber de Caesaribus. Carte despre împărați, editio bilinguis</i> /ediție bilingvă, ediția a II-a revizuită și adăugită, traducere, considerații privind limba și stilul și notă asupra ediției de Mihaela Paraschiv, ediție îngrijită, abrevieri, studiu introductiv, ediții de izvoare folosite, notă asupra ediției, note și comentarii, apendice și indice de Nelu Zugravu, Iași, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași, 2022, 734 p. ( <i>Thesaurus Classicus III</i> ) (Cozmin-Valerian Broșteanu); Lactanțiu, <i>Instituțiile divine. Epitoma</i> , traducere și note Petru Pistol, București, Editura Sophia, 2019, 286 p. (Nelu Zugravu); Giovanni Filoramo, <i>Crucea și puterea. Creștinii, de la martiri la persecutori</i> , traducere din italiană de Dionisie Constantin Pîrvuloiu, București, Editura Humanitas, 2022, 486 p. (Nelu Zugravu); <i>The Dacians in the Roman Empire. Provincial Constructions</i> , edited by Sorin Nemeti, Dan Dana, Irina Nemeti, Eugenia Beu-Dachin, Luciana Nedelea and Timea Varga, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Mega, 2019, 443 p. ( <i>Casian Gămănuț</i> ); <i>The Roman Provinces. Mechanisms of Integration</i> , edited by Sorin Nemeti, Eugenia Beu-Dachin, Irina Nemeti, Dan Dana, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Mega, 2019, 368 p. ( <i>Casian Gămănuț</i> ); Yann Le Bohec, <i>Războiul în lumea romană 58 a.Chr.–235 p.Chr.</i> , Cluj-Napoca, Editura Mega, 2021, 348 p. (Alex-Marian Cornea); <i>Scris, scriitură, text în Țările Române (secolele XV-XVIII)</i> , volum îngrijit de Monica Dejan cu un cuvânt înainte de Maria Magdalena Székely, Suceava, Editura Karl A. Romstorfer, 2020, 288 p. (Alexandru Gorea); Mihail K. Qaramah, <i>O istorie a Molitfelnicului românesc. Evoluția formularelor Sfințelor Taine (sec. XVI-XVII)</i> , Alba Iulia, Editura Reîntregirea, 2022, 307 p. (Celestin Ignat); <i>Doi călători elvețieni și lumea românească la începuturile modernității (1808-1811): Léonard Revilliod și Charles René Pictet de Rochemont. Mărturii inedite</i> , editat		

## Cuprins

---

de Alexandru-Florin Platon, Iași, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2021, 398 p. (*Adrian-Ionuț Gilea*); Gheorghe-Florin Știrbăț, *Alexandru Enacovici. Din activitatea politică*, Iași, Editura PIM, 2019, 343 p. (*Andrei Bordeianu*); Radu Mârza, *Călători și pacienți români la Karlsbad. O istorie culturală a mersului la băi pe la 1900*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2022, 504 p. (*Renata-Gabriela Buzău*); Sonya Orfalian, *Mărturii ale copiilor armeni 1915-1922*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2022, 218 p. (*Bogdan Iuțiș*).

*Abrevieri* .....

597

## Yugoslavia and the crisis of Petru Groza government (August 1945 – January 1946)\*\*

For the most part of World War II, Yugoslavia and Romania were on the opposite sides although formally they were not at war, despite the decades-long, or even centuries-long tradition of alliance. The circumstances which contributed to that were the situation in Europe created with the rise of Hitler's Third Reich, followed by the outbreak of the war and especially the occupation of Yugoslavia in April 1941, as well as the German attack on the USSR in June of the same year, in which Romania also took part. Having suffered severe material and human losses on the front, in the summer of 1944, due to the advances of the Red Army, it became clear that the war was entering its final phase which was not unfolding in its favour, and following the coup d'état staged by King Michael, Romania abandoned the alliance with Germany and turned against it.

After the coup d'état in Romania on 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1944 and its switch to the side of the Allies and after the liberation of the largest part of Serbia in the autumn of that same year, Romania and Yugoslavia (then as the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia) both reached their common border on the Danube. However, both countries were only nominally restored in their pre-war forms, while in fact a process of social and economic transformation was launched in both of them under the influence of the USSR which would turn the two neighbouring countries into 'people's democracies' within the following several years, with single-party systems and a new role within the Soviet interest zone<sup>1</sup>. In line with its new

---

\* Senior Academic Associate, Institute for Recent History of Serbia, Belgrade; cvetkovicv@yahoo.com.

\*\* This paper is a result of work at the Institute for Recent History of Serbia, which is financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia based on the Agreement on Accomplishment and Financing of Scientific Research of NIO /Scientific Research Organisations/ in 2022, no. 451-03-68/2022-14/200016 of 04/02/2022.

<sup>1</sup> See more about it in: Branko Petranović, Sava Dautović, *Jugoslavija, velike sile i balkanske zemlje, 1945-1948. Iskustvo "narodne demokratije" kao partijske države*, Beograd, 1994; Marija Obradović, *"Narodna demokratija" u Jugoslaviji 1945-1952*, Beograd, Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1995; Şerban Rădulescu-Zoner, Daniela Buşe, Beatrice Marinescu, *Instaurarea totalitarismului comunist în România*, Bucureşti, Cavallioti, 2002; Gheorghe I. Ioniţa, *Istoria românilor – de la 23 august 1944 până în prezent*, Bucureşti, Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2001; Dennis Deletant, *Romania under Communist Rule*, Bucharest, Civic Academy Foundation, 2006; Андрей Милин, Мюдраг

orientation, Romania took the first steps with the aim of coming closer to Yugoslavia soon after the coup d'état of 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1944. On 3<sup>rd</sup> September already, Marshal Tito got the information from Moscow that the Romanian Ministry of the Interior issued a statement denying the legitimacy of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), because it was an 'artificial creation of Hitler's regime'<sup>2</sup>. Such an attitude of the Romanian authorities was of crucial importance, since it was exactly the Romanian recognition of that puppet state that was the reason of breaking off diplomatic relations in 1941<sup>3</sup>. The final confirmation of this stance of Romania was signing the Armistice Agreement between Allies and Romania on 12<sup>th</sup> September, by which Romania pledged to break diplomatic relations with Germany and its satellites, including the Independent State of Croatia<sup>4</sup>. On 1<sup>st</sup> October already, in his capacity of President of the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia NCLY, i.e. the interim government, Tito appointed Nikola Petrović – a member of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), which functioned as an interim National Assembly, as the interim representative of Yugoslav interests in Romania<sup>5</sup>. However, it was clear from the activities of Nikola Petrović and his successor, Nikola Grulović, who replaced him in Bucharest quite soon, that the attitude of Yugoslavia towards both Romanian governments, first the one of General Sănătescu, and then the one of General Rădescu did not live up to Romanian expectations. Although their task was to represent their country before the Romanian authorities, the first Yugoslav representatives in Bucharest did not meet any of Romanian officials until the end of 1944, having focused on contacts with the Allied Control Commission, which was dominated by the Soviets<sup>6</sup>. The reason behind such an attitude was the opinion of Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ/CPY) that those governments were too close to the Antonescu regime, since they inherited the administration, army and diplomacy from him without any significant changes. Only with the appointment of Petru Groza as Romanian Prime Minister, the attitude of Yugoslav authorities towards Romania would change importantly.

