

Serbian/Yugoslav-Romanian Relations and Interactions in the 20th Century

**Edited by
Vladimir Lj. Cvetković
Ionuț Nistor**



Belgrade, 2025

INSTITUTE FOR RECENT HISTORY OF SERBIA
Series „Zbornici radova” Vol. 30
FACULTY OF HISTORY, „ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA” UNIVERSITY OF IAȘI

For Publishers
Dr Vladan Jovanović

Editors
Dr Vladimir Lj. Cvetković, Institute for Recent History of Serbia, Belgrade
Prof. Dr Ionuț Nistor, „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iași, Iași

Reviewers
Academician Ljubodrag Dimić, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade
Dr Daniel Cain, Institute for South East European Studies, Bucharest
Dr Vojislav Pavlović, Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade
Prof. Dr Silvana Rachieru, University of Bucharest, Bucharest

Editorial Board
Prof. Dr Raul Carstocea, Maynooth University, Maynooth
Prof. Dr Martin Previšić, University of Zagreb, Zagreb
Dr Boris Mosković, Institute of History, Faculty of Arts of the Charles
University, Prague
Dr Aleksandra Đurić Milovanović, Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade
Dr Slobodan Selinić, Institute for Recent History of Serbia, Belgrade
Dr Dmitar Tasić, Institute for Recent History of Serbia, Belgrade
MA Nikola Koneski, Institute for Recent History of Serbia, Belgrade
(Secretary)

Translation and proofreading
Ivica Pavlović

Layout
Nebojša Stambolija

ISBN 978-86-7005-205-5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Vladimir Lj. CVETKOVIĆ, Ionuț NISTOR

Serbian/Yugoslav-Romanian Relations and Interactions in the 20th Century	9
---	----------

PART I: A NEW BEGINNING, THE CRISIS OF THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM AND THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Anđelija MILADINOVIĆ

The Relations between the Serbian and Romanian Orthodox Churches 1919–1934	27
---	-----------

Aleksandar Đ. MARINKOVIĆ

Establishing the Dynastic Link between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Romania	51
--	-----------

Srđan MIĆIĆ

Yugoslav-Romanian Relations in Bilateral and Multilateral Context 1925–1927	71
--	-----------

Mile BJELAJAC

The Decline of Common Security. Yugoslavia and Romania 1936–1941	95
---	-----------

Adrian VIȚALARU

Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovak Crisis of 1938	107
--	------------

PART II: YUGOSLAV-ROMANIAN RELATIONS IN A DIVIDED EUROPE

Ionuț NISTOR

**Romanian-Yugoslav Cultural Relations
in the Period 1945–1948121**

Vladimir Lj. CVETKOVIĆ

**Yugoslavia, Romania and the June 28th 1948
Cominform Resolution: The First Consequences145**

Alexandru D. AIOANEI

**The United Kingdom and Romanian-Yugoslav
Relations in the 1950s161**

Nemanja MITROVIĆ

**In the Shadow of the Moscow Declaration:
Official Visit of Josip Broz Tito to Romania, June 23–26, 1956177**

Adrian-Bogdan CEOBANU

**The First Appointment as Ambassador. The Beginnings
of Vasile Șandru's Mandate in Belgrade 1969–1970195**

Petar DRAGIŠIĆ

**The League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Romanian
Communist Party from the mid-1980s to the fall of Ceaușescu207**

Ratomir MILIKIĆ

**Accession of Yugoslavia and Romania to the
Council of Europe in the Second Half of the 20th Century:
Similarities and Differences219**

**PART III: HOW WE SAW
AND UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER**

Marija MILINKOVIĆ

**A Cry of Horror Rose from Our Chests:
The Romanian View of the May Coup235**

Olivera DRAGIŠIĆ

**The Peach – Unnoticed Symbol of the Great War
in the Romanian Novel *The Game with Death*
and Bulgarian Novel *The Peach Thief*255**

Mircea MĂRAN

**The Attitude of the Weekly *Graiul românesc*
(Romanian Voice) from Pančevo Towards
the Yugoslav Dynasty and State269**

Dragan BAKIĆ, Rastko LOMPAR

**The Image of the Iron Guard in Yugoslavia and Reflections
of the Crisis in Romania 1934–1941279**

Zoran JANJETOVIĆ

**An Attempt at Creating a New National Minority
in North-East Serbia in the First Years after WWII307**

Miodrag MILIN

**Toward a Fluid Identity Profile:
The Serbs in Romania after WWII323**

Notes on Contributors347

Zoran JANJETOVIĆ

Institute for Recent History of Serbia, Belgrade
kokanzokan@yahoo.com

An Attempt at Creating a New National Minority in North-East Serbia in the First Years after WWII

Abstract: Based on published and unpublished sources the paper examines the attitude of Yugoslav communists toward the Romanian-speaking population in north-eastern Serbia and the attempt of the authorities after WWII to mold them into a separate national minority.

Keywords: Vlachs, communists, ethnic consciousness, national minority

Although the central part of the Republic of Serbia is usually perceived as more or less ethnically homogeneous, its population includes ethnic groups of non-Serbian origin that survive to this day, which nevertheless constitute part of the Serbian nation in a broader sense. The largest of these groups are the so-called Vlachs¹ in north-eastern part of Serbia (in sub-regions of Ključ, Krajina, Zvižd, Braničevo, Stig, Poreč and Homolje). Both their actual origin and their actual number are debatable. There are three major theories explaining their presence in the areas they inhabit today. According to the first and the least probable, they are the descendants of Roman colonists who mixed with the autochthonous Thracian population; according to the second one, they are the descendants of the Serbs who had fled from the Ottomans to Romanian-speaking countries, acquired Roma-

