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Political Parties and Movements as Alternative Options for Yugoslavia's Policy of International Cooperation

Familiarity with the practice in the foreign policy and diplomatic history of one country is especially important even for the contemporary conduct of foreign policy. Following the examples in that practice, all important aspects related to the activities in the sphere of diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations overlap, primarily those that provide valuable experiences in exceptional and specific situations in the field of foreign policy requiring special skills, competences and knowledge. In that sense, the parts of history characterized by crucial events for the destiny of a country are particularly important. Such special and fateful events abound with different moments and "case studies", out of which useful conclusions and observations may be reached in order to explain precisely and accurately certain historical issues. Their purpose is to obtain adequate responses to numerous questions dealing with current problems and to consequently improve the practice in the area of foreign policy, implement relevant diplomatic skills and increase the fund of knowledge in the field of international relations. One of such historical moments occurred in the years following the conflict between Yugoslavia and the USSR and the 1948 Informbureau Resolution, when the country suddenly faced a rather complicated situation in the area of foreign policy. Finding political allies in the world, notably in the West, was considered to be political priority in that moment. One has to bear in mind that former relations with the West were unenviable.

The subject-matter of this scientific paper is cooperation with political parties and movements as alternative political partners to official representatives of foreign countries in the Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy of the time. We endeavoured to analyse that cooperation following establishment and development of relations between Yugoslav communists with Socialist parties, movements and individuals from Western Europe in the period 1950-1960, as a special type of diplomatic and op-

erative “channel” in the foreign policy and the so called political “linkage” to the West and the world in the conditions of isolation. The topic is consisted of three parts. *The first part* covers the establishment of the first contacts and development of cooperation with European socialists in the period 1950-1953, i.e. from the beginning of intensive relations to significant historical turning point of this period, the death of Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, which created different climate in the international relations and new conditions for conducting foreign policy in Yugoslavia. *The second part* covers the period from 1953 to 1956, i.e. the period of stabilization and international consolidation in the Yugoslav foreign policy, both in relation to the USSR and to the West, but also to the Third World (postcolonial new area in global politics), through the prism of the continuation of relations with Western European Socialists. Relations with certain Western Socialist parties changed along with the change in the Yugoslav foreign policy orientation. Because of that, this segment has been explained using the examples of the continuation of relations with the five largest Western European Socialist Parties (British Labour Party, French Socialists, German Social Democrats, Belgian Socialists and Norwegian Labour Party). At that time, relations with those parties were the most intensive showing variability in the quality over time, ranging from estrangement, then indecisiveness, to friendship and affinity. In the final, *third part* we will endeavour to explain the practice and methods used during the establishment and development of cooperation with the European Socialist Parties and movements in the said period by means of several distinct most important examples (models).

When researching the given topic, i.e. during its scientific elaboration, formation and writing, the classical approach to historical science has been used. It implies collection and processing of primary and secondary historical sources and the usage of relevant literature. In order to collect primary sources, we did research in the Archives of Yugoslavia and Diplomatic Archive at the Serbian Foreign Ministry; numerous collections of published sources have also been used, whereas the secondary sources and material were placed in various domestic and foreign memoirs and in the memories of participants in the events, as well as in the relevant press belonging to the mentioned period. Historical sources were then combined with relevant headlines belonging to the corpus of foreign and domestic scientific and publicist writing, which encompasses miscellaneous relevant monographs, studies, articles, analyses and reviews of the topic studied in this scientific paper.

The aim of this research is to endeavour to explain the role and importance of a specific form of informal diplomacy (so called “ideological diplomacy”) when creating and implementing the foreign policy of one country by means of historical review and analysis of relations among Yugoslav communists (and thereby of Yugoslavia as a country). Historical segment used as a “case study” in this topic deals with one of the most complex foreign policy moments of Socialist Yugoslavia, dramatically permeated with the numerous aspects of the crisis in the international relations related to the Cold War. By perceiving the relations between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and different Western Socialist Parties, numerous specific moments of foreign policy practice, innovative initiatives, original operational methods and new means of communication, novel applications of old diplomatic skills, as well as importance of informal contacts, role of individuals’ activities and the role of ruling political factors in the state foreign policy in specific historical situations are refracted.

European Socialists and Yugoslav Communists 1950–1953. From the First Steps of Cooperation to Stalin’s Death

In the late 1940s, amidst the conflict with the USSR, Yugoslavia faced a specific and rather complex situation in the international politics. Initially, Yugoslavia got into a rather complex and complicated situation, facing isolation and prospective military aggression from the East, i.e. USSR and its allies. That caused problems in the economic field as well as in the military and defence area, which was dramatically perilous for the country that was underdeveloped at the time. Yet, the crucial problem was related to the international sovereignty of the country and its fundamental independence. The Soviet Union and the block of its satellite states, the so called “people’s democracies” launched a powerful campaign against Yugoslavia, political and economic blockade. As a result, their relations came close to an armed conflict and prospective military aggression from the East in the early 1950s.¹ Yugoslavia passed on the issue to a higher, state

1 For more info on Yugoslav-Soviet conflict, its consequences and Socialist Yugoslavia foreign policy of this period, see: Владимир Дедијер, *Изгубљена битка Јосифа Висарионовича Стаљина*, (Сарајево: Свјетлост, Просвета, Ослобођење, 1969); Ћedomir Štrbac, *Jugoslavija i odnosi između socijalističkih zemalja. Sukob KPJ i Informbiroa*, (Prosveta: 1984); Jadranka Jovanović, *Jugoslavija u Ujedinjenim nacijama 1945-1953*, (Beograd: ISI, 1985); Darko Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955*, (Zagreb: Globus, 1988); Ћedomir Štrbac, *Svedočanstva o 1948*, (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1989); Ivo Banac, *Sa Staljinom protiv*

level and internationalized it before the UN, in the autumn of 1949, which additionally heated up the situation giving it an international dimension.²

In addition, this situation created a special problem in the field of ideology. Namely, ideology represented an important segment of its political legitimization in the area of international relations. First and foremost, Yugoslavia was a socialist country, whose ruling party was not only the communist, but also the Stalinist one until the break-up with the Soviet Union in 1948, with the Yugoslav society developing following the Soviet model until that point. Since the Yugoslav leadership, having in mind the party it belonged to, was the communist one ideologically, it desired to retain its status at all costs. It also had a firm intention to keep the independence and international sovereignty of the state. On the other hand, it was obvious that support was to be asked from the West, given all the consequences and serious foreign policy circumstances. In addition to political support in the public, Yugoslavia obtained in the early 1950s a great amount of material assistance from the West, primarily from the US, comprising mostly of food and weapons.³ However, a logical question that appeared was how a country such as Yugoslavia, with the Stalinist ideological and political system and ruling communist ideology could cooperate with the Western capitalist countries and ask for political, material, and military aid, without being inevitably compromised in the socialist world and international labour movement?

Tita. Informbirovski rascjepi u jugoslavenskom komunističkom pokretu, (Zagreb: Globus, 1990); *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob 1948. Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa*, priredio Đ. Tripković, (Beograd: ISI, 1999); *Зборник радова са међународног округлог стола: Тито-Стаљин*, приредио М. Милошевић, (Београд: Архив СЦГ, 2007); *Velike sile i male države u hladnom ratu 1945-1955. Slučaj Jugoslavije*, priredio Ljubodrag Dimić, (Beograd: Filozofski fakultet, Arhiv SCG, INIS, 2008); Jovan Čavoški, *Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt 1959-1962*, (Beograd: INIS, 2009); Александар Животић, *Југославија, Албанија и велике силе (1945-1961)*, (Београд: Архипелаг/ИНИС, 2011); Александар Животић, *Југословенско-совјетске војне супротности (1947-1957). Искушења савезништва*, (Београд: Архипелаг/ИНИС, 2015); Александар В. Милетић, *Титов емисар Милован Ђилас. Дипломатско-преговарачке и спољнополитичке активности (1943-1953)*, (Београд: ИНИС, 2021).

2 See: Jovanović, *Jugoslavija u Ujedinjenim nacijama 1945-1953*, 85-93; Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu*, 37-58.

3 See: Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955. Jugoslovensko približavanje NATO-u* (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 2000); *Balkanski pakt 1953/1954*, priredivači dr Milan Terzić, dr Mihajlo Basara, Nemanja Milošević, Miljan Milkić, Dmitar Tasić i Tatjana Lečić, (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut, 2005); Ivan Laković, *Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951-1958* (Podgorica: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 2006); Александар Животић, *Вашингтонска конференција 1951* (Београд: Завод за уџбенике, ИНИС, 2015).

In a situation like that, a bridge of political cooperation with the West was of great importance to Yugoslavia. In addition, the West European Socialist and Social-Democratic Left presented a solid ideological alternative. It is important to emphasize that the first steps in the establishment of future non-aligned policy of Yugoslavia were created at the time. At that point, Yugoslav leadership commenced implementing the policy of neutralism, which was the policy of independence of small countries in relation to both confronted blocs, the Eastern and the Western one.⁴ Socialism played an important role in it as one of the means for political legitimization. Namely, the idea and attitude of Yugoslav leadership on the right of every country and every society to independent and original path toward socialism, was directly confronted to ideological monopoly and expansionism, not only of the USSR, but all Great Powers, as it was presented as a general orientation concerning the principle of independence of small countries as opposed to the large ones.⁵ Thus, “self-management system” as a specific socialist model that started developing in Yugoslavia at the time, presented a powerful symbol of Yugoslav independence and independent direction in the foreign policy area.

Owing to these reasons, the importance of cooperation with the West European Left was reflected in both the political and ideological sphere. The visits paid by the Western political representatives to Yugoslavia were regarded as important because the Yugoslav political leadership could get to know and liaise with the West. Yugoslav officials initiated such encounters and visits consciously as each political contact and relation in the West implied precious support for the current politics. Activities in this direction commenced in 1950. The first contacts were established with the British Labour Party, and later with all large and significant Western European Socialist Parties and movements, with special emphasis on the French Socialists, Belgian Socialists, German Social Democrats, Swiss Social Democrats, Spanish Socialists in exile, as well as socialists coming from Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and Denmark).

4 For more info on the idea of neutralism and origins of later “non-aligned” policy, see: Dragan Bogetić, *Koreni jugoslovenskog opredeljenja za nesvrstanost* (Beograd: ISI, 1990); Dragan Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike 1956-1961* (Beograd: ISI, 2006); Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju. O ideje do pokreta* (Beograd: Zavod za užbenike, 2019).

5 For more info on the Yugoslav usage of socialism in the foreign policy area following the break-up with the USSR, see: Милетић, *Титов емисар Милован Ђилас*, 229-324.

The goals of this cooperation were versatile and may be defined as “multi-level”. Getting acquainted, exchange of experience, conveying a positive image of Yugoslavia into the world, establishment of useful liaisons, contacts and friendships (primarily individual friendships between influential party members on both sides) were in focus. An attempt to extend political influence to political circles or even the governments of Western countries, primarily in terms of acceptance or at least of understanding Yugoslav foreign and domestic policy, but also finding concrete ways to help Yugoslavia when blocked and under threat from the East were seemingly of secondary importance. The level of influence was dependent on the fact whether the Socialists were in power or in the opposition and to what extent, if in power, they were represented in the governments of certain countries.

There was an abrupt ascent of the West European Left following the Second World War fuelled by the victory of The Allies. Socialist Left, but also Communists gained popularity in Western European countries. Consequently, there were several examples that governments were formed with Socialists as a majority or they formed Governments independently (the example of the British Labour Party) or they participated in governing coalitions with other parties, notably Christian Socialists and parties of the centre. Also, the Communists frequently participated in those coalition governments. It was until the late 1940s, when one could witness a sudden decline of Western European Socialists and the Left and repeated rise of Conservative Parties, parties of the right, centre and Christian Socialists (with the exception of most Scandinavian countries, where the Left maintained its dominance for many years).⁶

The British Labour Party was the largest and the most significant Western European Socialist Party that Yugoslav communists started cooperating with intensively in that period. Contacts and relations with the

6 For more info on the ascent and decline of the Socialist Left in Western Europe in the first decade following WWII, see: Stephen Padgett, William E. Paterson, *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe*, (New York: Longman, 1991); David Childs, *The Two Red Flags: European Social Democracy and Soviet Communism since 1945*, (London-New York: Routledge, 2002); Peter Van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development: The Globalization of Socialism and Christian Democracy 1945-1965*, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006); Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century*, (London-New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010); Talbot C. Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914-1960*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

British Labour Party had existed even before 1950⁷. However, the cooperation at an official, higher and more substantial level commenced that year.⁸ In the first phase of cooperation 1950-1953, rather intensive contacts were established and maintained, with cooperation developing through individual ties,⁹ i.e. visits of distinguished individuals from the circles of British Labourists who often paid visits to Yugoslavia, as well as via Yugoslav diplomatic consulate in Great Britain. That period of cooperation, primarily its very beginning, was regarded as highly important for Yugoslavia as the Labour Party was still in power in Great Britain at the time (until mid-1951 when Conservatives headed by Winston Churchill regained power).¹⁰ Consequently, among other things, Clement Attlee be-

7 See: Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), fond 836, Kancelarija maršala Jugoslavije (KMJ), 1-2-a/120, *Prijem britanskih laburističkih poslanika i podsekretara u Britanskoj vladi kod maršala Tita, (Beograd)*, 6. IX 1946; AJ, fond 836, KMJ, 1-2-a/124, *Prijem grupe britanskih parlamentara, laburističkih poslanika kod maršala Tita, (Beograd)*, 6. X 1947; AJ, fond 836, KMJ, 1-2-a/128, *Prijem člana britanskog parlamenta Konni Zilliacus-a, kod maršala Tita, Beograd*, 4. IX 1949.

8 The official visit of a high-delegation of the Labour Party to Yugoslavia was the event that marked the beginning of cooperation in September 1950. The Labour Delegation was headed by Morgan Phillips, the Party General Secretary and Sam Watson, the Chairman of Executive Committee. They stayed in Yugoslavia from 7 to 19 September 1950. The visit of a high-level Labour Party Delegation signified multidimensionally Yugoslavia's opening toward the West not only in realpolitik, but also symbolically. See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze (KMOV), Velika Britanija, 133/II-1, *Sastanak članova Izvršnog odbora NF Jugoslavije sa delegacijom Laburističke stranke Velike Britanije, održan 8. u 9. septembra u Beogradu*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-1, *Sastanak članova Izvršnog saveta Narodnog fronta Jugoslavije sa predstavnicima Laburističke stranke Velike Britanije, održan 15. septembra 1950*; Čedomir Štrbac, „Britanski laburisti u Jugoslaviji 1950”, *Jugoslovensko-britanski odnosi / Yugoslav-British relations*, Zbornik radova, ed. Petar Kačavenda, (Beograd: ISI, 1988), 331-344; Александар В. Милетић, „Пријем делегације британских лабуриста код маршала Тита у оквиру њихове прве посете Југославији, 1950. године”, *Токови историје* 1/2011, 137-164; Čedomir Štrbac, „Britanski laburisti u Jugoslaviji 1950”, *Međunarodni problemi* 4/1987, 543-551.

9 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-6, *Prepiska M. Phillips-V. Dedijer*, 6. IV-9. V. 1951; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-16, *Prepiska Jennie Lee-Vladimir Dedijer*, 6-7. XI 1951; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-25, *Pismo M. Phillips-a V. Dedijeru*, 14. V 1951; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-26, *Pismo M. Pijade M. Phillips-u*, 16. X 1952; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-28, *Pismo K. Zilliacus-a V. Dedijeru*, 12. XII 1952; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-29, *Pepiska V. Dedijer-M. Phillips*, 16-22. I 1953; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-32, *Pismo V. Dedijer Jennie Lee*, 23. II 1953; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-33, *Pismo M. Đilasa M. Phillips-u*, 31. III 1953., etc.

10 See: Александар В. Милетић, *Преломна времена. Милован Ђилас и западноевропска социјалистичка и социјалдемократска левица 1950-1954*, (Београд:

ing the Labour Prime Minister approved of military aid to Yugoslavia in early 1951¹¹ (which will be discussed in more detail in one of the following chapters). He also occasionally provided political support to the Yugoslav leadership that was defending from the USSR aggressive politics.

Regardless of the fact that the British Labour Party lost the election (October 1951) and joined the opposition, cooperation with the Yugoslav communists in the first three years of intensive relations (1950-1953) demonstrated continuity. Influential Labourists frequently supported Yugoslavia through different forums, including the Socialist International,¹² monitored activities and operations of the Yugoslav Party,¹³ paid visits to Yugoslavia,¹⁴ whereas the Yugoslav Party seemed cordial and moderate (having in mind the divisions in the Labour Party of that time).¹⁵

The French Party (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière – SFIO) was the second European Socialist Party after the British Labour Party in terms of importance, influence and size that Yugoslav communists were cooperating with in this period.¹⁶ The first unofficial contacts commenced at the same time as with the British Labour Party. In the fol-

ИНИС, 2019), 95-142; Nikola Mijatov, *Milovan Đilas i evropski socijalisti 1950-1958*, (Beograd: ISI, 2019), 58-66.

11 See: Милетић, *Титов емисар Милован Ђилас*, 325-360.

12 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-13, *Pismo Morgan Phillips-a Milovana Đilasa*, 28. август 1951; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-19, *Pismo Milovana Đilasa Morgan Phillips-u*, 4. decembar 1951; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-33, *Pismo Milovana Đilasa Morgan Phillips-u*, 31. mart 1953.

13 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-27, *Pismo Milovana Đilasa Morgan Phillips-y*, 22. oktobar 1952; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-30, *Pozdravni govor Sam Watson-a, pretstavnika Laburističke partije Velike Britanije*.

14 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-13, *Pismo Aneuren Bevan-a Milovanu Đilasu*, 2. jul 1951; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-25, *Pismo Morgan Phillips-a Vladimiru Dedijeru*, 14. maj 1952; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-26, *Pismo Moše Pijade Morgan Phillips-y*, 16. oktobar 1952; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-35, *Clement Attlee u Jugoslaviji (3-23. VIII 1953)*, 24. I-1. X 1953.

15 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-23, *Previranja u Laburističkoj partiji*, 21. mart 1952; „Диференцијација међу британским лабуристима. Два програма у једној партији”, *Борба*, 8. март 1952; „Ултимајум’ лабуристичке већине левици”, *Борба*, 9. март 1952; „Писмо из Лондона. Епилог последњег сукоба у Британској лабуристичкој партији”, *Борба*, 16. март 1952.

