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Frank Mattheis (eds.)

Globalization Projects of Regional Organizations

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The Globalization Project of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

Introduction

In recent history, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an internationally recognized organization encompassing most of the postcolonial and developing parts of the world, better collectively known in the past 70 years as the Third World or the Global South, has become one of the major transregional political, economic, and social phenomena that has exercised a considerable amount of influence on certain global developments, concurrently pursuing its own specific globalization agenda, primarily acting through the sheer vastness of its numbers in different international fora, above all in the United Nations (UN) where its weight and effect have been most tangible. The movement today has 120 member countries spread over four different continents (the European branch gradually losing its strength), together with 20 other countries worldwide acting as observers while also nurturing close relationships and coordinating joint activities with a number of key regional organizations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, thus making the NAM the most representative international organization in the world after the UN.¹

1 Some of the relevant international literature on the NAM: Cecil V. Crabb Jr., *The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment* (New York: Praeger, 1965); G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Nonalignment* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966); Leo Mates, *Nesvrstanost: teorija i savremena praksa* [Non-Alignment: Theory and Contemporary Practice] (Beograd: IMPP, 1970); Bojana Tadić, *Nesvrstanost u teoriji i praksi međunarodnih odnosa* [Non-Alignment in the Theory and Practice of International Relations] (Beograd: IMPP, 1976); Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance* (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1978); Leo Mates, *Počelo je u Beogradu...20 godina nesvrstanosti* [It started in Belgrade ... 20 years of Non-Alignment] (Zagreb: Globus, 1982); Richard L. Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers* (New York: Praeger, 1983); M.S. Rajan, *Studies on Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement: Theory and Practice* (New Delhi: ABC Publishers, 1986); A.W. Singham and Shirley Hume, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (London: Zed Books, 1986); Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tine, and Nada Boškovska, eds., *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade* (London: Routledge, 2014); Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927–1992)* (Leiden: Brill, 2018); Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju: od ideje do pokreta* [Non-Alignment throughout History: From Idea to Movement] (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2019); Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars: Asia, Middle East, Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Duško Dimitrijević and Jovan Čavoški, eds., *The 60th Anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement* (Belgrade: IIPE, 2021); Jovan Čavoški, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits: A History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2022).

Responding to the Global Condition

Third World/Global South multilateralism was not something unexpected during and after the Cold War years, since similarity of grievances and aspirations brought most of the postcolonial, non-bloc, and developing world closer together. While in the past a number of transregional collective projects of this sort have come and gone, the one that has been left standing until today is the NAM, together with the Group of 77 (G77) of developing countries, which was set up during the 1960s as part of the North-South dialogue organized under the auspices of the UN. The movement itself was officially established as a fully-fledged international organization during the third non-aligned summit in the Zambian capital Lusaka in 1970 (the first two summits in Belgrade and Cairo in 1961 and 1964 respectively only being ad hoc ones), though it was finally structured at the next summit in Algiers three years later, lasting afterwards through the following 14 summits until nowadays, in spite of enjoying a significantly diminished capacity and a quite narrower scope of influence since the end of the Cold War. In this respect, the NAM has become one of the longest-lasting organizations of the developing world in history, one that exercised a major role in raising critical self-awareness of its members about a pressing need for launching a total overhaul of the international political and economic systems, a restructuring that would suit best the necessities of its most deprived states, and one that could shape a significant non-great power alternative to the global order clearly dominated by great power blocs.

Nevertheless, the very concept of non-alignment as a foreign policy strategy and an international orientation for dozens of nations, but one primarily mired in the national interest of countries opting for it, also enjoys a prehistory that ranges back to the time of the late 1940s and early 1950s when a number of states in Asia, Africa, and Europe were individually opting for an independent and non-bloc course that would, with a differing degree of success, at least in their own perception, guarantee their non-return into the fold dominated by their previous colonial or bloc masters. In this way, global non-alignment enjoyed its immediate local roots that had, in time, evolved toward all these nations gradually recognizing mutual similarities on a wider regional level while concurrently searching for new partners in other regions of the world that saw eye-to-eye with them on a majority of central international issues. Since these were all small and underdeveloped nations, with a narrowing space to maneuver between the two blocs, they were all actively seeking strength in numbers, especially in areas of keen interest for the great powers, as well as trying to diversify leverages for pursuing their own agendas. The result was the eventual establishment of the unofficial non-aligned group at first and subsequently the NAM.

Therefore, as a unique transregional organization, one that pursued its goals on a truly global level but outside the control of the most powerful and richest countries in the world, one of NAM's most significant characteristics was to gradually overcome a plethora of outstanding differences that separated these nations geographically, histori-

cally, politically, economically, culturally, socially, religiously etc. while concurrently establishing a coherent response to different challenges. Initially, the non-aligned were formulating a security globalization project that was closely related to the issues of fighting colonialism, preservation of independence and safeguarding sovereignty, advocating worldwide equality and cooperation, as well as upholding global peace and stability, primarily in the interest of small non-bloc nations. This major globalization project would be soon complemented by another one that would dominate the agenda of the NAM and the Third World for decades – promotion of a balanced and effective socioeconomic development for the developing nations. In this way, global non-alignment and the NAM had started their historical journey as a comprehensive response of non-bloc nations to the East-West division of the world, one that frequently brought their safety and existence into question, in time also evolving toward an active political and economic struggle with the Global North for a world of stable and prosperous societies that would fundamentally change the landscape of the Global South for generations to come. This set of specific goals, both security and developmental ones, has remained the focus of NAM policies until today, with the majority of developing nations also holding high such ideals and principles individually as being the core of their existing national interests.

