

Drač-Elbasan Railway – “Railway of the Yugoslav-Albanian Brotherhood”¹

Božica Slavković Mirić

The Institute for Recent History of Serbia²

Abstract: After the end of World War II, Yugoslavia and Albania continued the cooperation that had been established during the war. The economic cooperation between the two countries began after the signing of the Friendship and Assistance Agreement in mid-1946. Part of the cooperation were joint ventures between the two countries and one of them was a railway company. The first Albanian railway, Drač-Elbasan, represented the result of Yugoslav-Albanian reconciliation. Its construction began in early 1947 and completed in November the same year. A plan for the Drač-Tirana railway also existed and was to be implemented as a joint project, but due to the crisis of the relations between the two countries, it never materialised. Yugoslavia and Albania discontinued their cooperation after Albania's acceptance of the Informbureau Resolution in mid-1948.

Keywords: Albania, Drač, Elbasan, Railway, The period after the Second World War, Yugoslavia.

¹The article is a result of work at the Institute for Recent History of Serbia, which is financed by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia, based on the Agreement on the Implementation and Financing of Scientific Research Work of the National Institute of Science and Technology in 2023 No. 451-03-47/2023 - 01/200016 of 2/3/2023.

²Trg Nikole Pašića 11, Belgrade; e-mail: bozica.slavkovic@gmail.com.

Introduction: Establishment of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania after World War II

After the end of the Second World War, Albania began its political development and economic renewal. Thanks to the friendship with Yugoslavia, which was achieved during the war, Albania tried to settle its internal situation and find its foreign policy position (Dizdarević 1988; Djaković 1984, 86-87; Pavlović 2001, 479; Verli 2008, 294). Yugoslavia and the USSR were the first to recognize the Albanian state (Bartl 2001, 233). There was an assumption that Albania could join the Balkan Federation, whose members were to be Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (Životić 2015, 283). Albania was supported by Yugoslavia at a Conference on reparations, where Albania successfully gained appropriate compensation from Germany (Petković 1985, 102-103; Petranović 1969, 219).

Yugoslavia and Albania signed two treaties in 1945, one in the form of a military alliance for the joint fight against the German occupation forces, which was to be extended in the post-war years, and the other constituting a treaty on economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania (Borožan 1995, 513-514; Petranović 1991, 335; Selinić and Bajagić 2010, 46; Smodlaka 1986, 220-222). The total value of deliveries was around 40 million dinars¹ on both sides.² In addition to the contractual benefits, Albania also received out-of-agreement assistance from Yugoslavia (Petranović 1994, 97). Relations with Albania were developing on other planes as well. Serbian language professors held courses in Albania. Albanian students received scholarships and were admitted to Yugoslav universities and schools. Albanian young people also went to Yugoslavia to attend the Congress of the Anti-Fascist Youth of the Balkans. Medicine and healthcare cooperation was established and one medical team visited Albania for one month (Slavković Mirić 2020, 95-97). The border issue was very important, so an agreement was signed that was supposed to resolve cross-border traffic.³

In December 1945, elections for the Constituent Assembly were held in Albania, which were won by the Popular Front led by Enver Hoxha (Skendi 1958, 23).⁴ The People's Republic of Albania was proclaimed in January 1946 and a Yugoslav-style Constitution was adopted.⁵ Albania also sought to secure its foreign policy position, i.e. it wanted to participate in the Paris Conference, for which it received Yugoslav support (Marmullaku 1975, 115; Perazić 1987, 96; Životić 2010, 94-95). Yugoslavia also supported Albania in its application for membership of the United Nations (1946, 8; 1961, 118).

In addition to regulating the political situation, one of the main tasks of the Albanian leadership was to improve the economic situation. In February 1946, the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania decided that Albania would definitely turn to cooperation with Yugoslavia (Krempton 2003, 69; Prifti 1978, 54; Zlatar 1986, 109-110). In order to

improve trade ties, the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Trade had appointed Hugo Havliček, a Ministry of Trade and Supply official, as its trade envoy to Tirana.⁶

The culmination of the cooperation between the two countries was the visit of Enver Hoxha to Yugoslavia in July 1946. The Agreement on Economic Cooperation, Payments and Loans was signed, followed by the Agreement on Friendship and Assistance in Tirana. Yugoslav-Albanian joint legal entities were set up, which were to take the form of joint stock companies with equal Albanian and Yugoslav equity interests (Babić 1981, 69; Bartl 2001, 76; Dedijer 1949, 152–154; Djilas 2009, 96; Gaćeša 1990, 91; Komatina 1995, 48; Stojković 1998, 4–6; Zlatar 1986, 112).⁷

The cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania followed the example of Yugoslavia's cooperation with the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, like other countries in Central, Southeastern and Eastern Europe, was considered a state of "people's democracy". This meant political and economic presence by the Soviet Union, strengthening of and power takeover by the Communist Party, major changes in the domestic organisation, implementation of reforms, nationalisation of industry and finance, as well as the development of a planned economy (Boffa 1985, 232-234; Wandycz 1992, 236-238; Laker 1999, 102-110; Geler-Nekrić 2000, 424-427; Longvort 2002, 104). Yugoslavia was a Moscow-aligned country and accepted all Soviet models (Mates 1976, 93-100). However, in the following period, Yugoslavia failed to consult with Moscow on certain issues. This could be interpreted as the Yugoslavia's "true revolution" and could be ascribed to its habit of solving problems independently (Dimić 2006, 5-11). Yugoslavia used the same forms of cooperation it had with the Soviet Union in its relations with Albania. The same way in which the USSR had helped Yugoslavia ideologically, politically, economically, militarily and culturally was employed by Yugoslavia in Albania (Pavlović 1996, 306-307).

Yugoslav-Albanian cooperation, which developed on multiple planes – ideological, political, economic, healthcare, military and cultural, unfolded with greater or lesser difficulty. Albanian leaders, especially Enver Hoxha, were cautious and distrustful of the Yugoslav leadership, which hampered closer cooperation and ultimately resulted in Albania's complete alignment to the USSR in 1948. The reason was that relations between Yugoslavia and Albania had been marked by conflict in the previous decades. Nevertheless, cooperation between the two countries had contributed to Albania's economic and political renewal. Livestock and agrarian reforms had been implemented⁸ (Frasheri 1964, 329; Krempton 2003, 67; Sjöberg 1991, 128). Industry, electrification, the situation of workers, cooperatives had improved. Regular traffic had been established, bridges and roads had been built, some factories, power plants and schools had been constructed and renovated. Also, a state economic plan had been developed, which foresaw investments in agriculture and industry (See details in: Slavković Mirić 2020).

It should also be emphasised that youth work, which is central to our paper due to its important role in the construction of the Drač-Elbasan railway, was very significant during the socialist state's emergence period. It was important from an economic point of view, but also because it was meant to instil individual discipline in the relationship with the state. Similar initiatives had occurred in the Soviet Union, a practice that was transferred to Yugoslavia and thus to Albania. Competition among the youth and the ambition to surpass the labour quota were the inspiration for the renewal of the country with great energy and enthusiasm. The reconstruction plan was limited to five years, and the result was to strengthen the state's economic and defence power. Development of industry and accelerated electrification of the country required restoration and construction of transport infrastructure, which was the reason why the construction of roads and railways became more important (See more in: Matošević 2015, 93-111; Petranović-Zečević 1988, 870-871; Popović 2013, 289-313; Senjković 2016; Selinić 2005, 87-101; Selinić 2007, 119-137).

In our paper, we will deal with the construction of the Drač-Elbasan railway in 1947, as an example of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania after the Second World War, but we will also look at the entire Albanian-Yugoslav cooperation until 1948. The aim of our paper is to show that the relations between these two countries had concrete results after the Second World War. This railway was built very quickly and was known as being the result of voluntary work by young people on both sides, so it was also used to promote the brotherhood and unity of Yugoslavia and Albania.

In the preparation of the paper, we used the classical historical method, with the study of quantitative sources, i.e. statistical data and economic sources. We primarily used published and unpublished archival materials. We looked for unpublished archival material mainly in the fonds of the Archives of Yugoslavia. The fonds of the Office of the Marshal of Yugoslavia contains material on the visits of the Albanian delegation, transcripts of the talks and notes on the messages exchanged by high-ranking statesmen. In the same fonds, we found material on the relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, based on which we can derive the extent of Yugoslav aid provided to Albania and how much Yugoslavia was present in the Albanian state and politics. The source that was most important to us in drafting the paper is the fonds of the Commission for International Relations, which contains a large amount of data on Yugoslavia's assistance to Albania, Yugoslav experts active in this country, reports of Yugoslav representatives. Data on meetings, important decisions and international relations can be found in the fonds of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Presidency of the Government. Rich archival material on the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania can also be found in the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, the Political Archive Fonds. There, we

identified diplomatic reports of Yugoslav representatives in Albania, summarised economic reviews and reports, political situation reviews, notes on talks between Yugoslav representatives and the Albanian leadership, reports of foreign missions in Albania, lists of Albanian economic requests to Yugoslavia, proposals of Yugoslav representatives to solve various problems in Albanian-Yugoslav cooperation, minutes of joint commissions, telegrams of Yugoslav representatives and reports of trade envoys of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to Albania. These folders also contain material on the military, cultural, educational and healthcare cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania.