¹ The origin of the term is not quite certain, but is usually understood as being derived from the Romanized name of a Belgian tribe, the Volcae, that Germanic tribes passed on to the Slavs in the sense of „Romance-speaking people”. (On several possible theories of the origin of the name (some of them quite outlandish) cf. Slavoljub Gacović, *Kud se dedoše Rumuni Tihomira Đorđevića*, (Bor: Nacionalni savet vlaške nacionalne manjine, 2008), 126–132.) During the Middle Ages and early Modern Age the term signified Aromanian semi-nomadic shepherds who roamed the Balkan Mountains, blending eventually with the Slavic population. Thus in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina it became a derogatory term for Orthodox Serbs, in Dalmatia for both Serbian and Croatian hillbillies from the hinterland of coastal towns, whereas in present-day Serbia it signifies the population of north-eastern part of the country speaking an archaic Romanian dialect. It is in this final sense the term will be used throughout this paper.

nian language and customs there, and returned eventually to their old home-land as Romanians; according to the third theory, they are comparatively recent immigrants from Romania (since late 17th or 18th centuries).² It seems their immigration was especially massive at the time immigration into Serbia was generally massive: during the 19th century, after Serbia had gained autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in 1830.³ Liberation from the Ottoman rule brought about abolition of feudalism and emigration of the Muslim population which left large swathes of land unpopulated, attracting settlers from all neighboring countries. The Serbian government introduced a number of measures to facilitate the colonization of the thinly populated land.⁴ Due to the lack of education in their native language⁵ by the mid-20th century, the majority of the Vlachs had come to identify themselves as Serbs, despite the fact that they spoke a Romanian dialect at home.⁶

² Nada M. Raduški, „Etnogeneza, identitet i demografski razvoj Vlaha u Srbiji”, *Srpska politička misao* 1/2021, 256–258. Tihomir Đorđević, one of the first scholars to explore the Vlach population, coupled the theories of re-emigration from Romania and late immigration. (Cf. Tihomir Đorđević, *The Truth concerning the Rumanes in Serbia*, (Paris: Graphique, 1919), 10–13, 18–20, 22–24; Idem, „Кроз наше Румуне. Путописне белешке”, *Српски књижевни листик*, 58/1906, 58, 376, 378, 776). However, when reading his works, one should keep in mind the time of the writing and be aware of the author's political bias. The learned pro-Romanian Vlach activist Slavoljub Gacović rejects the theory of continuous Vlach presence since Antiquity, but, adducing historical records, pushes the earliest date of Vlach settlement to late Middle Ages i.e. 15th century. (Gacović, *Kud se dedoše Rumuni*, 52–54, 69; Idem, *Od povlašćenih Srba do vlašskog jezika. O Poreklu i postojbini, seobama, o srbizaciji i asimilaciji, o maternjem jeziku i popisima Rumuna (Vlaha) istočne Srbije*, 5–1, (Beograd, Negotin: Verba Nostra, Izdavačko društvo Lek-sika, 2016), 127). The problem with his view is that he (like most Romanian nationalists) tends to equate Romanians with Aromunians which is debatable to say the least.

³ This was also the time the situation of the peasantry in Romanian lands was especially dire, as Tihomir Đorđević readily points out (Cf. Đorđević, *The Truth*, 17–19).

⁴ Холм Зундхаусен, *Исѣопуја Срѣје од 19. до 21. века*, (Београд: Clío, 2009), 160–165. The most prolific exponent of comparatively late immigration of the Vlachs was Dragoljub Petrović (Cf. Драгољуб Петровић, „Власи североисточне Срѣје као етнички идентитет”, *Положај мањина у Савезној рејублици Југославији*, eds. Милош Маџура, Војислав Становчић (Београд: САНУ, 1996), 795–806; Idem, „Важнији моменти из историје настанка Влаха у северној и североисточној Срѣји и конституисање њихове национално-политичке свести”, *Браничево* 2–3/1968, 44–49; Idem, „Die Vlach-ten oder Rumänen an der Donau – eine nationale oder ethnische Kategorie”, *Ethnicity and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Maria Craciun, Ovidiu Ghitta, (Cluj: Cluj University Press, 1995), 237–251).

⁵ Gacović tends to see this as perfidious attempt of the Serbian authorities to assimilate the Vlachs. (Gacović, *Kud se dedoše Rumuni*, 484–492.) Although unifying tendencies certainly did play a role, the key issue was the insufficient number of schools and teachers who could teach even in Serbian. As late as the turn of the 20th century hardly a quarter of all children in Serbia attended school. Nevertheless, Romania was one of the two European countries that were worse than Serbia in this respect (Зундхаусен, *Исѣопуја Срѣје*, 184–191, especially 187).

⁶ *Jugoslovenski federalizam. Ideje i stvarnost. Tematska zbirka dokumenata*, 2, 1943–1986, eds. Branko Petranović and Momčilo Zečević, (Beograd: Prosveta, 1987), 162; *KPS u*

Because of that, this population – except for a few individuals, who were usually inspired by irredentist circles in Romania – never demanded minority rights.⁷ However, the inter-war officials were aware that their assimilation into Serbs was far from complete and some even feared the Vlachs would assimilate the local Serbs.⁸

As a result of continuous and often significant changes, the population size of the Vlachs became a topic of debate, comparable to the discussions concerning their origin and ethnic identity. It varied considerably from one population census to another, which is a proof that the declared ethnic affiliation was situational and subject to various considerations.⁹

Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Romania, citing the Vlach population (which its government considered Romanian), demanded not only the Yugoslav Banat, home to approximately 60,000 Romanians, but also northeastern Serbia, predominantly inhabited by the Vlachs. Romania made this claim if not solely for itself, then as a potential German-Italian-Romanian (and possibly Bulgarian) condominium. Hitler refused such megalomaniac demands that ill fitted his plans and collided with territorial demands of his more important allies.¹⁰ Soon after the Ger-

istočnoj Srbiji – Okružni komitet 1945–1948, eds. Momčilo Mitrović and Strahinja Popović, (Beograd: INIS, 2012), 18, 80, 82; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji – Oblasni komitet 1949–1952*, eds. Momčilo Mitrović and Strahinja Popović, (Beograd: INIS, 2012), 539–540, 580, 625, 644; *Vlasi u dokumentima Zaječarskog istorijskog arhiva*, ed. Slavoljub Gacović, (Zaječar: Zaječarski istorijski arhiv, 2014), 18, 47–48, 50, 66, 93, 129, 183; Državni arhiv Srbije [The State Archives of Serbia] (DAS), Đ2, Organizaciono-instruktorsko odeljenje, k. 50 Godišnji izveštaj Sreskog komiteta KPS Kladovo – o radu partiske organizacije 1950. godine; DAS, Đ2, Komisija za nacionalne manjine CK SKS, k. 1, Zapisnik sa sastanka Komisije za nacionalne manjine CK SKS, 11. II 1960.