16 See: Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (DAMSPRS), Politička arhiva (PA)-1952, Francuska, f. 25, br. 417508, SFIO.

lowing years the cooperation was advancing.¹⁷ Initially they had unofficial individual contacts,¹⁸ presenting an introduction to official relations that commenced with the arrival of the first party delegations in Yugoslavia in mid-1951. Individual contacts were, primarily in the first phase of cooperation, of great importance for Yugoslav communists, as they were giving support to the Yugoslavs in different situations and international forums (Socialist International, publishing a journal, liaising with other parties, etc.), just like the British Labourists.¹⁹ The first SFIO delegation paid a visit to Yugoslavia in October, November and December 1951²⁰ presenting a sort of a predecessor to the most representative delegation,²¹ headed by General Secretary Guy Mollet, which was implemented from 26 March till 2 April 1952.²² According to the correct observation of certain authors, Guy Mollet's visit to Yugoslavia presented a lot more than

17 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/V-75, *Izveštaj o vezama sa francuskim društveno-političkim organizacijama u periodu od 1949. do 1951. godine*; DAMSPRS, PA-1951, Francuska, f. 25, br. 4512, *Telegram Petrovića, Pariz, 12. januar 1951.*

18 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-7, *Zabeleška o razgovoru S. Petrovića sa Georges Brutelle-om, 29. marta i 19. oktobra 1951, 29. III – 19. X 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-9, *Pismo Georges Brutelle-a jugoslovenskom predstavniku Petroviću, Pariz, 7. jun 1951*; DAMSPRS, PA-1951, Francuska, f. 25, 6p. 42184, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Georges Brutelle-a, pomoćnika generalnog sekretara i člana Glavnog odbora SFIO, 14. februara 1951*; DAMSPRS, PA-1951, Francuska, f. 25, br. 410014, *Zabeleška o razgovoru sa Julies Moch-om, 6. jula 1951*; DAMSPRS, PA-1951, Francuska, f. 25, br. 419115, *Zabeleška o razgovoru S. Petrovića sa G. Brutelle-om, 19. oktobra 1951*; DAMSPRS, PA-1951, Francuska, f. 25, br. 419115, *Zabeleška o razgovoru S. Petrovića sa Guy Mollet-om, 23. oktobra 1951.*

19 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-9, *Pismo Georges Brutelle-a Jules Humber-Droz-u, 7. jun 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-9, *Pismo Georges Georges Brutelle-a Milovanu Đilasu, 20. avgust 1951.*

20 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-11, *Zabeleška o razgovoru između druga Tita i članova rukovodstva SFIO: Leona Boutbien-a, Alberta Gazier-a i Andre Ferrat-a*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-13, *Poseta delegacije SFIO Jugoslaviji, od 22. novembra do 5. decembra 1951. godine*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-11, *Sastanak delegacije Francuske socijalističke stranke sa članovima Izvršnog odbora Narodnog fronta Jugoslavije, 4. decembra 1951. Stenografske beleške*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-11, *Izveštaj o boravku delegacije SFIO, 12. XI, do 5. XII 1951.*

21 DAMSPRS, PA-1951, Francuska, f. 25, br. 417600, *Telegram Srđe Price, Pariz, 21. novembar 1951.*

22 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-17, *Poseta delegacije SFIO Jugoslaviji, od 26. marta do 2. aprila 1952*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-17, *Zapisnik od 26. marta 1952. o razgovoru između članova delegacije francuske socijalističke partije i članova Politbira CK KPJ*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-17, *Razgovor Josipa Broza Tita i predsednika francuskih socijalista 31. mart 1952. Stenografske beleške.*

just a visit of a party delegation. Namely, General Secretary of the French Party, even though a member of the opposition at the time, actually presented “the French politics as a whole”²³, which is an indication of importance, authority and influence of not only SFIO but other significant parties upon the political reality in the world.²⁴

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD) presented an important party among the West Europe Socialist Parties that Yugoslav communists established cooperation with. Nonetheless, unlike with the British and French parties, the cooperation with the German party was initially more careful and cautious, though not weaker in terms of intensity and dynamics.²⁵ Contacts with German Social Democrats commenced as early as 1950. German Social Democrats expressed an interest in Yugoslavia and its politics whereas the Yugoslav side was striving to monitor the activities of SPD as intensively as possible.²⁶ However, the initiative aimed at visiting Yugoslavia by a SPD delegation was launched more openly as late as March 1952.²⁷ However, it was not until the first half of 1953 that the visit of the SPD delegation was arranged. In spite of that, intensive and continuous contacts were kept, to a great extent via Yugoslav diplomatic consulates in the Federal Republic of Germany.²⁸ Although the contacts between the two

23 Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu*, 373.

24 See: DAMSPRS, PA-1952, Francuska, f. 26, br. 417502, *Neka pitanja iz spoljne i unutrašnje politike i jugoslovensko-francuskih odnosa*.

25 Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 173-174.

26 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-9, *SPD štampa o politici KPJ*, 8. XII 1950; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-16, *Materijal o poseti poslanika SPD Jugoslaviji*, 8. III 1951; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-54, *Izveštaj o mišljenju nekih članova partijskog predsedništva SPD o Jugoslaviji*, 6. XII 1951.

27 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-84, *Beleška o razgovorima o poseti delegacije SPD-a Jugoslaviji*, 1952; DAMSPRS, PA-1952, SR Nemačka, f. 61, br. 410458, *Telegram MIP-u, Bon*, 1. avgust 1952.

28 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-66, *Zabeleška o razgovoru ambasadora FNRJ M. Ivekovića sa K. Schumacher-om*, 26. VI 1952; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-67, *Zabeleška o razgovoru ambasadora FNRJ M. Ivekovića sa Ollenhauer-om i Schumacher-om*, 2. VII 1952; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-81, *Zabeleška o razgovoru ambasadora FNRJ M. Ivekovića sa predstavnicima SPD*, 15. XII 1952; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-86, *Zabeleška o razgovoru ambasadora FNRJ M. Ivekovića sa predsednikom SPD E. Ollenhauer-om*, 27. I 1953; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-87, *Zabeleška o razgovoru ambasadora FNRJ M. Ivekovića sa Fritz Heine-om, članom rukovodstva SPD*, 2. II 1953; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-89, *Zabeleška o razgovoru ambasadora FNRJ M. Ivekovića sa predstavnicima SPD*, 7. II 1953.

parties were continuous and dynamic, German Social Democrats feared Yugoslav communists to a certain extent, primarily in the lifetime of SPD General Secretary Kurt Schumacher (who died in 1952), as the Yugoslav side was providing help to certain dissident groups (The Independent Workers' Party of Germany). Social Democrats perceived those groups as rivals.²⁹ This fact, as well as other not so negligible differences in the programme and ideology (parliamentarism, attitude towards the Cold War and Europe), were objectively hindering swifter and more open cooperation between the two sides.³⁰

The relations of Yugoslav Communists with the representatives of the Belgian Socialist Party could be assessed as special or even friendly (Parti Socialiste belge/ Belgische Socialistische Partij – PSB/BSP).³¹ Belgian socialists often supported Yugoslavia in various situations and openly defended and advocated its interests before other Socialist parties, movements and forums throughout the world, including the Socialist International.³² Individual connections with PSB were established quite early, even though Yugoslavia had been perceived politically and socially as “terra incognita” by the Belgians in the earlier period. The first representatives of Belgian socialists paid an unofficial visit to Yugoslavia as early as 1950, whereas cooperation “channels” worked perfectly the following year.³³ It is evident that Belgian Socialists very early on developed

29 See: Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 201.

30 For more info on West European policy and the policy of German Social-Democratic Party in this period, see: DAMSPRS, PA-1952, SR Nemačka, f. 60, br. 41571, *Mesečni politički izveštaj, januar, 1952*; DAMSPRS, PA-1952, SR Nemačka, f. 60, br. 410361, *Telegram MIP-u, Bon, 9. jul 1952*; DAMSPRS, PA-1952, SR Nemačka, f. 60, br. бр. 410361, *Telegram MIP-u, Bon, 18. jul 1952*; DAMSPRS, PA-1952, SR Nemačka, f. 60, br. 413166, *Telegram MIP-u, Bon, 29. septembar 1952*.

31 For more info on relations between the Yugoslav communists and Belgian socialists in the early 1950s, see: Aleksandar V. Miletić, “Yugoslav Communists and Belgian Socialists 1950-1956”, *Токови успонује*, 3/2021, 121-143.

32 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-11, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Milovana Đilasa sa Léo Collard-om, članom biroa SP Belgije i Van Remoortel-om, socijalističkim senatorom, 13. septembra 1951. godine*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-3, *Zabeleška o razgovoru L. Latinovića, poslanika FNRJ u Belgiji, sa Victor Larock-om, glavnim urednikom lista „La Peuple”, 27. februara 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-7, *Zabeleška o razgovoru L. Latinovića sa Victor Larock-om, sekretarom SP Belgije*.

33 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-7, *Zabeleška o razgovoru L. Latinovića sa Victor Larock-om, sekretarom SP Belgije, u periodu od marta do jula 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-8, *Zabeleška o razgovoru sa poslanikom u belgijskom Parlamentu, 21. avgusta 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-9, *Zabeleška o razgovoru sa Ernest Piot-om, generalnim sekretarom SP Belgije, u*

affection for Yugoslavia. They undoubtedly regarded it as a new and “exotic” country, observing it in many respects as a sort of social “experiment”. Paul Speyer, a young Belgian Socialist, declared inspirationally in 1950 that Yugoslavia was “the only perspective for the international labour movement”. “I will not diverge from that standpoint. I am aware of the fact that these writings on Communist Yugoslavia won’t help with my work and my clients, but this is who I am, when it comes to saying the truth, I will go through with it, even if it costs me my life”.³⁴

Official cooperation between the two parties commenced with the visit of a high-level delegation of the PSB, headed by President Max Buset, to Yugoslavia, which took place 21 July-2 August 1952.³⁵ The visit was organized on the initiative of the Yugoslav side, since every contact with the West, notably with organizations in favour of the Yugoslav Party, was politically beneficial for Yugoslavia.³⁶ Belgian Socialists were primarily interested in the Yugoslav attitude towards the Cold War and its policy towards the USSR and NATO. At the reception given on 30 July, Josip Broz Tito clearly declared that Yugoslavia’s stance was to maintain independence in relation to the two opposing blocs, and by extension NATO, but added that in the case of a Soviet attack on Europe, Yugoslavia would support Europe, i.e. the West.³⁷ Starting with this visit, which was perceived as pivotal in the development of further relations, cooperation with the Belgian Socialists markedly advanced. However, Belgian socialists were at times politically tactful (mostly because of public opinion and their current situation when it came to foreign policy). Thus, Belgian Socialists did not consider it necessary to send a delegation to the founding congress of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) in February 1953. Yet, observed as a whole, collaboration with the Belgian Socialists proved to be one of the warmest and most amicable among Western European Socialists, maintaining the same level in the period studied herein.

periodu od 1. juna do 7. septembra 1951; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-10, Zabeleška o razgovoru 21. avgusta 1951.

34 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-1, *Biografija Paul Speyer-a.*

35 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-19, *Delegacija SP Belgije u poseti Jugoslaviji, od 21. jula do 2. avgusta 1952; AJ, fond 836, KMJ, I-2-a/12, Prijem delegacije Socijalističke partije Belgije kod maršala Tita, Bled, 30. jula 1952; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-19, Razgovor Josipa Broza Tita sa delegacijom belgijskih socijalista, 30. jula 1952. godine.*

36 Miletić, “Yugoslav Communists and Belgian Socialists 1950-1956”, 127.

37 AJ, fond 836, KMJ, I-2-a/12, *Prijem delegacije Socijalističke partije Belgije kod maršala Tita, Bled, 30. jula 1952.*

Socialists coming from Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland) presented a special group among Western European Socialist Parties that Yugoslavia established cooperation with in the early 1950s.³⁸ Connections with Scandinavian Socialists were established in approximately the same time as with other large European parties. The Norwegian and Swedish party took the lead concerning this matter in the aforementioned period. The first contacts with the Norwegian Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet – AP/DNA) were established in the early 1950s. The official cooperation commenced with the visit of AP delegation to Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1951.³⁹ The affection of Norwegian Social Democrats (Labourists) for Yugoslavia was undoubtedly deep and strong throughout the entire period studied herein. The AP leadership was demonstrating it in practice. This was especially evident in the actions taken by Haakon Lie, General Secretary of the Party. He would often defend Yugoslav policy advocating it before miscellaneous organizations, particularly before the Socialist International.⁴⁰ The AP delegation arrived in Yugoslavia on 18 October and stayed there until 2 November 1951. This visit was an important phase not only in the cooperation between Yugoslav Communists and Norwegian Labourists, but also in the development of Yugoslav-Norwegian relations. This was primarily due to the fact that Norwegian Labourists were in power at the time and played the role of the most influential and powerful party in Norway. They marked an entire epoch in the Norwegian post-war history. A six-member delegation of the Norwegian Labour Party got the opportunity to visit several cities – Belgrade, Skopje, Ljubljana, Zagreb, Rijeka, Zenica, visit some factories and industrial

38 See: Aleksandar V. Miletić, „Unrealized Nordic Dream’. Milovan Đilas and the Scandinavian Socialists”, *Токови историје* 3/2015, 89-104; Aleksandar V. Miletić, „The Relationships between Yugoslav Communists and Scandinavian Socialists in the Light of Yugoslav Sources (1950–1953)”, *Acta Histriae* 1/2019, 75-87; A. Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 202-224; N. Mijatov, *Milovan Đilas i evropski socijalisti*, 79-85.

39 See: International Institute of Social History (IISH), ICFTU/ITUC Archives, ARCHH00622, 3033, *Poseta norveške delegacije Jugoslaviji*; AJ, fond 836, KMJ, I-2-a/60, *Prijem delegacije Radničke partije Norveške kod maršala Tita, Beograd, 29. oktobra 1950*; A. Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 206-211; N. Mijatov, *Milovan Đilas i evropski socijalisti*, 79-81.

40 See: IISH, Socialist International Archive, ARCH01340-853, *Odnos norveške partije prema SKJ, 10. mart 1953*; DAMSPRS, PA-1953, Norveška, f. 64, br. 415178, *Zabilješka o razgovoru savjetnika P. Popovića, sa Gen. sekretarom Radničke partije Norveške Haakon Lie-om u Oslu 22. septembra 1953*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Radna tela komisije, S/a-19, *O dosadašnjim vezama sa socijalistima (od početka – uključujući i 1953)*, 31. decembar 1953, 4-5.

plants and talk to the high-ranking officials, including Josip Broz Tito.⁴¹ This visit was really important from the aspect of sending a positive image about Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav society and system that were in the phase of formation at the time. The AP delegation was officially visiting the Foreign Policy Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CC CPY).

Yugoslavia established similar relations with the Swedish Social-Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti – SAP). Relations with the Yugoslav communists were established in mid-1951 and were characterized by intensive contacts, exchange of experience and public polemics, which was not a feature in the relations with other parties.⁴² Kaj Björk, a Swedish socialist and SAP Secretary for International Relations, visited Yugoslavia in April 1952 with the aim of getting acquainted with the Yugoslav system and society.⁴³ The relationships with Finnish and Danish socialists were not particularly developed, but they were uninterrupted. Relations with the Danish Social-Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne or Socialdemokratiet – SD) were more or less at a formal level (they became more intensive from the mid 1952), but they were far from being regarded as cold. So, the Danes supported Yugoslavia in relation to some foreign trade issues in this period, such as the issue of Trieste.⁴⁴ Relations with the Finnish Social-Democratic Party (Suomen sosialidemokraattinen puolue – SDP) were also rather superficial, notably owing to the geostrategic proximity between the USSR and Finland, which could put Finland to additional trouble. Thus, the Finnish Party demonstrated pronounced indecisiveness until 1953, particularly regarding the

41 AJ, fond 836, KMJ, I-2-a/60, *Prijem delegacije Radničke partije Norveške kod maršala Tita, Beograd, 29. oktobar 1951.*

42 The public is familiar with the theoretical polemic between Kaj Björk, SAP Secretary for International Relations and Rodoljub Čolaković. See: flee (1950–1953)", 77-80.

43 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/II-14, *Zabeleška povodom dolaska Kaj Björk-a, predstavnika Socijaldemokratske partije Švedske*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/II-14, *Program boravka Kaj Björk-a u Jugoslaviji*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/II-14, *Materijal o boravku Kaj Björk-a u Jugoslaviji, od 8. do 22. aprila 1952. i prepiska između KPJ i Socijaldemokratske partije Švedske.*

44 See: AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Danska, 23/II-2, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Lj. Kovačevića sa potpredsednikom Socijaldemokratske partije Danske, Andersen-om, 11. IX 1952*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Danska, 23/II-3, *Zabeleška o razgovoru delegacije jugoslovenskih novinara sa predsednikom Socijaldemokratske partije Danske, 2. XI 1952*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Danska, 23/II-4, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Lj. Kovačevića, otpravnika poslova, sa potpredsednikom Socijaldemokratske partije Danske A. Andersen-om i predsednikom H. Hedtoft-om, 18. XI 1952.*

sending of their delegation to Yugoslavia in spite of solid relations with the Yugoslav party.⁴⁵

Yugoslav communists established fairly substantive and amicable relations with the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland (Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz – SPS) in the period studied herein. Relations with the SPS were established as early as mid-1950, while Jules Humbert-Droz, General Secretary of the Swiss Party, paid an unofficial visit to Yugoslavia in April 1951.⁴⁶ In addition to Foreign Policy Commission of the CPY and the Yugoslav diplomatic consulates in Zurich, Humbert-Droz was the main “channel” of cooperation. General Secretary of the SPS showed strong affinity for Yugoslav policy and readiness to cooperate. However, relations to Yugoslav communists at the party level, due to understandable reasons related to circumstances in the foreign policy area, were characterized as moderate.⁴⁷

On the other hand, Yugoslav Communists had unsatisfactory and at times even difficult relations with the Dutch Party, Italian parties and to a lesser extent with the Austrian Party. The Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid – PVDA) had taken a markedly negative attitude towards Yugoslavia and its regime. Being markedly conservative (a strong clerical-catholic component was represented in its membership), the party was a fierce opponent of one-party system in Yugoslavia and the communist character of Yugoslav authorities. In addition, it was considered the opponent of Yugoslav policy, and as such it had a consistent anti-Yugoslav orientation and opposed the cooperation with the Yugoslav party in the Socialist International. Consequently, the cooperation with the PVDA was quite unsatisfactory in the period studied herein, regardless

45 See: AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Finska, 29/ II-3, *Социјалдемократска партија Финске, 1951*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Finska, 29/ II-4, *Materijal o dolasku delegacije Socijaldemokratske partije Finske u Jugoslaviju, 1951*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Finska, 29/ II-6, *Deklaracija o principima Socijaldemokratske partije Finske, 28. II 1952*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Finska, 29/II-9, *Dve zabeleške o razgovoru O. Đikića, sekretara poslanstva FNRJ u Finskoj sa v. d. Generalnog sekretara Socijaldemokratske partije Finske, 21. IV i 5. V 1953.*

46 AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švajcarska, 124/ II-8, *Poseta Jules Humber Droz-a, generalnog sekretara Socijaldemokratske partije Švajcarske Jugoslaviji, u aprilu 1951.*

47 AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švajcarska, 124/ II-2, *Zabeleška o razgovoru sa Jules Hmber Droz-om, 1. i 22. februara 1951*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švajcarska, 124/ II-3, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Radovana Uroševa sa raznim ličnostima političkog života Švajcarske, 12. VI 1951*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švajcarska, 124/ II-10, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Radovana Uroševa sa Kissel Brutschi, predsednicom udruženja socijaldemokratskih žena Švajcarske, 3. avgusta 1951.*

of the flexible attitudes towards Yugoslavia taken by certain members of the Dutch Party.⁴⁸

Yugoslav political disputes with certain countries were undoubtedly reflected in the relations with relevant political factors in those countries. Thus, unresolved territorial issues or other boundary disputes defined relations between Yugoslavia and certain socialist parties. The parties in question were the Austrian Social-Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ), Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano – PSI) and Italian Social-Democratic Party (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano – PSDI). The question of Carinthia in particular defined relations with the Austrian Party, since the Austrian side perceived it as a subject of Yugoslav territorial aspiration. There weren't any key moments in the aforementioned relations at the time studied herein. In addition, the SPÖ leadership was quite rigid and anti-communist ideologically, which additionally aggravated relations with the Yugoslav party. Relations with the Austrian Party improved as late as from mid-1953, even though there had been some flexible individuals in the SPÖ leadership in the earlier period, largely coming from the Carinthia region. They were so to speak ready to cooperate with the Yugoslav Party.⁴⁹ The unresolved Trieste issue was a subject of disagreement with the aforementioned Italian parties. The PSDI was particularly vocal concerning this issue. Italian Social Democrats raised this issue repeatedly as an argument against the Yugoslav Party and Yugoslavia, using their influence in the Socialist International with the aim of discrediting Yugoslav Communists as much as possible. Thus, it makes sense that the Trieste issue posed an obstacle to the development of relations with the Italian Socialists in this period.⁵⁰

48 See: IISH, Socialist International Archive, ARCH01340-853, *Pismo Alfred Mozer-a (Partij van de arbeid) Braunthal-u iz SI, o odnosu PVDA prema Jugoslaviji, 4. II 1953*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Holandija, 40/ III-1, *Članci objavljeni u „De Stem” o Jugoslaviji, 9. IX 1950*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Holandija, 40/ III-2, *Depeše, 13. X 1950*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Holandija, 40/ III-3, *Izveštaj o Socijalističkoj uniji Holandije, 24. X 1950*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Holandija, 40/ III-6, *Beleška o Socijalističkoj uniji Holandije, 18. I 1951*; Mijatov, *Milovan Đilas i evropski socijalisti*, 86-88.