In addition to unpublished archival material, professional literature provided us with background to the text, which enabled us to create the context we needed to better understand the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania in the relevant period. Our research is limited by the lack of Albanian material and thus the analysis of Yugoslav-Albanian relations from the perspective of Albanian fonds and documents. We tried to conduct an objective analysis of the archival documents we came across in our research, to show how important the railway was for the development of the Albanian economy and for its good relations with Yugoslavia. However, this railway also revealed shortcomings and difficulties in the Yugoslav-Albanian relations. The topic that our text deals with is partially covered in historiography, primarily in the broader context of the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania. Our text is based on unpublished archival documents, which we wanted to constitute an original contribution to scientific historiography that deals with issues of relations between countries in the period after the Second World War.

In this paper, we will first analyse the Yugoslav-Albanian joint ventures, and we will pay special attention to the work of the Railway Association. In a special part, we will deal with the topic of our paper, which is the joint work of Yugoslavs and Albanians on the construction of the Drač-Elbasan railway. However, despite the propaganda about youth and volunteer work, the construction of the railway did encounter difficulties, primarily in terms of financing and procurement of materials. We will deal with this in a special part of the paper. The last part of our article will be dedicated to the termination of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania in 1948, after the Albania's adherence to the Resolution of the Informbureau, which also affected the joint work on the railways and other plans. In the end, we will summarize the cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania and the importance of building a railway for the Albanian economy.

Yugoslav-Albanian joint ventures

The agreement on friendship and mutual cooperation provided for the set-up of Yugoslav-Albanian joint ventures (similar to the Soviet-Yugoslav instances),

which were to deal with the mutual exchange of goods, the production of Albanian mineral resources and transport. Those enterprises included railway construction and operation, oil extraction and production, mine exploration, ore production and processing, electrification, maritime navigation, an import & export trading company and the Albanian-Yugoslav Bank. According to the plan, the entities were to be joint stock companies, with equal Albanian and Yugoslav equity interests. The share capital of the companies ranged from 1,000,000 new Albanian francs (or 12,500,000 dinars, according to the Yugoslav exchange rate), in the case of the Import and Export Company, to 6,000,000 new Albanian francs (or 75,000,000 dinars, according to the Yugoslav exchange rate) in the case of the Railway Construction and Operation Company. Each share would cost 1,000 new Albanian francs (12,500 dinars), and Yugoslavia had to pay 50% of the share capital in the companies. 131,250,000 dinars were paid in two instalments: 37,500,000 dinars to the Albanian-Yugoslav railway construction and operation company, 25,000,000 dinars to the oil exploration and production company, 12,500,000 dinars to the mineral resources exploration and production company, 12,500,000 dinars to the electrification company, 6,250,000 dinars to the import and export company and 37,500,000 dinars to the Albanian-Yugoslav Bank.⁹

Each company had an eight-member board of directors and a four-member supervisory board, half of those representing the Yugoslav party and the other half representing Albanian capital. Article 4 of the Protocol on Personnel stated that

“with regard to the rights and duties of professionals and officials, the laws of the People’s Republic of Albania shall apply. However, their salaries and social security benefits shall not be lower than the salaries and benefits of the corresponding workers and officials in the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia”.¹⁰

The intended purpose of this provision was that Yugoslav experts in Albania would not have higher salaries than the Albanian staff. All companies were based in Tirana and, where necessary, main branch headquarters were planned in Belgrade. Each company had 30-year terms, which could be extended for periods of five years, but the Albanian government would have the right to redeem the Yugoslav interest after 30 years. The possibility to liquidate a company even before the expiration of that term was also envisaged, if the representatives of the Yugoslav and Albanian interests made a decision to that effect.¹¹

The Albanian-Yugoslav Bank played a particularly important role in achieving Yugoslav-Albanian economic cooperation. The bank was headquartered in Tirana, with a branch based in Belgrade. It was an Albanian legal entity and was governed by the laws of that country. The projected share capital of the bank was 4,000,000 new Albanian francs (50,000,000 dinars), with equal stakes (2,000,000 new Albanian francs each) held by the Yugoslav and

Albanian governments. Every company that would export goods from Yugoslavia to Albania had to submit all documents to the National Bank with an order requesting that the invoiced value of goods be paid by foreign buyers through the State Bank of Albania. At the telegraphic request of the State Bank of Albania, Albanian companies that would import goods had to obtain approval from the Ministry of Foreign Trade for payment of the invoiced amount through the National Bank of Yugoslavia and deposit the consideration for the imported goods with the National Bank. The Government of Yugoslavia was required to pay 50% of the share capital in the joint companies in three equal instalments within six months, with the first payment to be made during the formation of the board of directors. In addition, the Yugoslav government had to deposit with the State Bank of Albania the equivalent of wheat and other goods imported in lieu of payment for the Yugoslav shares in the equity of all said companies. The Albanian government was bound to make three equal cash payments for 50% of the share capital of the Albanian-Yugoslav Bank, also within six months. Under the joint venture plan, the bank would be liquidated after 30 years or if the joint venture ceased operations. It would also terminate operations if the state contributing more capital withdrew.¹²

The Albanian-Yugoslav Bank started operating on February 26, 1947. The governing body was the board of directors, which consisted of six members, elected by the General Meeting of Shareholders. The executive leadership of the bank was ensured by the General Directorate, headed by the general manager, a representative of the Yugoslav shareholding, and his deputy, a representative of the Albanian shareholding. The bank did not conduct business in 1947 due to unresolved issues in financing the joint ventures, so it only had a general manager and his deputy, with no clerks and support staff, and even lacking the necessary premises. The share capital, which was set at six million Albanian francs, was divided into 600 shares with a 50% payment parity between the two parties (after the changeover, it was worth 75 million leks). The first instalment of the share capital was to be paid on the day the company was incorporated, and the second by 1 June 1947. The Ministry of Finance of the FPRY paid the first instalment to the National Bank of the FPRY on the day of the incorporation, but the transfer was not made. A new trade agreement and a new protocol on the method of payment and transfer of share capital of joint ventures were signed in June 1947. After the signing, the first instalment was transferred and made available through the Albanian State Bank in September 1947, and the second in December 1947.¹³

In the first half of 1947, the Albanian-Yugoslav Bank extended a 2,887,000-franc loan to the oil company, a 400,000-franc loan to the mineral resources company and a 7,161,000-franc loan to the railway company, amounting to a total of 10,448,000 francs (94,032,000 leks). The bank did not participate in mixed companies because the issue of financing was not

regulated and because the mixed companies were taken over by the relevant Albanian ministries. The bank operated by giving large loans and charging high interest rates. In 1948 the bank recorded approved and spent investment loans with the Albanian State Bank with the approval of the relevant ministries. The Albanian State Bank made 10,500,000 leks available for loans, but bank did not have the funds needed to extend investment loans to companies. Due to that, the Ministry of Finance allocated the necessary amounts from the planned budget funds, which the Albanian state bank was supposed to further apportion. For working capital loans, it first used its own funds and charged, if possible, a lower, 4% interest rate. The bank tried to speed up the circulation of working capital, and this should have been made possible especially by the new regulation on the collection of invoices through the bank.¹⁴

Based on the above-mentioned parts of the agreement that referred to joint ventures, we see that they provided for mostly equal obligations among the parties. However, additional protocols relating to certain facilities and works stipulated unilateral obligations for the FPRY, which was a unique occurrence for contracts of this kind. Under those protocols, Yugoslavia undertook the following commitments: in railway construction, provide construction companies for these works and all the necessary materials and machinery, except for sleepers and ordinary construction materials; in the oil industry, to construct oil refineries and one hydropower plant for the needs of the oil industry; in the power industry, to build a hydroelectric power plant for the needs of the city of Tirana. For Albania, the agreements provided the obligation to contribute existing investments or already completed works to some of the joint ventures. In the case of the railway construction company, where, apart from some exceptions, the FPRY government had provided all machinery, trucks, rails, locomotives, carriages and other materials in 1947, the profit-sharing ratio was 65 to 35 in favour of Albania.¹⁵

The railway company was incorporated on the territory of Albania. The routes of the railways were to be determined by agreement between the Yugoslav and Albanian governments. The company's business included production of railway material and rolling stock. The supplies would be provided by the Albanian-Yugoslav Bank, which was supposed to imply the influence of both governments on all companies. According to the plan for the establishment of a railway joint venture, given the volume of funds, loans in the form of support from both governments were planned, which would include the ready-made, but also already used material, as well as new material. The Yugoslav Ministry of Transport had taken it upon itself to handle the delivery of materials to Albania.¹⁶ We will see in the following text of our research how much of the planned material was delivered. A regulation had been passed for the assessment of already performed works on the Drač-Elbasan railway, in order to continue with the works. A special regulation was also envisaged for the functioning

of railway lines (It should be added that there were several agreements that were later reached in accordance with the regulation of Albanian transport connections, especially between Yugoslavia and Albania). Finally, the issue of fees, as well as that regarding personnel were left open. There was a proposal to introduce a provision according to which the fees on the Albanian-Yugoslav railways would not be lower than those on the Yugoslav railways. This issue, in the absence of fee experts, had not been fully resolved. As for the issue of personnel, there was a proposal to include in the agreement a clause according to which the staff on the Albanian-Yugoslav borders would be Yugoslav until Albanian experts are trained. That was also not resolved.¹⁷