The government of Petru Groza, leader of the Ploughmen's Front, was sworn in on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1945, under Soviet pressure and following two weeks of unrest and riots in Bucharest. King Michael accepted it only after the promise of

---

Милин, Цветко Михајлов, *Срби у Румунији за време комунизма. Звучни архив и приручник о страдању*, Темишвар, Савез Срба у Румунији, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> Archives of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: AJ), Office of Marshal of Yugoslavia (KMJ) fonds, I – 3-b/527, Dispatch of Moša Pijade to Marshal Tito, no. 181, 3. 9. 1944.

<sup>3</sup> AJ, Government of Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Emmigration fonds (103), folder 60, file 280, Report of Report of Avakumović, Ambassador to Bucharest, to Dr Momčilo Ninčić, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, no number, 29<sup>th</sup> May 1941, 1.

<sup>4</sup> AJ, KMJ, I – 3-b/534, Armistice Agreement between Allies and Romania, 2.

<sup>5</sup> AJ, KMJ, I – 3-b/529, Power of Attorney of NCLY for Nikola Petrović, Belgrade, 01/10/1944.

<sup>6</sup> Владимир Љ. Цветковић, *Обнова дипломатских односа Југославије и Румуније после Другог светског рата*, у: "Токови историје", (2022), бр. 1, р. 136 – 137.

return of the Northern Transylvania to Romania. The government was politically diverse, although under control of the majority People's Democratic Front, dominated by the Romanian Communist Party (PCR)<sup>7</sup>. From that moment on, under the influence of USSR, a process of social and economic transformation began in Romania, similar to the one that had already started in Yugoslavia. This process was going to transform the two neighbouring countries into countries of 'people's democracy', with single-party systems and a new role within the Soviet interest zone<sup>8</sup>. In this process, which met much stronger resistance in Romania than in Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia openly provided support to the Romanian Communist Party in their ascent to power. This support was sometimes direct and sometimes indirect, as in the case of supporting the government of Petru Groza, which was accepted as a transitional formulation in the achievement of the final goal.

A positive attitude of Yugoslavia towards Groza's government was obvious even before the August crisis. In the beginning of May, reporting to Tito about Groza's wish to meet him, Yugoslav representative Grulović assessed Groza's government as the most popular of all the governments formed after the armistice had been signed. He underlined its activities on cleansing the state apparatus from fascist elements, on punishing war crimes, and numerous social actions taken, by which it became very close to Yugoslavia in its concept. Grulović emphasised that if Belgrade was planning to establish relationships with Romania, it had to be done with Groza's government in particular. The events that followed clearly demonstrated that official Belgrade shared Grulović's opinion: in May already, talks started on drafting a trade agreement between Yugoslavia and Romania. The first talks with the Romanian authorities on regulating mutual trade took place then but they failed to yield any results, primarily due to political reasons, because of the internal situation in Romania, in particular, because of the notorious dichotomy within the government of the People's Democratic Front. This dichotomy inside the Romanian government, which existed between the Romanian Communist Party and the Ploughmen's Front on the one side, and the Liberal and the Social-Democratic Party on the other side, was often manifested, and so was the case with the developing of trade relations with Yugoslavia. In this particular case, the bone of contention was the fact that Yugoslavia and Romania did not

---

<sup>7</sup> Ричард Ц. Кремптон, *Балкан после Другог светског рата*, Београд, Клио, 2003, р. 114-117; Ion Bulei, *Brève histoire de la Roumanie*, Bucharest, Meronia, 2005, p. 186-187; Bernard Lory, *L'Europe balkanique de 1945 à nos jours*, Paris, Ellipses, 1996, p. 27; *A History of Romania*, ed. by Kurt W. Treptow, Iași, The Center for Romanian Studies, The Romanian Cultural Foundation, 1996, p. 513-514; Овидију Печикан, *Историја Румунâ*, Београд, Бесједа, Клио, 2015; Gheorghe I. Ionița, *op. cit.*, p. 76-78; Ioan Scurtu, Gheorghe Buzatu, *Istoria românilor în secolul XX (1918-1948)*, București, Paideia, 1999, p. 492.

<sup>8</sup> See more about it in: Branko Petranović, Sava Dautović, *op. cit.*; Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988, III: Socijalistička Jugoslavija 1945-1988*, Београд, Nolit, 1988; Marija Obradović, *op. cit.*; Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, Daniela Bușe, Beatrice Marinescu, *op. cit.*; Gheorghe I. Ionița, *op. cit.*; Dennis Deletant, *op. cit.*; Андреј Милин, Миодраг Милин, Цветко Михајлов, *op. cit.*



have diplomatic relations at that moment. Namely, Nikola Grulović met Gheorghe Tătărescu, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs on 25<sup>th</sup> May, with the intention of learning more details on the recently signed trade agreement between Romania and the USSR, and also to deliver a list of goods which Yugoslavia wanted to import from Romania, and which were not included in the agreement with the USSR. On that occasion, Tătărescu was very determined and brisk, stating that Romania did not wish to establish trade relations with Yugoslavia before establishing normal diplomatic relations<sup>9</sup>. Grulović was puzzled by that, since before the meeting with Tătărescu, he had met Prime Minister Petru Groza on the same day, together with a couple of other members of the government, whose attitude was exactly the opposite of Tătărescu's – they were all in favour of developing and broadening the trade volume between Yugoslavia and Romania without delay, regardless of the non-existence of diplomatic relations<sup>10</sup>.