49 See: IISH, Socialist International Archive, ARCH01340-853, *Odnosi SPÖ prema SKJ, 5. mart 1953*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Austrija, 6/II-50, *Materijal o boravku austrijske socijalističke novinske redakcije u Jugoslaviji, 22. IX 1953*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Austrija, 6/II-51, *Zabeleška o razgovoru S. Fejića sa Walter Wodak-om, poslanikom Austrije, 13. X 1953*.

50 See: AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Italija, 48/V-1, *Izveštaj o tendenciji razvitka u Socijaldemokratskoj partiji i depeše, 25. II 1952*; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Italija, 48/V-2, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Velebita, poslanika FNRJ u Rimu, i predstavnika*

Particular attention should be paid to relations between Yugoslav Communists and the Socialist International, the most important socialist organization and forum of the time. The Socialist International (SI) was established in the summer of 1951⁵¹ (the founding congress in Frankfurt from 30 June to 3 July) with all significant global Socialist and Social-Democratic Parties becoming its members.⁵² Right before the establishment of SI, its predecessor, the Committee of the International Conference of Socialists (in Spanish *Comité de la Conferencia Socialista Internacional* – COMISCO) gave freedom of action to future SI members to establish cooperation with Yugoslav communists independently and at their own volition, even though its official attitude was “not to take any actions or adopt resolutions concerning the unfolding of events in Yugoslavia”.⁵³ This is how the member parties generally acted in the following period. Some SI members cooperated intensively with the Yugoslav party, whereas others fiercely opposed the same cooperation (each for of its own reasons), frequently sabotaging all sorts of Yugoslav attempts to join this powerful and reputed organization.⁵⁴

The Yugoslav Social-Democratic Party in exile and its leader Živko Topalović strongly influenced the attitude of SI towards the Yugoslav Party during this period. It was an observer party in the SI consciously sab-

Socijalističke partije Julijske Krajine, 29. VII 1952; AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Italija, 48/V-5; *Izveštaj o situaciji u PSDI, PSI i „Autonomi-i Socialista” i izjave Mateotija*, 4. III 1953; Mijatov, *Milovan Đilas i evropski socijalisti*, 91-94.

51 AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Međunarodne o rganizacije i skupovi, 144/XXXIV-7, *Materijal o osnivačkom kongresu Socijalističke internacionale u Frankfurtu, od 27. juna do 3. jula 1951. godine*.

52 Until the establishment or more accurately the renewal of the Socialist International, COMISCO or the Committee of the International Socialist Conference played a leading role among Socialist Parties and movements across the world (in Spanish *Comité de la Conferencia Socialista Internacional* – COMISCO, in English *Committee of the International Socialist Conference*), that would evolve into a new organisation called the Socialist International in the summer. See: Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism*, 307-417.

53 AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Međunarodne o rganizacije i skupovi, 144/XXXIV-6, *Izveštaj Denisa Healey-a sa sastanka COMISCO-a u Londonu, 2-4. marta 1951*.

54 According to the data found in the documents covering the period studied herein, division among the member parties of the Socialist International when it came to the stance on the Yugoslav Party appeared to be the same in both 1951 and 1953. Namely, the only party that opted for the establishment of official relations with the Yugoslav Party was the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland. The British, French, Norwegian, Swedish, Belgian, Danish, German, Israeli and Canadian parties declared for the unofficial cooperation, whereas the Dutch, Austrian, Finnish and Italian Parties were against the cooperation, as well as the Bulgarian, Spanish and Yugoslav Parties in exile. See: Mijatov, *Milovan Đilas i evropski socijalisti*, 95.

otaging all positive stances on the membership of the Yugoslav Party in this organization. It exerted influence on some SI member parties, failed to influence others, but the fact remains that Živko Topalović's party posed an obstacle to the development of relations between the Yugoslav Party and the entire Western socialist movement. Consequently, the Yugoslav side warned of Topalović's actions as a negative phenomenon in the development of relations with the Western Socialist Parties.⁵⁵

The Cold War and the world divided into blocks marked the Yugoslav foreign policy in the period studied herein. In that context, Yugoslavia accentuated its non-alignment as a paradigm of foreign policy orientation and the independence of small countries in relation to great powers as a principle it advocated in international relations. In the early 1950s, in the period prior to Stalin's death (March 1953), three basic directions, presenting significant turning points, defined the foreign policy of Yugoslavia: hostile relations with the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, an attempt to get closer and cooperate with the West and first steps made towards non-alignment policy globally speaking which implied going outside the European policy framework. The basics of such policy were neutrality in relation to the East and West and their alliances (blocs) which institutionally tied Yugoslav politics with the UN and its principles and rules.

On the other hand, Western European Socialist Parties, as well as the countries they came from, were a segment of Western policy. In the narrower sense, they were deeply rooted in the political context of a part of the continent to which they belonged (Western Europe) and, as a consequence, they defined the basic directions of their policy in line with those principles. These parties were opposing the USSR policy to a certain extent, which implied unreserved resistance to the hegemony of one of the Cold War-era powers. This was the major point where their interests partly coincided with the interests of Yugoslav communists at the time.

Danger threatening from the USSR almost hysterically loomed over Western Europe in the early 1950s, which additionally inspired homogenisation of local political forces in relation to the danger lurking from the East through various political and military alliances (ideas on the unification of Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO), under the patronage one of the most leading powers of the western world USA. Such an atmosphere prevailed in the Western Europe Socialist Parties. Thus,

55 See: AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Međunarodne organizacije i skupovi, 144/XXXIV-25, *Pismo Milovana Đilasa Morgan Phillips-u, 1953*; Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 66-68; Мijatov, *Milovan Đilas i evropski socijalisti*, 97-99.

Yugoslavia, being a unique example of a Communist country resisting the USSR, before long gained affection of most parties. Nonetheless, not all the socialist parties viewed Yugoslav case, Yugoslav leadership policy or Yugoslavia as a country through the same prism, or shared the same affection for it. Attitudes taken by Western European Parties towards Yugoslavia interwove relating to different issues at that moment, with foreign policy and ideology being the basic areas of understanding or misunderstanding. Relation to the USSR, opposed blocs, Cold War, USA, Europe, colonies were the issues that dominated in the area of international affairs, whereas issues such as democracy, society, socialism, capitalism and political freedom dominated in the field of ideology.

The most crucial question and anchor point for the cooperation with Western Socialists was the danger threatening from the USSR, where the standpoints of the two sides totally coincided.⁵⁶ The USSR posed a serious threat to Western European Socialists not only in the foreign policy area, but also as a danger threatening to disrupt the Western order.⁵⁷ Thus, the standpoint dominating at the First Congress of the Socialist International held in Frankfurt in the summer of 1951 was that Yugoslavia should be supported in its attempts to defend itself from the USSR aggressive policy. On the other hand, it was believed that its domestic affairs should not be interfered with and that Yugoslavia's efforts on its path toward socialism should not be hindered.⁵⁸ British Labourists were highly sensitive to the issue of attitude to the USSR. So, they provided support to Yugoslav resistance against the USSR, having in mind their mutual interest. Thus, the Labour Government approved of lethal aid to Yugoslavia in early 1951.⁵⁹ During the speech given by Milovan Đilas in Chatam House, it was obvious that it was not the stance of Labourists only, but of entire British politics. Sir Ian Jacob then said that "it is of utmost importance that we, nowadays in this country, understand events in Eastern Europe and the nature of division that made Cominform, inspired by the USSR, run a really intensive campaign against Yugoslavia that almost ended with a war."⁶⁰

56 See: AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Radna tela komisije, S/a-19, *O dosadašnjim vezama sa socijalistima (od početka – uključujući i 1953)*, 31. decembar 1953.

57 Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 62.

58 AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-39, *Depeša iz Nemačke*, 6. avgust 1951.

59 See: Милетић, *Титов емисар Милован Ђилас*, 345-360.

60 AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Razno, S/c-394, *Diskusija sa predavanja Milovana Đilasa u Chatham House-u*, 30. januara 1951. godine, 1.

International position of Yugoslavia was, therefore, recognized as really important from the perspective of Western interests and Socialism, as seen by Western Socialists. This is why the requests of Yugoslavia concerning delicate political issues were frequently met, regardless of conflicting views among certain Western Socialist Parties. Thus, Morgan Phillips openly showed affection for Yugoslavia, using his influence not only as SI Secretary General but also his influence among the socialist powers across the world, to take the issue of Trieste off the agenda at the congress held in Milan in October 1952.⁶¹

The question of relations among the USSR, USA and Europe in the context of cold war relations and actual situation in the early 1950s, made Yugoslav side take cautious and quite balanced, but also clear stances when exchanging views with Western Socialists. A good example is a discussion led with a high-level SFIO delegation in March 1952. Taking a decisive stance on non-accession to any military or political alliances, including NATO, Yugoslav side sent a message that it was in agreement with the current US policy, to the extent this policy was against the USSR aggressive intentions. It was vividly explained by Milovan Đilas: "If the USSR attacks Europe, then we will fight a war. Yet, if the USA attacks the USSR, we will contemplate. We will never be in any aggressive wars."⁶² The Yugoslav side showed some scepticism in relation to various ideas of Western political association and European unification, even if that unification was "socialist". It took similar stance on the German armament. Yugoslav leadership seemed to have been avoiding stronger liaising of its policy to Europe. It took the view that the country's interests were best defended through the UN, at a global level. The Yugoslav policy on such matters was best explained by Josip Broz Tito in his message to Belgian Socialists: "Our participation is partial and indirect, as we receive military aid. It implies that, in case of aggression against Yugoslavia or any other European country, we would support Europe. Understandably, without any written pacts. It is our moral obligation, since we are a peaceful country condemning all kinds of aggression through the UN. Our cooperation must be closely related to the UN, under no circumstances outside the UN."⁶³

61 AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-24, *Izveštaji iz zabeleški službenika ambasade FNRJ u Londonu, sa britanskim političarima u septembru 1952.*

62 AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-17, *Zapisnik od 26. marta 1952. o razgovoru između članova delegacije Fancuske socijalističke partije i članova Politbiroa CK KPJ.*

63 AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-19, *Razgovor Josipa Broza Tita sa delegacijom belgijskih socijalista, 30. jula 1952. godine, 4-5.*

Conflicts of interest with Western European Socialists existed. At some point there were conflicts of interest with the British Labour Party, the most reputed party, who backed Yugoslavia on almost all occasions before Stalin's death in 1953, on the issues of the USSR or Europe. However, when Yugoslavia surpassed local European boundaries and commenced building politics intensively at a global level, in the newly-liberated "third world" countries, Asia and later on Africa, the former colonies, the British Labour Party showed its true colours. At the session of the First Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon (Burma), the Yugoslav Party, advocating the independence of small countries in relation to Great Forces, came into conflict with the delegates of the SI, where Labourists were dominating and defending the interests of the British Crown.⁶⁴ A bit more on the participation of the delegation of the Yugoslav Party in the First Asian Socialist Conference will be discussed in the third chapter.

One of the most important stumbling blocks between the two sides and an obstacle to closer cooperation was the question of democracy. All Western Socialist Parties were unreservedly loyal to multi-party parliamentary system. A problem occurred during the public polemic Čolaković-Bjork, when it was these differences, i.e. attitudes to democracy and social development that appeared on the pages of the party press (this subject will also be more discussed in the third chapter of this paper).⁶⁵ The Yugoslav side frequently took the stance on the necessity of one-party regime and indisputable socialist society development at the same time criticizing severely capitalist and multi-party system. On the other hand, the Western side insisted on multi-party parliamentary system, as a guarantee of democracy, whereas it strived to fix the existing capitalist order without destroying it. Similarities existed mainly in the stances taken on the USSR, which was perceived as a main threat to the European and global peace and stability.

Yet, there were the parties which did not adopt a positive attitude towards Yugoslav policy from other reasons, such as the aforementioned

64 See: *Report of the First Asian Socialist Conference, Rangoon 1953*, (Rangoon: An Asian Socialist Publication, 1953); AJ, fond 507/ IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Međunarodne organizacije i skupovi, 144/I-3, *Azijska socijalistička konferencija*; Милетић, *Титов емисар Милован Ђилас*, 371-402; Jovan Čavoški, „Ideološki prijatelj iz daleka: Jugoslavija i Azijska socijalistička konferencija” *Istorija 20. veka*, 1/2019, 139-160; Aleksandar V. Miletić, „The Role of Milovan Đilas at the Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon, 1953” *Токови историје*, 3/2020, 117-137.

65 See: Miletić, “The Relationships between Yugoslav Communists and Scandinavian Socialists in the Light of Yugoslav Sources (1950–1953)”, 77-80.

Dutch, Austrian and Italian parties. They in their own ways believed that the cooperation with the Yugoslav communists should not be established. The Dutch, for instance, held the view that democracy was not present in Yugoslavia and were critical of “one-party dictatorship”, whilst Italians and Austrians advocated their negative attitudes owing to territorial disputes of their countries with Yugoslavia (the question of Trieste, etc.). Some of them were cautious due to geostrategic reasons. The Finns, for instance, were reserved due to proximity of the USSR and Finland, but their attitude was not hostile. Numerous parties owing to such and similar reasons opposed the membership of the Yugoslav party in the SI. Nonetheless, the main reason for opposing the membership of the Yugoslav party in the SI was the existence of one-party system in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslav Cooperation with the Western European Left in the Period of Foreign Policy Stabilization 1953–1956

Yugoslavia succeeded in making a diplomatic “breakthrough” in the world and departing from political isolation faced after the 1948 Informbureau Resolution and conflict with the USSR and its satellite states in the early 1950s. That process was successful owing to the key cooperation with the West, providing Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav leadership with necessary and valuable support, ranging from the political to other kinds of support, including the economic and defence support. In the first part of the paper, it was evident how the launching of dynamic cooperation with the representatives of West European Socialist and Social-Democratic Left, as one of the paths of Yugoslav diplomatic offensive, contributed considerably to an international promotion of Yugoslavia and its politics globally, particularly in the West. Thus, Yugoslavia “bypassed” successfully the crisis resulting from the conflict with the USSR, which marked effectively the 1948-1953 period, creating a special chapter of Yugoslav history in the foreign policy area.

Nonetheless, a sudden event signified an important turning point in the Yugoslav foreign policy. It was the death of the Soviet leader Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, on 5 March 1953, owing to which the Yugoslav leadership got the chance to change its policy in relation to the USSR and gradually balance its policy towards opposing and cold-war divided Eastern and Western blocks. The main priority and focal point of Yugoslav for-

eign policy in this period was to normalize its relations with Moscow.⁶⁶ Endeavours to normalize Yugoslav-Soviet relations resulted in the official state visit of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, in May- June 1955 and the visit of Josip Broz Tito to the USSR in June 1956, which improved, enhanced and restored strained relations between the two countries to mutual political respect of the past.⁶⁷ Major global events of that time, ranging from the USSR destalinisation, over the USA change of government and Dwight Eisenhower's taking power, to the 1956 "Hungarian Revolution" imposed on the Yugoslav leadership a special type of dynamics in the foreign policy area and close monitoring of events in the area of international relations.⁶⁸ It was necessary to "weigh" moves carefully, examine relations among the Great Powers, USSR and USA, and their blocs, take into account the global position of Yugoslavia and its politics. In addition, it was required to bear in mind Europe and, in particular, political situation in Western countries.

The shift in the Yugoslav foreign policy and new events in the international arena, undoubtedly had a great influence on the stances of certain Western Socialist Parties and their relations to the Yugoslav leadership. Yet, it didn't affect the dynamics of relations with the Yugoslav communists, exchange of opinions and views, mutual ties, visits, encounters and generally speaking the overall cooperation that retained the same intensity as in the earlier period. New events undoubtedly contributed to the enrichment of relations; in some cases, they also contributed to the strengthening of cooperation and comradeship deepening as well. Alterations to global, particularly European geostrategic relations and situations, led to a slightly different perceiving of interests, comprehending actual political processes, understanding social, ideological, economic and

66 On the period of normalization in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations, see: Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat. Ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita (1944-1974)*, (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014); Александар Животић, *Југословенско-совјетске војне супротности (1947-1957). Искушења савезништва*, (Београд: Архипелаг/ИНИС, 2015); Андрей Б. Едемский, *От конфликта к нормализации. Советско-югославские отношения в 1953-1956. годах*, (Москва: Наука, 2008); Radoica Luburić, *Pomirenje Jugoslavije i SSSR-a 1953-1956*, (Podgorica: Istorijски институт Crne Gore, 1999).

67 See: Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat*, 188-239.

68 See: Анатолий С. Аникеев, *Как Тито от Сталина ушел: Югославия, СССР и США в начальный период "холодной войны" (1945-1957)*, (Москва: ИС РАН, 2002); *Југославија и СССР. Сусрети и разговори на највишем нивоу руководилаца Југославије и СССР-а 1946-1964*, eds. Миладин Милошевић, Љубодраг Димић, Леонид Янович Гибианский, (Београд: Архив Југославије, 2014).

defence actors as well as the importance of mutual permeating and influencing real political and interstate relations.

Warming and normalization of relations with the USSR were followed by Milovan Đilas's removal from all the duties in the government and the party (January 1954) and his falling into disfavour of regime.⁶⁹ This event is important for this topic due to the fact that it came as a complete surprise to the circles of Western European Socialists. As a consequence, they started to question and doubt the Yugoslav leadership policy. Namely, Milovan Đilas, as a Yugoslav party and state official, figured as one of the most prominent individuals in charge of establishing cooperation with Socialist and Socialist-Democratic Parties in Western Europe. While performing the mentioned duties, he not only paved the way for cooperation along with his associates, but also developed cordial and sometimes amicable relations with numerous reputed individuals from the circles of West European Left, making a positive impression because of his appearance and thanks to his prodemocratic, proreform and pro-liberal views.⁷⁰ Having been informed about Đilas's removal, most Western European Socialists began doubting the sincerity of Yugoslav reformism and they were of the view that Yugoslavia was returning to the camp with the USSR and Eastern Bloc.⁷¹ Western European Socialists expressed surprise, regret and sometimes genuine disapproval because of Milovan Đilas's removal through their contacts with Yugoslav diplomatic agents in the West and also when addressing directly Yugoslav party leaders.⁷²

69 For more info, see: Александар В. Милетић, „Политичка делатност Милована Ђиласа (1944-1954)” (докторска дисертација, Универзитет у Београду, Филозофски факултет, Одељење за историју, 2017).