Joint work of Yugoslavs and Albanians on the Drač-Elbasan railway

Railway traffic was very important for the industrialisation of the Albanian state, which it started rapidly after the Second World War, especially if we keep in mind that Albania was the only country in Europe that did not have any railways before the end of the Second World War. The main connections were represented by unpaved roads (Prifti 1978, 52). Significant pieces of infrastructure planned for implementation were railway line Metohija - Prizren - Kuks - Skadar – Medua Bay and railway line Skoplje - Tetovo - Gostivar - Kičevo - Struga - Elbasan - Fijeri - Vlora. Of great importance for transport connections in Albania was the Drač-Elbasan railway. Work on the railway was initiated by the Italians during the Second World War.¹⁸ According to the data of the Yugoslav economic delegation in Albania, the Yugoslav participation in the joint companies was 7,944,250,000 dinars, of which 3,300,500,000 dinars for all three railway routes (see table below). The projected Yugoslav and Albanian investments in railways are outlined in the next table, according to which the projected Albanian share was 20%, while the remaining interest was held by the Yugoslav party. Yugoslavia's participation in the Drač-Elbasan railway was planned at 135 million pre-war dinars.¹⁹

| | Upper line (Prizren-Skadar - San Giovanni di Medua) | Lower line (Struga-Elbasan-Vlora) | Middle line (completion of the Drač-Elbasan railway) |
|--|---|-----------------------------------|--|
| Required railway investment | 580 million dinars | 430 million dinars | 168,750,000 dinars |
| Planned Albanian participation | 20% | 20 % | 20% |
| Yugoslav participation (depreciation rate was 3.5) | 464 million dinars | 344 million dinars | 135 million dinars |
| Estimated work performance term | 4 years | 7 years | 18 months |
| Total | 1,624,000,000 dinars | 1,204,000,000 dinars | 472,500,000 dinars |

The construction of the 75 km long Drač-Elbasan railway on a standard-gauge track (1.435 m) was carried out by the Ministry of Transport of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which provided technical and other professional staff, locomotives and carriages. Albania contributed unskilled workers and some of the skilled workforce: masons, blacksmiths, carpenters, drivers and one third of miners. Among the materials needed for the construction of the railway, Albania provided gravel, sand, pine timber - logs and planed timber, sleepers, bricks, tiles, lime, telephone poles, gasoline and Diesel oil. All other material was provided by the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.²⁰ The total value of the works on the Drač-Elbasan railway was 540,000 dinars (Gaćeša 1990, 102–105).

This railway was known as the “youth railway”, because of the voluntary work performed by young people in its construction.²¹ In March 1947, the first youth brigade left Tirana with a solemn ceremony: “A mass of people gathered in the central square carrying flags, banners and slogans. The trucks carrying the young people were decorated with Albanian and Yugoslav flags and pictures of Enver and Tito.” This way of building the railway was considered “a school that will educate 12,000 young men and women.” Throughout the construction of the railway, plans were made for literacy courses, book clubs and discussion groups to be held, as well as for visits by entertainment and sports teams.²² The workforce numbers grew over time up to 15,989, of which the youth of Argirokastra was in the lead with 2,606 registered volunteers, while in the area of Kukës, where “women were locked in their houses because of fanaticism, 505 young girls signed up.”²³ When work on this railway started, 35 literacy courses were held, which were attended by 510 young people, and 132 learned to read and write. Also, 53 book clubs were formed, attended by 277 young people.²⁴

The press regularly followed what was happening on the Drač-Elbasan railway. The arrival of young people continued (workgroup “Bajram Curi” - 246 young people, including 46 women, workgroup “Mico Mame” - 275 young people).²⁵ A competition was organised in April 1947, so “already in the first days of the competition, all work brigades had exceeded the quota by an average of 80%, while many young people exceeded it by 350%.”²⁶ The Yugoslav work brigades worked together with the Albanians “with great enthusiasm”. The slogans “We work here as in our own country” and “The love between Yugoslav and Albanian youth is boundless” were written on the carriages used by the Yugoslav youth and on the walls of their apartments.²⁷ In line with the construction efforts, the Secretariat of the People's Youth of Albania had decided to declare the week of 7-15 June as the “Railway Week”.²⁸

In September, a ten-day competition was organised on the railway in honour of Josip Broz Tito. On that occasion, Liri Belishova, President of the Albania's Popular Youth (Rinia Popullore), said in her speech:

“Our youth railway is rightly called the railway of brotherhood. We love Marshal Tito and his Yugoslavia, because without the help of Marshal Tito and Yugoslavia, we would not be able to win our independence and freedom. Without Tito’s help, we would not be able to rebuild the country.”²⁹

Greeting telegrams were sent to the Yugoslav President:

“Dear Marshal, we, the 13,500 young builders of the Drač-Elbasan youth railway, send you our warmest greetings. In close cooperation with Yugoslav technicians and experts, we have achieved great results in our creative work by overcoming all difficulties. As true brothers, we have committed ourselves together to complete a part of the Drač-Pecin railway, which is 43 km long, on the day of the Thirtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. From September 11 to 21, we will work with all our strength, in order to achieve new victories in our work.”³⁰

In November 1947, on the occasion of the completion of works on this part of the railway, 14,000 railway builders sent a greeting telegram to Enver Hoxha, in which they expressed their joy that 35,000 young people, as well as Albanian and Yugoslav experts, achieved a great victory after eight months of uninterrupted work. The telegram also stated:

“In all competitions and efforts to build the railway, our Yugoslav brothers were constantly with us. We received great and direct help from the people of Yugoslavia, without whom we would not be able to build the railway. Our railroad is the railroad of the brotherhood of our two peoples. We built the railway, and the railway built us.”³¹

At the opening of the railway on 7 November 1947, Kochi Dzodze, Albanian Interior Minister, also emphasised Yugoslav assistance:

“In the construction of the youth railway, we received great material, professional and technical assistance from our ally, the FPRY. This railway is specifically the result of our alliance with Yugoslavia. Albania is lucky to have the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia on its borders, which is a great guarantee for our survival and general development.”³²

Difficulties and shortcomings in railway construction

In the first half of 1947, the Yugoslav-Albanian Bank extended loans to the joint companies totalling 10,448,000 francs (94,032,000 leks), of which 7,161,000 francs to the Railway Company.³³ From 6 March 1947, 10,000,000 leks were set aside for the construction of railways, and 582,662 leks were used by 10 October 1947. 25,000,000 leks were to be used for the railway,

and 7,572,730 leks for the payment of the debt to the Ministry of Transport for the initial works on the construction of the Drač-Elbasan railway.³⁴ For the construction of this railway, all necessary construction machines and tools, vehicles and all other materials were sent from Yugoslavia, except for sleepers and ordinary construction materials, as well as two railway construction consultants out of the three who were available in the whole of Yugoslavia, according to Vladimir Dedijer. Material from Yugoslavia was brought in 71 carriages.³⁵ Dedijer wrote that the Yugoslav leadership did not comply with the agreement to the letter, but also provided material that was not obligatory under the agreement. Yugoslavia provided the material required to build barracks for the Albanian youth, although it was supposed to be provided by the Albanian government (Dedijer 1949, 185). The Yugoslav leadership also took “a number of other measures.” As Czechoslovakia did not timely supply the rails to be delivered to Albania³⁶, the Yugoslav government had to set aside some quantities out of the rails ready for the construction of the Yugoslav railways (the 12 km Bihać-Knin line and the 7 km Kuršumlija-Priština line) and dismantle about 24 km of rails from the railways around Belgrade and Ljubljana, as well as the remaining rails for the construction of the Šamac-Sarajevo line. The 1,700-ton rails were sent from Zenica, where they were produced for the Šamac-Sarajevo railway, to Dubrovnik, boarded on specialised trains, and they were in Drač by 12 October. They stayed there for three days, waiting to be unloaded (Dedijer 1949, 186).