The issue of establishing trade relations with Yugoslavia in the end of May and the beginning of June 1945 seemed to have been very important for the Romanian government which endeavored to somehow pull out the country – which had ended the war defeated, and which did not have a peace treaty with the winning countries at that moment, from diplomatic isolation. However, it seems that there was no accord within the government on how to do that. Apparently, Tătărescu believed that by conditioning the trade cooperation he could force Yugoslavia into establishing diplomatic relations with Romania before Romania signed a peace treaty with the Allies, while the other members of the government most probably favoured the option of reaching the goal in small steps. Two weeks later, Stoicu, General Secretary of Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, invited Grulović for talks and confirmed the information Grulović had heard earlier that the Romanian government had recently discussed the need of Romania aiding the renewal of the neighbouring Yugoslavia by facilitating purchasing and import of necessary goods – for a start, 500 tons of salt which Yugoslavia could pay in lei<sup>11</sup>. Grulović assumed that the issue had been agreed upon almost unanimously because Stoicu later informed him that Romania was investing every effort in order to receive an approval from the Allies for establishing relations with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and asked Yugoslavia to support those Romanian efforts, while Romania would on the other hand, until that was fulfilled, strive to develop the trade relations with Yugoslavia as much as possible<sup>12</sup>. This meant that the faction within the Romanian government that saw the trade relations as means of easier

---

<sup>9</sup> Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia (hereinafter: DAMSPS), Strictly Confidential Archives (SPA), 1945-1946, folder 11, file 11, Report of Nikola Grulović, Representative of DFY in Bucharest, to Vladimir Velebit, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of DFY, 15/06/1945, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>11</sup> DAMSPS, Political Archives (PA), 1945, folder 27, Letter of Head of Political Department of the 1<sup>st</sup> Regional Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY, Confidential, no. 1624, 28<sup>th</sup> June 1945, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*.

and faster establishing of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia prevailed over the faction that was against such a view.

In mid-June, a secret meeting between Tito and Groza was organised. The purpose of this meeting was to overcome the mistrust which arose after the banned Slovene congress in Timisoara in the beginning of May 1945, which Romania viewed as a step towards achievement of Yugoslav aspirations to annexation of a part of the Romanian Banat. Although it is neither possible to find any stenographic notes nor any other document from this meeting in the Yugoslav archival materials which would directly corroborate that the meeting did take place, there is a lot of indirect evidence, both on Yugoslav and on Romanian side about it. On 25<sup>th</sup> May 1945, Nikola Grulović talked to Groza about his meeting with Tito and learned that Groza had asked the Soviets for their consent in that regard<sup>13</sup>. Two weeks later, Groza told Grulović he had the consent of the Soviets received from General Susaikow from ACC. They advised him that the meeting should be held in 'complete secrecy', in the border zone, so that if information thereof leaked into the public, explanation could be offered that the meeting had occurred by chance, during a regular inspection<sup>14</sup>. On the occasion of marking the two-year anniversary of the Faculty of Medicine in Timisoara in July 1947, Petru Groza himself said: 'Two years ago, I went to Yugoslavia to have talks with Marshal Tito. Belgrade had been in ruins then, so I was not able to recognise it a few weeks ago'<sup>15</sup>. It can be concluded from that address that he had been to Belgrade, most probably in July 1945. The above-mentioned time of his visit in 1945 also coincides with the rumors that went around in Bucharest at the time, on how Groza was planning a secret visit to Belgrade with one or two of his ministers in order to have talks with Tito. Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, American representative at the Allied Control Commission in Bucharest also wrote a note about it<sup>16</sup>. Finally, Groza's youngest daughter, Mia, left a testimony according to which, in July 1945, she accompanied her father on his trip from Deva via Novi Sad to Pančevo, where he had a meeting with Tito in a castle surrounded by a large park. Impressed by Tito's appearance in an elegantly tailored uniform, Mia Groza said that her father and Tito had discussed the issue of Banat all day and all night and that they had finally agreed that Banat should belong to Romania<sup>17</sup>.

Finally, on 13<sup>th</sup> August, the Romanian initiative for renewal of diplomatic relationships was accepted. Yugoslavia did not hurry with establishing diplomatic relations with Romania, bearing in mind the previously acquired impression that the Soviets did not want Romania to establish diplomatic relations with other

---

<sup>13</sup> DAMSPS, Strictly Confidential Archives (SPA), 1945-1946, file 11, dossier 16, Report of Nikola Grulović sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFY), Strictly confidential, no. 11, Bucharest, 15/06/1945, 1.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>15</sup> DAMSPS, PA, 1947, Romania, file 103, dossier 1, Report of FPRY Ambassador Dane Medaković on political situation in Romania in the month of July, Bucharest, 31/07/1947, p. 6-7.

<sup>16</sup> Dorin-Liviu Bîțoi, *Petru Groza, ultimul burghez. O biografie*, București, Compania, 2004, p. 338.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*.

countries on its own at the moment that the Soviets did not find suitable. Therefore, the formal start of the process of establishing diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Romania happened on the initiative of Bucharest, only after diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Romania had been established. The official proposal was communicated in person by Gheorghe Tătărescu to Nikola Grulović. Tătărescu pointed out that his government concluded that, right after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR, the same should also be done with Yugoslavia. Substantiating the proposal, Tătărescu said that establishing diplomatic relations was self-explanatory, since Yugoslavia and Romania were neighbouring countries ‘that had never had any conflicts in the past’, as well as that such a step suited the Romanian foreign policy which, now relying on the USSR, was intending to follow the ‘old tracks’<sup>18</sup>. Obviously, he had in mind the foreign policy of Romania in the period between the two world wars as well as the place and role of Romania and Yugoslavia in the so-called Versailles order, since he indicated a course which went from Belgrade via Bucharest to Moscow, and from there turning via Warsaw and Prague all the way to Paris as the course of the future Romanian foreign policy<sup>19</sup>. Conceived like this, the Romanian foreign policy of Tătărescu’s was rather his wish than a policy based on reality, which he apparently did not understand well, starting with his own position in the government of Groza, continuing with the status of Romania and the importance of France, which were not the same after the war as they had been before the war, all the way to the failure in understanding the foreign policy conceptions of the USSR. Finally, Tătărescu also failed to realise that the course of the Yugoslav foreign policy ended in Moscow, without turning towards Paris. The best illustration of this was the swift and short answer of Yugoslavia to the Romanian proposal: ‘tell the Romanian government to address us with their proposal through the USSR’<sup>20</sup>. This didn’t mean that Yugoslavia did not wish to renew the diplomatic relations with Romania, but rather that it did not want to bypass Moscow. Two weeks later, Belgrade asked Romania to send a note via Yugoslav embassy in Moscow and promised a prompt answer<sup>21</sup>. This explanation was sent because the information from Bucharest was late, so the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not aware that Grulović had already talked to Tătărescu on 27<sup>th</sup> August, and that Tătărescu told Grulović that Romania had received a consent from the Soviets for establishing diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, as well as that he would immediately send a

---

<sup>18</sup> DAMSPS, PA, 1945, Romania, folder 27, file 25, Dispatch of the DFY Representative Office in Bucharest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY, Confidential, no. 2447, Bucharest, 13/08/1945.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>20</sup> DAMSPS, PA, 1945, Romania, folder 27, file 25, Encrypted telegram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY to the DFY Representative Office in Bucharest, Confidential, no. 3206, Belgrade, 16/08/1945.