70 For more info on Milovan Đilas and West European Left, see: Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 95-142; Александар В. Милетић, “Милован Ђилас и француски социјалисти 1950-1954”, *Токови историје*, 1/2020, 155-174; Nikola Mijatov, “Milovan Đilas i britanski laburisti 1950-1955”, *Istorija 20. veka*, 2/2015, str. 27-43; Mateja Režek, “Milovan Djilas and the British Labour Party 1950-1960”, *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, 3/2018, pp. 58-78.

71 See: Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 225-252.

72 See: DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Engleska, f. 20, br. 41735, *Zabeleška o razgovoru ministra-savetnika J. Petrića sa g. Saul Rose-om, 21. januara 1954, u Ambasadi*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Engleska, f. 20, br. 42508, *Zabeleška o razgovoru druga ambasadora i druga J. Petrića sa predsednikom I. O. Labursitičke partije Wilfrid Burke-om, sekretarom Morgan Phillips-om, predsednikom spoljno-političkog komiteta Sem Watson-om i načelnikom spoljno-političkog komiteta Saul Rose-om, na večeri 10. februara 1954*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Jugoslavija, f. 45, br. 41804, *Telegram Vladimira Velebita, London, 13. februar 1954*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/II-18, *Morgan Tidningen, 4. II 1954, „Intermeccо Ђилас”*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Jugoslavija, f. 45, br. 4228, *Telegram iz Bona SIP-u, 13. januar 1954*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Francuska, f. 23,

The interest that Western diplomats in Yugoslavia expressed in Đilas's actions was evident. Thus, the Swedish envoy Jödahl, a Social Democrat himself, stated in his last conversation with Đilas as a Yugoslav representative on 5 January 1954, suspecting Đilas's impending dismissal, that he had heard some diplomatic agents say that "the most intriguing period in the development of Yugoslavia has already passed" even though he allegedly didn't share their views.⁷³

Yet, bewilderment and disapproval could be observed in the personal reactions of individuals or they came as first reactions. Nonetheless, the official attitude of party leadership in the Western Socialist Parties, as well as of numerous individuals following the initially expressed emotions, were cautiously balanced and restrained, chiefly supporting the decisions taken by the Yugoslav leadership and official explanations given by the Party headquarters on "the Đilas case". Namely, the leaderships of almost all important Western Europe Socialist and Social-Democratic Parties inclined towards the actual leadership of Yugoslav party and state as they had to defend their own interests and take into account foreign policy priorities of their countries, regardless of whether or not they had personal affections for Milovan Đilas.⁷⁴ On the other hand, the leaderships of Western Socialist Parties were easily appeased thanks to patient explanations and elaborations on "the Đilas case"⁷⁵, convictions

br. 4676, *Telegram iz Pariza SIP-u, 19. januar 1954*; Vladimir Dedijer, *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas. Prilozi za biografiju*, (Beograd: Prosveta, 1991), pp. 378-380.

73 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/II-18, *Zabeleška o sastanku druga Đilasa sa švedskim poslanikom g. Jödahl-om, 5. I 1954. g. (od 11. do 11.45. č)*. On the other hand, American diplomats firmly estimated that Đilas's removal indicated the prevalence of the impact of "Conservative Communists" in the Yugoslav leadership, but also that Yugoslavia would not alter significantly its foreign policy direction; however, the event itself was "detrimental to the Western interests". See: *Paper Prepared in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence (Armstrong), Washington, January 18, 1954*, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. VIII, Washington 1988, p. 1365-1367; Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), CK2349320322, *Neutralism in Europe*; CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), CIA-RDP80-00810A003500450009-5, *Information Report, Djilas Case, 2 Feb. 1954*; CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), CIA-RDP80-00810A003800580003-4, *Information Report, Observations on the Milovan Djilas Case, 19 March 1954*.

74 See: DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Jugoslavija, f. 45, br. 41557, *Telegram SIP-u iz Stokholma, 8. februar 1954*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Jugoslavija, f. 45, br. 4715, *Telegram iz Bona SIP-u, 20. januar 1954*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/IV-32, *Zabeleška o razgovoru savetnika P. Popovića i zamenika ministra inostranih poslova Bojesona, u Oslu, 17. februara 1954*.

75 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Radna tela komisije, S/a-19, *Zapisnik sa sastanka Komisije za međunarodne veze SSRNJ, održanog 20. januara 1954. godine*; DAMSPRS,

about the insignificance of the case, adherence to the same foreign policy course and firm dedication of the Yugoslav leadership to carry on with the collaboration. Thus, the cooperation with the Yugoslav party persisted at almost the same pace in spite of the disquiet stirred up by the recent event. In addition, Julius Braunthal, the Secretary General of the Socialist International, expressed his full understanding for the decision taken by the Yugoslav leadership concerning “the Đilas case”, emphasizing his conviction that this event would not affect adversely the relationship between Western Socialists and Yugoslavia, even though divergent stances were taken by certain SI members on Đilas’s fall.⁷⁶

Thus, the fact that Milovan Đilas was removed from office had a sort of an ambivalent impact on the delegates of Western European Socialists. Yet, most parties and their leaders perceived pragmatically this situation, i.e. their political interests outweighed their emotions or personal affinities, as much as they personally had an aversion to “the Đilas case”. That referred, in particular, to the British Labour Party, whose views, given the power, repute and influence it enjoyed among the socialist parties throughout the world, carried a lot of weight. Đilas’s removal left a really poor impression on them, especially on their leadership. Morgan Phillips, General Secretary of the Party and then President of the Socialist International, suggested sending a letter of protest to Tito. However, Sam Watson, a reputed Labour, dissuaded him from doing that with an explanation that it would deteriorate the Yugoslav-British relationship.⁷⁷ In spite of that, Morgan Phillips made the whole thing personal by sending a protest letter to Tito in April 1956 because Đilas had been treated badly. According to Yugoslav estimates, the first stage of relations with the British Labour Party (until 1954) was the most intensive compared to all other Western European Parties, which influenced considerably their relations with the rest of European socialists. Namely, the impact and reputation that the Labour Party enjoyed among other Socialists was immense, and,

PA-1954, SAD, f. 83, br. 47046, *Razgovor J. B. Tita sa grupom američkih novinara, 6. marta 1954.*

76 DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Engleska, f. 20, br. 42508, *Zabeleška o razgovoru sekretara Kneževića sa Julijus Brontelom, sekretarom Socijalističke internacionale u prostorijama SI, dana 13. februara 1954.*

77 DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Engleska, f. 20, br. 42508, *Zabeleška o razgovoru druga ambasadora i druga J. Petrića sa predsednikom I. O. Laburističke partije Wilfrid Burke-om, sekretarom Morgan Phillips-om, predsednikom spoljno-političkog komiteta Sem Watson-om i načelnikom spoljno-političkog komiteta Saul Rose-om, na večeri 10. februara 1954.*

as a consequence, the representatives of most European Socialist parties adjusted their stances on Yugoslavia depending on the attitude taken by the British Labour Party. In this stage, the leadership of the British Labour Party had, to say the least, an ambivalent stance on Yugoslavia, supporting and monitoring the launched democratic reforms in the early 1950s, but also coldly adjusting their policy to British interests, which resulted in sometimes confronted stances on Yugoslav politics (colonial question, Trieste crisis, Đilas's removal).⁷⁸

The British Labour Party commenced the year 1954 with additionally deepened internal divisions (right and left wing), which was monitored closely by the Yugoslav side that endeavoured to maintain balanced relations with the party as a whole.⁷⁹ For this purpose, cautious steps were taken in the future collaboration, in particular owing to a negative impression that "the Đilas case" had made on certain distinguished individuals, such as Morgan Phillips and Jennie Lee.⁸⁰ The issues from the sphere of foreign policy were also monitored, notably by Yugoslav diplomatic agents who maintained regular contacts with Labour. Consultations were held frequently to that effect. They exchanged views with numerous Labourists on the armament of FR Germany, China, USSR, expanding the influence of SI, where Labour presented one of the dominant parties, throughout the world.⁸¹ Thus, Vladimir Velebit, Yugoslav Ambassador to London, had a substantive conversation with Sam Watson in September 1954 on the recent visit of British Labourists to the USSR. During the conversation it was concluded that Moscow was eager to split the West and divide Europe from the USA. Yet, the Labourists did not fall for the story. During the conversation, they also mentioned a visit to China, which left Labour-

78 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-37, *Beleška o odnosima sa LP (početak 1954)*.

79 Division in the Labour Party was expressed, in the foreign policy, in particular in relation to the German Question, *i.e.* the armament of Western Germany, which was advocated by the right wing of the party, while the left wing headed by Bevan was opposing it. See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-41, *Razgovor P. Knežević-D. Ginsburg, 24. aprila 1954*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-42, *Razgovor N. Pašić-E. Castle, 27. aprila 1954*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-44, *Razgovor J. Petrić-Keneth Younger, 11. maja 1954*.

80 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-45, *Razgovor J. Petrić-S. Watson, 19. maja 1954*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-49, *Razgovor J. Petrić-Jennie Lee, 11. juna 1954*.

81 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-47, *Razgovor J. Petrić-M. Phillips, 31. maja 1954*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-51, *Razgovor J. Petrić-Saul Rose, 9. avgusta 1954*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-52, *Razgovor J. Petrić-Burke, 20. septembra 1954*.

ists with the impression that the Chinese leadership was a lot more stable compared to the Soviet one.⁸² As far as Europe was concerned, British Labour adopted the attitude that the essence of British and American policies was to prevent German-Soviet reconciliation.⁸³

In early 1955, the British reconsidered the Đilas-Dedijer case from late 1954. However, they exercised a lot more caution and restraint in respect of that issue, even though they still perceived Đilas as a pro-democratic politician. As for the Yugoslav policy of neutralism, Labourists took the stance that they did not oppose such policy, so long as Yugoslavia was “really tied with the West”.⁸⁴ Nonetheless, they pointed out that neutralism did not suit the West, notably in the case of India, which was increasingly gravitating towards neutralism.⁸⁵ Thus, the Yugoslav politics that was also increasingly gravitating towards neutralism met with a frosty reception from the West; yet, the West, as reported by the Labourists, was still willing to cooperate, notably in the field of creating regional alliances wherein Yugoslavia would play a major role.⁸⁶ Before long, a high-level Soviet delegation, headed by N. S. Khrushchev, paid a visit to Yugoslavia in May-June 1955, which drew attention of not only Labourists but the entire West.⁸⁷ Labourists perceived the visit as really important in the context of Yugoslav-Western relations; yet, the visit for perceived as important also for Yugoslavia as it “was able to draw out the maximum in the given situation to its advantage”. On the other hand, the Soviets showed “the first crack” in their politics – and advantage should be taken of it.”⁸⁸ It was also estimated that the Soviet side through this move was trying to organize “the belt” of socialist countries, less dependent on Moscow, but entirely independent on the West, where Yugoslavia played a prominent role owing to its nonalignment policy.⁸⁹

82 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-53, *Razgovor V. Velebit-S. Watson, 21. septembra 1954.*

83 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-55, *Razgovor P. Kneževića sa S. Rose i sekretarom italijanske ambasade F. Bacchetti-em, 29. decembra 1954.*

84 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-58, *Razgovor J. Petrić-Dennis Healey-Arthur Bottomley, 5. januara 1955.*

85 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-60, *Razgovor P. Knežević-E. Davis, 19. januara 1955.*

86 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-70, *Razgovor P. Knežević-E. Davis, 5. aprila 1955.*

87 For more info, see: Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu*, 667-734.

88 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-74, *Razgovor Tunguz, Кнежевић-S. Rose, 7. juna 1955.*

89 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-75, *Razgovor Tunguz,, Кнежевић-Barbara Castle, 8. juna 1955.*

Yugoslavia was ready to improve the shaken relations, in particular after the new "Đilas-Dedijer case". Labour made a proposal to take into consideration the establishment of a new labour delegation in late 1954.⁹⁰ However, this idea was given serious consideration as late as the summer of 1955, immediately after Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia.⁹¹ Thus, before long it was arranged for a labour delegation to visit Yugoslavia in August.⁹² Yet, even though it was agreed initially to send a high-level delegation headed by General Secretary Morgan Phillips, but also to make the visit reciprocal, with a return visit of SAWPY delegation, the British eventually sent two minor officials who made feeble excuses as to the absence of Phillips and other reputed officials (scheduled rounds of golf in Switzerland and alike). With this, the British seem to have sent a rather symbolic and powerful message upon the visit of the USSR delegation. Thus, a two-member Labour delegation paid a visit to Yugoslavia from 6 to 27 August 1955. On that occasion Dr Edit Summerskill, Chair of the Labour Executive Committee, and Jack Cooper, a member of the Executive Committee, came to Yugoslavia. The visit was not perceived as effective in Yugoslavia; yet, the message was understood due to its, by all means, deliberately unrepresentative and unserious character (the two delegates used this visit as a free of charge holiday).⁹³ In spite of that, the Fabian Summer School of a really reputed and old socialist society was organized in late summer on Crveni otok (Red Island) in Yugoslavia.⁹⁴ In the meantime, the Labour Party again suffered a defeat in the May 1955 parliamentary elections.

It was in late 1955 and early 1956 that an initiative was relaunched on "possible cooperation" between the British Labour Party and SAWPY.⁹⁵ SAWPY planned to intensify cooperation with the British Labour Party

90 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-78, *Razgovor sa Sam Watsonom*, 29. decembra 1954.

91 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-74, *Razgovor Tunguz, Knežević-S. Rose*, 7. juna 1955; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-78, *Delegacija LP u Jugoslaviji*, 6-8. avgusta 1955.

92 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-78, *Biografije članova Izvršnog odbora Laburističke partije koji polaze za Jugoslaviju*, 6. avgusta 1955. *I program posete*.

93 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-78, *Izveštaj o poseti članova Izvršnog odbora Laburističke partije dr Edith Summerskill i Jack Cooper*, 6-27. avgusta 1955.

94 For more info, see: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-79, *Fabijanska škola na Crvenom otoku kod Rovinja*, 29. avgust-12. septembar 1955.

95 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-87, *Zabeleška sa sastanka V. Velebita, J. Petrića i M. Stojakovića u Londonu*, 13. januara 1956.

during 1956, which implied primarily reciprocal visits, including the prospective visit of a new leader of the Labour Party Hugh Gaitskell.⁹⁶ Yet, during their conversations with Yugoslav diplomatic agents, British Labour openly expressed their negative stance on Yugoslavia's nonalignment policy, i.e. its attempts to be equidistant and act as an intermediary between East and West. In that context, Morgan Phillips commented on the recent article written by Veljko Vlahović on the aforementioned topic in *The Communist (Komunist)*, where Vlahović spoke fiercely about neocolonialism and uneven development of capitalism, pointing out the Yugoslav role in the liaising of socialist forces throughout the world and authenticity principle as to different paths to socialism.⁹⁷ Phillips took a similar position on this matter at the session of the Council of the Socialist International, warning of the danger that Yugoslavia and the USSR may take the initiative in the international labour movement as they were drawing closer.⁹⁸ On the other hand, an initiative was launched at the time to invite Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the British Labour Party, to visit Yugoslavia.⁹⁹

The idea that a new Labour Party leader should visit Yugoslavia was welcomed by SAWPY members, holding the view that his arrival would considerably improve their relations with Labourists.¹⁰⁰ In that respect, other options were considered, such as the visits of other prominent individuals, including Morgan Phillips and in particular Sam Watson, who was perceived as a friend of Yugoslavs, unlike Phillips.¹⁰¹ Thus, the initiative made by the Yugoslav Embassy in London as regards Gaitskell and Watson's visits was accepted, whereas a suggestion that Phillips visit Yugoslavia was rejected, due to his markedly recent negative stances on Yugoslavia.¹⁰² However, owing to these poor relations between Yugoslavia and Morgan Phillips, especially between Phillips and Veljko Vlahović, the

96 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-88, *Informacije o saradnji sa LP, početak 1956. godine.*

97 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-97, *Razgovor V. Velebit-M. Phillips, 22. februara 1956.*

98 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-100, *Razgovor L. Kersnik-P. Ericsson, 19. marta 1956.*

99 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-106, *Pismo Veljka Vlahovića Vladimiru Velebitu 6. mart 1956*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-106, *Pismo Vladimira Velebita Veljku Vlahoviću, 29. mart 1956.*

100 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-106, *Pismo Veljka Vlahovića Vladimiru Velebitu 6. mart 1956.*

101 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-106, *Pismo Vladimira Velebita Veljku Vlahoviću, 29. mart 1956.*

102 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-106, *Pismo Veljka Vlahovića Vladimiru Velebitu 12. maja 1956.*

President of the SAWPY International Relations Commission, along with new and improved Soviet-Yugoslav relations, collectively aggravating relations between the Labour Party and Yugoslav communists, Gaitskell appreciated the invitation, with good will and intention of improving such relations and paying a visit in the foreseeable future.¹⁰³ This is why Hugh Gaitskell's visit to Yugoslavia never materialised. Yugoslav reconciliation with the USSR, as has been noted, contributed largely to an aggravation of relations with the British Labour Party. It was received among the top officials of the British Labour Party with unhidden suspicion and interpreted as an evident alienation of Yugoslav communists from Western Socialists.¹⁰⁴ The arrest of Milovan Đilas in November 1956 additionally led to the deterioration of relations, which gained publicity in Western Europe.¹⁰⁵ Jennie Lee, a famous Labourist and Aneurin Bevan's wife, soon paid a visit to Yugoslavia, being interested, among other things, in the new Đilas case. She met with Josip Broz Tito on 14 December.¹⁰⁶ Nonetheless, the initiative to "improve relations with the British Labour Party was relaunched by the end of the year, so it was possible to have an optimistic outlook on this issue at the end of the year."¹⁰⁷

Relations with French Socialists (SFIO) seemed amicable during the first phase of cooperation in the early 1950s, even though not too intensive or substantive. Georges Brutelle, a young and enthusiastic French Socialist, known for his affection for Yugoslavia, expressed his hopes for future cooperation at the founding congress of the SAWPY in February 1953. Yet, he did not make an effective positive impression on the Yugoslav side. Namely, his statements were perceived as "giving lectures" and one could not help wondering why he was showing a continuous and persistent reserve as to the cooperation between Yugoslav communists and French Socialists. It was estimated that such an attitude was either influenced by the Socialist International or by personal ambitions and internal

103 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-106, *Pismo Vladimira Velebita Mariji Vilfan, 5. juna 1956.*

104 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-106, *Zabeleška o razgovoru N. Pašića sa T. Castle-om, saradnikom "Daily Mirror"-a, 21. juna 1956.*

105 See: AJ, fond 837, Kabinet predsednika Republike (KPR), II-4-a/116, *Izveštaji, informacije, beleške, pisma i pisanje štampe o slučaju Milovana Đilasa.*

106 For more info on Jennie Lee's sojourn in Yugoslavia in December 1956, see: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-124, *Jennie Lee u Jugoslaviji, 9-15. decembar 1956.*

107 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-125, *Razgovor Bejsoda-Phillips, decembar 1956.*

factional struggles in the SFIO.¹⁰⁸ It was right before Stalin's death when the danger from the USSR was still extant. In the summer of 1953, the Yugoslav side expressed an interest in deepening relations with French Socialists, in particular prior to the 45th SFIO Congress, 2-5 July.¹⁰⁹ At the time, SFIO was going through internal divisions, so depending on the faction to whom they belonged, its representatives held opposing views on Yugoslavia. Generally speaking, Fourth Republic, whole rule was soon to be ended, was going through internal crisis and political divisions. However, it was concluded by the end of 1953 that the stances adopted by the SFIO on Yugoslavia were generally positive, though the collaboration was limited, in particular because of the unresolved issue dealing with "the forms of collaboration". It was especially emphasized that the relations and collaboration were established with the left wing of the party,¹¹⁰ in particular with General Secretary Guy Mollet.¹¹¹

Yet, in practice the collaboration with French Socialists reduced to occasional correspondences and leaders' interpersonal greetings. It was as late as September 1954 that French Socialist André Philip, a member of the SFIO Managing Board, Law Professor and a Member of the French Economic Council, paid a visit to Yugoslavia and was hosted by SAWPY. Philip spent 20 days in Yugoslavia (6-26 September) and visited a number of cities and factories, spoke to workers, representatives of the union and local officials in that period. André Philip was also actual President of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe, so he gave a lecture at the Institute for International Politics and Economy with regard to European unification as an implementation of "universal principle – necessity of global unification in the distant future".¹¹² French socialists basically supported the question of European unification. In a conversation with Edvard Kardelj in October 1954, Guy Mollet stated that he regarded that kind of unification as unification of "free, independent and autonomous states", including Germany, which would imply first political, and then military alliance. According to Mollet, German military strengthening would shift Germany towards the USSR, which is something the SFIO

108 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-31, *Georges Brutelle na kongresu SSRNJ*.