Savo Zlatić, a Yugoslav delegate sent to Albania in August 1946, noted that experts were slowly arriving in Albania and that work on the Drač-Elbasan line was “stuck”, that the freight under the trade agreement was arriving very slowly, and that Yugoslav experts, whose arrival was scheduled for December, came in mid-January.³⁷ The lack of professional staff in Albania, as well as the shortage of workforce were hindering the construction of the railway, because discipline among young people was declining, and some whose voluntary work stint had expired had not been replaced. Yugoslav brigades should have been sent to help so that the deadline for the completion of work would not be breached. Sava Zlatić added that it was necessary to strengthen food supply on the railway construction site with 50 carriages of wheat, replace hostile individuals, change the Albanians’ view that the construction of the railway benefitted the Yugoslavs (import of materials for the railway) and check whether it was true that textiles and other trade goods coming from Yugoslavia lay in warehouses and were not distributed. The possibility of repairing broken trucks owned by the Albanians (allegedly 400) was to be examined. Zlatić also emphasised that the attitude towards the Yugoslav staff on the railway had not been determined precisely in terms of pay.³⁸

In a later report, Zlatić cited shortcomings on the Yugoslav side, most notably the delay with which Yugoslav experts joined the joint companies;

then that the staff sent initially was “quite poorly qualified.” Thus, one Yugoslav official was arrested for embezzlement on the railway, and seven of them were returned. Three others returned to Yugoslavia from Tirana. There were issues with “the proper attitude of our people towards Albanians.” He pointed out that Yugoslav representatives “often got lost with many unnecessary practical calculations, such as in connection with the exchange rate and the national income of Albania.” There were also shortcomings in the delivery of goods, for example railway trucks came without batteries and tires, the new carriages were not usable, so they were sent to workshops for repair. The pumps came without hoses, compressors without the necessary parts, which remained in Rijeka. The goods had arrived unaccompanied with invoices for some time. Zlatić, however, concluded that “these shortcomings are being better overcome and the delivery of our obligations is becoming more orderly and accurate.”³⁹

Drago Košmrlj, the Yugoslav charge d'affaires in Albania, also spoke about shortcomings and dissatisfaction, when he reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia that Hoxha had delivered an address in Drač on the occasion of the ceremonial opening of works on the Drač-Elbasan railway. He pointed out that Hoxha had set the foreign policy line quite clearly, although “given its role and importance in relation to Albania, it could have afforded greater importance to Yugoslavia.”⁴⁰

In a report on the overall activity of the railway construction company submitted in mid-1947, General Manager Engineer A. Heibner stated that the issue of the “share capital had not been clarified”. The company had not received any official act on the railways that would be built during the five-year plan. They complained that supplies from Yugoslavia were delayed, and that they were not well-organised and properly marked. They had a similar problem with supplies from Albania, so the execution of the plan was delayed. The Directorate for the Construction of the Drač-Elbasan Railway complained about the lack of experts from Yugoslavia. There was a total of five Yugoslav experts of various trades working with the company in Tirana, and 268 with the Railway Construction Administration in Drač, of which 21 were engineers, two architects, 25 technicians, one mechanical technician, one surveyor, three draftsmen, 57 supervisors, three miners, two mechanical managers, two construction managers, two locksmiths and blacksmith managers, two car mechanics, and the rest were financial and administrative staff. There were 701 Albanian paid staff, including drivers, 135 carpenters, 169 skilled workers, and the rest were semi-skilled and auxiliary administrative staff. The company needed vehicles, primarily off-road vehicles, to tour the terrain. Then, members of the Railway Construction Administration complained that the machines had not arrived as planned. They cited concrete mixers that arrived without engines, which had been idle for more than a month, pumps that arrived

without hoses or some were fitted with electric motors where there was no electricity supply. They complained that everything that was missing for machines and equipment had to be made up from Albania. Procurement of materials was also troublesome, and concerns regarding a shortage of young workforce, as well as declining discipline among young people were particularly raised. Food supply was also a problem and the company ordered the management in Drač to hire 2,000-3,000 paid workers, but it was not easy to find them either. According to the health service regulations, each young person should have received at least 3,800 calories a day, but in fact they received 2,500-3,000 calories. They didn't even have food supplies in the warehouses. In the canteen in Drač, food stocks were insufficient. The report specifically highlighted the issue of wages and salaries of Yugoslav workers. The impediments of working in Albania were emphasised: climatic conditions, health, overtime work, time spent away from family and the homeland, etc. The problem was that not all Yugoslav workers stayed in Albania at the same time, so some were told they would be there for three months and some for six months. Work records were indicated as one of the administration's strengths with trained staff being the only shortcoming. All work on the Drač-Elbasan railway was based on Yugoslav quotas, because achievement of Albanian quotas was unrealistic. The attitude towards the Albanian staff was "mostly correct and friendly", but there were "various clashes and frictions on the ground and it can be said that a higher percentage of misunderstandings and outbursts comes from the Albanians".⁴¹

A similar situation in the Railway Company was described in another report that presented conclusions on its activity. It stated that its operations, starting from the General Directorate to the units in the field, gave the impression of an incomplete organisation. There was no expert to lead the personnel policy, employees were replaced with inappropriate substitutes or their position would remain vacant, so "many irresponsible people" got involved. The recruitment of Albanian staff was conducted through the Deputy Director General. Operational records were not systematically kept, the dispatch service did not even exist. The organisation of supply and delivery of materials from the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia functioned with a delay, and the procurement of materials from Albanian companies was not carried out. The plan for 1948 was submitted late, so the preparation of the material balance and the determination of the contingent was delayed. The Ministry of Public Works and the Railway Company did not cooperate enough, so the works slowed down. It was also concluded that the organisation of maintenance and use of the existing vehicle fleet of the Administration was not satisfactory. It was determined that there were 75-80% of breakdowns that came mostly due to bad drivers and the use of domestic fuel and lubricants.⁴²

In August 1947, Savo Zlatić pointed out the shortcomings on the Yugoslav side in the construction of the Drač-Elbasan railway, the assistance was

“interwoven with so many weaknesses, shortcomings and mistakes that we left a bad impression and that the construction site of this railway does not provide a picture of a construction site in which the people of the new Yugoslavia pledged.” However, S. Zlatić again concluded that those shortcomings were not obstacles to the execution of the economic plan.⁴³

Deficiencies in the implementation of the plans were also visible when ordering consumables for the railway. Vladimir Dedijer wrote that, in September 1947, during the completion of concrete works on the Drač-Elbasan line, it was determined that six thousand tons of cement were unnecessary, so the Albanian-Yugoslav Railway Construction Company informed the manufacturer and cancelled further deliveries, but the Albanian Planning Commission did not agree to that, and in addition, many construction sites in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia were lacking cement at that time. Later, the Control Commission established a surplus of 800 tons of cement at the Railway Construction Company, and that a part of that cement, due to poor storage over the winter, had become unusable (Dedijer 1949, 196).

According to the plan, by the end of September 1947, 84.4% of the planned material worth 151,570,518 dinars had been completed for the Railway Company. Compared to other companies, the Railway Company's situation was better, because the financial operations were settled, the investment that Albania made in the company was assessed, records of receiving materials from Yugoslavia and Albania were established, but transport tasks were difficult to solve.⁴⁴ By the end of 1947, according to the report, the Railway Construction Company had executed the annual plan for 1947 and exceeded it by 3%. This referred to the performed construction works, because the plan did not exceed expectations in terms of length, and the financial effect of the performed work was negative, because materials and labour had not been used reasonably, as the company had not drafted a financial plan before the start of the works. It was noted that the Railway Construction Company used 40,551,470.91 leks of the investment funds to increase its fixed assets. Also, this company borrowed materials worth 45,511,599 Albanian leks from Yugoslav producers for investment works.⁴⁵

Termination of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania - impact on the joint works on the railways

The crisis in the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania began in 1947. The Albanian leadership considered that Yugoslavia had not fully met the plan, and others irregularities and shortcomings that led to the non-execution of the trade agreement were ignored (Slavković Mirić 2020, 274-279). In such a tense atmosphere, Enver Hoxha prepared a visit to Moscow, but the Albanian press

and leadership continued to praise the Yugoslav aid (Komatina 1995, 58-59; Zlatar 1986, 123). Albania signed a Trade Exchange Agreement with Yugoslavia on 22 June 1947. In the 1947 budget, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia envisaged a loan of two billion dinars to Albania.⁴⁶ Enver Hoxha visited Moscow in mid-1947. In addition to talks on economic and cultural relations between the two countries, the USSR granted Albania a small loan and promised to provide a factory for the production of agricultural machinery (Borozan 1999, 50; Fevziu 2014, 318; Hoxha 1979, 55-90; Pollo and Puto 1974, 308). After Hoxha's return, there was a clear pro-Soviet stance in Albania. Yugoslav aid was concealed, as it was less mentioned in the press. Disagreements with Yugoslavia especially arose repeatedly: when the Albanian lek was equated with the Yugoslav dinar, when the Albanian side worked without the consent of the Joint Coordination Commission, as well as during the drafting of the Albanian five-year plan, which the Yugoslav side considered "unrealistic and autarchic" (Životić 2009, 113).⁴⁷