<sup>21</sup> DAMSPS, SPA, 1945-1946, folder 11, file 16, Telegram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY to the DFY Representative Office in Bucharest, Strictly Confidential, no. 121, Belgrade, 30/08/1945.

note with that request, through the Soviet government<sup>22</sup>. Upon the return from Moscow, which a delegation of the Romanian government had visited in the meanwhile, Prime Minister Petru Groza received a visit from Grulović, whom he said that it was going to be decided at the government session on 19<sup>th</sup> September who the ambassador to Belgrade was going to be and that he was going to inform him about it immediately<sup>23</sup>. However, the future Romanian ambassador to Belgrade was not appointed even one month later. According to the information of the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow, the reason behind it was the refusal of King Michael to sign any document of the government, including the one on appointment of an ambassador to Yugoslavia<sup>24</sup>. The process of renewal of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Romania was thus stalled for a while, due to the complicated internal political relations in Romania, i.e. due to the conflict between the King and the government.

Yugoslav support was evident especially during the crisis in relations between King Michael and the government of Petru Groza. In fact, this was an attempt of King Michael to prevent the process of sovietisation of Romania which was advancing faster under Groza's government than before. Encouraged by the Potsdam Declaration, according to which Romania was envisaged to establish a democratic government before signing the peace treaty and before being admitted into the United Nations, the King relied on the fact that the Western Allies did not recognise Groza's government due to the method in which it was established and due to its composition. In mid-August 1945, the King invited Groza to offer his resignation, but Groza refused it<sup>25</sup>. The King asked the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom for support, but he did not get it. Therefore, he went on strike of a kind, having retreated to Sinaia and refusing to have contacts with Groza and to sign decrees.

However, the communication breakdown between King Michael and the government of Petru Groza, and the crisis it created, slowed the normalisation of relationships between Yugoslavia and Romania. On the other hand, it also created an opportunity for the Yugoslav side to support Groza's government more openly. Yugoslav authorities were informed in detail about the course of the crisis and about the events in Romania, starting with 19<sup>th</sup> August and the official announcement of the USA and the UK that they did not recognise Groza's government and that they were not going to negotiate with it at the peace conference, continuing with the King's meetings with Groza when he was trying to force his resignation, all the way to the King's communiqué to the USA, the UK,

---

<sup>22</sup> DAMSPS, PA, 1945, Romania, folder 27, file 25, Telegram of Nikola Grulović to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY, Confidential, no. 3881, Bucharest, 02/09/1945.

<sup>23</sup> DAMSPS, SPA, 1945-1946, folder 11, file 16, Telegram of Nikola Grulović to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY, no number, Bucharest, 18/09/1945.

<sup>24</sup> DAMSPS, PA, 1945, Romania, folder 27, file 26, Telegram of the DFY Embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY, Confidential, no. 5249, Moscow, 20/10/1945.

<sup>25</sup> P. Џ. Крештон, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

and the USSR from whom he demanded support for establishing a new government<sup>26</sup>. Interestingly, despite the authorities having been well-informed, the Yugoslav public was left without any information. After the news on establishing diplomatic relations between Romania and the USSR, the leading Belgrade newspapers, such as the “Politika” and the “Borba”, did not write a single word about the events in Romania up until the visit of Petru Groza to Moscow in the beginning of September 1945. From that moment on, the Yugoslav press started publishing information on a daily basis, about Groza and Tătărescu’s stay in Moscow, on Groza’s meeting with Stalin; they reported on official press releases of the Romanian government about the visit, and published announcements of the People’s Democratic Front<sup>27</sup>. The Belgrade press paid special attention to the results of Groza’s visit to Moscow, reporting on the accounts of both Romanian and Soviet press that emphasised the importance of the achieved arrangements. Although it concluded that there was no change in the relationships between King Michael and Groza after the Moscow visit, Yugoslav diplomats estimated that the government’s position improved, especially with the general public<sup>28</sup>. What contributed most to such a public opinion was the provision of food from the USSR as well as mitigating of the severe reparations of Romania to the USSR.

A similar pattern is noticeable with regard to the riots organised on the occasion of King’s birthday on 8<sup>th</sup> November, by the so-called historical parties of Maniu and Brătianu, that lead to bloodshed with numerous victims. Already on the next day, 9<sup>th</sup> November, Grulović talked to Groza, who characterised the event as an attempt of a coup against the current authorities, organised by Maniu and Brătianu, aided from abroad<sup>29</sup>. That Grulović accepted this version of the event is visible from his detailed report to Belgrade, written one week later, in which he indicated the officers and soldiers close to the Legionary Movement as the main culprits for the conflict, as well as the members of the British and American military mission, who were present at the riots, instigating those who attended the protest to commit acts of violence<sup>30</sup>. Communists, Jews and labourers, who ‘happened to be there minding their own business’, were indicated as victims. Yugoslavia had no dilemma about it: the riots of 8<sup>th</sup> November were fascist, anti-Soviet, anti-Semitic, and directed against democratisation of the country. Articles

---

<sup>26</sup> DAMSPS, SPA, 1945-1946, folder 11, file 16, Report of Nikola Grulović to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY, Strictly Confidential, no. 21, Bucharest, 03/09/1945, p. 1-4.

<sup>27</sup> ‘Generalissimo Stalin Received Prime Minister and Members of Romanian Government’, “Politika”, 06/09/1945; ‘Statement by Romanian Prime Minister’, “Politika”, 06/09/1945; ‘Communiqué of Romanian Council of Ministers on Situation in Country’, “Politika”, 07/09/1945; ‘Declaration of Romanian People’s Democratic Front’, “Politika”, 08/09/1945.