The main goal of this chapter is to follow the evolution of the NAM globalization project in both its overarching dimensions, security and development, by primarily analyzing the sources shaping the NAM and non-aligned policies in world affairs from the early days of the Cold War to the world after the end of the bipolar confrontation, with a specific accent still being on the Cold War decades when the movement's influence was at its apex and its global reach was farthest and quite tangible, especially inside the UN.

The NAM Globalization Project in Practice

The rise of non-alignment on local, regional, and global levels was an immediate consequence of two major historical currents shaping the outlook of the world after the end of the Second World War. The first was the emergence of the bipolar world order, epitomized in the conflicting ideologies of capitalism and communism advocated by the United States and the Soviet Union and the two blocs they led. The other one was the downfall of old European colonial empires, finally bringing freedom to so many new nations in Asia, Africa, and parts of Latin America. When facing such a new global system, these newly liberated nations were seeking alternate ways to chart their own path of political and economic development on the international stage while strongly arguing for equality between small and big nations inside the UN, a path that would put issues of independence preservation, political survival, freedom of choice and action, lessening of international tensions, reduction of foreign influences, as well as economic

modernization right at the core of their immediate aspirations.² In this respect, three major issues had become the driving force behind the non-aligned globalization project. While each took precedence at a certain period of time, all remained at the forefront of the agenda of the movement and its members: national liberation, opposition to accession to great power alliances and blocs, and socioeconomic modernization, with the last two remaining the credo of many developing nations until nowadays.

As a response to reverberations of such epic historical events, non-alignment had quickly evolved into a realistic, pragmatic, proactive, and flexible foreign policy doctrine, as well as its practical orientation, one that fully acted in strict accordance with the basic interests of small non-bloc and newly liberated countries, often driven by their strong sense of insecurity and feebleness, thus providing them with an evident blueprint for navigating all the complexities of their international dealings while keeping them firmly away from any permanent political, economic, or military affiliation with any of the great power blocs.³ It was this understanding of what independence and freedom of action essentially entailed for these small nations that clearly served not only as a rationale for their individual policies but also as an impetus for putting together transregional collective actions that ultimately led to the rise of the non-aligned global alternative. Therefore, it was the Cold War that made the NAM project possible, keeping it relevant for decades while still producing a profound impact on the formation of multivector or strategic autonomy policies of different developing nations after the end of that historical era.⁴

Since the Cold War was marked by the existence of great power blocs as its dominant feature, for many newly liberated countries or outright bloc defectors – like Yugoslavia as one of the key founders of the NAM – joining any great power blocs was tantamount to surrendering their hard-won independence. Considering themselves victims of subjugation throughout history, joining any bloc meant abandoning their right to choose freely their own destiny both in the political and socioeconomic sense. Therefore, non-alignment, as a response to outright Cold War pressures and demands, in words of one author, had become a tool that “enabled the powerless to hold a dialogue with the powerful and to try to hold them accountable.”⁵ In fact, even though non-alignment was both practical and pragmatic in its concepts and performance, thus often using to its own advantage all the nuances of the existing world order, frequently playing off the blocs against each other, it was basically quite a principled approach, though still

2 Tadić, *Nesvrstanost u teoriji i praksi*, 50–70.

3 “Pregled diskusije: mesto i uloga nesvrstanosti u savremenom svetu” [Discussion Overview: The Place and Role of Non-Alignment in the Modern World], in *Politika nesvrstanosti u savremenom svetu*, ed. Ljubivoje Aćimović (Beograd: IMPP, 1969), 54–55.

4 S.B. Jain, *India's Foreign Policy and Non-Alignment* (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers, 2000), 8–14.

5 Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press, 2007), xv–xix.

devoid of any dogma or moral haughtiness. Above all, it was freely embraced by any of its adherents as the most difficult path one could choose, while their individual interests were largely not in opposition to the general cause of the group or movement, thus even making inroads into finding points of convergence with the great powers and their blocs over crucial international issues tackling independence, equality, peace, security, and development.⁶

Non-alignment and the NAM, as its immediate emanation, therefore, as products of the Cold War period, were poised to inject new essence into the very character of international relations, above all by overturning the customary paradigm of stratified and subservient relations between the big and small, rich and poor, strong and weak nations. It was, according to them, the inherent equality of every actor on the world stage and open rejection of any arbitrary use of force primarily by the big and strong that should become the new norm of the world everyone aspired to live in, since world peace, stability, and unhindered cooperation were all issues of pressing interest for all members of the international community.⁷ Therefore, by pushing its security globalization project, the NAM and its members understood well that such decisive issues should never be left to the mercy of the great powers, since, like many times throughout history, this often triggered major conflicts. It was up to the non-aligned to act, mostly out of their own self-interest for survival, as responsible mediators and balancers, sometimes even moral arbiters, that could bring more predictability and moderation to the international situation, along the way allaying mutual suspicions with the blocs while welcoming new allies into efforts to further democratize and stabilize world affairs.⁸