Plans to continue co-operation were resumed next year despite the crisis. One of the most important plans of the joint companies for 1948 was the construction of the Drač-Tirana, Skadar-border-Titograd and Kuks-border railways.⁴⁸ In 1948, Yugoslavia was foreseen to contribute about 300,000,000 dinars to joint companies, apart from the approved three billion. At the request of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on 23 January 1948, the Ministry of Finance approved the payment of 281,000,000 dinars for the period January-March 1948, of which 70,000,000 dinars to the Railway Construction and Operation Company.⁴⁹ At the end of January 1948, the Albanian Assembly adopted a state plan for that year, which provided for investments in the total amount of 2,059,300,000 leks, i.e. about half a billion more than the investments for 1947. Of this amount, 34.67% was planned for industry, mining and electrification, then a significant part for agriculture, as well as for the construction of the Drač-Tirana and Skadar-Titograd railways.⁵⁰ The cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, although declining, was confirmed at the Eighth Plenum in February 1948.⁵¹ In March 1948, youth work began on the Drač-Tirana railway, which was to be completed by November 1948.⁵² During the opening of works on the railway, Kochi Dzodze stated that "this is one of the most significant actions envisaged by the state plan for 1948" and emphasised that "success is guaranteed with the fraternal help of the people of Yugoslavia".⁵³ Despite emphasising that economic renewal would not be possible without Yugoslavia, disagreements began in the joint companies over Yugoslav participation in their financing. In April 1948, Tirana authorities stated that the Yugoslav share in joint companies was only a small part of their fixed assets. Thus, they cited the example of the Railway Construction Company, in which 6.5% was the participation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and 93.5% the participation of Albania. They believed

that the Yugoslav share should be increased through credit and through the import of materials from Yugoslavia.⁵⁴

The plans made for joint cooperation were not realised. The open split between Yugoslavia and Albania came after the publication of the Informbureau Resolution in June 1948.⁵⁵ Albania agreed to this resolution and terminated all treaties with Yugoslavia except the Treaty of Friendship, which Yugoslavia terminated on 12 November 1949 (1991, 296-303; Stojković 1999, 207-215).⁵⁶ All ongoing projects were halted, and Yugoslav experts had to leave Albania.⁵⁷

On the night of 30 June to 1 July 1948, on the Drač-Tirana railway, Albanians took hold of the designs for all construction sites and detained all vehicles.⁵⁸ On 2 July 1948, the Albanians demanded that all railway sections be handed over to them. The management office of the railway construction company in Drač was raided.⁵⁹ The heads of the construction sites were supposed to hand over all the projects and operations of the accounting department, and the designs, plans and technical data were forcibly collected from all construction sites.⁶⁰ Albanian authorities also detained all vehicles so that none of the Yugoslav technical managers could visit and control the work in the field. A police guard had been stationed at the entrance to the building.⁶¹ The main role on this line was taken over by Soviet expert Gajdarov.⁶² However, the Soviet envoy in Albania, Čuvahin, claimed that there was no need to strain relations, because the USSR had always been in favour of the cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, that “his hair stood on end when he heard that the Russians were inciting Albanians against the Yugoslavs.”⁶³ The Soviet side, in this respect, was not interested in the development of Albanian industry, but on the development of its agriculture. The USSR was also interested in the construction of the first Albanian railway Drač-Elbasan, so it thoroughly analysed the complaints about the Yugoslav aid for the construction of this railway (Životić 2009, 109).

In an interview with the newspaper “Bashkimi”, the director of works on the Drač-Tirana railway, Selim Alimerk, said that:

„ the Yugoslav government did not fully and timely meet the requirements of our plan, both in terms of technical staff and materials and machines. It was not interested in the spare parts it was supposed to send to repair the damaged cars. Also, the Yugoslav government sent a number of cars that were over 60% worn out and without spare material. If we had not had great help from our state last year, such as transport, machinery, materials, spare parts, timber, etc., we would not have been able to complete the Drač-Pećin (Elbasan) railway on 7 November, so this year we would not be able to achieve such good results (...) The Yugoslav technicians were dominated by the tendency to colonize, excessive bureaucracy and lack of efficiency. They stood far from the work flight, the youth competition, thus becoming an obstacle in their development.

This is well seen in the realisation of the plan for the month of June. In earthworks, for example, the Yugoslavs performed 53,000 m³ in June, while in July, when the works were managed by the Albanians, 87,000 m³ of earthworks were performed, i.e. 64% more. As for concrete works, 2,219 m³ were done in July, while 3,045 m³ were done in June. ⁶⁴

The Albanian side accused that Yugoslavia did not adhere to the agreement, that the Yugoslav experts did not want to consult with the Albanian experts, and that Yugoslav workers were treated differently from Albanian ones.⁶⁵ The Yugoslav side defended itself against these accusations made by the Albanian leadership during 1948, trying to prove that the aid had maintained not only in terms of obligations, but also in terms of visible results. In July 1948, an article was published in *Borba* stating that by the end of 1947, Albania had concluded deals worth 1,600,000,000 dinars on the basis of a two billion-dinar loan. Of that, Yugoslavia delivered material to Albania in the amount of 1,350,000,000 dinars or 84% of what was planned. The rest was not delivered due to the slow and untimely submission of Albanian demands. At the same time, Yugoslavia received from Albania material in the amount of about 150,000,000 dinars, which was not even a 1:10 ratio. As for 1948 and the three billion-dinar loan, by the end of June, Yugoslavia had delivered about 90% of the goods, which had already arrived in or were en route to Albania. Albania did not establish a plan for exporting its goods to Yugoslavia, it had exchanged and exported to Yugoslavia goods for only about 240 million dinars at that time, and did not want to be bound by fixed terms and quality of goods. The joint companies were run by Albanians only, bypassing the boards of directors. The joint banking company was almost completely sidestepped. Among other things, the article in *Borba* stated that all the material for the construction of the Drač-Elbasan railway came from Yugoslavia, and that 45% of the work on the Drač-Tirana railway was performed in 1948.⁶⁶

Due to the new situation, the Yugoslav brigade working on the Drač-Tirana youth railway left the construction site and returned to the country. In a letter from the Yugoslav brigadiers to the General Council of the People's Youth of Albania, the Yugoslav brigade explained their actions: "because of the harsh insults by the Albanian authorities to our state leadership, Marshal Tito and our peoples, because of the rude and brutal actions of the Albanian authorities against us in recent days - actions that are extremely inhumane - our brigade decided to leave Albania." (Mitrović 1997, 200–201).

After the termination of cooperation with Yugoslavia, it was pointed out that the situation in Albania had returned to normal. Preparations for the First Congress of the Labor Party of Albania (the changed name of the Communist Party of Albania) began in September 1948. In order for the congress to start off under the auspices of economic success and to confirm that Albania can

be built without Yugoslavia, the Central Committee issued a directive that the Drač-Tirana railway had to be completed by 7 November, the anniversary of the October Revolution.⁶⁷ Thus, the works on the Drač-Tirana railway continued, despite the fact that 27 Yugoslav engineers and a large number of technicians and specialists were removed, “despite sabotaged projects that were abandoned by Yugoslav engineers for large facilities such as the bridge on Erzen, Limuth, tunnel, etc.”⁶⁸

Enver Hoxha presented the definitive break away from Yugoslavia and the shift towards the USSR at the 11th plenum, held on 13-24 September 1948. At the First Congress of the Labor Party of Albania, held from 8 to 22 November 1948, Hoxha cut off cooperation with Yugoslavia for the next five years.⁶⁹ Due to the change in the Albanian attitude towards Yugoslavia, the Government of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia suspended the activity of its Embassy in Tirana on 4 June 1950, and dealt with the Albanian government through the Embassy in Budapest. Albania suspended its embassy in Belgrade on 22 November that same year (Cvetković 2012, 206). After the rapprochement between the USSR and Eastern European countries and Yugoslavia, which followed Stalin’s death in 1953 (Borožan 2005, 137)⁷⁰, Albania and Yugoslavia reopened their respective embassies in Belgrade and Tirana in 1954 (Komatina 1995, 95).

Conclusion

Yugoslavia and Albania had good relations after the end of World War II, which was a continuation of the cooperation started during the war. The highlight of the cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania was Enver Hoxha’s visit to Yugoslavia in mid-1946 and the signing of a treaty on economic cooperation, payments and loans, followed by a Friendship and Assistance Treaty in Tirana. Yugoslav-Albanian joint companies were part of the cooperation, which were supposed to be joint stock companies with equal Albanian-Yugoslav participation. One of them was the Railway Construction and Operation Company. The Drač-Elbasan railway was an important transport connection, which the Italians began to build. It was crucial for the Albanian economy to complete this railway (75 km long), which could be achieved through cooperation with Yugoslavia. The railway was called the “youth railway”, because it was planned that young people would work on it. During the construction of the railway, plans were made for literacy courses, book clubs and discussion groups to be held, as well as for visits by entertainment and sports teams. The slogans “We work here as in our own country” and “The love between Yugoslav and Albanian youth is boundless” were written on the carriages used by the Yugoslav youth and on the walls of their apartments. It was emphasised that

this railway was “the railway of the brotherhood of two peoples”. In addition to the above, the construction of the railway also showed the shortcomings of Yugoslav-Albanian cooperation. There was a lack of professional staff, as well as non-fulfilment of contractual obligations on both sides. However, the railway was opened on 7 November 1947. At that time, the crisis in Yugoslav-Albanian relations was already acute and the official separation came after the publication of the Informbureau Resolution in June 1948. Albania agreed to this resolution and terminated all treaties with Yugoslavia except the Friendship Treaty, which Yugoslavia terminated on 12 November 1949. All ongoing projects were halted and Yugoslav experts had to leave Albania. Yugoslavia and Albania reopened their respective diplomatic offices in Tirana and Belgrade in 1954, but relations between the two countries remained cold and reserved.