⁷ Dragoljub Petrović, „Iredenta fašističke Rumunije u severoistočnoj Srbiji 1941–1944“, *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis* 3–4/1966, 31–53; *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 56–61, 67, 99–100.

⁸ Зоран Јањетовић, „Националне мањине у очима српске елите 1918–1941“, *Срби у Југославија. Држава, друштво, пољитика. Зборник радова*, (Београд: ИНИС, 2007), 121–122.

⁹ Raduški, „Etnogeneza“, 260–261. Thus the census of 1948 registered 93.400 Vlachs; the one in 1953 just 28.047 etc. At all times the number of people who declared themselves Vlachs was considerably lower than that of those who adduced Vlach as mother-tongue (Monica Huțanu and Annemaria Sorescu-Marinković, „Changing the Linguistic Landscape: Vlach Romanian in Eastern Serbia“, *Teme* 1/2023, 71–72). Before WWII fluctuation in the number of Vlachs was caused also by statistical inconsistencies, registering the mother tongue and by lumping together Romanians of the Banat, the Vlachs and the Aromunians. Thus in 1921 there were officially 231.068 people who spoke „Romanian” and in 1931 147.248 (Gacović, *Od povlašćenih Srba do vlašskog jezika*, 341).

¹⁰ Klaus Olshausen, *Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan. Deutsche Politik gegenüber Jugoslawien und Griechenland von März bis Juli 1941*, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973), 210; Ekkehard Völkl, *Der Westbanat 1941–1944, Die deutsche, die ungarische und andere Volksgruppen*, (München: Ungarisches Institut, 1991), 31.

man attack on the Soviet Union, Romanian leaders repeated their demands as reward for their help against the Soviets, adducing the need to „protect” the local „Romanians”. However, the Germans were loath to give up economically so important areas.¹¹ Despite this, Romania's leaders did not give up: they organized propaganda activities (especially in the villages of the Ključ and Krajina regions, on the banks of the Danube and in the Timok Valley.) Although the number of people involved in this propaganda was small, during the first months of the war part of the population wondered if Romanian occupation was not preferable to the German one.¹² Propaganda started to wane by August 1941, but Romania continued to put pressure on Germany.¹³ In October of that year the division of the Timok Valley between Serbia and Romania with population exchange was proposed.¹⁴ To be sure, the Reich's leaders were not willing to undertake any radical measures during the war, so Romanian propaganda continued to wane. The irredentist office in Turnu Severin was shut down in early 1942.¹⁵ During the remaining war years Romanian propaganda was focused on arousing Romanian national consciousness among the Vlachs with an eye on annexing the regions they inhabited at some point in the future. The effects of this propaganda were poor because ethnic consciousness of the Vlachs was undeveloped whereas their large illiteracy rate and differences in dialect made the propaganda inaccessible for most of them.¹⁶ Furthermore, German and Serbian authorities worked hard to suppress it.¹⁷ The development of the wartime situation that made German victory increasingly less likely, also forced the Romanian government to confine the propaganda to the cultural field.¹⁸

The actual behavior of the Vlach population during WWII is poorly researched. This very fact indicates that the post-war authorities did not

¹¹ Dušan Lukač, *Treći rajh i zemlje jugoistočne Evrope*, I-III, (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1987), III/147. The Banat was an agricultural area important for supplying German troops in Serbia, citizens of Belgrade and the Reich itself. North-eastern part of Serbia was the home of the largest European copper mine, Bor.

¹² Petrović, „Iredenta”, 39–40.

¹³ In August 1941 the Romanian government accused their Serbian counterparts of maltreating Romanians released from POW camps and in September Romanian troops tried to land on the Serbian bank of the Danube but were driven back by the Germans (Petrović, „Iredenta”, 38–39).

¹⁴ Völkl, *Der Westbanat*, 32.

¹⁵ Petrović, „Iredenta”, 40.

¹⁶ Petrović, „Iredenta”, 41; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Oblasni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 539.

¹⁷ Petrović, „Iredenta”, 46–47, 50.

¹⁸ The secretary of the Romanian legation Sandu Christea set up an intelligence network of some 30 people who, among other things, spread propaganda for annexation of the Vlach-inhabited regions by Romania. (Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia] (AJ), Fond 507, Savez komunista Jugoslavije, XVIII, k. 5/1–43, O nekim problemima u rumunskoj nacionalnoj manjini u FNRJ, January 9, 1956).

consider the Vlach population „problematic”¹⁹ – both during the war and after it. Communist sources registered that the strongest influence on the Vlachs was executed by the royalist chetniks. It lingered on even after the end of the war.²⁰ The chetniks too were fiercely opposed to Romanian irredentism, which was the political plank they shared with Serbian collaborationists, Germans and communist-led partisans.²¹ On the whole it seems the Vlach population, that mostly considered themselves Serbs, being politically passive and uneducated, displayed no particular activity during WWII. The influence of the chetniks seems to have been the strongest – just as it was in most parts of rural Serbia.²² The Vlachs willingly joined the overtly collaborationist chetniks of Kosta Pećanac already in August 1941, whereas they had to be forcibly recruited into the nominally resistance-minded units of Draža Mihajlović.²³ In those units they did not display any particular bellicosity.²⁴ Where there were partisans, the Vlachs could be found also among their numbers. Nevertheless, the communists perceived Vlach „backwardness” as an obstacle to joining the partisans, claiming they adhered much more to „greater Serbian” ideology, of the chetniks and collaborationists than to the communist ideology of the partisans.²⁵ However, the fact that several chetnik bands roamed the Vlach-inhabited areas of

¹⁹ „Problematic” should be understood as meaning „causing trouble” for the powers-that-be by either endangering the territorial integrity of the state or by subverting the political order in it.