In fact, closely intertwined with the security agenda of the NAM, one that was largely at the forefront during the 1950s and 1960s, although still important until today, was also its socioeconomic globalization project that was most visible during the 1970s and 1980s, one that would exert major influence on the international debate on the global position of the developing world for decades. This project was an announcement of movement's aspirations to fundamentally shift the balance between the North and the South more in favor of the latter by creating a more egalitarian, inclusive, and mutually beneficial world economic and financial system, one that would be based on a profound and diversified global interdependence and integration. This part of the NAM globalization project would remain its hallmark even after the Cold War ended, also becoming an outstanding goal for any other regional organizations too, thus influencing similar aspirations all over the Global South.⁹ This socioeconomic dimension of non-alignment, embodied in the pursuance of modernization, primarily

6 Rajan, *Studies on Nonalignment*, 10–11.

7 Crabb Jr., *The Elephants and the Grass*, 80.

8 Mates, *Nesvrstanost*, 178–180.

9 Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 174–183.

driven by the evident underdevelopment and backwardness of many of its members, was a potent driving force for embracing such a foreign policy strategy as a long-term choice. Overcoming such evident deficiencies was also a way in which these small nations could reassert their role, as well as earn more recognition, by actively seeking economic aid from the great powers while also forging new ties between themselves for a mutually beneficial economic order that could essentially transform their international stand and potentially elevate it within the traditional hierarchies.¹⁰ It was both this security and developmental identity of the NAM that offered untraditional ways for these nations to overcome old barriers laid down for small nations within the customary world system dominated by the great powers and to seek new positions for themselves, one more attuned to their own interests and in accordance with the constantly evolving historical conditions.¹¹

On the other hand, another part of the NAM globalization project was the national liberation and anticolonial struggle, also one of its hallmarks. If there had not been for decolonization, there would have never been so many newly liberated countries that could freely opt for a non-bloc and independent foreign policy, hence there would have never been the NAM. Concurrently, it was this frequent identification of alignment with colonialism and imperialism that largely pushed these nations in the direction of non-alignment, since this new doctrine was observed as another strong reaffirmation of their independence and equality.¹² Therefore, without the anticolonial struggle there would have never been the non-aligned world as this new factor in world affairs. Colonialism, however, was not the only challenge that non-bloc and developing nations had to face in order to become stable and prosperous societies – nations poised to fundamentally and comprehensively change the very nature of international relations. The future and success of the NAM globalization project was closely related to its outright ability to distance itself from any controversial and contentious issues of the past, and on a much wider scale, while cutting across any individual differences, establish an all-encompassing platform that would deal with the core issues that plagued the destiny and prospects of the postcolonial world.

However, even though the NAM had succeeded to see right through the end the entire process of decolonization and it was still one of the important topics within its overall discourse, especially related to Africa, nevertheless, both anti-imperialism and anticolonialism, although standing right at the origins of non-alignment, never became its exclusive driving force and primary motivation, contrary to the efforts of certain members to act differently. In essence, non-alignment was primarily a postcolonial

10 Bimla Prasad, "Opšte iskustvo i perspektive nesvrstanosti" [General Experience and Perspectives of Non-Alignment], in *Politika nesvrstanosti u savremenom svetu*, ed. Ljubivoje Ćimović (Beograd: IMPP, 1969), 109–111.

11 Čavoški, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits*, 30–31.

12 "Neutralism," January 30. 1961, Foreign Office (FO) 371/161211, The National Archives (TNA), London.

concept, one with clear anticolonial roots and motivations but still largely dedicated to the postliberation phase of these nations, one that was closely interrelated with security and modernization, major issues that guaranteed their protracted existence and also becoming NAM's central globalization projects. Any ignoring of such a crucial feature of non-alignment often led to the internal rise of radicalism, whereas emphasis on regional, racial, and historical specifics often drove a wedge between member states, fomenting mutual conflict, as well as one with the blocs, thus going against the NAM's truly constructive, transregional, and "universalist" identity. In this light, any such negative tendencies, like it was the case with the competitive regionalist project of "Afro-Asianism" or "Afro-Asian internationalism" or later attempts to side the NAM with one bloc, often justified by colonialist sufferings and racial exclusiveness, also mired in ideas about continuous anti-imperialist and anticolonial struggle, eventually triggered the rise in regional disputes and further radicalization, thus representing one of the most serious challenges to non-alignment's conceptual and structural integrity.¹³

Evolution of the NAM Globalization Project

As already stressed, anti-imperialism and anticolonialism stood at the very roots of non-alignment's rise after 1945, with this new phenomenon initially emerging in Asia and then spreading into the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, thus rapidly becoming a worldwide movement characterized by different individual points of origin but sharing identical collectivist aspirations. In a matter of a decade, many diverse states from three different continents were so closely politically bonded, in spite of fact that they often had no significant mutual contact outside their respective regions throughout history. It was these strong impulses of independence preservation and a clear need to survive under tense international conditions that drove these newly liberated nations to use their justified anticolonialist sentiments to build up a new current in world affairs, one dedicated to shaping their own future outside the projections of great powers. Therefore, as indicated, anticolonialism was the initial globalization project of non-alignment, one that brought it into close association with the parallel Afro-Asian discourse, which enjoyed similar sources with non-alignment but would have a different destiny from it altogether.¹⁴

Soon enough, it was Asia, embodied in the former British and Dutch colonies, like India, Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Indonesia, that became the cradle of non-alignment. These nations gave shape to the first collectivist impulses to set up something wider than separate countries or even narrow regions, something that used similar

¹³ Čavoški, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits*, 17, 23–25.