References

- Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Serbia, Fonds 50, Presidency of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ); Fonds 112, Tanjug news agency (Novinska agencija “Tanjug”); Fonds 507/9, Commission for International Relations of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Komisija za međunarodne veze CK SKJ); Fonds 836, Office of the Marshal of Yugoslavia (Kancelarija Maršala Jugoslavije).
- Babić, Milenko. 1981. *Enver Hodžina Albanija*. Beograd: Novinska agencija Tanjug.
- Bartl, Peter. 2001. *Albanci: od srednjeg veka do danas*. Beograd: Clio.
- Bela knjiga o neprijateljskoj politici Vlade Narodne Republike Albanije prema Federativnoj Narodnoj Republici Jugoslaviji*. 1961. Beograd: Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije.
- Boffa, Giuseppe. 1985. *Povijest Sovjetskog Saveza 2. Od domovinskog rata do položaja druge velesile: Lenjin i Hruščov 1941–1964*. Opatija: “Otokar Keršovani”.
- Borozan, Djordje. 1995. *Velika Albanija: porijeklo–ideje–praksa*. Beograd: Vojnoistorijski insitut Vojske Jugoslavije.
- . 1999. Albanija u kampanji Kominforma protiv Jugoslavije 1948-1950. In *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob 1948. godine*. Ed. P.Kačavenda. 49-58. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju.
- . 2005. Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi u prvoj deceniji Hladnog rata. In *Velike sile i male države u Hladnom ratu 1945–1955, Slučaj Jugoslavije*, Ed. Lj.Dimić. 131-139. Beograd: Filozofski fakultet, Katedra za istoriju Jugoslavije, Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore, Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, London: Centar za istraživanja hladnog rata LST.
- Bukvić, Rajko. 2016. Yugoslav Foreign Currency Policy in 1945-1990: Experiences and Lessons. *Munich Personal RePEc Archive*. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76211/1/MPRA_paper_76211.pdf
- Cvetković, Vladimir. 2012. Diplomatske misije FNRJ u Sofiji, Bukureštu i Tirani 1953–1954: povratak ambasadora, uslovi rada i incidenti. In *Jugoslovenska*

- diplomacija 1945-1961*, Ed. S.Selinić. 205-220. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije.
- . 2013. *Pogled iza gvozdene zavese: jugoslovenska politika prema zemljama narodne demokratije u susjedstvu 1953–1958*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije.
- Dedijer, Vladimir. 1949. *Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi: 1939-1948*. Beograd: Borba.
- Dimić, Ljubodrag. 2006. *Josip Tito – Josip Staljin*. Beograd: Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore.
- Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije), Belgrade, Serbia. Political Archives (Politička arhiva), 1945-1948, Albanija.
- Dizdarević, Nijaz. 1988. *Albanski dnevnik*. Zagreb: Globus, Sarajevo: Oslobođenje.
- Djaković, Spasoje. 1984. *Sukobi na Kosovu*. Beograd: Narodna knjiga.
- Djilas, Milovan. 2009. *Vlast i pobuna: memoari*. Zagreb: Europapress, Novi liber.
- Dokumenti spoljne politike SFRJ: 1949*. 1991. Beograd: Jugoslovenski pregled.
- Ekspoze Maršala Tita o spoljnoj politici Jugoslavije: održan na zajedničkoj sednici Savezne skupštine i Skupštine naroda 1 aprila 1946*. 1946. Beograd, Zagreb: Kultura.
- Fevziu, Blendi. 2014. *Enver Hodža: prva biografija zasnovana na dokumenti od ličnata arhiva i na ispovedite na onie što go poznavaa*. Skopje: Fondacija Otvoreno opštestvo – Makedonija.
- Frasheri, Kristo. 1964. *The History of Albania. A Brief Survey*. Tirana: na.
- Gaćeša, Nikola L. 1990. Privredni odnosi Jugoslavije i Albanije 1945-1948“. *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju* 42: 87-127.
- Geler, Mihail, Aleksandar Nekrić. 2000. *Utopija na vlasti. Istorija Sovjetskog Saveza*, Podgorica: Cid.
- Hoxha, Enver. 1979. *Avec Staline: souvenirs*. Tirana: 8. Nëntori.
- Komatina, Milorad. 1995. *Enver Hodža i jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi*. Beograd: Službeni list.
- Krempton, Ričard. 2003. *Balkan posle Drugog svetskog rata*. Beograd: Clio.
- Laker, Volter. 1999. *Istorija Evrope 1945–1992*. Beograd: Clio.
- Longvort, Filip. 2002. *Stvaranje Istočne Evrope. Od preistorije do postkomunizma*. Beograd: Clio.
- Marković, Dragan, Sava Križevac. 1976. *Informbiro: šta je to: Jugoslavija je rekla ne*. Beograd: Sloboda.
- Marmullaku, Ramadan. 1975. *Albania and the Albanians*. London: C. Hurst and Co.
- Marović, Miodrag. 1978. *Sumrak staljinizma*, I. Beograd: Sloboda.
- Mates, Leo. 1976. *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije*. Beograd: Nolit, 1976.
- Matković, Hrvoje. 1998. *Povijest Jugoslavije 1918–1991: Hrvatski pogled*. Zagreb: Pavičić, 1998.
- Matošević, Andrea. 2015. Omladinske radne akcije: kontinuiteti i odmaci iz iskustva akcijaša. *Traditiones* 44/3: 93–111.
- Mitrović, Momčilo. 1997. *Izgnubljene iluzije: prilozi za društvenu istoriju Srbije 1944-1952*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije.
- Pavlović, Momčilo. 1996. Albanija između Tita i Staljina. In *Balkan posle Drugog svetskog rata*. Ed. P.Kačavenda. 306-315. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju.
- Pavlović, Stevan K. 2001. *Istorija Balkana*. Beograd: Clio.
- Perazić, Gavro. 1987. Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi u odnosu na teritorijalni integritet. *Ideje* 5-6: 91–97.

- Petković, Ranko. 1985. *Nesvrstana Jugoslavija i savremeni svet. Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1945-1985*. Zagreb: Školska knjiga.
- Petranović, Branko. 1969. *Politička i ekonomska osnova narodne vlasti u Jugoslaviji za vreme obnove*. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju.
- . 1991. Kosovo u jugoslovensko-albanskim odnosima i projekt balkanske federacije. In *Srbi i Albanci u 20. veku*, Ed. A. Mitrović, 375-379. Beograd: SANU.
- . 1994. *Jugoslavija, velike sile i balkanske zemlje 1945-1948: Iskustvo „narodne demokratije“ kao partijske države*. Beograd, Podgorica: Istorijski institut Crne Gore.
- Petranović, Branko, Momčilo Zečević. Ed. 1988. *Jugoslavija 1918-1988. Tematska zbirka dokumenata*. Beograd: Rad.
- Pollo, Stefanaq and Arben Puto. Ed. 1974. *Histoire de l'Albanie: des origines à nos jours*. Roanne: Editions Horvath.
- Popović, Dragan. 2013. Omladinske radne akcije kao ideološki (udarnički) turizam. In *Sunčana strana Jugoslavije: Povijest turizma u socijalizmu*. Eds. H. Grandits, K. Taylor. 289-313. Zagreb: Srednja Europe.
- Pifti, Peter. 1978. *Socialist Albania since 1944. Domestic and Foreign Developments*. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, cop.
- Selinić, Slobodan. 2005. Omladina gradi Jugoslaviju. Savezne omladinske radne akcije u Jugoslaviji 1946-1963. *Arhiv* 1-2: 87-101.
- Selinić, Slobodan. 2007. Život na omladinskim radnim akcijama u Jugoslaviji 1946-1963. *Arhiv* 1-2: 119-137.
- Selinić, Slobodan and Dušan Bajagić. 2010. *Jugoslavija i svet 1945-1950. Hronologija*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije.
- Senjković, Reana. 2016. *Svaki dan pobjeda. Kultura omladinskih radnih akcija*. Zagreb: Srednja Europa.
- Sjöberg, Örjan. 1991. Ed. *Economic change in the Balkan states: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia*. London: Pinter Publishers
- Skendi, Stavro. 1958. Ed. *Albania*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
- Slavković Mirić, Božica. *Jugoslavija i Albanija 1945-1948: Ekonomski odnosi*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije.
- Smodlaka, Josip. 1986. *Partizanski dnevnik*. Zagreb: Spektar.
- Stojković, Momir. Ed. 1998. *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi: 1876-1996.: dvostrani i višestrani međunarodni ugovori i drugi diplomatski akti o državnim granicama, političkoj i vojnoj saradnji, verskim i etničkim manjinama II (1919-1945)*. Beograd: Službeni list SRJ: Međunarodna politika.
- . Ed. 1999. *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi: 1876-1996.: dvostrani i višestrani međunarodni ugovori i drugi diplomatski akti o državnim granicama, političkoj i vojnoj saradnji, verskim i etničkim manjinama III (1946-1996)*. Beograd: Službeni list SRJ: Međunarodna politika.
- Thompson, Edward P. Ed. 2020. *Pruga: avantura izgradnje*. Beograd: Fabrika knjiga.
- Verli, Marenglen. 2008. *Historia e Shqipërisë e viteve 1912-1964 në Kujtimet e Spiro Kosovës (History of Albania 1912-1964 in the memoirs of Spiro Kosova)*. Tirana: Klean.
- Zlatar, Pero. 1986. *Enver Hodža: politička biografija*. Beograd: Rad.
- Životić, Aleksandar. 2009. Jugoslavija i jačanje sovjetskog uticaja u Albaniji 1947-1948. *Tokovi istorije* 3: 94-116.