<sup>28</sup> DAMSPS, PA, 1945, Romania, folder 27, file 10, Report of Nikola Grulović to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY, Confidential, no. 4845, Bucharest, 28/09/1945, p. 1.

<sup>29</sup> DAMSPS, PA, 1945, Romania, folder 27, file 10, Report of Nikola Grulović to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY, Confidential, no. 5980, Bucharest, 11/11/1945, p. 1 -2.

<sup>30</sup> DAMSPS, PA, 1945, Romania, folder 27, file 10, Report of Nikola Grulović to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DFY, Confidential, no. 6566, Bucharest, 15/11/1945, p. 1-2.

in the press, that started writing about the events with a delay of a few days – similarly to the manner demonstrated at the beginning of the crisis of Groza's government, reveal that such a view of the events was accepted by the competent Yugoslav authorities. The "Politika" wrote about the events on 13<sup>th</sup> November, reporting on the official announcement of the Romanian Ministry of the Interior<sup>31</sup>, while the "Borba" wrote about the massive riots only on 17<sup>th</sup> November, on the occasion of the funeral of the victims, when calls for a ban of the political parties led by Maniu and Brătianu were heard<sup>32</sup>.

The solution to this crisis, which had shaken Romania for several months already, was found out of the country, with an agreement of the great powers. The ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR, the USA, and the UK agreed in Moscow on 26<sup>th</sup> December 1945 that the Romanian crisis should be resolved by introducing one minister from each Maniu's and Brătianu's political party into the government<sup>33</sup>. Following an agreement with King Michael, Hațieganu and Romniceanu joined the government on 7<sup>th</sup> January 1946, by which the conflict between the King and Groza was ended, and his government was subsequently officially recognised by the Western Allies, in the beginning of February. In accordance with the official Yugoslav standpoint, the Moscow conference, at which the method of resolving the crisis was agreed on, was considered a great success of Petru Groza and democratic forces. In other words, the victory of Groza's option was regarded in Belgrade as a confirmation of correctness of the Yugoslav position.

Over almost five months of the crisis, Yugoslavia was striving to support the government of Petru Groza in many ways, both in political and in economic field. At the height of the crisis, a Romanian delegation arrived in Belgrade for negotiations on a trade agreement. The negotiations started on 20<sup>th</sup> November and ended by signing of the Trade Agreement on 15<sup>th</sup> December 1945. Two months before, in the beginning of October, the Romanian side was already sending the first lists of products which could have been considered for the exchange. Romania was ready to export oil and oil derivatives to Yugoslavia, including various types of oil, paraffin, Vaseline, bitumen, aluminum sulfate, ammonium nitrate, compressed ammonium, plaster, wood, charcoal, salt, and cellulose, and it was expecting to get the following goods from Yugoslavia in return: tannin, iron ore, scrap iron, copper, lead, zinc, antimony, aluminum, magnesite, chromium, hops, various types of leather, tobacco and cigarette paper<sup>34</sup>. Negotiations followed in Belgrade, where Nikola Petrović, Yugoslav Minister of Trade and Supplies, and

---

<sup>31</sup> 'Press release of Ministry of Interior of Romania on criminal activities of legionary elements in Romania', in "Politika", 13/11/1945.

<sup>32</sup> 'At the funeral of the victims of fascists in Bucharest, 500.000 citizens asked for a ban of Maniu and Brătianu's party and arrest of its leaders', in "Borba", 17/11/1945.

<sup>33</sup> P. Ț. Кремpton, *op. cit.*, 121; I. Bulei, *op. cit.*, 187-188; B. Lory, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>34</sup> DAMSPS, PA, 1945, fasc. 27, From the report of the DFY representative in Bucharest of 10<sup>th</sup> October 1945, Confidential, no. 7873, p. 2.

Constantin Agiu, Romanian Undersecretary of State, signed the Agreement on Exchange of Goods and Payment between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) and Romania on 15<sup>th</sup> December 1945<sup>35</sup>. The Agreement was signed with the expiry date of 30<sup>th</sup> September 1946, and a possibility of its extension. It specified types, quantity, and prices of goods, which were determined as goods desirable for mutual exchange<sup>36</sup>. The part of the Agreement which considered the payment arrangements between the two countries stipulated that all payments be made via central banks of the two countries, in particular by means of special collective accounts, in Swiss Francs<sup>37</sup>. This solution applied only to the payments from the exchange of goods while for other payments, the two governments agreed to start negotiations within a month and reach an agreement on non-commodity payments by 31<sup>st</sup> January 1946 at the latest<sup>38</sup>. In addition to their principal purpose, the negotiations and reaching the accord on the Trade Agreement between Yugoslavia and Romania also served a purpose of a specific kind of support to Petru Groza due to the fact that the Yugoslav side provided huge publicity to these events. Already on 21<sup>st</sup> November, the Belgrade daily "Politika" published an article over half a page on the start of negotiations, highlighting the words of Andrija Hebrang, Yugoslav Minister of Economy, that it was the first official contact between the two countries after the break of diplomatic relations in 1941, which was a proof that there were no controversial issues between the government of Petru Groza and Marshal Tito<sup>39</sup>. In order to emphasise the support to Groza's government even more, he added that the peoples of Yugoslavia were following with great enthusiasm the 'struggle of young Romanian democracy against the remnants of fascism and reactionary powers', as well as that people in Yugoslavia 'are cheering your every success and your every victory over the dark powers of the past which are doing everything in their power to prevent the rebirth and renewal of Romania'. The head of the Romanian delegation, Constantin Agiu, pointed out that the Romanian people could only watch with sadness as German forces crossed over Romania in order to attack Yugoslavia, because the anti-people regime of Antonescu was in power then. In contrast with those times, now both countries had governments, as he put it, 'of wide-ranging democratic concentration' which would endeavour to expand the cooperation. He also called the current negotiations, the negotiations of two friendly peoples and not of two

---

<sup>35</sup> AJ, Ministry of Trade and Supplies of DFY fonds (50), folder 64-138, Agreement on Exchange of Goods and Payment concluded between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Romania, 15<sup>th</sup> December 1945; Interestingly, Yugoslavia is referred to under its official name – FPRY in the text of the Agreement and in all the accompanying documents, both in Serbian and in French, while Romania is referred to only as Romania, without the term of reference: 'Kingdom'.

<sup>36</sup> AJ, Ministry of Foreign Trade of DFY fonds (9), folder 6, Overview of Trade Agreements, no number and date, p. 2.