¹⁴ Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, 267–277, 288–290.

experiences, grievances, and aspirations to effectively formulate a coherent political response to the deteriorating international situation. Early examples of such attempts are the Asian Relations Conference (1947–1949), the Five Colombo Powers (1954–1955), or the Asian Relations Conference (1953–1956).¹⁵ Very early on, during the Korean War (1950–1953), all these nations – along with others from the Middle East and Africa, as well as Yugoslavia – had understood the immense diplomatic and propaganda value of the UN as the chief world platform where newly independent and non-bloc nations could openly and equally discuss with the blocs any pressing issues, extend their criticism without any fear of retaliation, offer their own opinions and solutions. Through such independent engagement, they could even try to mobilize the world public opinion in support of their cause, especially since issues like peace, stability, independence, prosperity, equality, cooperation, and others were all topics that enjoyed massive international backing.¹⁶

With the onset of the first superpower détente in the mid-1950s, Asian and some African countries were already leading the way in formulating a collective response of postcolonial and non-bloc countries to new world developments, since any lagging behind in this respect could have left them again on the sidelines of the international decision-making process. Even though this initial multilateral format would be primarily driven by the anticolonial globalization project, often encompassing both non-aligned and aligned nations, also limiting its scope only to two continents, thus being somewhat different from the overall non-aligned vision, the Asian-African Conference held in the Indonesian town of Bandung in April 1955 was, indeed, one of the watershed moments in the history of the Third World/Global South. It was the time when the postcolonial world was speaking in one voice, seriously deliberating the world situation while also coming up with creative solutions to new developments. The famous “Ten Principles” adopted at this gathering were also laid down in the conceptual foundations of the NAM, putting major stress on central issues like freedom, racial and national equality, basic human rights, independence, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, external non-interference, worldwide cooperation, etc. It was these principles, together with the strong anticolonial sentiments, as well as obvious inclination toward launching collective initiatives in the form of summits that have remained the NAM’s legacy for decades.¹⁷ On the other hand, as a downside to all this, at Bandung non-bloc and bloc nations could still not find any common ground beyond just these universal principles, regional exclusiveness prevented nations from other continents to make their own contributions, while racial divisions between Afro-Asia and other parts of the world was

15 Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Nonalignment*, 51–74, 83–101, 143–180.

16 David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), 35–39.

17 Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 42–83.

often emphasized, thereby contributing to the limited effect this event had produced on the world at large.¹⁸

In fact, Bandung was the historical moment when the anticolonial and security globalization projects of the NAM had started their competition for dominance within this specific discourse, while regional framework of Afro-Asia as non-alignment's primary geographical vessel had started gradually transforming itself into a transregional endeavor extending to four continents where the non-bloc criteria, primacy of security and developmental issues, all irrespective of geographical, historical and other differences, made a decisive impact on the future shape and essence of the movement. At this point of time, non-alignment had become a somewhat personal joint effort where leaders of three key nations – Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt (Josip Broz Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Gamal Abdel Nasser respectively) – took over the initiative from the loose and already moribund Bandung group by setting up new mechanisms of mutual coordination and consultations. These mechanisms were primarily based on strict non-bloc adherence, which would gradually lead to the establishment of an informal but quite relevant non-aligned group in world affairs, NAM's immediate predecessor.¹⁹

Being a European country and not a former colony, but only a bloc renegade, Yugoslavia was essentially interested that the non-bloc, transregional, security, and developmental agenda that finally gained prominence within this larger conceptual framework, especially since there would be no place for Belgrade in that story if everything else eventually came down to anticolonialism and Afro-Asia. Therefore, the rise of the security and then the developmental globalization projects of the NAM as its long-term orientation were largely thanks to Tito's continuous efforts. In his vision, these were essential issues that had a direct impact on the present state and future of all non-aligned countries, despite all the individual differences, while also tackling the destiny of the world where big and small countries had to find adequate ways to constructively co-exist and mutually prosper.²⁰ It was largely Yugoslavia that was spearheading all major initiatives of the non-aligned, particularly inside the UN, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, closely shadowed by Egypt and occasionally India and Indonesia, along the way continuously insisting on forging greater non-bloc unity vis-à-vis the two blocs. Even though many of these diplomatic efforts proved to have a less relevant effect due to constant great power obstructions, nonetheless they did create a cumulative effect

18 Jovan Čavoški, *Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt 1959–1962* [Yugoslavia and the Sino-Indian conflict 1959–1962] (Beograd: INIS, 2009), 79–80.

19 Čavoški, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits*, 26–29, 45–46.

20 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 75–114.

that largely contributed to the emergence of the non-aligned group at the Belgrade Conference in 1961.²¹

The Belgrade Conference, bringing together 25 non-aligned nations, was another watershed moment in the history of global non-alignment and one of the major stepping stones on the road to creating a more permanent and better organized non-bloc alternative. Already during the preparations for this gathering, fundamental criteria of what entailed for one country to be authentically non-aligned, thus granting it full access to the group, as well as unhindered presence to any future summits, were all laid down before the seminal event, thereby exerting a long-term impact on NAM's identity, effectively separating that organization from any regional competitors.²² On the other hand, during the conference, in spite of expected calls for a swift end to all forms of colonialism, it was due to Tito's insistence that security issues pertaining to the East-West conflict – as well as Third World's developmental agenda, which had eventually dominated the debate – decisively shifted the non-aligned agenda toward this new paradigm. These tendencies were all reflected in the final documents adopted at this meeting, primarily through consensus as another long-standing NAM procedure, sending out reverberations throughout the non-aligned world while changing many perceptions about this group's relevance.²³