109 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-33, *45. kongres SFIO održan u Asnières-u od 2. do 5. jula 1953. godine*.

110 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-38, *Referat o SFIO (1953)*.

111 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-40, *Odnosi SKJ i SFIO*.

112 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-44, *Poseta André Philip-a Jugoslaviji, od 6. do 26. septembra 1954. godine*.

strongly opposed, as it would reinforce Germany at a European level. SFIO General Secretary then proposed Yugoslav cooperation with the European Council, while, being asked about the policy of the USSR towards Yugoslavia, Kardelj responded that Russia suffered from internal instability and added that recent events in Hungary (rebellion against Moscow) were preparing the USSR for “even deeper changes in terms of its policy towards Yugoslavia”. Collocutors agreed that the intensification of cooperation would suit both sides, while Mollet mentioned André Philip’s visit to Yugoslavia as a positive example, and added that André seemed “impressed” after paying a visit to Yugoslavia.¹¹³

Collaboration with the French Socialists, although the contacts were regular, still was not substantive enough. There were no reciprocal visits of the delegations, in particular high-level delegations, and during the contacts they were not mentioned at all. The only idea that was initiated in the autumn of 1955 was prospective visit of up to 30 French heads of municipalities (Socialists), who were supposed to “study” Yugoslav local administrative arrangement in Yugoslavia.¹¹⁴ French Socialist Daniel Mayer, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly, paid a visit to Yugoslavia in April 1956. On that occasion, he spoke with the representatives of the SAWPY Commission for International Relations about socialist building in Yugoslavia and Yugoslav stance on relations among Socialist movements in the world after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), whereas the Yugoslav side was interested in the difficulties that Guy Mollet’s socialist cabinet was facing.¹¹⁵ A small SFIO delegation paid a visit to Slovenia in August 1956,¹¹⁶ while more representative, but not a high-level delegation, paid a visit to Yugoslavia in September. A SFIO delegation composed of prominent representatives (some of them had been to Yugosla-

113 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-45, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Edvarda Kardelja sa Guy Mollet-om, 22. oktobra 1954. godine*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Francuska, f. 23, br. 413632, *Zabeleška o boravku u Jugoslaviji André Philip-a*. See also: DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Francuska, f. 23, br. 18019, *Hronologija događaja u jugoslovensko-francuskim događajima*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Francuska, f. 23, br. 18021, *Jugoslovensko-francuski odnosi 1954-1955*; DAMSPRS, PA-1955, Francuska, f. 18, br. 41371, *Izveštaj jugoslovenske ambasade za 1954. godinu, Pariz, 31. januar 1955*.

114 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-54, *Pripreme za posetu predsednika opština – članova SFIO Jugoslaviji*.

115 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-61, *Zapisnik sa sastanka Komisije za međunarodne veze SSRNJ sa Daniel Mayer-om, predsednikom Spoljnopolitičkog odbora francuske Narodne skupštine, 11. aprila 1956*.

116 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-65, *Poseta delegacije SFIO Sloveniji*.

via earlier) was hosted by SAWPY in the period 6-16 September 1956. On that occasion, they visited Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana and spoke with Yugoslav highest political officials.¹¹⁷ In general, French-Yugoslav relations at the time were showing some continuity and stability, which is best demonstrated through Josip Broz Tito's visit to France in May 1956, when he was hosted, among others, by Guy Mollet, the Socialist Prime Minister. The visit was perceived as a "major political event".¹¹⁸ Yet, relations between Yugoslavs and French Socialists, even though they were regular, did not yield any significant results and were, in its essence, "futile".

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) represented an important link in the overall collaboration between Yugoslav communists and Western Socialists. Mutual caution and restraint dominated in the first phase, more on the German side, but one could also observe a solid continuity and even intensity in their contacts. There were no delegations, but some individual visits were arranged. The German Social Democrats were, first of all, cautious, they even shied away from Yugoslavs, as they believed that the Yugoslav side, by supporting some communism's "dissidents", was indirectly undermining the impact of Social Democrats. Thus, the second phase of cooperation (starting with Stalin's death) commenced at the same pace and with just the same tone. The Yugoslav side got deeply interested in SPD's policy and programme, insisting on deepening the cooperation through visits in early 1953. It suggested to the General Secretary of the Party Erich Ollenhauer to send delegates to the forthcoming NFY/SAWPY congress in February, as it would officially be "the first contact between SPD and our Front and the Party."¹¹⁹ German Social Democrats claimed that they had shown restraint owing to the issues related to German war criminals in Yugoslav wars and those dealing with Yugoslav socialists in exile.¹²⁰ However, it was concluded at the time that the collaboration with the SPD had extended and that the German "reserve" was only related to "some principal issues". In addition, notably due to

117 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-66, *Delegacija SFIO u Jugoslaviji, od 6. do 16. septembra 1956. godine.*

118 DAMSPRS, PA-1956, Francuska, f. 25, br. 410510, *Komentari nakon posete predsednika Tita Francuskoj, Pariz, 28. jun 1956.*

119 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-86, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa predsednikom SPD E. Ollenhauer-om, 27. januara 1953.*

120 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-87, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa Fritz Heine-om, članom rukovodstva SPD-a, 2. februara 1953.*

elections in Germany, official delegations' visits were out of the question in 1953,¹²¹ yet, with the positive support of SPD leadership they may be materialised in the foreseeable future.¹²²

After Stalin's death and coming of new leadership to power in the USSR, diplomats in the Yugoslav Embassy in Bonn were warning of Moscow's efforts, in particular before the September elections, to get closer to the SPD leaders who were refusing it.¹²³ German Social Democrats were strongly influenced by the Socialist International (where the British Labourists were the most dominant), which is something they did not particularly try to hide before the Yugoslav representatives. Thus, this was one of the explanations why the official collaboration, in particular when encouraged through mutual visits, had not reached high levels yet.¹²⁴ Yet, Ollenhauer was pretty direct and straight when revealing underlying reasons during one of his common conversations with Mladen Iveković, Yugoslav Ambassador to Bonn. Namely, the SPD leader revealed in a candid conversation with Iveković in October 1953, that he was reluctant about coming due to the "invasion" of English and French socialists recently of Yugoslavia, as, he believed, the British Foreign Office policy was behind all that.¹²⁵ After being defeated in the September 1953 elections, already existing divisions within the SPD additionally deepened, splitting the party to the right and the left wing, while the Yugoslav side was attempting to keep balanced relations with both factions.¹²⁶

The Yugoslav side, in particular its diplomatic representatives in Bonn, were maintaining intensive contacts and striving to strengthen cooperation through the SAWPY, while the SPD insisted on maintaining relations through state and diplomatic channels. That was demonstrated at the SPD congress in July 1954, when diplomatic representatives were invited to participate, while the Yugoslav Embassy was insistent that the

121 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-92, *Pismo savetnika Ambasade u Bonu F. Primožića Spoljnopolitičkoj komisiji SSRNJ*, 24. marta 1953.

122 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-98, *Zabeleška o razgovoru drugova Moše Pijade i Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa predsednikom SPD E. Ollenhauer-om i njegovim zamenikom Mellies-om*, 16. juna 1953.

123 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-99, *Depeša od 11. jula 1953.*

124 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-100, *Zabeleška o razgovoru sa Fritz Heine-om, članom rukovodstva SPD, u Bonu, 5. avgusta 1953.*

125 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-102, *Zabeleška o razgovoru sa prvacima SPD Erich Ollenhauer-om, Herbert Wehner-om u Karl Schmidt-om, 6. oktobra 1953, na večeri kod ambasadora dr. Ivekovića.*

126 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-108, *Zabeleška sa sastanka sa drugom Ivekovićem po pitanju situacije u SPD, 10. decembra 1953.*

Yugoslav observers be from the SAWPY.¹²⁷ However, the SPD leadership declared against inviting Yugoslav observers to attend the congress, so that Ambassador Iveković stopped insisting on sending the SPD delegation to Yugoslavia.¹²⁸ Thus, collaboration continued through numerous individual, mainly private visits of German Social Democrats to Yugoslavia or the visits of some less important groups, including various youth associations, etc. In that period the German Social Democrats were also going through political isolation crisis inside the Socialist International, primarily in early 1954, when they were exposed to strong pressures, mostly coming from the British Labour Party and the USA.¹²⁹ The SPD leadership, in particular its leader Erich Ollenhauer, were showing open animosity towards US politics, especially NATO. Thus, in late October 1954 Ollenhauer expressed his doubts before high-ranking Yugoslav officials Edvard Kardelj, Vladimir Bakarić and Ambassador Mladen Iveković as to the appropriateness of the existence of this security organization, following the change in the global political situation. The SPD was also in favour of the reunification of Germany.¹³⁰ Nonetheless, according to the estimates made by the Yugoslav side in late 1954, the USA made a powerful impact on SPD in this period, as they were making efforts to redirect the party towards the policy pursued by the Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his “Washington-Bonn axis”, which was particularly visible in the so called “American Faction” of the party, which was in favour of “abandoning Marxism”.¹³¹

The Đilas-Dedijer case did not pass by German Social Democrats. In early 1955, certain SPD’s delegates reacted with the Yugoslav Ambassador Iveković, who responded resolutely that Yugoslavia was entitled to prosecute its citizens in accordance with its own legislation, emphasize-

127 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-118, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa prvacima SPD Ollenhauer-om u Wehner-om, 1. jula 1954.*

128 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-119, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa Wehner-om, 2. jula 1954.*

129 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-114, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa SPD Herbert Wehner-om, 18. marta 1954.*

130 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-126, *Zabeleška o razgovoru drugova Edvarda Kardelja, Vladimira Bakarića, Ivekovića i Vratuše sa predsednikom SPD Ollenhauer-om, zamenikom predsednika Meilles-om članom predsedništva Wehner-om, 26. oktobra 1954, na večeri u Ambasadi FNRJ u Bonu.*

131 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-128, *Izveštaj o stavu SPD po najvažnijim pitanjima unutrašnje i spoljne politike (1954).*

ing in particular that they and their sympathizers once and for all “had to reconcile with the fact that Yugoslavia would not turn westwards, towards West Democracy, whatever it was that the West officials did, but it would follow its own path corresponding to its specific situation and its well-understood interests”.¹³² At the time, Josip Broz Tito was paying a visit to India and Burma (December 1954-January 1955), so that the Yugoslav side interpreted the SPD’s reaction as regards the Đilas-Dedijer case as a thought-out “anti-Yugoslav campaign”. In addition, Mladen Iveković, Yugoslav Ambassador to Bonn, lodged a protest directly with the SPD leader, who negated it by giving a statement that those had not been party’s official stances”.¹³³ Quite the contrary, the SPD leadership was convincing the Yugoslav side of its amicable intentions and willingness to resume collaboration. Ollenhauer again promised to eventually pay a visit to Yugoslavia, which had been postponed so many times before.¹³⁴ The Yugoslav Ambassador maintained regular and cordial contacts with the SPD highest officials, but he still did not consider it “the real thing”, i.e. it was necessary to establish a direct and immediate contact between the SPD and SAWPY to strengthen the cooperation.”¹³⁵ Nonetheless, the planned visit of SPD high-level delegation was being postponed, which was justified by the Germans by circumstances, i.e. relations they developed with the Socialist International.¹³⁶

In the spring of 1955, immediately before Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia, the Soviet side, among other things, was endeavouring to get closer to the SPD leadership.¹³⁷ That subject was touched upon in the conversations conducted between the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives and SPD representatives in Bonn, on 22 May 1955. Namely, just before the

132 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-129, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa poslanikom SPD Fritz Erler-om, 20. januara 1955.*

133 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-129, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa predsednikom SPD Ollenhauer-om, 24. januara 1955.*

134 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-130, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa Erich Ollenhauer-om, 9. marta 1955, kod Ollenhauer-a na večeri.*

135 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-132, *Pismo Mladena Ivekovića Veljku Vlahoviću od 31. marta 1955.*

136 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-137, *Zabeleška o razgovoru sa članovima nemačke parlamentarne delegacije u Komisiji za međunarodne veze SSRNJ od 17. maja 1955. godine.*

137 DAMSPRS, PA-1956, SR Nemačka, f. 59, br. 421545, *Godišnji izveštaj Ambasade FNRJ u Bonu za 1955. godinu.*

arrival of a high-level Soviet delegation in Belgrade, SPD representatives asked from the Yugoslavs to act as intermediary in order to inform the SPD about the exact intentions of the Soviet side given the contacts they had recently had with the German Social Democrats. The Germans were mainly intrigued with how the German question could be solved and how the Russians perceived that issue. They also tried to explore the possibility of Yugoslav mediation in the contacts between Ollenhauer and Nehru; yet, it was kindly rejected by the Yugoslav Ambassador.¹³⁸ In the second half of 1955, the Soviet side cooled its relations with German Social Democrats, by “ignoring” them at international meetings, while the relations between German Social Democrats and Yugoslav communists were, to say the least, ambivalent, even though the SPD’s leaders were assuring Yugoslav diplomatic representatives of their comradeship and trustful relationship with Yugoslavia.¹³⁹ This is how the year 1956 started, with frequent contacts, conversations and opinion exchange; the SPD leadership expressed willingness to send its high-level delegation to visit Yugoslavia in the foreseeable future.

Improvement in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations was one of the topics in the conversations held between Yugoslav diplomatic representatives and SPD’s leadership in early 1956. Yugoslav representatives perceived Yugoslav policy as an attempt to gain full independence and collaborate with everyone who was willing to cooperate, while German Social Democrats believed that one could not object to such policy; they also shared belief that this policy would contribute to “the scheme of East-West Accord”, as well as to extending influence to the postcolonial world (India, Burma); with an impression that “the balance may be lost exclusively for the benefit of the Eastern bloc” in that situation.¹⁴⁰ Aside from diplomatic channels, contacts with German Social Democrats¹⁴¹ were maintained by means of individual private visits of SPD officials to Yugoslavia. Thus,

138 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-138, *Zabeleška o razgovoru vođenim sa H. Wehner-om, članom predsedništva SPD, na večeri kod savetnika Jovića, 22. maja 1955, na kojoj je bio prisutan i ambasador Iveković.*

139 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-140, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa prvacima SPD Ollenhauer-om u Wehner-om, 25. novembra 1955. Razgovor se vodio na večeri kod Ollenhauer-a.*

140 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-148, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Ambasadora FNRJ u Bonu dr Mladena Ivekovića sa Ollenhauer-om, Mellies-om u Heine-om, 14. marta 1956.*

141 See: DAMSPRS, PA-1956, SR Nemačka, f. 59, br. 41228, *Telegram MIP-u, Bon, 26. januar 1956*; DAMSPRS, PA-1956, SR Nemačka, f. 59, br. 43932, *Telegram MIP-u, Bon, 15. mart 1956*; DAMSPRS, PA-1956, SR Nemačka, f. 59, br. 49180, *Telegram MIP-u,*

Veljko Vlahović, the head of the Foreign Policy Commission of the SAWPY, took advantage of Herbert Wehner's stay in Yugoslavia in May 1956 to hand an official invitation to a SPD delegation. On that occasion, while addressing Wehner, Vlahović especially emphasized that the Yugoslav side perceived the German Social Democratic Party as "the only political force that pulled together a vast majority of the working class in Western Germany", which only piqued Yugoslav communists' interest in them.¹⁴² During the dinner Kardelj organized in Herbert Wehner's honour on 24 May 1956, while proposing a toast to the guest, a wish was expressed that the two parties further intensify the cooperation. Wehner responded using a proverb "good food takes time", to what Kardelj replied "in cooking, it is necessary to use properly stored fresh ingredients in order to prevent food poisoning", which illustrates vividly the relations between Yugoslav Communists and German Social Democrats in that period.¹⁴³

Friendly relations with the Belgian Socialist Party (PSB) established in the first stage of collaboration with Western European Socialists did not deteriorate after Stalin's death. Following the substantive stage in their relationship and the visit paid by a high-level PSB delegation, headed by President Max Buset (29 July-2 August 1952) and the arrival of a number of other prominent PSB members, Yugoslav communists took its turn to visit Belgium. So, the visit was repaid by SAWPY delegation from 26 September to 6 October 1954, headed by Edvard Kardelj, Vladimir Bakarić and Rodoljub Čolaković. The SAWPY delegates had an opportunity to meet numerous individuals from the circles of Belgian Socialists, get familiar with the functioning of the Belgian Party, and also get acquainted with Belgian political and social life.¹⁴⁴ Belgian socialists not only showed affinity for Yugoslavia and its politics, but they also showed affinity for the Yugoslav system, expressing great interest in studying it. They were

Bon, 9. jun 1956; DAMSPRS, PA-1956, SR Nemačka, f. 59, br. 411343, Telegram MIP-u, Bon, 2. jul 1956.

142 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-154, *Zabeleška o dva razgovora Herbert Wehner-a, člana predsedništva Socijaldemokratske partije Nemačke, u Komisiji za međunarodne veze SSRNJ, 19. maja 1956.*

143 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-154, *Zabeleška o razgovoru druga potpredsednika E. Kardelja sa Herbert Wehner-om na večeri 24. maja 1956. godine.*

144 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-31, *Boravak delegacije SSRNJ u Belgiji, 1954; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-31, Sastanak sa Biroom Socijalističke partije Belgije, održan 19. septembra 1954; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-31, Sastanak u Birou PSB, 6. oktobra 1954.*

also openly showing their affinities for Yugoslavia before their public.¹⁴⁵ After this visit, relations with Yugoslavia additionally deepened; thus, in the spring of 1955 it was arranged that a large delegation of local PSB secretaries visit Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁶ As a result, a group of regional PSB secretaries consisted of 22 representatives stayed in Yugoslavia from 20 to 30 September 1955. On that occasion, they gained insight into the Yugoslav society and system, though the visit was limited to the People's Republic of Croatia. They conveyed impressions to the Belgian public and the visit had a good response in Belgium.¹⁴⁷

Even though they showed restraint to Yugoslav Communists at times and were critical of "one-party dictatorship" and the absence of democratic pluralism in the public life, while advocating multi-party parliamentary democracy, Belgian Socialists acted as friends to the Yugoslavs across the world, advocating their side in a number of situations, in particular in the Socialist International and similar organizations. Thus, in the spring of 1955, at the request of Yugoslav diplomatic agents in Belgium, the Belgian party launched an initiative to organize a meeting of West European socialists at the Émile Vandervelde Institute in Brussels, where the Yugoslav side was expected to present the main report. Belgian Socialists used the influence they enjoyed in the Socialist International at the July session in London to invite other West European Socialist countries to send their delegates to Brussels.¹⁴⁸ Belgian Socialists showed great interest in this meeting.¹⁴⁹ The meeting was to be held on 5 and 6 November, but it was cancelled in the meantime because some parties had withdrawn from participation (British, German, Swiss, Austrian, Dutch, and Swedish) out of fear that the gathering may lead to the dissolution of the Socialist International, as they believed Yugoslav Communists were advocating it.