²⁰ *Jugoslovenski federalizam*, II, eds. Petranović and Zečević, 162; DAS, Đ 2, Organizaciono-instruktorsko odeljenje, k. 50, Godišnji izveštaj Sreskog komiteta u Brzoi Palanci o radu partiske organizacije sreza Brzopalanačkog, [Brza Palanka, January 22, 1951]; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 160, 480; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Oblasni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 22, 450, 518–519, 540, 552, 591.

²¹ Petrović, „Iredenta”, 48.

²² Коста Николић, *Сѣрах и нага у Србији 1941–1944. Свакодневни животи њог окућациојом*, (Београд: Службени гласник, 2002), 237, 240–241; Zoran Janjetović, *Collaboration and Fascism under the Nedić Regime*, Belgrade (INIS) 2018, 439; Branko Petranović, *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945*, (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992), 694; *Jugoslovesnki federalizam*, II, eds. Petranović and Zečević, 162; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji, Okružni komitet*, Mitrović and Popović (eds.), 160; DAS, Đ2, Organizaciono-instruktorsko odeljenje, k. 50, Godišnji izveštaj Sreskog komiteta KPS u Brzoi Palanci o radu partiske organizacije sreza brzopalanačkog u 1950 godini, [Brza Palanka, January 22, 1951].

²³ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 123. In Kosta Pećanac’s units they were paid which certainly motivated many to join them.

²⁴ They were prone to panic (Petrović, „Iredenta”, 49) which shows that their ideological persuasion was not very deep. The advantage of serving with the chetniks was that they were officially armed forces of the legal Yugoslav government in exile, that they actually did not do much fighting and that their units stayed close to their native villages. The Vlachs displayed the same lack of martial spirit when recruited into partisan units to fight in the final operations for liberation of the rest of the country since autumn 1944.

²⁵ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 124, 179–180.

north-eastern Serbia several years after the end of the war relying on a network of aiders and abettors,²⁶ does not necessarily imply ideological or political sympathies on part of the general population. It seems the main feature of behavior of most Vlachs were peasant pragmatism and opportunism. This means the communists had a hard time winning them over,²⁷ but that at the same time, thanks to their predominantly pro-Serbian feelings, unlike most other minorities, they posed no threat to the integrity of the country. Romanian irredentist propaganda faltered over German resistance, lack of Romanian national consciousness with the Vlachs,²⁸ difference in dialect and opposition of both the chetniks and the communists. At the same time, the ambiguous stance most Vlachs adopted during the war increased their potential exposure to communist retribution and oppression in the aftermath.

Thus the Vlachs as an ethnic group posed a very untypical problem for the communists once they came to power. Like most other members of minorities, there were few communist sympathizers among them, but unlike other national minorities they had no developed national consciousness. Unlike most other national minorities, they did not have the record of collaboration with the invading powers.²⁹ Their cultural level was extremely low, but so was that of the bulk of population.³⁰ This made them more susceptible to chetnik propaganda³¹ and less open for the revolutionary gospel of progress spread by the communists. However, their backwardness was not inherent and resistant to change: on the contrary, when the new authorities built schools in Vlach villages they were well attended and some other progressive innovations were readily accepted.³² A report sta-

²⁶ *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Oblasni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 518, 540, 591.

²⁷ *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji, Oblasni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, passim; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji, Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, passim.

²⁸ Some documents speak of hatred and disdain of the Vlachs for the Romanians (*KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Oblasni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 474, 483).

²⁹ Most Germans, Hungarians, Albanians and Bulgarians collaborated wholeheartedly with the occupiers, especially when they came from their mother-country (Zoran Janje-tović, *Konfrontacija i integracija. Nacionalne manjine u Srbiji 1944–1964*, (Beograd: INIS, 2022), 89–152).

³⁰ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 18, 70, 75–76; Mitrović, Popović (eds.) *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, 69, 137, 158, 285, 368, 455, 466, 481; DAS, Đ2, Organizaciono-instruktorsko odeljenje, k. 50, Godišnji izveštaj Sreskog komiteta KPS u Brzoi Palanci o radu partiske organizacije sreza brzopalanačkog u 1950 godini, [Brza Palanka, January 22, 1951]; DAS, Đ2, Organizaciono-instruktorsko odeljenje, k. 49, Izveštaj o radu oblasnog komite-ta – glavni zadaci koji stoje pred partiskom organizacijom naše oblasti, [1952]; DAS, Đ2, Organizaciono-instruktorsko odeljenje, k. 49, Godišnji izveštaj Oblasnog komiteta KPS za Timočku oblast 1949 godine.

³¹ DAS, Đ2, Organizaciono-instruktorsko odeljenje, k. 50, Godišnji izveštaj Sreskog komi-teta KPS u Brzoi Palanci o radu partiske organizacije sreza brzopalanačkog u 1950 go-dini, [Brza Palanka, January 22, 1951].

³² *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 136–139, 192–196.

ted ten years after the end of the war that Vlach villages were making better headway than the Serbian ones.³³

If general education made progress, political education of the Vlach masses left much to be desired. It was not only that the Vlach members of the Communist Party were on low ideological and educational level.³⁴ What was typical of the Vlachs was that they were totally apolitical.³⁵ This made implementation of any policy difficult. At the same time, the Vlachs presented a very special problem since most of them refused to declare themselves Vlachs, opting rather for Serbian ethnic affiliation instead.³⁶ In a bourgeois state the authorities would be quite happy with such national identification. However, in communist Yugoslavia during the first post-war years, such identification was unacceptable for the communist top-brass (even though some local officials thought otherwise). The reasons lay in the communist nationality policy.