However, since there is some confusion in the international literature, the Belgrade Conference, as an ad hoc event, was not the true birthplace of the NAM nor was it the starting point for any other permanent form of cooperation between these nations, but it was the point of origin for a better organized non-bloc and transregional global option gradually taking shape, also providing it with a more complex political consciousness about the role it could play internationally and what kind of actions should be undertaken to finally transform the international system to finally reflect the profound historical changes taking place since 1945.²⁴ Nevertheless, as soon as this major event ended, the entire group had entered into a crisis period of few years, one that initially played out as an attempt by internal regionalist tendencies and the anticolonial globalization project to once again reassert themselves as non-alignment's sole and dominant identity, as a result reducing its character and scope again to Afro-Asia and the continuous struggle against imperialism and colonialism. This stirred a major rift between the “moderate” and “radical” members of the group, leading to an

21 Dragan Bogetić, *Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije 1956–1961* [The New Foreign Policy Strategy of Yugoslavia 1956–1961] (Beograd, ISI, 2006), 343–362.

22 “Report on the Cairo Preparatory Meeting,” June 1961, 837, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (KPR), I-4-a, Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Belgrade.

23 Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 100–111.

24 Čavoški, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits*, 56–64.

almost total paralysis, with a possibility of “Afro-Asianism” by means of organizing a new regional conference to finally supplant principles set down in Belgrade.²⁵

This would eventually become a straight out race between the two conference models, the Bandung and Belgrade ones, for the supremacy in the Third World. Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt headed the moderate and more pragmatic camp, sticking to the security and developmental globalization projects and seeking gradual changes within the boundaries of the Cold War system. The other competitor was embodied in Indonesia’s more militant policies, enjoying full backing from more radical non-aligned nations and Maoist China, thus placing emphasis on a confrontationist approach to international affairs. In this form, racial and political divisions that separated the North and South were stressed alongside calls for a showdown that would, in their mind, bring about ultimate liberation and emancipation for the postcolonial world.²⁶ Through skillful diplomatic maneuvers of the moderate camp, as well as their readiness to thoughtfully merge the anticolonial, security, and developmental globalization projects, both Tito and Nasser during the next summit in Cairo in October 1964 succeeded in isolating Indonesia’s position, thereby preventing the growing rift from evolving into a final split while also bringing the non-aligned discourse back to its original principles.²⁷

Nevertheless, this tense competition between the Afro-Asian and non-aligned camps, similar to the ongoing great power struggle, had drained the vitality of the group, largely blurring its focus, and dimming its, until recently, very bright prospects. As a result the sheer will of many participants was affected regarding their ability to invest more time and energy, beyond just verbal statements, into creating something more permanent and complex that would fundamentally alter the general understanding of the role small and non-bloc nations should collectively exert in world affairs.²⁸ Beyond this organizational and conceptual crisis, the group was also struck by a sudden string of unfortunate events that had swept away many key non-aligned leaders from the historical scene, leaving only Tito and a handful of others to continue struggling for the viable future of global non-alignment. For the five years to come, there were no new events of this kind, with only a consultative meeting finally being held in Belgrade in July 1969, primarily due to Yugoslavia’s unwavering perseverance to keep the entire effort alive and going, thus announcing a new era of non-alignment, one where the NAM would finally become an institutional reality and where its efforts at pushing its globalization projects would achieve most relevant results.²⁹

25 Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, 281–286.

26 Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Nonalignment*, 363–383.

27 Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, 115–128.

28 Fouad Ajami, “The Fate of Nonalignment,” *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1980): 367–369.

29 Čavoški, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits*, 90–93, 103–114.

Spatialization Effects of the NAM Globalization Project

Since the international situation was undergoing tremendous political, economic, social, and other changes during the 1970s – shaping a world that would be far more interconnected and mutually dependable than ever before – the non-aligned saw this as an auspicious moment to finally realize their earlier visions and move beyond just a loose informal group of nations and ultimately transform it into an institutionalized and globally recognizable movement that would – through its strong institutions, clearly defined and well-adjusted policies, and more extensive influence inside and outside the UN – vociferously speak on behalf of one-third of humanity. This could, as they perceived it, produce a more profound effect on major international developments with a fresh doctrinal vision that was not only part of practical policies but also becoming a minutely defined set of lasting and comprehensive principles and ideas about the world everyone lived in.³⁰ Furthermore, not only that, this was the time when movement's institutional outlook was clearly defined, with continuity of its existence and action being guaranteed as its crucial feature. Additionally, a fresh global agenda was also established, one that put the developmental globalization project right at the forefront of the NAM's conceptions and activities. While the security agenda would remain high among the NAM's priorities, since it was closely connected with the fundamental issues of independence preservation, stability strengthening, and non-bloc position, thus becoming more complementary with the developmental agenda, it was anticolonialism that would – beyond the issues of completion of liberation of the south of Africa or Palestinian independence – largely take the back seat in future projections, despite being quite present in summit declarations.³¹

In fact, it was countries of eastern and southern Africa, especially Tanzania, leaning upon Tito's earlier ideas, that were leading the way in this respect, arguing for collective self-reliance and enhanced and diversified South-South political and economic cooperation, one that would boost mutual exchanges in different fields, primarily by putting stress on their complementary character while also creating new mechanisms for Global South's collective protectionism from, as they saw it, the developed world's depredations.³² Under such significant changes, a leadership transition was also occurring, one where the old power structure of the non-aligned would not reign high any more, as it had been customary during the previous twenty years. Yugoslavia and India, however, would preserve their considerable influence inside the movement for another twenty years, but they would have to share their credentials with the new forces

30 Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, 302–305, 429–436, 446–451.