145 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-31, *Stenografske beleške sa sastanka Komisije za međunarodne veze SSRNJ, održanog 6. oktobra 1954, povodom povratka delegacije SSRNJ sa posete Socijalističkoj partiji Belgije.*

146 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-39, *Pismo Marije Vilfan jugoslovenskom poslaniku Barišiću, 19. maja 1955.*

147 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-39, *Izveštaj o boravku grupe od 22 oblasna sekretara Socijalističke partije Belgije, od 20. do 30. septembra 1955.*

148 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-38, *Pismo Komisiji za međunarodne veze SSRNJ, Brisel, 27. jul 1955; DAMSPRS, PA-1955, Belgija, f. 6, br. 410123, Izveštaj Komisiji za međunarodne veze SSRNJ, 27. jul 1955; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-38, Pismo R. Evalenka, direktora Instituta Vandervelde poslaniku FNRJ u Briselu, 29. septembra 1955.*

149 DAMSPRS, PA-1955, Belgija, f. 6, br. 414192, *Izveštaj SIP-u, 26. septembra 1955.*

Regardless of the aforementioned case, collaboration with Belgian Socialists continued at the same pace; thus, as early as November 1955 a new SAWPY delegation, headed by Veljko Vlahović, came to Belgium. This visit was fairly significant for both parties, as it was aimed to further intensify their collaboration. On that occasion, Yugoslav delegates spoke with the highest PSB officials, including Max Buset, President of the Party, Victor Larock, Belgian Foreign Trade Minister and Paul-Henri Spaak, then Foreign Affairs Minister.¹⁵⁰ As reported by the Yugoslav Embassy, this meeting affected the foreign policy conceptions of PSB; in addition, Paul-Henri Spaak suggested further strengthening of the collaboration.¹⁵¹ Thus, in the spring of 1956 was the official visit of the new PSB delegation to Yugoslavia. The delegation was headed by the party president Max Buset, and it took place from 10 to 15 April, 1956.¹⁵² This visit coincided with the visit of Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Head of Diplomacy, so he partly participated in the delegation's activities. Josip Broz Tito received the delegates on 13 April and the discussions tackled the topics such as foreign policy and cooperation with the European Socialists.¹⁵³ Their discussions primarily dealt with the new USSR policy following the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956, but also with the perspective of European collaboration, position of Europe in relation to two blocs and its integration, which was an idea that Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Affairs Minister strongly advocated.¹⁵⁴ This visit confirmed the favourable cooperation between the two sides, indicating further good relations as well.

For the purpose of this paper, relations with Scandinavian Socialists are to be mentioned. In this context, the most intensive and probably most amicable relations, in the first phase of cooperation with Western European Socialists, were established with the Norwegian Labour Party (AP) and the Swedish Social-Democratic Party (SAP). In the first phase of collaboration, Scandinavian countries as a whole caught the interest of Yugoslavs, so they closely monitored the situation in that area.¹⁵⁵ In the

150 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-38, *Diskusija između predstavnika SSRNJ i Socijalističke partije Belgije, Brisel, 3. novembra 1955.*

151 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-38, *Pismo savetnika Ambasade FNRJ S. Obradovića Komisiji za međunarodne veze SSRNJ.*

152 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-44, *Delegacija SP Belgije u Jugoslaviji od 10. do 15. aprila 1956. godine.*

153 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-44, *Zabeležka o razgovoru druga Tita sa predstavnicima Socijalističke partije Belgije, Brioni, 13. aprila 1956.*

154 Miletić, "Yugoslav Communists and Belgian Socialists 1950-1956", 137-138.

155 See: Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 206-208; DAMSPRS, PA-1953, strogo poverljivo, f. 3, br. 83, *Izveštaj o strateškoj situaciji Skandinavije.*

second phase, following Stalin's death, the collaboration continued at the same pace, despite certain situations where misunderstanding would appear, such as "the Đilas case", which seriously disturbed Scandinavian socialists in early 1954.¹⁵⁶ Namely, in the atmosphere that implied intensifying and improving of cooperation, in the summer of 1953, it was suggested that Milovan Đilas, a high-ranking Yugoslav official, visit Scandinavia, as a guest of local Socialists. Agreement was reached with the Swedish and Norwegian party, and Đilas was to visit Denmark as well.¹⁵⁷ However, due to Milovan Đilas's removal from office in January 1954, the visit was never materialised. Scandinavian parties did not greet this event enthusiastically; yet, it did not affect gravely the continuation of already well-trodden collaboration, which was perceived by both parties as useful.

So, after a certain period of time, in the summer of 1954, the initiative for a SAWPY delegation to visit Norway was relaunched. It was to be hosted by the local Labour Party.¹⁵⁸ On this occasion, the Swedish and Danish parties did not send an official invitation; however, they agreed that prior to or after visiting Norway, the Yugoslav delegation may visit Sweden, though privately and without party's official invitation. The reasons for it, as observed by both the Norwegian and the Yugoslav side, lay in the Soviet-Swedish relations.¹⁵⁹ The Yugoslav delegation, headed by Edvard Kardelj, within the scope of a wider visit to Western Europe, was hosted by the Norwegian Labour Party in Norway from 3 to 10 October 1954. On this occasion, members of the delegation met and spoke with numerous prominent individuals in the Labour Party and Norway, including Prime Minister Oscar Torp. The topics they tackled were current issues in the foreign policy field, such as the changes in the USSR, the Trieste issue, Yugoslav relations with NATO, USA, Europe, Yugoslav sys-

156 See: Aleksandar V. Miletić, „Unrelized Nordic Dream”. Milovan Đilas and the Scandinavian Socialists”, *Токови историје*, 3/2015, 89-104; Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 211-219; Милетић, *Титов емисар Милован Ђилас*, 403-417.

157 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/ II-18, *Zabeleška o razgovoru drugova Dedijera i Stojakovića sa dr. Darkom Černejom, našim savetnikom u Švedskoj, koji je održan u Komisiji za međunarodne veze SSRNJ, 8. jula 1953*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/ II-18, *Telegram Vladimira Dedijera, 3. oktobar 1953. godine*; DAMSPRS, PA-1953, Norveška, f. 64, br. 417481, *Godišnji izveštaj poslanstva FNRJ u Oslu za 1953. godinu, 24. decembar 1953. godine*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/ II-18, *Pismo Svena Asplinga Milovanu Đilasu, 28. decembar 1953. godine*.

158 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-33, *Pozivno pismo Haakon Lie-a Veljku Vlahoviću, od 15. juna 1954.*

159 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-33, *Zabeleška o razgovoru druga Uvalića sa generalnim sekretarom Radničke partije, Haakon Li-em, 31. avgusta 1954.*

tem, etc.¹⁶⁰ The journey of the Yugoslav delegation met with a positive response in the Western press, in particular in the Norwegian and Belgian press,¹⁶¹ as the Yugoslav delegation visited Belgium in addition to Norway (which has already been mentioned). Collaborating with the Norwegian party was by far the most intensive collaboration as compared to that with the parties from other Scandinavian countries. Thus, as of 1954, the so called "summer schools" were organized by Norwegian Labourists and Yugoslav Communists, within the scope of a wider Yugoslav initiative for discussion among Socialist Parties, where the current problems in the area of society, socialism, politics and international relations were discussed once a year.¹⁶²

The Norwegian Labour Party showed a strong interest in the social processes in Yugoslavia and Yugoslav foreign policy, which was one of the key topics in the discussions between Yugoslav diplomatic representatives and AP representatives. Thus, Finn Moe, a reputed Norwegian Labourist and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Norwegian Parliament (Storting), stated in early 1955 that the recent Tito's visit to India and Burma was of great importance, given the increasing role that Asian countries played throughout the world.¹⁶³ In addition, the Norwegian Labour Party was also striving to find "new forms" or other ways of collaboration among the socialist parties in the world, as they considered the Socialist International to be an "obsolete" organization in that sense.¹⁶⁴ Before long, in September 1955, Finn Moe paid a visit to Yugoslavia. In his conversation with Edvard Kardelj on 14 September, Moe expressed his opinion according to which the USSR was shifting its policy towards Scandinavian countries and was showing an interest in the establishment of neutral "Scandinavian" bloc. Nonetheless, with all the hopes that Moe expressed in relation to the positive changes in the USSR, he maintained

160 For more info, see: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-33, *Materijal o pseti potpredsednika SIV-a E. Kardelja i predsednika Sabora NR Hrvatske V. Bakarića Norveškoj, od 3. do 10. oktobra 1954.*

161 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-33, *Odjek puta potpredsednika SIV-a druga Edvarda Kardelja i predsednika Sabora NR Hrvatske druga Vladimira Bakarića u štampi skandinavskih i zapadnoevropskih zemalja.*

162 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-35, *"Letnje škole" predstavnika RPN i SSRNJ.*

163 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-43, *Zabeležka o razgovoru poslanika Uvalića sa Finn Moe-om, predsednikom Spoljnopolitičkog odbora Storting-a, 24. januara 1955.*

164 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-44, *Zabeležka o razgovoru poslanika Uvalića sa sekretarom Radničke partije Aake Oding-om, 26. marta 1955.*

his position that NATO should not be dissolved.¹⁶⁵ The following month, a new SAWPY delegation paid a visit to Norway, where it stayed from 16 to 24 October 1955.¹⁶⁶ On that occasion, a Norwegian-Yugoslav “Socialist Conference” was organized in Oslo from 18 to 22 October, where the topics, ranging from foreign policy, through internal policy and economy, to the cooperation among socialist forces in the world, were tackled.¹⁶⁷

The most important event by all means in the Yugoslav foreign policy in 1956 was Tito’s visit to the USSR, from 1 to 23 June. This event drew the attention of Norwegian Labour Party, given different factional struggles within the party. AP General Secretary Haakon Lie was considered to be western-oriented; it was believed in the party he “feared any contacts with Communists” and also that he did not share optimism relating to the potential changes in the USSR, whereas other AP officials, including Finn Moe and Andreas Andersen, had more flexible stances.¹⁶⁸ Even though they were showing some reserve when it came to the reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the USSR, Norwegian Labourists, in particular following Tito’s visit to Moscow, expressed their conviction that Yugoslavia would have a positive impact on Moscow with the aim of further changing of the Soviet overall policy.¹⁶⁹ The high-level delegation of the Labour Party arrived in Yugoslavia in the month of September, headed by General Secretary Haakon Lie and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Norwegian Parliament Finn Moe. Additional Norwegian-Soviet “socialist conference” was held in Belgrade at the time, from 17 to 20 September 1956, where topics such as foreign and internal policy were tackled and experience was exchanged. The reports were submitted, among others, by Haakon Lie и Finn Moe.¹⁷⁰ The delegation of La-

165 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-45, *Zabeleška o razgovoru potpredsednika SIV-a druga E. Kardelja sa sa g. Finn Moe-om, predsednikom Spoljnopolitičkog odbora Storting-a, dana 14. septembra 1954. godine.*

166 For more info, see: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-48, *Materijal o boravku delegacije SSRNJ u Norveškoj, 16-24. oktobra 1955.*

167 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-48, *Diskusija predstavnika SSRNJ i Radničke partije Norveške, Oslo, 18-22. oktobar 1955.*

168 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-54, *Zabeleška o razgovoru na večeri 21. marta 1956, na kojoj su prisustvovali Finn Moe, Aake Ording, Frithjof Jacobsen i Andreas Anderson.*

169 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-59, *Zabeleška o razgovoru sa Haakon Lie-om u Ording-om u stanu Ording-a (dan posle objavljivanja Moskovskog kominikea).*

170 For more info, see: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-64, *Materijal o norveško-jugoslovenskoj socijalističkoj konferenciji održanoj u Beogradu od 17. do 20. septembra 1956.*

bours was hosted on 19 September 1956 by Josip Broz Tito.¹⁷¹ This event additionally strengthened the collaboration between the two parties, with the promising perspective to continue good relations.¹⁷²

The second “phase” of collaboration, i.e. the second period in the relationship between the Yugoslav Communists and Western European Socialists (1953-1956) was, as seen, an indicator of certain changes in terms of the stances that some parties had taken on Yugoslavia, while they maintained the same relationship with some other parties or even established a better one than in the first phase (before Stalin’s death). The main reason for such state of affairs was that Yugoslavia changed its foreign policy direction following Stalin’s death in March 1953, which was a turning point in its relationship with Moscow and relations with the USSR were coming back to normal. In addition, the overall Yugoslav foreign policy began stabilizing in the context of already developed policy of equidistance in relation to opposing blocs, the Eastern and the Western one. As shown in the examples of five parties, relations varied, ranging from the evident cooling and “impediment” in cooperation with Labour, through regularly maintained but basically sterile relations with French Socialists and nagging and caution displayed by the German Social Democrats, to strengthening and deepening of amicable relations with Belgian Socialists and Norwegian Social Democrats. Therefore, the relations with the above-mentioned Western European Socialist Parties serve as a relatively good indicator of complexity, not only in the relations between Yugoslav Communists and Western European Socialists, but also with regard to the overall Yugoslav foreign policy in this period.

Methods and Practice of Yugoslav Cooperation with Western European Socialists in the First Half of the 1950s

Establishment and development of cooperation between Yugoslav communists and Western European Socialists in the first half of the 1950s, was mutually beneficial for then Yugoslav foreign policy. Having in mind the numerosity and intensity of contacts with influential political circles in the West and throughout the world stemming from the mentioned co-

171 AJ, fond 507/IX, CKSKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-64, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike i članova delegacije Norveške radničke Partije, 19. septembra 1956.*

172 *Борба*, 9. септембар 1956; *Политика*, 18. септембар 1956.

operation, as well as both direct and indirect participation of frequently top Yugoslav officials in those processes, relations with the West European Socialist Left undoubtedly played a role of an unofficial diplomatic channel in turbulent and complicated times. Having that in mind, this form of activity, notably in the case of cooperation with Western Socialists, may be defined as “ideological diplomacy”, as the common socialist ideology was the main bonding and anchor point in the above-mentioned relations.

Officially, relationship and cooperation with the Western Socialist Parties, as well as with all other parties, movements and organisations throughout the world, were formalised by means of the new Foreign Policy Commission of the CC CPY (as of 1953 it was part of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia – SAWPY), which was established specifically to that aim in 1950. Upon its establishment, Milovan Đilas was designated as Chairman of the Commission, while Vladimir Dedijer was appointed his deputy. Following Đilas’s removal from office (January 1954) this duty was assumed by Veljko Vlahović. This body was tasked with establishing contacts and developing cooperation with international political organisations, parties and numerous political and other reputed officials and individuals; it also took upon itself to organize both group and individual visits of delegations, organize and convene meetings, conferences and public debates, analyse situations through teamwork, as well as political and all other, notably ideological trends and movements in the world, monitor the courses of global politics and international activities, analyse activities, engagements and moves of politicians, statesmen, parties or other public figures, act operatively and spread the influence of Yugoslavia on political circles in other countries, have an impact on propaganda and the promotion of Yugoslav policy, society, ideology and system, work in coordination with Yugoslav diplomatic representatives abroad, propose ideas, give advice and direct activities within its domain, etc.

In particular it should be noted that the relations with the parties pertaining to the West European Socialist Left developed through the Party, i.e. the party apparatus, initially directly through the Central Committee, and thereafter indirectly, through the SAWPY, which was not officially a party, but it was where the Communists ruled the roost, the same as elsewhere. Consequently, the relations maintained through the Foreign Policy Commission of the CC CPY/SAWPY could not be defined as official interstate relations, nor they formally carried that weight. Nonetheless, since the Party (the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, later on the

League of Communists of Yugoslavia – LCY) played the key and most significant role in the entire political life of the Socialist Yugoslavia, as the centre of decision-making, so did the Foreign Policy Commission of the CC CPY/SAWPY assume the role of “reserve command” whose responsibility was to improve and conduct foreign policy. On the other hand, foreign parties with whom the cooperation had been established, depending on whether or not they were in power, exerted some influence on the policy of their respective countries. Obviously, in the situations when certain political parties formed a new government at some point, all the more so their political programmes corresponded to the official policies of their countries. It was owing to these reasons that the relations between Yugoslav Communists and Western European Socialists, studied in this paper, contained some elements of informal diplomacy.

The ways and methods of cooperation were versatile. The crucial and most frequent forms of establishing this kind of cooperation during this period will be mentioned herein. Those were official visits of party delegations, individual contacts and ties, individual visits, political and ideological debates and conferences, secret channels supporting certain groups. The above-mentioned forms of cooperation and communication interweaved, permeated and often carried within two or three models at the same time, depending on the situation. A special form of cooperation with the Western European Socialist and Social Democratic Parties, as well as other parties throughout the world, was being developed through regular ties with the Yugoslav diplomatic service in certain countries and owing to abundant assistance of Yugoslav diplomatic missions abroad.

The most important and most representative were official delegations of foreign parties that were visiting Yugoslavia, as well as Yugoslav party delegations paying visits to certain foreign countries. The purpose of these reciprocal group visits was to get to know each other, which was especially important for Western Socialists who knew nothing or little about Yugoslavia. During these tours, they had an opportunity to reside in the largest Yugoslav cities, visit factories or other institutions and talk to the top Yugoslav political leaders at receptions. The Yugoslavs were given an opportunity to explain the nature of Yugoslav system to their guests, make them familiar with the life of locals in Yugoslavia, and clarify their attitudes and the political direction that Yugoslavia had chosen in those direct conversations. Owing to that, the picture of Yugoslavia, its society and policy was conveyed to the world directly in a rather functional and practical manner. Three distinguished examples will be men-

tioned in this paper: a visit paid by a high-level delegation of the British Labour Party to Yugoslavia in September 1950, participation of the LCY delegation at the First Asian Socialist Conference in January 1953 and a visit paid by the SAWPY to Norway in October 1954.