<sup>37</sup> AJ, p. 50-64-138, Agreement on Exchange of Goods and Payment concluded between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Romania, 15<sup>th</sup> December 1945, Art. 7 and 8.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*, Art. 15.

<sup>39</sup> 'Yugoslav-Romanian Commerce Talks Started in Belgrade Yesterday', in "Politika", 21/11/1945.

merchants<sup>40</sup>. Once the negotiations were completed and when the Trade Agreement was signed, the Yugoslav press reported about it<sup>41</sup>.

In the field of politics, through its representative office in Bucharest, Yugoslavia maintained intensive diplomatic contacts with Groza and other members of his government. In the situation when Groza's government was isolated even from its own sovereign, such contacts were even more important. Yugoslavia was ready to go a step further in its support to Groza's government. Although Romania had not signed a peace treaty with the Allies at the time of King Michael's strike of its own kind, Yugoslavia was negotiating an establishment of diplomatic relationships with it. It was ready to go so far in its support, that it even agreed to send an ambassador to Bucharest without presenting credentials, since King Michael refused to sign any government documents or decrees at the time. The resolution of the crisis in January 1946 made that move unnecessary. Nevertheless, the readiness for such an unusual step in diplomatic practice remains an indicator of how far Yugoslavia was ready to go in its support to the government of Petru Groza.

Finally, over the crisis months, Yugoslavia intensified activities in the field and in the press directed at promotion of the traditional Yugoslav-Romanian friendship, as another form of support to the Romanian government. Yugoslavia was sending its official representatives to conventions of Serbs in Romania that supported Groza's government, while representatives of the Yugoslav government participated in conventions of Romanians in Banat. Nikola Petrović, who was just appointed Minister of Trade and Supplies in the Federal Government of Yugoslavia, although he had assumed the duty of a diplomatic representative of Yugoslavia in Romania only a few weeks before that, addressed the local Romanian population at the pre-election rally in Alibunar in mid-October 1945. Addressing the attendees in the Romanian language and referring to the traditional friendship, Petrović emphasised the wide extent of rights given to the Romanians in Yugoslavia after World War II, including the envisaged establishment of a Romanian-language eight-year grammar school in Vršac<sup>42</sup>.

As part of the efforts towards highlighting the friendship between the Yugoslav peoples and the Romanian people as much as possible, the Red Star Football Club was sent to Romania to play several friendly matches there. In Bucharest, the Red Star played matches against the best selection of Bucharest footballers and against the best selection of players from the country, while several days later, it had scheduled matches against Victoria FC in Timisoara as well as against the Romanian national team<sup>43</sup>. Another event that illustrates the

---

<sup>40</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>41</sup> 'Agreement on Exchange of Goods between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Romania signed', in "Politika", 16/12/1945.

<sup>42</sup> 'Rally of Romanians in Alibunar where brotherhood and equality among the peoples of Yugoslavia was demonstrated', in "Politika", 17/10/1945.

<sup>43</sup> 'Success of Red Star Football Club in Romania', in "Borba", 02/10/1945.



determination of Yugoslav authorities to support the government of Petru Groza in any possible way was when Archpriest Milan Smiljanić, Minister of Agriculture in the Federal Government of Serbia, was sent to Bucharest in mid-October, to represent the Serbian Orthodox Church at the Congress of Orthodox Priests of Romania, although he was not occupying any position in the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church and despite the fact that the Serbian and the Romanian Orthodox Churches were in the status of broken relations due to the Romanian acknowledgement of the so-called Croatian Orthodox Church. The Congress, attended by both the Romanian Patriarch Nicodim and Petru Groza, was convened with the intention of openly inviting the Romanian clergy to cooperate with Groza's government. Archpriest Smiljanić, as a 'representative' of the Serbian Orthodox Church reiterated the same invitation<sup>44</sup>.

The attitude of Yugoslavia towards Romania after World War II was before all determined by the positions of the two countries during the war that ended recently but also by the clear affiliation of Yugoslavia to the Soviet sphere of influence, which could not be said in the Romanian case. Unlike Yugoslavia, at the end of the war, Romania was on the threshold of a process of joining the future 'Soviet Bloc', which did not unfold without resistance from the Romanian part, in spite of the fact that it was occupied by the Red Army. Obviously, tending to the needs of the Soviet foreign policy, Yugoslavia treated the respective Romanian governments of General Sănătescu and General Rădescu, in which the Soviets did not have a prevailing influence, almost with ignorance. Only with the establishment of the government of Petru Groza, in which the Romanian Communist Party was calling the shots, Yugoslavia started to take active steps towards improving relations with Romania. This would especially become obvious during the crisis of the government of Petru Groza, from August 1945 to January 1946. Aware that it was a critical point, Yugoslavia invested every effort in diplomatic, political, and economic field, as well as in the sphere of propaganda, to support Groza's government. Yugoslavia saw it as a necessary interim solution, towards the establishment of a single-party 'democracy', which Yugoslavia itself had already turned into, followed by joining the 'Socialist Bloc' in which Yugoslavia, led by Tito, was considered one of the most loyal Stalin's allies.

---

<sup>44</sup> 'Congress of Orthodox priests in Romania attended by delegates of the Serbian Orthodox Church', in "Borba", 31/10/1945.

---

**Yugoslavia and the crisis of Petru Groza government  
(August 1945 – January 1946)**

*Abstract*

*This paper has been written based on the Yugoslav archival sources and relevant Serbian/Yugoslav and Romanian literature. It represents an attempt of reconstruction of Yugoslav policy towards Romania at the time of the Romanian internal crisis and the breakdown of communication between the King and the government. The emphasis was given to the Yugoslav support embodied in the readiness to cooperate with the government of Petru Groza in political, diplomatic, and economic fields despite the fact that diplomatic relations had not been established between the two countries by then.*

*Keywords: Yugoslavia; Romania; Yugoslav-Romanian relations; Josip Broz Tito; Petru Groza; sovietisation.*