31 “Declaration on non-alignment and economic progress,” Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), HI/121/15/70, National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi.

32 Julius Nyerere, *Non-Alignment in the 1970s: Opening Address by J.K. Nyerere* (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1970).

emerging around the non-aligned world, now enjoying more weight and respect. Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana and some other countries of the old guard would fall behind in this respect, ceding their leadership position to these new forces represented by Algeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Sri Lanka, and Cuba.³³

Already during the third summit in Lusaka in September 1970, the new socio-economic agenda of the movement was unanimously adopted, together with the strong promotion of collective self-reliance as both becoming the conceptual mainstream, with first permanent institutions also being established, above all the so-called Standing Committee, a technical body that would oversee preparations for the next summit and different other events, like ministerial conferences, thus guaranteeing NAM's continuity as well as its official presence on the world stage. Therefore, as mentioned, only after Lusaka can the movement as being a fully-fledged international organization with a well-defined action program, as well as an agency of the North-South conflict, be definitely discussed.³⁴ However, the process of NAM's institutionalization would be completed only during the fourth summit in Algiers in September 1973, when the Coordinating Bureau (CB) was finally set up, a kind of a representative executive body of 15 regional states that would steer movement's activities between the two summits, especially in the UN, implement summit resolutions, organize different gatherings, and hold press conferences. However, the CB still avoided becoming a sole decision-making body, thereby providing both bureau members and non-members an equal say in all important matters related to the NAM's functioning.³⁵ In the future, CB's structure and membership would be reshaped and further expanded not only to reflect the growing numbers of NAM members, as well as their equal regional distribution, but also to create adequate mechanisms for response to the ever-changing international situation. Nevertheless, this expansion also hid in it dangers that too many representatives and excessive deliberations could eventually paralyze CB's effectiveness, which proved to be an issue in the 1980s.³⁶

In addition, the newly established NAM was still trying to balance its security and developmental globalization projects, primarily by trying to extend the superpower détente into the Third World, also boosting the role of the UN as the chief arbiter of international politics, so that firm security guarantees could eventually go hand-in-hand with emerging initiatives to break up the existing levels of inequality between the developed and developing parts of the world. Therefore, at the Georgetown ministerial conference in August 1972, a comprehensive action program for economic cooperation

33 "The third nonaligned summit: the swan song of Yugoslav predominance," September 4, 1970, CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020044-2, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST).

34 Čavoški, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits*, 118–122.

35 "Foreign Secretariat's telegram," September 10, 1973, Political Archives (PA), 1973, f-135, 438085, Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serbia (DAMSPS), Belgrade.

36 "Telegram from Sri Lanka," August 14, 1976, PA, 1976, f-177, 444685, DAMSPS, Belgrade.

and accelerated development was introduced, one that contained a clear set of guidelines, as well as a list of necessary measures that all member states had to introduce both at the individual and collective levels in order to increase the pressure on developed countries to change some of their restrictive economic practices (setting up new associations of raw materials producers, mutual coordination of exports, expanded economic, financial, technical, and scientific cooperation and integration, mutual preferential trade treatment, non-discriminatory measures, etc.).³⁷

This would become even more evident when the NAM, already at the Algiers summit and afterwards, was starting to implement collective measures (nationalization, cartelization, closer coordination in all spheres, establishing a solidarity fund for self-financing of different non-aligned projects, etc.) that often implied manipulating the control exercised by some of its members over some of world's crucial commodities, like oil and others, thus transforming this tool into movement's immediate political and economic weapon focused on extricating major concessions from the Global North with respect to the subsequent overhaul of the international economic system. It was not surprising that a major new initiative had also been launched at this event, the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO) concept, a call for a substantial North-South dialogue, not for confrontation, thus becoming the most evident expression of the primacy of the NAM's developmental globalization project during the 1970s and part of the 1980s.³⁸

By trying to profit from the oil embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) introduced against the West in October 1973, the NIEO would become the most serious systemic challenge to Western economic hegemony in the twentieth century, one that would try to change the traditional North-South paradigm, primarily by rocking the very foundations of the international economic system but always keeping the door open for serious negotiations that could endorse substantial evolutionary changes, above all those opening doors to a more egalitarian, inclusive, and mutually beneficial world order, one recognizing sovereign rights of all nations.³⁹ Since the NAM had already become a well-organized force in the UN General Assembly (GA), often outvoting the blocs, especially the Western one, on many important issues, like the throwing out of South Africa from that body, it was this most representative world platform that was eventually used to make the call for the NIEO official in April–May 1974. Promotion of Third World solidarity, also one of NAM's highlights for decades, as well as advocating stronger North-South interdependence, mutual non-discriminatory treatment, relieving the debt burden, boosting technology transfers, strengthening

37 Mates, *Počelo je u Beogradu*, 88–90.

38 "Report of the Yugoslav delegation," September 12, 1973, 837, KPR, I-4-a/15, AJ, Belgrade.