The visit paid by a high-level delegation of the British Labour Party, 7-19 September 1950, was beneficial in multiple ways for Yugoslavia. Firstly, it was the first official visit paid by a high-level delegation of an influential and powerful western party, which provided Yugoslav Communists and Yugoslavia with satisfaction because it was improving their reputation across the world. Secondly, Labour were able to get familiar with the stances adopted by the high-ranking Yugoslav officials, including Josip Broz Tito, gain insight into how the political, economic, commercial and social system worked, get familiar with the model of Yugoslav “democratic socialism” and a new model of “self-management”, which had been put into effect that year in Yugoslavia and to get a picture of the Yugoslav way of life. The Labour representatives held really substantive conversations with the most eminent Yugoslav leaders on several occasions, on 8-9 September,¹⁷³ thereafter on 15 September,¹⁷⁴ while on 18 September they were hosted by Josip Broz Tito.¹⁷⁵ During the three meetings, British Labourists exchanged opinions with the representatives of the People’s *Front of Yugoslavia*, including leading officials Milovan Đilas, Blagoje Nešković, Boris Kidrič, Moša Pijade. The British were most interested in the topics such as liberalisation and democratisation of economics, economy and governmental system; they were also interested in the Yugoslav standard of living, level of political and other freedoms in Yugoslavia, penal policy, role of trade unions, level of workers’ management in the new system, the way the People’s Front was functioning and issues in the area of foreign policy. Based on the available data from these meetings, one can observe clear differences between the Yugoslav Communists and British Labour, in the first place concerning the functioning of representative democracy and the way democratic system was comprehended. However, it is important to bear in mind that the British demonstrated tolerance for

173 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-1, *Sastanak članova Izvršnog odbora NF Jugoslavije sa delegacijom Laburističke partije Velike Britanije, održan 8. i 9. septembra u Beogradu.*

174 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-1, *Sastanak članova Izvršnog saveta Narodnog fronta Jugoslavije sa predstavnicima Laburističke stranke Velike Britanije, održan 15. septembra 1950.*

175 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-1, *Razgovor maršala Tita i predstavnika engleske Laburističke stranke, Beograd, 18. septembar 1950.*

the Yugoslav system, as well as understanding for the situation Yugoslavia was facing at the time, even though Labour were the representatives of a completely different system and society. Labour could obtain a direct answer to almost all of their queries from Josip Broz Tito. On the basis of what was said in the meeting with Tito, one could observe the intention of Labour to “feel” the pulse of the Yugoslav leadership in their intentions in the area of democratisation and liberalisation of the society, i.e. which decisions were firm and which political and temporary. Tito, however, was clear and unequivocal in that respect, making it clear to the British that the multiparty western democracy was not an option in Yugoslavia, which undoubtedly reassured Labour in their hopes that the option of prospective “regrouping” of the system in that direction was feasible. They also made Labour acquainted with the Yugoslav policy of neutralism in relation to the blocs, regardless of the existing tensions in the relationship with the USSR. At the end of their visit, Labour extended an invitation to the members of the People’s Front of Yugoslavia to visit Great Britain. Nonetheless, it was not until the end of 1956 that any Yugoslav party or People’s Front (later on SAWPY) delegation paid a visit to Great Britain.

The participation of the LCY at the first Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon (Burma), from 6 to 15 January 1953, was of great importance for both the Yugoslav Party and the Yugoslav foreign policy.¹⁷⁶ This event was not extremely significant only because Yugoslavia abandoned the local and entered the international political scene, but it indirectly affected relations with the Western European Socialists, notably with the British Labour. Namely, in the period following the conflict with the USSR and international isolation, Yugoslavia started pursuing the policy of equidistance from the two opposing blocs in the Cold War. It implied an active affirmation of the rights of small nations to pursue independent policies in relation to the Great Powers, placing Yugoslavia in a specific position within Europe divided into two blocs, regardless of its collaboration with the West, which was forced and harmonised with the current situation. In spite of certain differences between the states, the West was political-

176 For more info, see: Jovan Čavoški, „Ideološki prijatelj iz daleka: Jugoslavija i Azijska socijalistička konferencija”, *Istorija 20. veka*, 1/2019, 139-160; Aleksandar V. Miletić, „The Role of Milovan Đilas at the Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon, 1953”, *Токови историје*, 3/2020, pp. 117-137; Милетић, *Титов емисар Милован Ђилас*, 371-402; AJ, fond 142, Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije (SSRNJ), Materijal komisije za međunarodne veze, f. 38, *Report of Preliminary meeting for the Asian Socialist Conference held to Rangoon (25 to 29 March, 1952)*; *Report of the First Asian Socialist Conference, Rangoon 1953*, (Rangoon: An Asian Socialist Publication, 1953).

ly, systemically and ideologically monolithic representing one of the two opposing cold war camps. That is why Yugoslavia and its new nonaligned and neutralist policy could not be entirely comprehended in Europe divided into two opposing blocs. Collaboration with the capitalist and multi-party parliamentary West that was underway around that time was basically technical and pragmatic, not ideological and conceptual. Relations with Western European Socialists did not reach the level that would be entirely compatible with the new Yugoslav foreign policy course; the level was dependent in many ways on the Yugoslav stance towards the Eastern Bloc. Hence, it was necessary to search for partners in other parts of the world as well who would conduct conceptually the same or at least similar policy to that of Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁷

An opportunity to find allies outside Europe occurred in the late 1940s, in Asia, where the new processes of decolonization had taken place, Asian peoples got liberated, India achieved independence in 1947 and the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in 1949, which was an indication of new and important trends in global politics. One of the most important consequences of decolonization was the striving of newly-liberated zones, peoples and states to remain independent from the existing blocs. The ideas on nonalignment policy emerged exactly in the countries that were one of the first to gain independence, such as India, Indonesia and Burma. Within the scope of above-mentioned tendencies, the needs to establish independent socio-political systems arose. The mentioned processes and political phenomena were referred to at the time as the "third way" or the "third force", which will subsequently evolve into the policy of neutralism, and then the policy of nonalignment.¹⁷⁸ Yugoslavia closely monitored the stated processes, via numerous competent diplomats who were at the time being appointed across Asian countries.¹⁷⁹

The mentioned political and ideological tendencies in South and Southeast Asia were closely connected with socialist forces, which, in this part of the world, were increasingly showing an aspiration towards obtaining an indispensable socio-political role. Thus, the idea to form a powerful regional socialist organisation, with an independent, neutralist and nonaligned orientation of its member countries, i.e. their socialist

177 Милетић, *Титов емисар Милован Ђилас*, 372.

178 Čavoški, „Ideološki prijatelj iz daleka: Jugoslavija i Azijska socijalistička konferencija”, 139.

179 Jovan Čavoški, *Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt 1959–1962*, (Beograd: INIS, 2009), 42-52.

parties, emerged in the late 1940s. It was the Asian Socialist Conference (ASC). The preparations for its establishment began in the early 1950s; its members were the parties coming from Burma, India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Japan, Israel and other minor Asian Parties, whereas the Burma Socialist Party formed the backbone of this organisation.¹⁸⁰ Simultaneously, Yugoslavia developed intensive relations with Burma and was providing it with military aid, at war that was being fought against various domestic forces undermining the independence of Burma.¹⁸¹ Relations were also established with the Burma Socialist Party, while some of its representatives paid a visit to Yugoslavia in the early 1950s.¹⁸² Recognizing the differences in the political aspirations of both countries, notably in the domain of foreign policy and concerning the principle of an independent path of every country to socialism, the Yugoslav Party was invited to participate at the First Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon, in January 1953.

Thus, the LCY delegation, headed by Milovan Đilas and Aleš Bebler, participated in the first ASC as a "brotherly delegation", whereas, out of the foreign delegations, the delegates of the Socialist International, headed by Clement Attlee, also participated in the same role, as a "brotherly delegation". The Yugoslav Party was the only independent European party representative who was paid honour to participate in the activities of the First Asian Socialist Conference, which was a major recognition for the LCY, but also for Yugoslavia as a country and for its foreign policy. The Yugoslav efforts to impose political influence on the Asian continent were thereby confirmed; in addition, recognition was undoubtedly given to its ideological independence, i.e. its effort to pave its own way to

180 Čavoški, „Ideološki prijatelj iz daleka: Jugoslavija i Azijska socijalistička konferencija”, 140.

181 For more info on Yugoslav-Burmese relations around this time, see: Jovan Čavoški, "Arming Nonalignment: Yugoslavia's Relations with Burma and the Cold war in Asia, 1950–1955", *CWIHP Working Paper No. 61*, (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2010); Јован Чавошки, „Рука пружена преко света: југословенска подршка Бурми у борби против спољне агресије 1952–1954”, *Токови историје*, 2/2018, 143-176; Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat*, 155-174; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Burma, 17/VI-3, *Burmanska vojna i civilna delegacija u Jugoslaviji, jul 1952*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Burma, 17/VI-1, *Izveštaj o poseti dr Sein Banga i Uhla Manga, delegata na VI zasjedanju OUN, 27. XII-30. XII 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Burma, 17/VI-3, *Zabeleška o razgovoru druga Đilasa sa predstavnicima burmanske privredne delegacije Ča Njenom i Muang Đijem, održanom 30. juna 1952. godine*; AJ, fond 837, KPR, 1-2/4-2, *Elaborat „Burma”, novembar 1954*.

182 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Burma, 17/VI-1, *Sein Bang i Uhl Mang u Jugoslaviji, 27-30. XII 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Burma, 17/VI-1, *Razgovor maršala Tita sa gostima iz Burme, Beograd, 28. decembar 1951*.

socialism, both in relation to the Soviet and the Western European model.¹⁸³ It is important to mention animosities arising between the Yugoslav Communists and British Labour during that event, owing to the differences in their views of postcolonial issues. Anticolonial stances of Yugoslav delegation, attracting sympathy of almost all Asian Socialists, provoked antipathies among the SI delegates, where Labour were the most dominant. At the conference, the LCY delegates adopted the stance according to which the ASC should not join the Socialist International as a regional organisation, but the relations should be maintained on an equal footing. It was in direct conflict with the British Labour policy, whose intention was to use the Socialist International to influence the future events in Asia.¹⁸⁴ The mentioned events took place in the months before Stalin's death, when the crisis in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations had reached its peak and the arrangement dealing with the lethal aid that was to be provided by Britain to Yugoslavia was of great importance. Thus, the given example of Yugoslav activities that implied sending delegations, notably outside Europe, depicts to what extent the Cold War circumstances may change for the worse for Yugoslavia and how much political tactfulness and moderation were needed to put things in balance and optimise them.

One more visit deserves to be mentioned. It is the visit of the SAWPY delegation to Norway that took place from 3 to 10 October 1954, led by Edvard Kardelj, then President of the SAWPY and Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council (FEC) and Vladimir Bakarić, Speaker of the Parliament of People's Republic of Croatia (Sabor).¹⁸⁵ The delegation was provided with an opportunity to meet almost all leaders of the Labour Party as well as the national leaders of Norway during the visit. On

183 Čavoški, „Ideološki prijatelj iz daleka: Jugoslavija i Azijska socijalistička konferencija”, 143-147.

184 AJ, fond 836, KMJ, I-3-6/157, *Telegram Aleša Beblera MIP-u (prenos Đilasovog telegrama), Rangun, 9. januar 1953.*

185 For more info on the role of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Oslo relating to the preparations for the arrival of the SAWPY delegation, see: DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Norveška, f. 64, br. 413359, *Telegram SIP-u, Oslo, 18. avgust 1954*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Norveška, f. 64, br. 413359, *Telegram SIP-u, Oslo, 1. septembar 1954*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Norveška, f. 64, br. 413359, *Telegram SIP-u, Oslo, 8. septembar 1954*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Norveška, f. 64, br. 413359, *Telegram SIP-u, Oslo, 10. septembar 1954*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Norveška, f. 64, br. 413359, *Telegram SIP-u, Oslo, 14. septembar 1954*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Norveška, f. 64, br. 413359, *Telegram SIP-u, Oslo, 16. septembar 1954*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Norveška, f. 64, br. 413359, *Zabeleška o razgovoru sekretara Uvalića sa sekretarom Radničke partije Norveške Haakon Lie-om, 16. septembar 1956*; DAMSPRS, PA-1954, Norveška, f. 64, br. 413359, *Telegram SIP-u, Oslo, 24. septembar 1954.*

that occasion, Yugoslav delegates met and spoke with Prime Minister Oscar Torp, Labour Party Leader and Speaker of the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) Einer Gerhardsen, General Secretary of the Labour Party Haakon Lie, Minister of the Exterior Halvard Lange, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Norwegian Parliament Finn Moe, as well as members of the Oscar Torp's cabinet and other state and party officials. Conversations between the SAWPY delegates and Norwegian hosts were exceptionally substantive, multithemed, ranging from economy and economics, through domestic to foreign policy, which illustrates the importance of this delegation and also what policy Norway pursued in relation to Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁶ The above-mentioned example shows to what extent the party delegation (including the state officials though) could serve as "substitute" for the state delegation in certain situations, in particular when on the other side there was a friendly political party in power, with whom stable relations had been built in the meantime (this topic has been explored in the previous chapter).

Private contacts and individual actions constituted the following model of cooperation. They were of great importance primarily due to their greater or lesser informality. Namely, important and prominent representatives on both sides at times made acquaintances, became politically or intellectually close, they even made friends, which was manifested in many instances through regular contacts and correspondences. Thus, a "channel" that may serve as a means for the introduction of a direct political influence, was being established, whereby the mentioned "personal" channels were used in a number of situations to execute tasks of the utmost importance for the state. The finest example of the role personal contacts played was the case from 1951 when the acquaintances and friends among the British Labourists, of one of the most influential Yugoslav leaders, Milovan Đilas, were used to negotiate about the military aid to be granted to Yugoslavia by Great Britain.

It has already been mentioned that Yugoslavia obtained an abundance of financial assistance from the West in the early 1950s, as well as political support while opposing the pressure being exerted by the USSR and its satellite states. In addition, owing to the tensions and threatened by the prospect of a military aggression from the East, the Yugoslav side was compelled at the time to ask for military aid from the West. Yugosla-

186 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-33, *Materijal o poseti potpredsednika SIV-a Edvarda Kardelja i predsednika Sabora NR Hrvatske Vladimira Bakarića Norveškoj, od 3. do 10. oktobra 1954.*

via arranged to receive military aid from the West by means of the Tripartite Committee, composed of representatives of the USA, Great Britain and France; it was founded with that aim in 1950. The British Labourists, who were in power at the time, played a special role in initiating the process of providing military aid to Yugoslavia. The initiative to address Clement Attlee's labour government for military aid stemmed from the personal contacts that Milovan Đilas, Head of the Foreign Policy Commission of the CC CPY, established in the autumn of 1950 with high-level Labour representatives, following the visit of a high-level labour delegation to Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁷

The visit paid by a British Labour Delegation in September 1950 was of utmost importance for Yugoslavia in terms of political promotion. Along with other things, however, personal contacts were established at the time among the Yugoslav leaders and the leading members of the British Labour Party, with special emphasis on Milovan Đilas, the leading Party ideologist of the time. According to the archival documents and sources, it was right after the visit that Đilas won the sympathies of Morgan Phillips, General Secretary and Sam Watson, Chairman of the Labour Executive Committee.¹⁸⁸ Morgan Phillips and Sam Watson were highly politically influential at the time, not only in their Party and in Great Britain, but in the international socialist movement. In mid-1951, Morgan Phillips became President of the newly-established Socialist International to hold that position until 1957, which influenced considerably the relations of this organization towards Yugoslav Communists around this time. Until the end of 1950, Milovan Đilas had established and maintained fairly cordial relations with the mentioned two Labour leaders, notably with Morgan Phillips. Numerous documents and mutual correspondences kept in those months are sufficient proof of that.¹⁸⁹ Namely, following their visit to Yugoslavia and coming to London, along with other things, the British Labourists conveyed their positive impressions about Milovan Đilas,

187 Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu*, 249; Milovan Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, (Beograd: Književne novine, 1991), 223-224; Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 118.

188 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-1, *Sastanak članova Izvršnog odbora NF Jugoslavije sa delegacijom Laburističke partije Velike Britanije, održan 8. i 9. septembra u Beogradu*.

189 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-13, *Pismo Morgan Phillips-a Milovanu Đilasu, 28. avgust 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-19, *Pismo Milovana Đilasa Morgan Phillips-u, 4. decembar 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-4, *Pismo Morgan Phillips-a Milovanu Đilasu, 29. decembar 1950*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-4, *Pismo Milovana Đilasa Morgan Phillips-u*.

as one of the highest Yugoslav officials and the man in favour of reforms both in the party and in the country. Owing to this, British political circles knew who Đilas was already in late 1950, so around this time Đilas obtained an invitation to give a lecture in the prestigious British Royal Institute of International Affairs, also known as Chatham House.¹⁹⁰

Presumably, one of the main (if not the main) reasons for selecting Milovan Đilas as a delegate for negotiations with the British Government as to the military aid to be extended to Yugoslavia, were his ties with the leading Labourists and the fact that his name was already well-known in the British political circles. Thus, Đilas was sent to London, together with his deputy Vladimir Dedijer at the end of January, under the pretext of paying a private visit to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Great Britain, while they were secretly tasked with negotiating about military aid.¹⁹¹ Around this time Josip Broz Tito noted down in his diary that the aim of this mission, apart from "setting the stage" for military aid, was also to make connections with "those labour and progressive organizations we can influence most owing to our practice", referring, in the first place, to the British Labourists.¹⁹² The British Labour Party was well-informed about Đilas's arrival, owing to their direct contact with Đilas and by means of the Yugoslav Embassy in London,¹⁹³ so that his arrival was expected, well-prepared and nicely covered by the media.¹⁹⁴ Once in London, Đilas and Dedijer immediately got in touch with Labour. Owing to, among other things, the references given by the reputed Labourists like Aneurin Bevan (who Đilas met in those circumstances),¹⁹⁵ before long they reached the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and scheduled negotiations about military aid. According to Dedijer's testimony, Đilas and Dedijer were host-

190 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Razno, S/c-394, *Pozivno pismo Chatham House-a Milovanu Đilasu za predavanje, 28. decembar 1950. godine*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Razno, S/c-394, *Pismo Milovana Đilasa predstavnicima Chatham House-a*; DAMSPRS, PA-1951, strogo poverljivo, f. 3, br. 6, *Telegram Lea Matesa, 4. I 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Razno, S/c-394, *Diskusija sa predavanja Milovana Đilasa u Chatham House-u, 30. januara 1951. godine*.

191 Милетић, *Титов емисар Милован Ђилас*, 338.

192 *Титов дневник*, ed. Перо Симић, (Београд: Новости, 2009), 94.

193 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-4, *Pismo Morgana Filipasa Milovanu Đilasu, 29. decembar 1950*; DAMSPRS, PA-1951, strogo poverljivo, f. 3, br. 7, *Telegram Lea Matesa, 4. I 1951*.

194 DAMSPRS, PA-1951, strogo poverljivo, f. 3, br. 68, *Telegram Brileja MIP-u, London, 24. XII 1950*; DAMSPRS, PA-1951, strogo poverljivo, f. 22, br. 4555, *Plan boravka Đilasa u Engleskoj, 15/16. januar 1951*; DAMSPRS, PA-1951, strogo poverljivo, f. 23, бр. 41067, *Telegram Brileja od 19. I 1951*; Dedijer, *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas*, 360.

195 Dedijer, *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas*, 360.

ed by Clement Attlee in Downing Street 10, the Office of the British Prime Minister, behind closed doors, as ordered by Tito, the meeting was held in the absence of the Yugoslav Ambassador, due to the delicate subject of negotiations.¹⁹⁶ Military aid was extended to Yugoslavia during a brief meeting, without any objections.¹⁹⁷ The results of these negotiations, i.e. the British extending of military aid to Yugoslavia, were undoubtedly “incorporated” in the further negotiations of Yugoslavia with the West concerning the military aid, which resumed in the same year. It is evident that Đilas’s close ties with Labour helped immensely in that sense, whereas the example provided above shows to what extent these ties, as a special model of relations, may have been used at a time when a propitious political option was in power in a certain country, as was the case with Labour in Great Britain.

Individual visits of influential and reputed politicians were also considered as an essential form of collaboration. They helped greatly and sometimes even crucially to build “bridges” and to settle in communication and collaboration “channels”. They often directly preceded the official visits of party delegations. As they were often private and unofficial, individual visits served to investigate political situation and mood. In addition, it was owing to this form of communication that new contacts and ties were established, while the existing ones deepened, which was certainly reflected in the strengthening of political stronghold and impact of Yugoslavia in certain countries, not only in Western Europe, but also across the world.