- Životić, Aleksandar. 2010. Pitanje Albanije u odnosima Jugoslavije i Zapada 1945–1947. *Istorija 20. veka* 3: 83-96.
- . 2015. Između velikih sila i ideje balkanskog jedinstva: jugoslovenska politika na Balkanu (1945-1948). In *Dva veka moderne srpske diplomatije*, Ed. Č.Popov, D.P.Živojinović and S.G.Marković. Beograd: Balkanološki institut SANU, Institut za evropske studije.
- Wandycz, Piotr S. 1992. *The Price of Freedom. A history of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the present*. London: Routledge.

Endnotes

- 1 Since our text mentions the franc, the lek and the dinar as payment currencies, we will provide a comparative overview of their values that we found in historical sources and professional literature. We will first look at the exchange rate of the Albanian franc, i.e. the lek, against the Yugoslav dinar and the US dollar according to the regulations from 1945 to 1947. The Albanian franc was the official currency of Albania after World War II. According to the Albanian State Bank's official exchange rate at the end of 1945, one franc was 13.50 dinars (Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (Hereafter: DAMFARS), Political Archives (Hereafter: PA), 1946, doc. 23, sign. 7003, Prenos dinara u Albaniju, 8 December 1945). The exchange rate for one US dollar in 1946 was 24 Albanian francs (Archives of Yugoslavia (Hereafter: AY), Fonds 50, Presidency of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ), 50-48-105, Sa sastanka održanog u finansijskom servisu albansko-jugoslovenskih privrednih pregovora, 11 July 1946). Starting 15th July 1946, a new exchange rate was set for the dinar (6.12 new Albanian francs for 100 dinars, i.e. 16.34 dinars for one Albanian franc). This was the exchange rate that was much closer to the Yugoslav exchange rate (12.30 dinars for one Albanian franc) in relation to the exchange rate that was applied before the change: 5 dinars = 1 old franc. As for other exchange rates, one US dollar was 2.77 francs, 100 Swiss francs were 69.84 Albanian francs, etc (AY, Fonds 507/9, Commission for International Relations of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Komisija za međunarodne veze CK SKJ), 1 / 1-1-126). In June 1947, the Albanian government replaced the Albanian franc with the lek at the rate of 1: 9, i.e. 1 franc was 9 leks, while the lek was on par with the dinar. According to the new regulation, 100 leks were 100 dinars, and 846 leks were 10 US dollars (Slavković Mirić 2020, 202). In order to have an insight into how much the Yugoslav state invested in the Albanian state, we will look at the Yugoslav dinar-US dollar rate in that period, and also compared to today's US dollar rate. The first official US dollar-dinar exchange rate was determined on 12th April 1945: one US dollar was 50.06 dinars. The first parity confirmed by the International Monetary Fund in 1949 was 50 dinars for one US dollar (Bukvić 2016, 5-6). We should also keep in mind the inflation of the dollar. According to some internet sites we have accessed, if in 1945 we purchased an item for one dollar, then in 2022 that same

- item would cost 15.76 dollars (<https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>; <https://www.dollartimes.com/inflation>. Accessed March 24, 2022).
- 2 AY, 50-48-105, Protokol povodom sklapanja Trgovinskog ugovora, 1 July 1946.
 - 3 DAMFARS, PA, 1945, Saobraćaj, doc. 9, sign. 2205, Sporazum o pograničnom prometu između DFJ i Albanije i pogranični promet.
 - 4 DAMFARS, PA, 1947, folder 2, doc. 19, sign. 10646, Ministarstvo za konstituantu DFJ Ministarstvu inostranih poslova FNRJ, 18 December 1945.
 - 5 AY, Fonds 112, Tanjug news agency (Novinska agencija "Tanjug"), 112-791-792, 13 January 1946; AY, 112-791-792, 27 February 1946.
 - 6 AY, 50-94-195, Ministarstvo trgovine i snadbevanja, Izveštaj za maj 1946.godine.
 - 7 AY, 112-795-796, 22 June 1946; AY, 112-795-796, 28 June 1946; AY, 507/9, box 1, 1/1-71, 19 June 1946; AY, 50-49-108, *Bashkimi*, 11 July 1946.
 - 8 In order to consolidate the state after the war, an agrarian reform was implemented, which was the most extensive that Albania has ever had. It began in July 1945 in Elbasan and then continued throughout the country on September 6. In order to implement it, Albanian authorities received the help of Yugoslav surveyors (DAMFARS, PA, 1945, doc. 7, sign. 2453, Kratak pregled političke situacije u Albaniji, 1945). In Albania, the beys owned large areas of land, primarily in Berat, Fier with Lušnja, Elbasan, Drač and Tirana (100 to 20,000 hectares). The state owned about 50,000 hectares and 2/3 of all forests (DAMFARS, PA, 1945, doc. 9, sign 1/158, Ministarstvo poljoprivrede i šuma, 1945). The land was confiscated without compensation from all landowners who did not cultivate it themselves. According to Piter Bartl, those who worked their land with modern technology were allowed to keep 40 hectares. All other landowners and church institutions that cultivated their own estates could keep 20 ha each. A total of 173,000 hectares of land was confiscated (the total arable land in Albania in 1938 was 292,000 hectares). Of that, 155,000 hectares were allocated to landless peasants (about 70,000 families). The rest was used to form state-owned properties (Bartl 2001, 237). In November 1946, the process of agrarian reform in Albania was completed. Each peasant household with 5-6 members was supposed to receive five hectares of land. Thus, with the agrarian reform, 200,000 people were granted land (AY, 112-800-801, 17 November 1946).
 - 9 AY, 50-49-107, Pitanje učesća u industrijskim preduzećima.
 - 10 AY, 50-49-107, Ugovori o mešovitim društvima sa Albanijom.
 - 11 AY, Fonds 836, Office of the Marshal of Yugoslavia (Kancelarija Maršala Jugoslavije), 1-3-v/23, Finansijska i pravna pitanja u vezi sa osnivanjem mešovitih albansko-jugoslovenskih društava.
 - 12 AY, 50-49-108, Osnivanje albansko-jugoslovenske banke, 16 July 1946; AY, 836, 1-3-v/23, 6-7.
 - 13 AY, 50-49-108, Albansko-jugoslovenska banka.
 - 14 AY, 50-49-108, Albansko-jugoslovenska banka.
 - 15 AY, 836, 1-3-v/23, Posebne crte svakog pojedinog društva, 1-2.
 - 16 AY, 507/9, 1/1-127-242, Centralnom komitetu Komunističke partije Jugoslavije, 1 July 1947.
 - 17 AY, 836, 1-3-v/23, Posebne crte svakog pojedinog društva, 4-5.

- 18 AY, 50 -52-113, Izgradnja železnica u Albaniji, 14 July 1946.
- 19 AY, 836, 1-3-b/23, Finansijsko učešće FNRJ u albansko-jugoslovenskim mešovitim društvima.
- 20 It took 22 construction engineers, 3 architects, 2 mechanical engineers, 26 construction technicians, 10 geometers, 1 mechanical technician, 6 draftsmen, 300 miners, 400 masons, 200 assistant miners, 270 assistant masons, 83 drivers, 83 assistant drivers, 32 machinists, 32 assistant machinists, 50 blacksmiths, 50 assistant blacksmiths, 100 carpenters, 40 woodworkers, 92 members of the administrative staff and 10,000 unskilled workers to build this line. Regarding the required material, tools, accessories, machines and devices for the railway, the following was necessary: construction material (25,000 tons of cement, 135,000 m³ of gravel and sand, 100,000 m³ of curtains, 5,000 m³ of round pine timber, 5,000 m³ of planed pine timber, 123,000 pieces of oak sleepers, 3,000,000 pieces of bricks, 2,285,000 pieces of tiles, 300 tons of quicklime, 2,000 pieces of telegraph oak poles, 1,000 kg of explosives, 15,000 kg of nails, 15,000 kg of silicon wire), fuel (2,000 tons of gasoline, 500 tons of Diesel oil), 4 tons of oil, 120,000 kg of carbide), tools (6,000 pieces of shovels, 3,000 pieces of carts, and 4,000 kg of hammers, etc.), accessories (600 pieces of wagons for track and 600 pieces of carbide lamps), rolled products (6,500 tons of rails, 2,300 tons of track accessories, 20 km of track, 100 tons of concrete iron and 3,000 kg of mining steel), machines (10 concrete mixers, 6 crushers, 12 compressors, 80 trucks, 4 locomotives and 3 passenger cars) and devices (14 telephones and 2 water stations).
- 21 Youth and voluntary international work on railways was not specific only to the construction of the Drač-Elbasan railway. Yugoslavs also had international help in the process of their constructions. One example is the Yugoslav railroad Šamac-Sarajevo, for the construction of which an invitation was sent to all countries that were members of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. British, French, Bulgarians, Greek refugees, Danes, Hungarians, Palestinians, Romanians, Czechs, Italians, Canadians, Belgians, Poles, Swedes, Albanians, as well as young people from Trieste responded. A description of the British participation can be found in the book “Duh pruge”, whose main author was Edward Palmer Thompson, the commander of the British Brigade. The other authors were members of that brigade who joined the Yugoslav youth at the construction site next to the Bosna River in the summer of 1947. The book states that the youth were possessed by the “spirit” of the railway and that they were seized by “action fever”. As a result of such work, the railway was not only a tool for faster transportation of people and goods, but also served for modernization and the creation of a new social order. The bearers of that modernization were certainly part of a new political entity that they called “friendship”, because friendship transcended gender and ethno-national divisions, which was also emphasized by British volunteers writing about that friendship as a vector for the development of internationalism beyond the borders of Yugoslavia. In this way, a new energy of brotherhood and unity was to be produced through youth connection: “we build the railway and the railway builds us”, which could be heard during the construction of the Drač-Elbasan Railway (see more: Thompson 2020).