39 Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 67–70; Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 202–204.

the UN role, establishing new financial international institutions, etc. were all pushed through at this special session, thus becoming an official slogan of the Global South.⁴⁰

These practical measures would be expanded even more during subsequent meetings inside and outside the UN, especially during the Lima ministerial conference in August 1975 and the subsequent summit in Colombo in August 1976, when the NAM finally set up the solidarity fund, as well as two other similar bodies in the field of financing and exporting raw materials, with three specialized centers for public enterprises, multinational corporations, and mutual scientific and technical cooperation being organized, thereby expanding fields of economic and financial cooperation among its members into many new areas. Everything on paper seemed perfect for the NAM, with the link between the security and developmental globalization projects working as expected; however, the challenge remained with the successful realization of all these measures, especially in the field of rewriting global trading rules and reorganizing global production. Therefore, such earth-shaking demands for the redistribution of global wealth could not be met with optimism by developed countries, even though these were then couched in moderate terms. This only triggered profound frustration on the part of the West, particularly since such demands were wedded to specific proposals for resources nationalization or imposing new export controls by developing nations. The fierce diplomatic struggle for the NIEO would last for a couple of years, though eventually ending in a failure, besides some tactical concessions made by the developed nations, which was, conversely, still more than anyone had hoped for from the start.⁴¹ Similar destiny would befall another major NAM initiative of those years, the New International Information Order (NIIO), an attempt at breaking up the monopoly of major Western news agencies in information collecting and their worldwide distribution by establishing a pool of non-aligned news agencies that would supplement their work and broadcast to the world, as the movement perceived, more accurate and truthful information about the NAM, its policies, and conditions of its member states.⁴²

In spite of the ultimate failure of the two NAM global initiatives, it was due to its heavy-handed tactics in the UN, where the movement's strength and impact had been felt the most, that it was already perceived by the blocs as a kind of collective entity that had moved beyond separate regional policies to which the great powers were often trying to limit its role and scope. The NAM's rapid emergence had basically changed the general perception about spatiality, where there was no single region or a continent as the central unit for political engagement but an entire world in its own right that spoke in one language, shared some of the key principles, and had overarching common interests on which their present state and joint future depended on.⁴³ In a way, the non-

40 Čavoški, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits*, 163–172.

41 Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, 329–336, 359–378.

42 Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 196–201.

43 "Role of non-alignment," April 22, 1976, MEA, HI/102(28)/76, NAI, New Delhi.

aligned, as they were often accused by the US, had become another bloc, at least a voting bloc in the UN, one that stood for different transregional initiatives unlike any of its competitors. However, what essentially separated the non-aligned from the blocs was the fact that they never had a hegemon – nor were they following any bloc-like unity or discipline, characteristic of both the East and the West – since they were essentially a rather diverse group, one that often boasted its democratic and pluralistic character and stressed individuality and freedom of choice for any of its members.⁴⁴ While, on the one hand, that would become the NAM's strength – particularly during the Cold War, which was based on clear divisions – since the movement offered a fresh approach to overcoming all the deficiencies of the Third World, on the other, this also opened ways for some outside influences to make an attempt to stir up conflict by placing emphasis on the individual, regionalist, or radical characteristics of a certain group within it.

As it had been the case during the 1960s, it was regional differences and radical impulses that once again proved to be the greatest threat to preserving NAM unity during the late 1970s and 1980s, becoming the most serious obstacle to continuing with any meaningful and effective joint actions. Bilateral conflicts between the non-aligned states themselves were on the rise, affecting the movement's unity and purpose, prompt many countries to act within their respective regional and not wider NAM interests (attempts by Arab states to exclude Egypt from the NAM for its peace treaty with Israel; dissatisfaction demonstrated by Southeast Asian countries over NAM's handling of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia).⁴⁵ In addition, both sides of the Cold War specter were sparing no efforts to either create disunity within the non-aligned ranks or forcefully push the entire movement or at least large chunk of it right into their open arms. In fact, during the NIEO offensive, the US was trying to play up differences between the rich and poor NAM members, encouraging discontent over the issue of the former financing their less fortunate partners. Even though this strategy would not yield immediate results, in time, after the NIEO failure, some of the richer members were indeed trying to find their own place within the existing economic and financial system dominated by the West, irrespective of NAM policies.⁴⁶

Furthermore, since the Soviets were then on the offensive in the Third World, they had tried to use countries ideologically affiliated with them, above all Cuba and Vietnam, to try to push the NAM in the direction of becoming a “natural ally” of the Soviet bloc, emphasizing its anti-imperialist and anticolonial orientation as its true and only essence, while any other discussions about the security or socioeconomic paradigm were considered as a distraction from the movement's real goals or deliberate attempts to keep it away from Moscow's fold. This would, in return, trigger a dynamic leader-

44 Singham and Hume, *Non-Alignment*, 27–30; Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 102–109.

45 Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, 499–502, 523–531.