After the visit of the delegation of the British Labour Party to Yugoslavia in September 1950, which is the period studied in this article, i.e. until the end of 1956, there were no other high-level party delegations. Nonetheless, regular relations with the Yugoslav Communists were maintained in the years to come, partly owing to occasional individual, largely private visits of the prominent Labour to Yugoslavia. Thus, a famous Labour leader Aneurin Bevan and his wife Jennie Lee, also a famous Labour, stayed in Yugoslavia privately (yet, the Labour visits almost always had a certain political background) in the summer of 1951, largely in order to have a holiday.¹⁹⁸ Later on, in the summer of 1952, Morgan Phillips, Gen-

196 *Ibid*; see also: *The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State, London, January 31, 1951*, FRUS 1951, vol. IV, Washington 1985, pp. 1713-1714.

197 Đilas, *Vlast i pobuna*, 224. For more info about negotiations conducted by Milovan Đilas and Vladimir Dedijer in London and military aid to Yugoslavia, see: Милетић, *Титов емисар Милован Ђилас*, 345-360.

198 Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 142.

eral Secretary of the Labour Party and Chairman of the Socialist International came with his family;¹⁹⁹ in the summer of 1953, Leader of the Labour Party and former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee²⁰⁰ arrived and for the second time the spouses Bevan-Lee;²⁰¹ in the summer of 1954, a Labour delegate Richard Crossman;²⁰² in the summer of 1955, Labour high-ranking officials John Strachey and Ernest Davis²⁰³ and in the summer of 1956 Sam Watson's family stayed in Yugoslavia;²⁰⁴ then again Ernest Davis,²⁰⁵ and Jennie Lee in December 1956.²⁰⁶ In addition, a lower-level delegation paid a visit to Yugoslavia in August 1955, consisted of Edith Summerskill and Jack Cooper, which has already been discussed in the previous chapter.²⁰⁷ As opposed to other Western European Parties, the British did not invite anyone from Yugoslavia to visit Great Britain either officially or unofficially with the exception of Đilas and Dedijer in 1951.²⁰⁸

In addition to Labour, a number of representatives from Western European Socialist Parties paid private visits to Yugoslavia. We will mention some of them. Reputed French Socialists, such as Georges Brutelle in late 1950,²⁰⁹ and a high-ranking party official and Minister Jules Moch in September 1952,²¹⁰ a famous journalist Jean Rabaud in March 1953,²¹¹

199 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-127, *Odnosi sa Laburističkom partijom (1956)*.

200 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-35, *Clement Attlee u Jugoslaviji (3-23. avgust 1953), 24. januar-1. oktobar 1953*.

201 Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 142.

202 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-48, *Richard Crossman u Jugoslaviji*.

203 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-127, *Odnosi sa Laburističkom partijom (1956)*.

204 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-112, *Boravak porodice Watson u Jugoslaviji, 10-30. jun 1956*.

205 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-127, *Odnosi sa Laburističkom partijom (1956)*.

206 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-124, *Jennie Lee u Jugoslaviji, 9-15. decembar 1956*.

207 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-78, *Izveštaj o poseti članova Izvršnog odbora Laburističke partije Velike Britanije, dr Edith Summerskill i Jack Cooper, 6-27. avgusta 1955*.

208 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Velika Britanija, 133/II-127, *Odnosi sa Laburističkom partijom (1956)*.

209 Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 146.

210 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-25, *Poseta Jules Moch-a Jugoslaviji od 5. do 19. septembra 1952. godine*.

211 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-30, *Beleške o razgovoru Milovana Đilasa i Jean Rabaud-a, dopisnika Francukse Radiodifuzije, 11. marta 1953. godine*.

a reputed party official Jean Rous in June 1953,²¹² a professor and economist André Philip in September 1954²¹³ and a high-ranking parliamentary official Daniel Mayer in April 1956, paid individual visits to Yugoslavia.²¹⁴ Even though there were no official delegations around this time, a large number of German Social Democrats paid a visit to Yugoslavia, including Peter Blachstein, an MP, and Arno Behricsch in March 1951,²¹⁵ one of the SPD leaders Stephan Thomas²¹⁶ and a journalist Gerhard Szczesny in October 1953,²¹⁷ Vice-President of the SPD Heinrich Zinnkann in September 1954,²¹⁸ Hellmut Kalbitzer, SPD Federal Representative, in May 1955,²¹⁹ a member of the SPD party leadership Herbert Wehner in May 1956.²²⁰ Belgian Socialists who paid private visits to Yugoslavia around this time were Paul Speyer, a lawyer and young Socialist in September 1950,²²¹ reputed Socialists Léo Collard and William Van Remoortel in September 1951,²²² a reputed Socialist and mayor of Anderlecht Joseph Bracops in October 1951,²²³ Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak in April 1956,²²⁴ whereas Norwegian Labourists who paid private vis-

212 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-32, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Milovana Đilasa sa Jean Rous-om, 24. juna 1953. godine.*

213 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-44, *Poseta André Philip-a Jugoslaviji, od 6. do 26. septembra 1954. godine.*

214 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Francuska, 30/II-61, *Zapisnik sa sastanka Kimisije za međunarodne veze SSRNJ sa Daniel Mayer-om, predsednikom Spoljnopolitičkog odbora francuske Narodne skupštine, 11. aprila 1956.*

215 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-16, *Materijal o poseti poslanika SPD-a Jyzocnawuju.*

216 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-104, *Zabeleška o boravku u Jugoslaviji Stephan Thomas-a, člana Predsedništva Socijaldemokratske partije Nemačke, 19-29. oktobar 1953.*

217 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/IX-64, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Milovana Đilasa sa nemačkim novinarom dr G. Šesnijem, 10. oktobra 1953.*

218 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-123, *Zabeleška o boravku Heinrich Zinnkann-opotpredsednika SPD i ministra unutrašnjih poslova pokrajinske vlade u Esenu, u Jugoslaviji 2-9. septembra 1954.*

219 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-133, *Zabeleška o boravku Hellmut Kalbitzer-a poslanika SPD, maja 1955.*

220 AJ, fond 507/IX, CKSKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-154, *Materijal o boravku u Beogradu člana Predsedništva Socijaldemokratske partije Nemačke, Herbert Wehner-a, 18-25. maja 1956.*

221 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-1, *Biografija Pola Spajera.*

222 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-11, *Zabeleška o razgovoru Milovana Đilasa sa Léo Collard-om, članom Politbiroa Socijalističke partije Belgije i Van Remoortel-om, socijalističkim senatorom, 13. septembra 1951. godine.*

223 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Belgija, 11/II-12, *Poseta Joseph Bracops-a, člana Politbiroa SP Belgije Jugoslaviji, oktobra 1951. godine.*

224 Miletić, "Yugoslav Communists and Belgian Socialists 1950-1956", 135.

its to Yugoslavia were Andreas Andersen in February 1953²²⁵ and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Norwegian Parliament Finn Moe in September 1955,²²⁶ then a journalist and Swedish Social Democrat Kaj Björk in April 1952,²²⁷ while the General Secretary of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party Jules Humbert-Droz paid a private visit to Yugoslavia in April 1951.²²⁸ The above-mentioned examples present only some of the private visits from the circles of Western European Socialists and Social Democrats, which helps us draw a conclusion about how frequent the contacts with Yugoslav Communists were in this period.

As a special means of communication, organized political and ideological debates and exchanges of opinion between Yugoslav Communists and Western Socialists were considered as important. The mentioned discussions were held as conferences or similar type of gatherings, mainly as part of the visits paid by official delegations; those debates would at times ripen into public polemics, then documented by the party press of both sides. This way, the Yugoslav side was introducing the global political public to its ideological and political stances in the most undeviating and most straightforward fashion. In those circumstances, the most subtle discussions opened up in the field of social development, socialism, democracy, ideology, political topicalities, economics and, unavoidably, issues dealing with the Cold War and international relations. One of the best-known was surely public polemic between Rodoljub Čolaković, a Yugoslav Communist and reputed party official, and the well-known Swedish Social Democrat Kaj Björk. During the polemic, both similarities and differences were revealed in a rather straightforward, clear and transparent fashion, with regard to ideological views, the way democracy was perceived and political attitudes, not only between the Yugoslav Communists and Swedish Social Democrats, but in some major features between Yugoslavia and the West in general.

225 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-20, *Poseta Andreas Andersen-a Jugoslaviji, 1953.*

226 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Norveška, 92/II-45, *Zabeleška o poseti Finn Moe-a, člana Izvršnog odbora Radničke partije Norveške, predsednika Spoljnopolitičke komisije Radničke partije Norveške i predsednika Spoljnopolitičkog Odbora u Norveškom parlamentu.*

227 Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 203-204.

228 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švajcarska, 124/ II-8, *Poseta Jules Humbert-Droz-a, generalnog sekretara Socijaldemokratske partije Švajcarske, Jugoslaviji, u aprilu 1951.*

Kaj Björk, a journalist, diplomat and well-known Swedish Social Democrat, paid a visit to Yugoslavia from 8 to 22 April 1952.²²⁹ On that occasion, he met a number of Yugoslav officials and visited several cities (Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Ljubljana) and industrial centres.²³⁰ To add, Yugoslavia was total enigma to the Swedish Social Democrats, the country they got interested in only after the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict.²³¹ Björk intended to get the big picture of Yugoslavia, its economy, locals, foreign policy, functioning of political system and democracy during the visit.²³² He was especially focused on theoretical questions in the field of democracy and socialism, in the first place on a specific Yugoslav experience with regard to those issues. He had an opportunity to discuss that with Yugoslav leaders Đilas, Čolaković and Dedijer.²³³ And so an ideological polemic between Kaj Björk and Rodoljub Čolaković commenced. It was public and was documented on the pages of the Yugoslav and Swedish party press.²³⁴

The Čolaković-Björk polemic is important because it processes a range of issues significant for grasping “the main points of misunderstanding” between the two sides, primarily in the field of ideology. The tone of the polemic was friendly, well-intentioned and fair. Thus, it was evident that a socialist single-party state, on the one hand, and a Western multi-party democracy, on the other hand, may conduct a constructive dialogue. The official topic of Čolaković-Björk polemic was “Socialism and Democracy”.²³⁵ The basic question that was discussed, and at the same time the main “point of misunderstanding”, was the question of the functioning and importance of single-party system, on the one hand, and parliamentary democracy, on the other.²³⁶ More to the point, the most sensitive point was whether it was feasible to establish a multi-party parlamenta-

229 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/II-14, *Zabeleška povodom dolaska Kaj Björk-a, sekretara spoljnopoličke komisije Socijaldemokratske partije Švedske*.

230 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/II-14, *Program boravka Kaja Bjorka u Jugoslaviji*.

231 Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 204.

232 *Ibid.*

233 See AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/II-14, *Materijal o boravku Kaj Björk-a u Jugoslaviji od 8. do 22. aprila 1952. i prepiska o saradnji između KPJ i Socijaldemokratske partije Švedske*.

234 Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 204-205.

235 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/II-16, *Prilozi na temu „Socijalizam i demokratija” objavljenih u Švedskoj i Jugoslaviji prema dogovoru SKJ i Socijaldemokratske partije Švedske*.

236 Miletić, „The Relationships between Yugoslav Communists and Scandinavian Socialists in the Light of Yugoslav Sources (1950–1953)”, 77.

ry system of the Western type in Yugoslavia. Rodoljub Čolaković's fundamental standpoint was that the current Western democracy had "bourgeois character" and its primary role was to preserve the capitalist order, serving it as the political "upgrade". As opposed to that type of democracy stood proletarian socialist democracy, as a special form of democratic system being currently built in Yugoslavia. According to Čolaković, assignment of the working class was to surpass the frameworks of Western "bourgeois" democracy and replace it with "proletarian" socialist democracy. Such socialist democracy had "exclusive character" and was different from all other democracies known at the time as it gave the working class unreserved right to make decisions.

Čolaković supported the official attitude of the Yugoslav party according to which every country had the right to its own path towards socialism. As both the Yugoslav and Swedish side had a common goal – building socialism, one-party system was not necessary in all countries to achieve that goal, but it depended on historical and social conditions in each country respectively.²³⁷

The view held by Kaj Björk was totally different from that of Čolaković. The basic difference between the Yugoslav Communists and Swedish Social Democrats that Björk pointed out lay in different perception of Marxism. As opposed to the Swedish who had a rather flexible approach, having in mind real possibilities and conditions, the Yugoslavs perceived and applied it in a rigid and utopian fashion. It follows that they had a different approach to the building of socialism and to understanding of both socialism and democracy. As opposed to the Yugoslav understanding of one-party system, the Swedish favoured political actions within the existing model of multi-party parliamentary democracy, as a system of values whose principles should be strictly observed. Contrary to the Yugoslav understanding of the proletarian socialist democracy, the Swedish highlighted the Welfare State,²³⁸ rejecting harsh class fight and advocating achieving objectives in the direction of gradual changes, improvements and mitigations, rather than abolishing capitalism.²³⁹

237 AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Švedska, 125/II-16, *Prilozi na temu „Socijalizam i demokratija” objavljenih u Švedskoj i Jugoslaviji prema dogovoru SKJ i Socijaldemokratske partije Švedske.*

238 For more info on Welfare State, see: Tim Tilton, *The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through Welfare State to Socialism*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

239 Miletić, „The Relationships between Yugoslav Communists and Scandinavian Socialists in the Light of Yugoslav Sources (1950–1953)”, 78–80.

Contacts with Western European Socialists and Social Democrats were also established using other, less transparent, but equally important methods. For instance, Yugoslav diplomatic missions and other representative offices seized every opportunity to deepen and improve those contacts. Alongside all of this, the Yugoslav side endeavoured to exert political influence on certain political circles in the West in other, secret ways, thereby using certain left-wing and socialist groups (mainly communism's dissidents) that were directly financed by Yugoslavia, but without much success.

In the early 1950s, at the time when Yugoslavia was going through the most severe crisis in relations with the USSR and its satellite states, the Yugoslav side endeavoured to exert more direct political influence on certain Western Socialists. Those were dissident members of western communist parties who attempted to receive aid from Yugoslavia when establishing new socialist parties, with some of them succeeding in that attempt. Thus, Spanish, Italian and German communists' "outcasts" established socialist parties relying at the time on the Yugoslav political and financial aid. It was as early as 1949 that the former members of the Communist Party of Spain José del Barrio Navarro and Francisco Félix Montiel liaised with Yugoslav Communists and established the pro-Yugoslav Socialist Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Socialista – MAS) in exile in France in 1950. It was until 1953 that Yugoslavia was supporting MAS strongly, at a political, financial and propagandist level. This movement was active in France and Mexico, with the Yugoslav side attempting to influence the political life of Western Socialists. Owing to weak results, the movement disbanded in 1953 leaving Yugoslav communists without real benefits from providing assistance to the movement. On the contrary, they suffered damage, as they had entirely neglected their relations with the legal Spanish socialist forces acting in exile.²⁴⁰

240 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Španija, 122/III-14, *Zabeleška o tekućim problemima Accion Socialista i o razgovoru sa Del Barijom i Montielom, održanom 25. VI 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Španija, 122/III-11, *Problemi našeg daljeg rada sa španskom emigracijom, april 1951*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Španija, 122/III-17, *Zapisnik sa sastanka održanog 2 XII 1951. sa rukovodstvom Accion Socialista*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Španija, 122/III-30, *Delegacija MAS u Jugoslaviji, 12. X – 13. XI 1952*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Španija, 122/III-30, *Zabeleška o razgovoru između druga Đilasa i Španaca, 30. X 1952*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, Španija, 122/III-30, *Predlog sastanka sa drugom Đilasom*; Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 197-200.

The prominent former communists Aldo Cucchi and Valdo Magnani who had abandoned the Italian Communist Party in early 1951 and established the Italian Labour Movement (Movimento lavoratori Italiani – MLI) were among the so called Italian “dissidents” who were assisted by Yugoslav communists around this time. This political organisation was closely tied with the Yugoslav leadership. There were attempts from Belgrade to influence actively the political life of Italy through this group of “dissidents”, primarily in the matter of Trieste, because of which the Yugoslavs were in political crisis and in continued conflict with the Italian side. Relations and ties with the MLI were maintained through the Yugoslav diplomatic and consular missions in Italy and via the Foreign Policy Commission of the CC CPY. As with the Spanish socialist “dissidents”, the MLI was also financially supported by the Yugoslav side until 1953, when because of poor election results the support was no longer provided.²⁴¹

Yugoslav Communists had their favourite also among the “dissidents” in the FR Germany. It was The Independent Workers’ Party of Germany (Unabhängige Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands – UAPD), established by Josef Schappe together with the group of like-minded people who had left the Communist Party in 1950. They made connections with the Yugoslav Communists who provided them with ample financial and political support. By supporting the UAPD, the Yugoslav side was attempting to influence the political life of the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, it created a problem, as it raised suspicion and mistrust among the leadership of the SPD, which was the most important political actor among the local leftist organizations. Namely, the SPD leadership held the view that by supporting the UAPD, the Yugoslavs were directly undermining German Social Democrats, which was decidedly negated by the Yugoslav side. Yet, providing assistance to the UAPD and politically protecting them yielded poor results on the one hand; on the other, it resulted in poor relations with the SPD. As a result, providing financial assistance to Schappe’s movement ceased after a two-year period (in 1952) and the party disbanded shortly after.²⁴² (Support to Spanish, Italian and German dissidents will be discussed in more detail in one of the following chapters).

241 See: Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu*, 267-268; Natalija Dimić, “In Search of an Authentic Position: The First Phase of Political and Ideological Cooperation between Yugoslavia and West European Left, 1948-1953”, *Acta Histriae*, 1/2019, 55-74; Милетић, *Преломна времена*, 200-201.

242 See: AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-26, *Socijaldemokratija i UAP*; AJ, fond 507/IX, CK SKJ, KMOV, SR Nemačka, 87/II-26, *Đilasov telegram Sibinoviću*,

Relationship and cooperation between Yugoslav Communists and European Socialist and Social Democratic Parties was, therefore, extremely beneficial for the Yugoslav state policy around this time. In addition to making a powerful isolation “breakthrough” and effective political advance to the West, this kind of unofficial diplomacy legitimised the Yugoslav policy in the world, distinguishing it from the remaining Eastern Bloc countries and contributing heavily to the creation of fundamentals for the future nonalignment policy in relation to both opposing blocs. “Ideological diplomacy” had effective results primarily in the legitimization of Yugoslav socialism before other socialist and left-wing forces in the world, enabling Yugoslav leadership in an efficient and good manner to explain the Yugoslav position patiently and persistently, attitude on the right of every country to independent path to socialism and stance on the preserving of sovereignty and independence of small countries in relation to Great Powers. That opened the door to the Yugoslav politics in other parts of the world as well, notably in Asia and somewhat later in Africa, where it found an adequate collocutor and like-minded group of people among the local socialist forces, primarily in those parts of the world that had just been freed from the colonial rule.

In a nutshell, the Yugoslav “ideological diplomacy” succeeded in defending its ideological legitimacy before the global public, in cooperation with European Socialists and Social Democrats. Owing to its stance on different models of socialism across the world, it acknowledged the political fight of Western Socialists, whereas it deprived the USSR of the right to monopoly over the socialist development model, providing, at the same time, its own model of socialism with a powerful opportunity to develop independently. This way it was also supporting firmly the foreign policy of its country.

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