Throughout the interwar period the Communist Party used the unsolved national question as means of gathering support among the non-Serbian masses. The Communist Party followed the Comintern's tack that went so far as to demand destruction of the bourgeois Yugoslavia in favor of small Balkan republics that would be useless as allies of the „imperialist” powers in struggle against the Soviet Union. With the rise of fascism, this policy was dropped in mid-1930s, but the demand for ethnic equality remained one of the corner-stones of the communist policy. As long as the Party was small and illegal, it could dangle vague slogans of self-determination and national rights with no obligation to make them materialize. The same shibboleths were used during the war when it became necessary to win fighters for the partisan army with promises of liberation and reorganization of the country.³⁷ Once in power the Communist Party had to pro-

³³ Ibid, 142.

³⁴ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 82; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 249.

³⁵ DAS, Đ2, Agitprop komisija/ideološka komisija, k. 4, SK Donji Milanovac, [1949]; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 110–111.

³⁶ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 18, 48, 50, 64–66, 73, 93, 107–108, 183, 185, 204; DAS, Đ2, Organizaciono-instruktorsko odeljenje, k. 49, Okružni komitet, Izveštaj o radu oblasnog komiteta – glavni zadaci koji stoje pred partiskom organizacijom naše oblasti, [1952]. This was also stated by Bogoljub Stojanović at the founding congress of the Communist Party of Serbia, who claimed that issue had never existed as such before (*Jugoslovenski federalizam*, II, eds. Petranović and Zečević, 161). A smaller part of the Vlachs, especially those living to the east of the Timok, were suspect of pro-Bulgarian sympathies, or at least of ethnic vacillation. (*Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 108, 112, 118–119, 165) The Vlachs from formerly Bulgarian areas were deemed politically even slacker than the rest (Ibid, 115).

³⁷ This did not work at all since the largest national minorities (Germans, Albanians, Hungarians) and some of the smaller ones (Bulgarians, Romanians in the Banat) received much more at the hands of the occupiers than the communists could offer them (Janjević, *Konfrontacija i integracija*, 94–99, 103–104, 106–110, 113–116, 118–119, 121–136, 150–151).

ve the plausibility of its promises. Yugoslav peoples were granted the equality or indeed recognition they were denied during the inter-war period, whereas national minorities were offered a set of minority rights never seen before: depending on the available means and cadres, they were granted schools in their native language (elementary and secondary), government-sponsored press, cultural associations, theaters, publishing houses, participation in the government, inclusion into the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations etc. The Vlachs were worse equipped for these benefits than any other national minority – because, unlike them, they did not regard themselves a minority! However, in order to prove the consequentiality of their national policy, the communists set out to create the Vlach national minority.

Consequently, communist activists in the Vlach-inhabited regions faced the dual responsibility of recruiting the Vlachs into the Party while simultaneously fostering their national consciousness.³⁸ However, it often happened that people of Vlach extraction who joined the Party refused to declare themselves Vlachs – disturbing further the unsatisfactory ethnic imbalance within the Party.³⁹ Lack of agitators who would spread propaganda in the Vlach dialect was keenly felt since part of the Vlachs did not speak Serbian, or spoke it only imperfectly. This held true especially for women (who were underrepresented among the Party membership everywhere).⁴⁰ On the other hand, it was convenient that at least part of the Vlach men (who were the most likely new members) spoke good Serbian.⁴¹ However, the more problematic part of the task was the Vlach language itself. It was undeveloped and uncoded, removed from the Roma-

³⁸ The leading Party ideologue, Edvard Kardelj, favored national rights for the Vlachs and development of their national culture – the feasibility of which the local Party official from north-east Serbia Bogoljub Stojadinović-Tane doubted (*Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 19; Idem, *Od povlašenih Srba*, 344). Kardelj, being one of the highest officials in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, seconded by another of the top-brass, Milovan Đilas, had his way and after the founding congress, the „awakening of the Vlach national pride” was imposed as one of the main tasks of Party units in the Vlach-inhabited territory. (KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 30).

³⁹ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 64–65, 132–133, 145; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 18; DAS, Đ2, Organizaciono-instruktorsko odeljenje, k. 50, Godišnji izveštaj Sreskog komiteta Zaječar za 1949 godinu, [Zaječar, January 16, 1950]. Some members were registered as Vlachs in Party documents, very much against their will (*Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 65).

⁴⁰ *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 77, 97, 183, 209, 243, 368.

⁴¹ According to Party reports from the Brza Palanka district, as late as early 1950s some 30% of the local Vlach women spoke no Serbian. (DAS, Đ2, Organizaciono-instruktorsko odeljenje, k. 50, Godišnji izveštaj Sreskog komiteta KPS u Brzoj Palanci o radu partiske organizacije sreza brzopalanačkog u 1950 godini, [Brza Palanka, January 22, 1951]). During the first post-war years district conferences of the Communist Party were held partly in Serbian and partly in Vlach (*Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 133).