46 Garavini, *After Empires*, 215–224.

ship conflict between Yugoslavia and Cuba, both backed by groups of “moderate” and “radical” members, that would ultimately preoccupy the NAM’s agenda for a couple of years, undermining its ongoing globalization projects and strengthening regionalist inclinations, thereby further reducing its real strength, draining its vitality, and reducing its scope and focus right at the time when a new round of confrontation was raging again between the blocs.⁴⁷

Throughout the 1980s, the NAM had been in a permanent crisis, one that manifested itself in an institutional disarray (members were searching for solutions for their individual issues outside the realm of the movement); leadership paralysis (the old guard was gone and there were only a few younger leaders having any serious weight to push the organization out of this quagmire); ideological wandering, accompanied by disillusionment (much of movement’s original principles had been reduced to empty talk); and the rise in bilateral non-aligned conflicts, which had opened doors to further aggressive great power interference. All major projects of the NAM had effectively been dead by the end of that decade, only becoming hollow slogans of a more glorious past, while many members were already choosing to side with Western bloc, accepting its political and economic rules in order to survive already quite damaging debt crisis.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, such challenges also allowed the “moderates” to start again with implementing middle-of-the-road tactics that would give prominence again to the old agenda, pushing the debate away from controversial bilateral and regional disputes, promoting moderation and accommodation as well as reduction of tensions, thus finding again a wider common ground and a meaningful consensus that would bring the NAM back from the very edge of extinction. India, under Indira Gandhi and backed by post-Tito Yugoslavia, had largely succeeded in this respect by at least preserving the movement as an organization for the future, together with some of its guiding principles still remaining relevant for the majority of developing nations (independence, peace, security, stability, and development), irrespective of the NAM’s diminished influence and reduced efficiency.⁴⁹

One of the NAM’s main problems by the end of that decade was its readiness to continue adapting to the Cold War conditions, not astutely understanding that a new world order was on the horizon, with the obvious end of the Cold War in sight. Movement was already lagging behind key international developments, not attaching too much importance to the superpower negotiations, except in general, still debating issues that were becoming either obsolete or irrelevant under altered historical conditions. It was up to Yugoslavia, before its tragic demise, as well as India, to chart out a new agenda for the NAM, one that would prepare it for the post-Cold War phase. It aimed

47 Čavoški, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits*, 196–221.

48 Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 229–259.

49 Jain, *India’s Foreign Policy*, 244–268.

to set up a new globalization project, focusing on bringing the movement into the new world by stressing specific economic, social, humanitarian, ecological, technological, and other issues that would go hand-in-hand with the dominant mainstream while promoting more substantial North-South integration. The new wave of globalization would shape this approach, with the goal of gaining as much as possible from the new context, which would never be preferred by the developing world but which had become a new reality that they had to adapt to in order to gain for themselves as much as they could.⁵⁰ This provided the NAM with quite necessary breathing space, enabling its formal procrastination until today, with the specific developmental agenda still remaining its key feature, above all in the UN. Such aims have since been copied by different regional organizations, with the earlier radical impulses, sometimes promoted by some of its members, never again becoming a prevalent trend or a substantial threat to the movement's unity and purpose.

Conclusion

During and after the Cold War decades, the NAM has remained the only significant transregional format on the international stage, besides the UN – one that stands right at the crossroads of both the East-West and North-South conflicts, thus becoming a rare historical phenomenon indeed, and situated firmly outside the realm of great powers, effectively cutting across so many differences that individually separated many member states but never becoming an unsurpassable obstacle for formulating their joint action. As for NAM's lasting legacy, this largely comes down to its strong capacity to truthfully and comprehensively express Global South's collective identity, its pertinent ability to build upon continuous inclinations of non-bloc and developing nations toward multilateralism and coordinated actions, as well as its determination to further nurture the Global South's strong political consciousness about its independent stand and self-respect, also never neglecting the general idea about the more relevant role that part of the world should exercise in international affairs. In addition, aspirations for a more inclusive, egalitarian, just, and democratic world order have never become obsolete for these nations, with many political, economic, social, environmental, security, and other challenges still remaining in place, thereby fundamentally shaping their views and policies vis-à-vis the great powers, both inside and outside the movement, for the foreseeable future.

If we look at the NAM today, it is still present in the world headlines, at least when a summit is held, but it has never gained such prominence as it had during the heyday of

50 Sally Morphet, "Three Non-Aligned Summits: Harare 1986, Belgrade 1989 and Jakarta 1992," in *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry*, ed. David H. Dunn (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 150–157.

the Cold War. Even though movement's most important feature is its immediate contribution to the successful evolution of the North-South dialogue, with the developmental globalization project still remaining its priority, it has basically remained a byproduct of the East-West conflict and thus not fully capable of reinventing itself beyond that historical paradigm. It is much harder in a world that is gradually evolving toward some kind of multipolarity (though still a blurry one), when facing a growing number of different regional organizations sharing the same members and similar ideas with the NAM, to eventually rediscover a common cause, challenge, or threat that would gather together again nations from four different continents and galvanize them to become another potent tool for forcefully pushing through a unified agenda. Years of regional engagements and different bilateral conflicts, as well as individual dealings with major regional and world powers, have all left a specific legacy where many of these nations are still seeking their safety and realization of their interests within their own arrangements and multilateral networks of a more localized kind, while global initiatives have remained more generalized and verbal in essence, though less practical ones.

Nevertheless, the intensifying great power conflict, as well as the gradual rise of new blocs and great power alliances, has created new challenges. Furthermore, the disenchantment of many developing nations with the nature of their dealings with these major centers of power, especially due to increasing levels of external interference and interventionism, has opened up new possibilities for boosting and diversifying South-South cooperation under these new conditions. As a result, a substantial expansion and reshaping of this transregional format is taking place, primarily by drawing lessons from the NAM's Cold War experiences. In fact, all this effort will ultimately become just another expression of independent, self-aware, and non-bloc policies pursued by all these nations, both individually or collectively, similar as in the past. With or without the NAM, non-alignment in some of its emanations, as the movement's most lasting echo, will definitely remain the preferred foreign policy choice for the majority of nations of the Global South, with a potential for many others joining them in that strenuous effort.

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