## ABREVIERI

<i>AARMSI</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice
<i>AARMSL</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Literare
<i>AARPAD</i>	= „Analele Academiei Române”, seria II, București, 1879-1916
<i>AA.SS.</i>	= <i>Acta Sanctorum</i> , ed. Bollandisti, III <sup>a</sup> edițiune, Parigi 1863-1870
<i>AB</i>	= Arhivele Basarabiei
<i>ACNSAS</i>	= Arhivele Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității
<i>AE</i>	= L'Année Epigraphique, Paris
<i>AIR</i>	= Arhiva Istorică a României
<i>AIAC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj
<i>AIIAI</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>AIIC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj
<i>AIINC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională, Cluj
<i>AIIX</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>ALIL</i>	= Anuarul de Lingvistică și Istorie Literară, Iași
<i>ALMA</i>	= <i>Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi</i> . Genève.
<i>AM</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei, Iași
<i>AMAE</i>	= Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe
<i>AmAnthr</i>	= American Anthropologist, New Series, Published by Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
<i>AMM</i>	= Acta Moldaviae Meridionalis, Vaslui
<i>AMMB</i>	= Arhiva Mitropoliei Moldovei și Bucovinei, Iași
<i>AMN</i>	= Acta Musei Napocensis
<i>AMR</i>	= Arhivele Militare Române
<i>AMS</i>	= Anuarul Muzeului din Suceava
<i>ANB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, București
<i>ANC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Cluj
<i>ANDMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Direcția Municipiului București
<i>ANG</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Galați
<i>ANI</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Iași
<i>ANIC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale
<i>ANR-Cluj</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Cluj-Napoca
<i>ANR-Sibiu</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Sibiu
<i>ANRM</i>	= Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău
<i>ANRW</i>	= Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin-New York
<i>ANSMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Municipiului București
<i>ANV</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Vaslui
<i>AO</i>	= Arhivele Olteniei
<i>AP</i>	= Analele Putnei
<i>APH</i>	= Acta Poloniae Historica, Varșovia
<i>AqLeg</i>	= <i>Aquila Legionis. Cuadernos de Estudios sobre el Ejército Romano</i> , Salamanca
<i>AR</i>	= Arhiva Românească
<i>ArchM</i>	= Arhiva Moldaviae, Iași
<i>ArhGen</i>	= Arhiva Genealogică
„Arhiva”	= „Arhiva”. Organul Societății Științifice și Literare, Iași
<i>ArhMold</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei
<i>ASRR</i>	= Arhiva Societății Române de Radiodifuziune
<i>AȘUI</i>	= Analele Științifice ale Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași

- ATS = Ancient Textile Series, Oxbow Books, Oxford și Oakville  
 AUAIC = Arhiva Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași  
 AUB = Analele Universității „București”  
 BA = *Biblioteca Ambrosiana*, Roma, Città Nuova Editrice  
 BAR = Biblioteca Academiei Române  
 BArchB = Bundesarchiv Berlin  
 BAR int. ser. = British Archaeological Reports, International Series  
 BBRF = Buletinul Bibliotecii Române din Freiburg  
 BCIR = Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a României  
 BCMI = Buletinul Comisiei Monumentelor Istorice  
 BCU-Iași = Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, Iași  
 BE = Bulletin Epigraphique  
 BF = Byzantinische Forschungen, Amsterdam  
 BJ = Bonner Jahrbücher, Bonn  
 BMI = Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice  
 BMIM = București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie  
 BNB = Biblioteca Națională București  
 BNJ = Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher  
 BOR = Biserica Ortodoxă Română  
 BS = Balkan Studies  
 BSNR = Buletinul Societății Numismatice Române  
 ByzSlav = Byzantinoslavica  
 CA = Cercetări arheologice  
 CAI = Caiete de Antropologie Istorică  
 CartNova = *La ciudad de Carthago Nova 3: La documentación epigráfica*, Murcia  
 CB = Cahiers balkaniques  
 CC = Codrul Cosminului, Suceava (ambele serii)  
 CCAR = Cronica cercetărilor arheologice din România, CIMEC, București  
 CCh = *Corpus Christianorum*, Turnhout  
 CChSG = *Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca*  
 CCSL = *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, Turnhout, Brepols  
 CDM = *Catalogul documentelor moldovenești din Arhivele Centrale de Stat*, București, vol. I-V; supl. I.  
 CDȚR = *Catalogul documentelor Țării Românești din Arhivele Statului*, București, vol. II-VIII, 1974-2006  
 Chiron = Chiron: Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, 1971  
 CI = Cercetări istorice (ambele serii)  
 CIL = *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin  
 CL = Cercetări literare  
 CLRE = *Consuls of the Later Roman Empire*, eds. R. S. Bagnall, A. Cameron, S. R. Schwartz, K. A. Worp, Atlanta, 1987  
 CN = Cercetări Numismatice  
 CNA = Cronica Numismatică și Arheologică, București  
 CSCO = *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*, Louvain  
 CSEA = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiae Aquileiensis*, Roma, Città Nuova Editrice  
 CSEL = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, Wien, De Gruyter  
 CSPAMI = Centrul de Studii și Păstrare a Arhivelor Militare Centrale, Pitești  
 CT = Columna lui Traian, București  
 CTh = *Codex Theodosianus*. Theodosiani, Libri XVI cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis, I, edidit adsumpto apparatu P. Kruegeri, Th. Mommsen, Hildesheim, 1970-1971  
 Cv.L = Convorbiri literare (ambele serii)