nian literary standard, and having at least two major dialects that differed considerably among themselves. Under the influence of Stalin's practice in solving the nationality question, the Party set up the Vlach Commission in Zaječar in 1945 that was to work towards „creating conditions for development of the Vlachs as an ethnic group”. Thus, a group of people was entrusted with a task deign of an academy of sciences – but that was in keeping with the can-do mentality of the communists at that time. Unfortunately nothing much is known about this Commission: the number of its members, their names, individual duties, hierarchy, ties with other institutions (if any) and the like. What is known is that the Commission started writing the Vlach grammar, collecting folk songs, stories and proverbs, publishing the journal *Vorba Nostra*. It tried to create an alphabet based on the Cyrillic one and orthography on the model of the Banat Romanians.⁴² What other peoples did over decades, the Vlachs were to achieve in the briefest period of time – which was also typical of the Yugoslav communists of the era who believed huge historical tasks (such as industrialization, alphabetization, electrification) could be mastered in a couple of years. The first number of the hebdomedary journal *Vorba Nostra* came out in Cyrillic in late July 1945 but was encumbered by technical and alphabet difficulties.⁴³ This epitomized the whole project: the newspaper was launched before the alphabet or grammar were agreed upon. Small wonder that the information about the acceptance the paper met with differed. In some places the journal was accepted well, whereas in others it was not, due to the incomprehensibility of the dialect in which it was written.⁴⁴ Another important question is how many people it could reach – considering the poor road conditions, lack of transportation, general negligence in press distribution and low literacy rate. Despite these difficulties that *Verba Nostra* shared with the whole Yugoslav press at the time, the journal was published between July 1945 and 1949. It is not quite clear if its publication was suspended for technical or political reasons. It seems technical difficulties (lack of editors, translators and printing workers, primitive printing press and slow printing process) proved insurmountable over time.⁴⁵ Radio pro-

⁴² *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 50–51, 94–95, 128–129; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović, Popović, 41, 44; *Jugoslovenski federalizam*, II, eds. Petranović and Zečević, 161–162.

⁴³ *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 65.

⁴⁴ According to some data, the paper was received well, whereas according to others, it was derided. Yet, it seems positive reactions were much more prevalent – which encouraged the authorities to increase its print run and to double the number of its pages in April 1946 (*Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 52, 64, 128, 133, 178, 182; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 81–82, 111, 153, 242, 258, 316). A collection of Vlach folk songs and Vlach translations of partisan songs was published in 1946 (*KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 410).

⁴⁵ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 79; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović 153, 205, 316, 502–503, 528.

grams in the Vlach language were also launched and they met with warm reception – at least in places that had power supply and radios – that were rather an exception than the rule. Furthermore, the powers-that-be were dissatisfied with the quality of the program that was caused by lack of qualified personnel.⁴⁶ This too was a common shortcoming of all media in post-war Yugoslavia, especially minority outlets.⁴⁷ In order to win the Vlachs and to raise their cultural level, choral and drama societies were founded that offered programs in Vlach dialect in villages. A propaganda team was organized with the task of politically mobilizing the Vlachs and integrating them into the new system of government⁴⁸ - another task that proved difficult in case of practically all national minorities. Wall-newspapers were posted with the same goal.⁴⁹ However, as was often the case with initiatives led by the communists, they began strongly but gradually dwindled due to lack of grassroots support and the rapid fatigue experienced by the activists on the ground who were inundated with new tasks almost on daily bases.⁵⁰ Thus Vlach drama societies died down already in early 1946 after hardly half a year's activity. At best they organized an occasional performance here or there, only to disband afterwards.⁵¹ The Yugoslav communists had to overcome many of these difficulties in other places too, but many did not exist with any other national minority or ethnic group.

After these first attempts at building up the infrastructure of the would-be new national minority, they were given up after just couple of years. There were several reasons: firstly, the difficulties were huge and

⁴⁶ *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 152, 154–155, 244, 265, 316.

⁴⁷ Janjetović, *Konfrontacija i integracija*, 619–638. Lack of personel and material resources were the two most important difficulties in developing media in minority languages, which can be summed up under the motto: the smaller a minority, the greater the difficulties. This held true especially when it came to hiring adequate journalists (i.e. literate enough and politically reliable at the same time.)

⁴⁸ Like all other ethnic minorities, the Vlachs were under-represented among the members of the Communist Party and its transmission mass organizations. This was due to general lack of interest in politics and antipathy toward the communist regime, but in the Vlach case also because many Vlachs did not acknowledge their ethnic affiliation when joining the Party. Some observers believed they had detected differences of mentality between the Serbs and Vlachs, that was allegedly also reflected in their political behavior (*Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 145; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 20, 25, 27, 32, 168–170, 172, 179, 181–182, 184–185, 216–217, 270, 293, 345, 367–368, 392, 471, 480–481).

⁴⁹ *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 20, 26, 30–31, 38–39, 41, 48, 59, 66, 85, 113.

⁵⁰ Local Party officials were expected to take care of almost everything: from running the local government, to collecting taxes, spreading political propaganda, setting up peasant cooperatives, all the way to organizing cultural activities, building schools, distributing the press and recruiting people for „voluntary” work in factories, building sites or mines.

⁵¹ *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 262, 364.

the desired response unencouraging. Indeed, in the beginning the attempts of the powers-that-be caused the Vlachs to fear they would be given over to Romania, for which they held no sympathies whatsoever.⁵² To be sure, the Vlachs liked folklore programs in their language, but that was about the measure of their ethnic enthusiasm.⁵³ On the other hand, it was precisely the folklore that the leading communists did not like much: on the contrary, for them it was a sign and perpetuator of backwardness. It was used only where they had no better substitute and only as long as they did not have one.⁵⁴ The folklore, in case of the Vlachs and in general, was to be just the first step in introducing the masses to culture; it was means, not an end in itself.⁵⁵ For propagation of higher culture one needed schools, libraries, theaters and museums. Teachers and schoolbooks were lacking for all ethnic minorities, even more than for schools in South Slavic languages. Educating the educators took time, and required specialized schools too, and writing or translating schoolbooks needed authors (that were lacking) or translators and also took time and money.⁵⁶ For the Vlachs, all these problems were additionally aggravated by low cultural level, difference in dialect(s) that prevented improvement through import of books or teachers from Romania. On the other hand, as with the Czechs and Slovaks, knowledge of the official language among the Vlachs was much more widespread than in any other national minority. For all these reasons the communist top brass soon concluded it would be hard and unnecessary to try to spread education in the stunted and semi-Serbianized Vlach idiom, so they gave up on attempts to elevate it to a literary standard and to use it as means of enlightenment of the masses.⁵⁷

⁵² *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 59, 61, 80, 82, 152. Plans for federation with Bulgaria or with Albania that could include exchange of territories, or the agreement on partial exchange of minorities signed with Hungary maybe contributed to such fears. (Enikő A. Sajti, *Hungarians in the Vojvodina 1918–1947*, (Boulder, Col.: Social Science Monographs, 2003), 446–456; Jugoslovenski federalizam, II, eds. Petranović, Zečević, 260; Petar Dragišić, *Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi 1944–1949*, (Beograd: INIS, 2007), 61–68.

⁵³ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 79, 133, 135, 197.

⁵⁴ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 159–160; *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji. Okružni komitet*, eds. Mitrović and Popović, 337, 356; Zoran Janjetović, *Od Internacionalne do komercijale. Popularna kultura u Jugoslaviji 1945–1991*, (Beograd: INIS, 2011), 87–89.

⁵⁵ Folklore performances or programs in which folklore was one of the component parts, were used also to spread the political message and to indoctrinate the masses.

⁵⁶ Due to small print runs, minority schoolbooks were much more expensive than those for the major Slavic peoples (Janjetović, *Konfrontacija i integracija*, 567–570).

⁵⁷ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 68, 77, 80, 94. According to a local Party activist Milenko Stojanović, the Vlachs themselves demanded schools in Serbian (*Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 111). This may have been true since they had been used to them for decades, and those willing to educate their children clearly saw advantages of learning in the official language. After having been better integrated into the Yugoslav society, many members of other minorities also for practical reasons opted for education in Serbian, even when they had the opor-

However, it seems that the decisive impetus to end attempts at creating the Vlach national minority was due to the radical change in the field of foreign policy. The Yugoslav authorities' attempts were ended after the Cominform resolution in mid-1948 excommunicated Yugoslavia from the international communist fold and ushered in the conflict with Stalin and his eastern European satellites.⁵⁸ It is not known who made the decision, but one must presume it came from the very top – just like the one to try to make a national minority out of an amorphous ethnic group. On the one hand it was certainly a departure from the communist minority policy that in other cases did not falter even in the face of conflict with sponsor-countries of the largest national minorities (Hungary, Albania and Romania). Changing policy towards other minorities would be difficult, and certainly counterproductive. Their nationalism was stronger even than their rejection of communist regimes in their mother-countries – which they proved by collaborating with their intelligence services and by spreading their propaganda.⁵⁹ Enlarging the Romanian minority by some 150.000 ethnically aware Vlachs living at the frontier could be dangerous. On the other hand, it was difficult to equip the backward Vlachs with the necessary institutions, infrastructure and trappings of a national minority. Furthermore, most of them thought of themselves as Serbs – at least in the political sense – so there was no mileage in going into hard and potentially dangerous experiments at a historical juncture that could spell life or death for Tito's regime. Thus, the Yugoslav communist top-brass chose the easy way out: the Vlachs remained only an ethnic group in the eyes of outsiders, the official ethnic affiliation of its members being rather situational. To all intents and purposes they remained part of the Serbian nation and it seemed they were destined for gradual linguistic and cultural absorption into its ethnic majority. The fact that during the first half of the 1950s the ideas of schools in Vlach were still ventilated at Party conferences,⁶⁰ and that preparatory classes for their children existed until mid-1960s⁶¹ did not matter: these measures were aimed at increasing the educational level of the Vlach population⁶² and not at preserving and developing their ethnic heritage and distinct consciousness.

Although it is debatable if such policy could be termed forced assimilation as some Vlach activists would have it, it encouraged the already

tunity to attend schools in their mother tongue (Janjetović, *Konfrontacija i integracija*, 550, 582–583).

⁵⁸ *Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 129.

⁵⁹ Janjetović, *Konfrontacija i integracija*, 381–427.

⁶⁰ It seems the opinion that such schools were unnecessary and eventually harmful, prevailed (*Vlasi*, ed. Gacović, 150–156).

⁶¹ Gacović, *Od povlašćenih Srba*, 493.

⁶² As late as 2011 in the four major municipalities inhabited by the Vlachs 54% of the population have finished just elementary school (Huțanu and Sorescu-Marinković, „Changing the Linguistic Landscape”, 82).

ongoing processes. However, in the early 1990s things got an unexpected turn: with the collapse of communism ethnic revivals spread across eastern Europe. The Vlachs (or at least, part of them) were no exception. Groups of activists appeared who strove to awake their ethnic consciousness and to acquire minority rights within the reshaped political system. The difference from other minorities was that the Vlach activists were split into two groups: one claiming the Vlachs of north-eastern Serbia were part of the Romanian national minority (and thus of the Romanian nation), the other claiming they were a people in their own right, i.e. a separate Vlach nationality. The first accept all the standard tenets of Romanian nationalism, including the literary language and the story of the ethnogenesis; the latter want to develop the local idiom as the literary language and claim local origin from Antiquity.⁶³ In retrospect, this situation additionally proves that the communist leaders have realistically assessed the difficulties in creation of a Vlach national minority.

⁶³ Huțanu and Sorescu-Marinković, „Changing the Linguistic Landscape”, 72; Gacović, *Kud se dedoše*, 136–141.

Summary

The paper deals with the Romanian-speaking minority in north-eastern Serbia known as the Vlachs and the attempt of the communist authorities to upgrade this rather amorphous ethnic group with strong pro-Serbian leanings to a full-fledged national minority in the first years after WWII. The Vlachs settled in Serbia on various occasions since late Middle Ages. Probably the largest group came after 1830 when Serbia acquired autonomy from the Ottoman Empire and feudal burdens became more onerous in Romanian lands. Living in a country of free small peasants, the Vlachs tended to identify with the Serbian nation. This was seen in WWII when most of them sympathized with the royalist chetniks.

On the other hand, the communists strove to gain support before and during WWII by promising rights and equality to ethnic minorities. After coming to power at the end of the war, they strove to realize these promises. In that context they tried to build the necessary infrastructure to develop the Vlach ethnic group into a real national minority: ethnic self-definition as Vlachs was encouraged, a committee was set up to write a grammar, design an alphabet, collect folklore and publish books. A journal in Vlach dialect was launched as well as radio programs, cultural societies were founded that performed in Vlach villages. Although this met with favorable response from the Vlachs, there was no widespread enthusiasm for developing higher forms of culture. This endeavor faced huge obstacles anyway: the general level of culture was very low, illiteracy high, the local dialect undeveloped, resources and educated personnel were lacking, actions of the communist authorities short-breathed. After split with Stalin and his east European satellites, the attempt at developing the Vlach nationality were dropped: the response of the would be members of the minority was lukewarm, obstacles too great, whereas national minorities tended to side with their mother-countries after the conflict with the Cominform. Thus, it became counter-productive to develop yet another potentially disloyal national minority on the border with a Cominform country.

Grass-roots attempts at developing the Vlachs as a national minority were taken up after the collapse of communism, but this time they lacked government support and were two-pronged: part of the activists tried to instill Romanian national consciousness into the Vlach community, whereas the other part tried to develop it as a national minority in its own right.

Sources and Literature

- Arhiv Jugoslavije, Fond 507, Savez komunista Jugoslavije.
- Državni arhiv Srbije, Fond Savez komunista Srbije.
- *Jugoslovenski federalizam. Ideje i stvarnost. Tematska zbirka dokumenata, 2, 1943–1986*, eds. Branko Petranović and Momčilo Zečević. Beograd: Prosveta, 1987.
- *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji – Okružni komitet 1945–1948*, eds. Momčilo Mitrović and Strahinja Popović. Beograd: INIS, 2012.
- *KPS u istočnoj Srbiji – Oblasni komitet 1949–1952*, eds. Momčilo Mitrović and Strahinja Popović. Beograd: INIS, 2012.
- *Vlasi u dokumentima Zaječarskog istorijskog arhiva*, ed. Slavoljub Gacović. Zaječar: Zaječarski istorijski arhiv, 2014.
- Dragišić, Petar. *Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi 1944–1949*. Beograd: INIS, 2007.
- Đorđević, Tihomir. „Kroz naše Rumune: Putopisne beleške. *Srpski književni glasnik* 16/1906, 44–58, 126–136, 200–210, 376–384, 526–532, 614–619, 692–698, 763–782. (Cyrillic)
- Đorđević, Tihomir. *The Truth concerning the Rumanes in Serbia*. Paris: Graphique, 1919.
- Gacović, Slavoljub. *Kud se dedoše Rumuni Tihomira Đorđevića*. Bor: Nacionalni savet vlaške nacionalne manjine, 2008.
- Gacović, Slavoljub. *Od povlašćenih Srba do vlašskog jezika. O Poreklu i postojbini, seobama, o srbizaciji i asimilaciji, o maternjem jeziku i popisima Rumuna (Vlaha) istočne Srbije*, 5–1. Beograd, Negotin: Fabula Nostra, Izdavački društvo Leksika 2016.
- Huțanu, Monica, Sorescu-Marinković, Annemaria. „Changing the Linguistic Landscape: Vlach Romanian in Eastern Serbia”. *Teme* 1/2023, 69–86.
- Janjetović, Zoran. *Collaboration and Fascism under the Nedić Regime*. Belgrade: INIS, 2018.
- Janjetović, Zoran. *Konfrontacija i integracija. Nacionalne manjine u Srbiji 1944–1964*. Beograd: INIS, 2022.
- Janjetović, Zoran. „Nacionalne manjine u očima srpske elite 1918–1941”. *Srbi i Jugoslavija. Država, društvo, politika*, Zbornik radoava, 163–189. Beograd: INIS, 2007. (Cyrillic)
- Janjetović, Zoran. *Od Internacionale do komercijale. Popularna kultura u Jugoslaviji 1945–1991*. Beograd: INIS, 2011.
- Lukač, Dušan. *Treći rajh i zemlje jugoistočne Evrope, III, 1941–1945*. Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1987.

- Nikolić, Kosta. Strah i nada u Srbiji 1941–1944. Svakodnevni život pod okupacijom. Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2002. (Cyrillic)
- Olshausen, Klaus, *Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan. Deutsche Politik gegenüber Jugoslawien und Griechenland von März bis Juli 1941*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973.
- Petranović, Branko. *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945*. Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992.
- Petrović, Dragoljub. „Die Vlachen oder Rumänen an der Donau – eine nationale oder ethnische Kategorie”. *Ethnicity and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Maria Craciun and Ovidiu Ghitta, 237–251. Cluj: Cluj Univesity Press, 1995.
- Petrović, Dragoljub. „Iredenta fašističke Rumunije u severoistočnoj Srbiji 1941–1944”. *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis* 3–4/1966, 31–53.
- Petrović Dragoljub, „Važniji momenti iz istorije nastanka Vlaha u severnoj i severoistočnoj Srbiji i konstituisanje njihove nacionalne svesti”. *Braničevo* 2–3/ 1968, 44–49. (Cyrillic)
- Petrović, Dragoljub, „Vlasi severoistočne Srbije kao etnički identitet”. *Položaj manjina u Saveznoj republici Jugoslaviji*, eds. Miloš Macura and Vojislav Stanovčić, 795–806. Beograd: SANU, 1996. (Cyrillic)
- Raduški, Nada M. „Etnogeneza, identitet i demografski razvoj Vlaha u Srbiji”. *Srpska politička misao* 1/2021, 251–271.
- Sajti, Enikő A. *Hungarians in the Vojvodina 1918–1947*. Boulder, Col.: Social Science Monographs, 2003.
- Völkl, Ekkehard. *Der Westbanat 1941–1944. Die deutsche, die ungarische und andere Volksgruppen*. München: Ungarisches Institut, 1991.
- Zundhausen, Holm. *Istorija Srbije od 19. do 21. veka*. Beograd: Clio, 2009. (Cyrillic)