- 22 AY, 112-807-808, 7 March 1947.
- 23 AY, 112-808-809, 9 March 1947. Although the Albanian society aspired to modernization, so it wanted to improve women's status in society, this mostly remained only on paper. A large percentage of women were illiterate. Also, women in the patriarchal northern Albanian mountain areas, as well as in predominantly Muslim cities and flat parts of the country were in a subordinate position. Nevertheless, in socialist Albania, women became equal, at least in law, and were involved in the labour process (Bartl 1995, 259-260). Thus, it should had been shown that women were involved in the construction of the railway, even women coming from those parts of Albania that were most stubborn in terms of women's rights.
- 24 AY, 112-809-810, 2 March 1947. It should be noted here that in the years immediately before the beginning of the Second World War, there was a large number of illiterates (more than 80%) in Albania. Although the number of schools had increased (in 1937 there were 14% more schools than in 1927), only part of the youth of school age attended schools (36.7% in 1938). In 1938, across Albania, there were 643 primary schools with 52,000 students and 13 schools for further education with about 3,500 students. Higher education did not exist in Albania. After taking power, the Communists began a literacy campaign, and until 1949, Albanian citizens were under the obligation to learn to read and write in evening schools (Bartl 1995, 206, 260-261).
- 25 AY, 112-809-810, 4 April 1947.
- 26 AY, 112-809-810, 12 April 1947.
- 27 AY, 112-812-813, 28 May 1947.
- 28 AY, 112-813-814, 6 June 1947.
- 29 AY, 507/9, 1/3-66, Tanjug, 12 September 1947.
- 30 AY, 112-819-820, 14 September 1947.
- 31 AY, 112-824-825, 1 November 1947.
- 32 AY, 112-824-825, 8 November 1947.
- 33 AY, 50-49-108, Albansko-jugoslovenska banka.
- 34 AY, 112-809-810, 2 April 1947.
- 35 AY, 112-820-821, 16 September 1947.
- 36 According to a report by the Ministry of Trade of the People's Republic of Albania published by Radio Tirana, during 1946, 60% of goods were imported from the FPRY, 30% from the USSR and 10% from Czechoslovakia. During 1947, 95% of goods were imported from Yugoslavia, 2% from the Soviet Union and 3% from Czechoslovakia (DAMFARS PA, 1948, folder 3, doc. 5, sign. 425748, Embassy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Tirana, press department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 September 1948).
- 37 AY, 507/9, 1/1-127-242, Centralnom komitetu Komunističke partije Jugoslavije, 20 February 1947.
- 38 AY, 507/9, Box 2, 1-1-137, 29 May 1947.
- 39 AY, 507/9, 1/1-127-242, Centralnom komitetu KPJ, 1 July 1947.
- 40 DAMFARS, PA, Albanija, 1948, folder 1, doc. 5, sign. 47938, Košmrlj Ministarstvu inostranih poslova, 3 May 1947.
- 41 AY, 50-52-320, Izveštaj o celokupnom radu Društva za gradnju železnice, generalni direktor A. Huibner, 29 July 1947.

- 42 AY, 50-52-330, Zaključci o radu Društva za gradnju železnice.
- 43 AY, 507/9, 1/1-127-242, August 1947.
- 44 AY, 507/9, 1/3-28, Osnovne karakteristike stanja mešovutih albansko-jugoslovenskih društava, 11 February 1948.
- 45 AY, 50-49- 360, Ugovori o mešovitim društvima sa Albanijom.
- 46 AY, 50-48-105, Sporazum o trgovinskoj razmeni između FNRJ i NRA, 22 June 1947.
- 47 DAMFARS, PA, folder 1, 1947, doc. 15, sign. 413637, Poslanstvo FNRJ Ministarstvu inostranih poslova FNRJ, Naša propaganda u Albaniji, 17 July 1947.
- 48 AY, 50-48-693, Neki problemi između FNRJ i Albanije po pitanju po pitanju privredne saradnje.
- 49 AY, 50-49-502, Ministarstvo finansija FNRJ, 24 January 1948.
- 50 AY, 112-829-830, 30 January 1948.
- 51 AY, 507/9, 1/ 2-111, Osmi plenum CK KPA, 27 March 1948.
- 52 AY, 112-833-834, 15 March 1948.
- 53 AY, 112-834-835, 12 April 1948.
- 54 AY, 507/9, 1/3-28, 8 April 1948.
- 55 Relations between Yugoslavia and Albania definitely deteriorated when the Informbureau Resolution was published in Bucharest on 28 June 1948. With this resolution, the leadership of the CPY, led by Josip Broz Tito, was condemned for its hostile policy towards the USSR, “for discrediting the Soviet army and equating the Soviet army and the foreign policy of the USSR with the policy of imperialist countries.” Also, the leaders of the CPY were accused of “abandoning the positions of the working class in their domestic policy and breaking with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle” and of “revising the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the party” (Marković, Križevac 1976; Matković 1998, 300–302; Marović 1978, 71–72). On 29 June 1948 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania supported the USSR and turned against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Životić 2009, 110-111). Albania did not become a member of the Informbureau, as it was considered a young party and a party to be represented through the CPY. Enver Hoxha invited all secretaries to the Ninth Plenum (June 27-30, 1948) and presented them with the IB Resolution: 1. “The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania unanimously and completely supports the resolution of the IB of the Communist Parties on the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and strongly condemns the open betrayal by the leaders of the CPY, who abandoned Marxism-Leninism. They betrayed the camp of socialism and they are in an open and shameful war with the glorious homeland of socialism, with the glorious Lenin-Stalin party and with the democratic and anti-imperialist camp. The leaders of the CPY, the heinous Trotskyist traitors, have betrayed the sacred cause of the heroic and fraternal Yugoslav people and want to lead them on a path of catastrophe. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, led by Tito, distorted all economic relations with our country; 2. The Executive Board of the Democratic Front of Albania is grateful to the great USSR and the great Stalin who once again saved our people and our country from anti-Marxist danger and expresses its unwavering determination to be united forever in the democratic and Marxist camp, led by the powerful USSR - an invincible bulwark of the freedom

of the people and the saviour of the people, to fight with all its might against the imperialists and their tools. 3. The Albanian people who sacrificed their sons and shed their blood in the struggle for the liberation of Yugoslavia will continue to cultivate friendship and alliance with the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia, who will always have a friend and a secure ally in our small nation" (AY, 507/9, 1/3-77, Izvršni odbor Demokratskog fronta Albanije, 2 July 1948).

- 56 AY, 507/9, 1/1-191.
- 57 AY, 50-57-119, Privredni odnosi Jugoslavije i Albanije.
- 58 DAMFARS, PA, 1948, folder 1, doc. 14, sign. 417895, Telegram Diminića Ministarstvu inostranih poslova, 1 July 1948.
- 59 AY, 507/9, 1/1-193, 4 July 1948.
- 60 AY, 507/9, 1/3-27, Albansko-jugoslovensko društvo za gradjenje i eksploataciju železnica u Albaniji, 1 July 1948.
- 61 DAMFARS, PA, 1948, folder 1, doc. 15, sign. 1/389, Generalnoj direkciji gradjenja železnica direktor preduzeća inž. Bogner.
- 62 AY, 50-48-105, 3 July 1948.
- 63 AY, 836, 1-3-v-42, 12 July 1948.
- 64 AY, 507/9, 1/2-113, *Baškimi*, 2 September 1948.
- 65 AY, 507/9, 1/1-197, *Szabad Nep*, 29 July 1948; AY, 507/9, 1/1-197, *Tanjug*, 22 September 1948.
- 66 AY, 507/9, 1/1-127-242, *Borba*, 6 July 1948.
- 67 AY, 836, 1-3-v/50, 10 September 1948.
- 68 AY, 507/9, 1/2-109-156.
- 69 AY, 507/9, 1/2-111, Rezolucija 11. Plenuma Komunističke partije Albanije.
- 70 For more information on the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Albania and the countries of the "people's democracy" in the region 1953-1958. see: Cvetković 2013.