„Dacia”, N.S.	= Dacia. Nouvelle Série, Revue d'archéologie et d'histoire ancienne, București
DANIC	= Direcția Arhivelor Naționale Istorice Centrale
DGAS	= Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului
DI	= Diplomatarium Italicum
DIR	= <i>Documente privind istoria României</i>
DIRRI	= <i>Documente privind Istoria României. Războiul pentru Independență</i>
DOP	= Dumbarton Oaks Papers
DTN	= <i>Din trecutul nostru</i> , Chișinău
DRH	= <i>Documenta Romaniae Historica</i>
EB	= Études Balkaniques
EBPB	= Études byzantines et post-byzantines
EDCS	= <i>Epigraphik-Datenbank Clauss-Slaby</i> ( <a href="http://www.manfredclauss.de/">http://www.manfredclauss.de/</a> )
EDR	= <i>Epigraphic Database Roma</i> ( <a href="http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php">http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php</a> )
EpigrAnat	= Epigraphica Anatolica, Münster
ERAsturias	= F. Diego Santos, <i>Epigrafiya Romana de Asturias</i> , Oviedo, 1959.
Gerión	= Gerión. Revista de Historia Antigua, Madrid
GB	= Glasul Bisericii
GCS	= <i>Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller</i> , Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1897-1969
GLK	= <i>Grammatici Latini Keil</i>
HEp	= <i>Hispania Epigraphica</i> , Madrid
„Hierasus”	= <i>Hierasus</i> . Anuarul Muzeului Județean Botoșani, Botoșani
HM	= Heraldica Moldaviae, Chișinău
HU	= Historia Urbana, Sibiu
HUI	= Historia Universitatis Iassiensis, Iași
IDR	= <i>Inscripțiile din Dacia romană</i> , Bucurști-Paris
IDRE	= <i>Inscriptions de la Dacie romaine. Inscriptions externes concernant l'histoire de la Dacie</i> , I-II, Bucarest, 1996, 2000
IGLN	= Inscriptions grecques et latines de Novae, Bordeaux
IGLR	= <i>Inscripțiile grecești și latine din secolele IV-XIII descoperite în România</i> , București, 1976
ILLPecs	= Instrumenta Inscripta Latina. <i>Das römische Leben im Spiegel der Kleininschriften</i> , Pecs, 1991
ILAlg	= <i>Inscriptions latines d'Algérie</i> , Paris
ILB	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae in Bulgaria repertae. Inscriptiones inter Oescum et Iatrum repertae</i> , Sofia, 1989
ILD	= <i>Inscripții latine din Dacia</i> , București
ILN	= <i>Inscriptions latines de Novae</i> , Poznan
ILLPRON	= <i>Inscriptionum Lapidarium Latinarum Provinciae Norici usque ad annum MCMLXXXIV repertarum indices</i> , Berlin, 1986
ILS	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , 1892
IMS	= <i>Inscriptiones Moesiae Superioris</i> , Belgrad
IN	= „Ioan Neculce”. Buletinul Muzeului Municipal Iași
ISM	= <i>Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor grecești și latine</i> , București, vol. I-III, 1983-1999
JGO	= Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas
JL	= Junimea literară
JRS	= The Journal of Roman studies, London
LR	= Limba română
MA	= Memoria Antiquitatis, Piatra Neamț
MCA	= Materiale și cercetări arheologice
MEF	= <i>Moldova în epoca feudalismului</i> , vol. I-XII, 1961-2012, Chișinău
MEFRA	= <i>Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Antiquité</i> , Roma

- MGH** = *Monumenta Germaniae Historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum Germanicarum medii aevi*, Berlin 1877-  
**MI** = Magazin istoric, București  
**MIM** = Materiale de istorie și muzeografie  
**MM** = Mitropolia Moldovei  
**MMS** = Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei  
**MN** = Muzeul Național, București  
**MO** = Mitropolia Olteniei  
**MOF** = Monitorul Oficial al României  
**Navarro** = M. Navarro Caballero, *Perfectissima femina. Femmes de l'elite dans l'Hispanie romaine*, Bordeaux, 2017.  
**NBA** = *Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana*, Roma, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum  
**NDPAC** = *Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichità Cristiane*, I, A-E, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2006; III, P-Z, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2008  
**NEH** = *Nouvelles études d'histoire*  
**OI** = Opțiuni istoriografice, Iași  
**OPEL** = *Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum*, vol. I-IV, Budapesta-Viena, 1994-2002  
**PG** = *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca*, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1886-1912  
**PIR** = *Prosopographia Imperii Romani. Saec. I.II.III*, editio altera, Berlin.  
**PLRE** = *Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, 3 vol., eds. A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, and J. Morris, Cambridge, 1971-1992  
**RA** = Revista arhivelor  
**RBAR** = Revista Bibliotecii Academiei Române, București  
**RC** = Revista catolică  
**RdI** = Revista de istorie  
**REByz** = *Revue des Études Byzantines*  
**RER** = *Revue des études roumaines*  
**RESEE** = *Revue des études Sud-Est européennes*  
**RHP** = *Die römischen Hilfstruppen in Pannonien während der Prinzipatszeit. I: Die Inschriften*, Viena  
**RHSEE** = *Revue historique de Sud-Est européen*  
**RI** = Revista istorică (ambele serii)  
**RIAF** = Revista pentru istorie, arheologie și filologie  
**RIB** = *Roman Inscriptions of Britain*, Londra  
**RIM** = Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, Chișinău  
**RIR** = Revista istorică română, București  
**RIS** = Revista de istorie socială, Iași  
**RITL** = Revista de istorie și teorie literară  
**RIU** = *Die römischen Inschriften Ungarns*, Budapesta  
**RJMH** = *The Romanian Journal of Modern History*, Iași  
**RM** = Revista muzeelor  
**RMD** = *Roman Military Diplomas*, Londra  
**RMM** = *Römische Militärdiplome und Entlassungsurkunden in der Sammlung des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums*, Mainz  
**RMM-MIA** = Revista muzeelor și monumentelor, seria Monumente istorice și de artă  
**RMR** = Revista Medicală Română  
**RRH** = *Revue roumaine d'histoire*  
**RRHA** = *Revue roumaine de l'histoire de l'art*  
**RRHA-BA** = *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire de l'Art. Série Beaux Arts*  
**RSIAB** = Revista Societății istorice și arheologice bisericești, Chișinău  
**Rsl** = Romanoslavica

---

<i>SAHIR</i>	= Studia et Acta Historiae Iudaeorum Romaniae, București
<i>SAI</i>	= Studii și Articole de Istorie
<i>SCB</i>	= Studii și cercetări de bibliologie
<i>Sch</i>	= <i>Sources Chrétiennes</i> , Paris
<i>SCIA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istoria artei
<i>SCIM</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie medie
<i>SCIV/SCIVA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie veche (și arheologie)
<i>SCN</i>	= Studii și Cercetări Numismatice, București
<i>SCȘI</i>	= Studii și cercetări științifice, Istorie
<i>SEER</i>	= The Slavonic and East European Review
<i>SHA</i>	= <i>Scriptores Historiae Augustae</i>
<i>SJAN</i>	= Serviciul Județean al Arhivelor Naționale
<i>SMIC</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană, București
<i>SMIM</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie medie, București
<i>SMIMod</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie modernă, București
<i>SOF</i>	= Südost-Forschungen, München
<i>ST</i>	= Studii Teologice, București
<i>StAntArh</i>	= Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica, Iași
<i>T&amp;MBYZ</i>	= <i>Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de recherches d'histoire et de civilisation byzantines</i>
<i>ThD</i>	= Thraco-Dacica, București
<i>TR</i>	= Transylvanian Review, Cluj-Napoca
<i>TV</i>	= Teologie și viața, Iași
<i>ZPE</i>	= Zeitschrift für Papyralogie und Epigraphik
<i>ZSL</i>	= Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde